



# **The Indian Central Banking Enquiry Committee**


**1931**

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**VOLUME I**

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## **PART I—MAJORITY REPORT**



CALCUTTA GOVERNMENT OF INDIA  
CENTRAL PUBLICATION BRANCH  
1931

*Price Rs. 3 or 5s. 3d.*



# **The Indian Central Banking Enquiry Committee**

**1931**

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**VOLUME I**

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1931



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*Cost of Banking Enquiry.*

Name of Committee	Total expenditure	Cash contribution made by Provincial Governments	Balance paid from Central revenues.
	Rs.	Rs.	Rs.
1 Madras .	71,247	32,200	39,047
2 Bombay . .	1,20,563	20,000	1,00,563
3. Bengal .	78,244		78,244
4 United Provinces .	44,124		44,124
5 Punjab . . .	44,467	10,967	33,500
6 Burma	73,474	10,447	54,027
7. Bihar and Orissa .	68,871	..	68,871
8 Central Provinces .	1,09,506		1,09,506
9 Assam . . .	40,443	10,000	30,443
10. Central Arcas . .	71,283	.	71,283
11 Indian Central . .	6,14,518	...	6,14,518
Total	13,36,740	92,614	12,44,126

*List of publications of the Indian Central Banking Enquiry Committee and the various Provincial Committees*

Name of Committee	Description of publications and price of each					
	Volume I,	Volume II	Volume III	Volume IV	Volume V	Volume VI
1 Madras	Report (Rs 2 2 or 4s)	Evidence (Rs 12 14 or 21s)	Evidence (Rs 14 2 or 28s.)	Evidence (Rs 10 6 or 17s)	Evidence (Rs 6 or 9s 9d)	Org Sub Committee Report (Rs 3 or 5s 3d)
2 Bombay	Report (Rs 5 or 8s 3d)	Evidence (Rs 10 or 16s 6d)	Evidence (Rs 10 or 16s 6d)	Evidence (Rs 10 or 16s 6d)		
3 Bengal	Report (Rs 4 or 6s 9d)	Evidence (Rs 6 14 or 11s)	Evidence (Rs 3-2 or 5s 6d)			
4 United Provinces	Report (Rs 2 6 or 4s 3d)	Evidence (Rs 5-8 or 9s)	Evidence (Rs 6 or 9s 6d)	Evidence (Rs 6 8 or 10s 6d)		
5 Punjab	Report (Rs 5 or 8s 3d)	Evidence (Rs 8 6 or 14s)	Evidence (Rs 10 10 or 17s 6d)			
6 Burma	Report (Rs 3-4 or 5s 6d)	Evidence (Rs 11-8 or 18s)	Evidence (Rs 11-8 or 18s)			..
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9 Assam	Report (Rs 3-4 or 5s 6d)	Evidence (Rs 13 or 21s)				..
10 Central Areas	Report (Rs 5 or 8s 3d)	Evidence (Rs 8 14 or 15s)	Evidence (Rs 7-14 or 13s)	Evidence (Rs 4 8 or 14s)	..	..

NOTE —The publications mentioned above are obtainable at the Central Publication Branch, Hastings Street, Calcutta

# Indian Central Banking Enquiry Committee's Report.

## PART I—MAJORITY REPORT

### *Corrigenda.*

*Page 17, para 28, line 3 —For ' five ' read ' three '*

*Page 41, sub-para to para 60, line 4 —For " The Punjab Peasant " read " The Punjab Peasant in Prosperity and Debt "*

*Page 74, paragraph 108, line 22 —For ' interests rates ' read ' interest rests '*

*Page 75, para 108 (c), line 19 —For ' mitimized ' read ' victimized '*

*Page 77, line 12 —For ' short-time ' read ' short term '*

*Page 107, para 137, line 6 from bottom —For ' their operations ' read ' its operations '*

*Page 107, para 138, line 6 —Omit ' out ' after ' driving '*

*Page 112, para 151, line 2 —Read ' in ' for ' to ' after ' subject '*

*Page 113, para 152, last line, just above the statement —For ' is as follows ' read ' being as follows '*

*Page 125, para 163, line 17 —For ' Co-operativie ' read ' Co-operative '*

*Page 133, para 171, line 19 —Omit comma between ' selected ' and ' places '.*

*Page 150, para. 190 (2), first line —For ' each credits ' read ' cash credits ' ✓*

*Page 167, line 6 from top —Omit ' bank ' between ' mortgage ' and ' department '*

*Page 295, para 388, line 11 —Omit ' the ' before ' industrial '.*

*Page 467, para 717, first line —For ' made ' read ' make '*

*Page 490, para 766, line 22 —Omit comma between ' and ' and ' exchange '*

*Page 503, item 52, line 11 —For ' provincial banks ' read ' Provincial Governments '*

*Page 522 —Insert an asterisk after ' M Jamal Mahomed '.*

*Page 625, line 5 —For ' Proper ' substitute ' proper '*

*Page 626, line 18 —Read ' depend ' for ' dtpend '*

- Page 626, line 19 —Read 'Witnesses giving evidence' for 'Evidence'*
- Page 629, line 7 from bottom —For 'depositors apprehensions' read 'depositors' apprehensions'.*
- Page 645, para 2, first line —For 'assist on' read 'assist in'.*
- Page 649, line 7 —For '50 per cent more' read '50 per cent or more'*
- Page 649, line 17 —For 'interests' read 'interest'*
- Page 649, last line —For 'point' read 'points'*
- Page 653, line 6 from bottom —For 'As such' read 'Such'*
- Page 654, line 4 from bottom —For 'interests' read 'interest'.*
- Page 655, line 2 —For 'operations' read 'operators'*
- Page 656, last para, line 7 —Omit 'in' after 'drawn'*
- Page 659, clause (h) —For 'expenses' read 'expense' in the last line*
- Page 664, clause (e) —For '2' in the last column against 1910 read '26'*
- Page 666, para 12, line 17 —For 'property' read 'properly'*
- Page 668, para 6, line 2 —Delete comma after 'deposits'*
- Page 674, para 5, first line —For 'th seasonal' read 'the seasonal'*
- Page 675, para 9, clause (b) —For 'rate demand loans' read 'rate for demand loans'*
- Page 676, 2nd line —For 'or commercial' read 'commercial or'*
- Page 681, clause (7), first line —Read 'on' for 'or' after 'auditor'*
- Page 681, clause (16), last line —Read 'affects' for 'affect'*
- Page 687, item (46) —For 'shareholders, 114' read 'shareholders'*
- Page 687, item (49) —For 'charges' read 'changes'*
- Page 687, item (51) —Read 'blank' for 'bank'.*
- Page 690, last para, line 3 —For 'prove' read 'proves'.*
- Page 690, last para, line 8 —For 'avilage' read 'average'.*
- Page 693, clause (1) under II—Central Co-operative Banks —Omit the colon between 'that' and 'no'*
- Page 696, line 29 —For 'Socities' read 'Societies'*
- Page 702, line 7 from bottom —For 'o' read 'to' after 'good'*
- Page 703, line 2 —Insert comma after 'whole'*
- Page 705, line 21 —For 'or' read 'of'*
- Page 705, line 22 —For 'manners' read 'manures'*
- Page 705, line 39 —Read 'army of' for 'army or'*
- Page 705, line 47 —Omit comma between 'all' and 'these'*

- Page 707, line 7 from bottom —For ' adoptable ' read ' adaptable '.
- Page 707, line 3 from bottom.—Insert ' good ' after ' great '.
- Page 711, para 5, line 7 —For ' catastrophe ' read ' catastrophic '.
- Page 712, para. 3, line 9 —Correct ' Glassgow ' into ' Glasgow '.
- Page 716, line 8 —For ' demand ' read ' demands '.
- Page 716, line 18, under *Rural Reconstruction Societies* —Read ' increase ' for ' increased '.
- Page 718, line 19.—Insert a semi-colon after ' before '.
- Page 718, line 41 —Read ' utopian ' for ' utonian '.
- Page 718, line 8 from bottom —For ' land ' substitute ' borrowers '.
- Page 721, line 12 from bottom —For ' organised ' read ' organize '.
- Page 723, line 13 —For ' guarantet ' read ' guarantee '.
- Page 723, lines 18 & 17 from bottom —Read ' antiquated ' for ' antequated '.
- Page 724, line 8 —Read ' real ' for ' ital '.
- Page 725, line 16 —Substitute comma for full-stop after ' India '.
- Page 725, line 20 —Substitute full-stop for semi-colon after ' aimed at '.
- Page 726, line 27 —Read ' aises ' for ' aise '.
- Page 728, line 7 from bottom —For ' prict ' read ' price '.
- Page 729, para 4, line 3 —For ' he handed ' read ' be handed '.
- Page 729, para 9, line 6 —For ' years supply ' read ' year's supply '.
- Page 730, line 11 from bottom —For ' lightening ' read ' lightning '.
- Page 731, line 14 —For ' samples ' read ' surplus '.
- Page 731, line 20 —For ' extent to ' read ' extent of '.
- Page 731 —For ' bepanes ' read ' beparis ' wherever the word occurs.

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N B —A number of obvious misprints have been collected in the list above. Rush of work and desire for economy are responsible for these and any other undetected errors —V K A ANANGAR



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# CHAPTER I.

## INTRODUCTORY

The demand for a banking enquiry in India is very old and was voiced as early as 1890 at the first Industrial Conference in the following words —

“No fact in the economic condition of this country arrests more forcibly our attention than the contrast presented by the hoards of unused capital stored up in the vaults of the Presidency and other exchange banks and the high premium Government securities command on the one side, and on the other the utter paralysis of industry in rural India due to the poverty of the resources of the classes engaged in the production of wealth. It would appear as if some impenetrable barrier intercepted the overflow of wealth and barred the channels of communication between the reservoirs of capital and the parched fields of industry dried up for want of the wealth-bearing and fertilizing moisture.”

To come to recent times, in 1914 the Royal Commission on Indian Finance and Currency urged the appointment of a committee to study certain questions connected with banking. Later on in 1918, the Industrial Commission made the following recommendation —

“We ask, therefore, for the appointment at the earliest possible date of an expert committee to consider what additional banking facilities are necessary for the initial and for the current finance of industries, what form of Government assistance or control will be required to ensure their extension on sound lines as widely as possible throughout the country, and whether they should be of provincial or of imperial scope, or whether both these forms might not be combined in a group of institutions working together”.

In 1919, the Hon'ble Mr (now Sir) B N Sarma moved a resolution in the Imperial Legislative Council urging the appointment of a banking committee. More recently, in 1924, the External Capital Committee observed, “India possesses vast stores of dormant capital awaiting development and in order to make these available for investment, facilities should be increased and extended. We would emphasize the importance of a co-ordinated survey being undertaken at the earliest opportunity of the whole field of banking in India.”

2. While the Government of India were considering, in consultation with the local Governments, both the method of surveying

the field, and of encouraging the development, of banking in India, the report of the Royal Commission on Indian Currency and Finance, 1926, was received. After examining the replies from the local Governments and the Commission's Report, the Government of India came to the conclusion that it would be preferable to postpone further enquiry into the field of banking as previously contemplated until the Reserve Bank was established and some experience of its working had been gained.

3 When, therefore, in February 1927, Mr S N Haji moved a resolution in the Legislative Assembly recommending the appointment of a commission to investigate the existing condition of banking in India, the Government of India decided that the time was not opportune for the appointment of such a committee. They further considered that it was desirable to await the Report of the Royal Commission on Agriculture in India, as in their opinion an important portion of the ground of the proposed banking enquiry was covered by the terms of reference to that Commission.

1 The Reserve Bank Bill was rejected by the Legislative Assembly in 1928. The report of the Royal Commission on Agriculture was presented in April of the same year. These two factors, coupled with the resolutions\* of the Associated Chambers of Commerce of India and Ceylon and the Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry, at their annual meetings in December 1927 and 1928 respectively urging upon the Government immediately to appoint an Indian Banking Enquiry Committee, led Government to change their previous attitude in regard to the Enquiry and to take steps for its inauguration. After ascertaining fully the views of the two commercial bodies mentioned above and after further discussions with the representatives of the various political parties in the Central Legislature, which disclosed a fairly general consensus of opinion as to the broad lines

\* The resolutions of the two bodies are quoted below —

(i) *The Associated Chambers of Commerce of India and Ceylon*

"This Association urges on Government the advisability of holding, at an early date an examination into banking in India with a view to steps being taken to regulate banks and banking business in this country."

(ii) *The Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry*

"The Federation urges upon the Government of India to immediately appoint an Indian Banking Enquiry Committee with appropriate reference to look into the system of Indian indigenous banking (*shikast*) with a view to develop and foster the same."

The following resolution had also been passed in 1927 at the fifth session of the Indian Industrial and Commercial Congress, by which name the Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce was then known —

"This Congress urges upon the attention of the Government of India, the resolution moved in the Legislative Assembly by Mr Sarabhai N. Han regarding the appointment of an Indian Banking Inquiry Committee consisting of a majority of Indians and an Indian Chairman with a special reference to look into the organization of Indian indigenous banking, with a view to foster and develop the same and strongly urges upon the Government the need for the immediate appointment of such Committee."

of the proposed Enquiry and its objects, the Government of India prepared a scheme for enquiry and forwarded it for the consideration of the local Governments whose co-operation, they considered, was essential

5. The plan which was approved by the local Governments was to split the Enquiry into three stages. In the first stage a number of Provincial Committees, with persons possessing intimate knowledge of local conditions, were to be appointed to deal with the following subjects, *viz*, agricultural credit including co-operative credit, credit facilities for small industries, mortgage banks, financing of internal trade and stimulation of habits of investment and attraction of banking deposits. After the Provincial Committees had reported, an all-India Committee was to continue the work by making investigation into certain fields of banking excluded from the scope of the Provincial Committees' Enquiry, such as regulation of banking, banking education and credit facilities for India's main industries such as cotton, jute and coal. This was to be the second stage of the Enquiry. When the Central Committee had completed the survey of the whole banking field, the third and the last stage would be reached when a small body of foreign experts, selected by Government and having experience of rural credit and industrial banking, was to be appointed to assist the Central Committee in coming to their conclusions.

6. The Provincial Committees were accordingly constituted and all of them began regular work by the beginning of August 1929 except the Punjab Committee which began a little later. The first of the provincial reports was received in May 1930 and though the reports of certain Committees were published so late as November of the same year, we were supplied with advance copies before that date. We cannot adequately express our gratitude to the Provincial Committees for the comprehensive picture they have drawn for us of the conditions in the provinces and for the valuable recommendations and suggestions they have made. We have in fact used the material contained in these reports so freely in our own report that we have not found it possible to acknowledge our indebtedness at each place\*. At the same time we should like to draw attention to the fact that owing to the comparative shortness of time allowed and the rigid economy practised, which stood in the way of these Committees undertaking a more thorough investigation of the various questions concerning the economic conditions and the banking problems of their provinces, and for various other reasons mentioned in their reports, it was difficult for them to work out satisfactory statistical data relating to the amount of rural indebtedness, the amount of agricultural finance required, and the volume of business of the indigenous bankers.

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\*References have, however, been given by footnotes on several pages of the Report to the paragraphs in the Provincial Committees' Reports, e.g., Bengal, paras 346-56 on page 12.

7 Our Committee was formally appointed in the Government of India's Resolution No F 2 (4)-F /29, dated the 22nd July 1929, with the following personnel.—

*Chairman*

- 1 The Hon'ble Sir Bhupendra Nath Mitra, Who commenced his regular duties on the termination of his appointment as Member of the Executive Council of the Governor General  
KCSI, KCIE, CBE

*Vice Chairman*

- 2 Sir Purshotamdas Thakurdas, Kt, Who acted as Chairman pending the taking up of his duties by Sir Bhupendra Nath Mitra  
CIE, MBE, MLA
- 3 Mr D P Khaitan }  
4 Mr B F Madon } Nominated in consultation with the Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry
- 5 Sir Hugh Cooke, Kt }  
6 The Hon'ble Mr J H Fyfe } Nominated in consultation with the Associated Chambers of Commerce of India and Ceylon
- 7 Dr L K Hyder, MLA }  
8 Mr Manu Subedar } Indian Economists
- 9 The Hon'ble Mr V Ramadas Pantulu }  
10 Rai Jamini Mohan Mitra Bahadur } Representatives of the Co operative movement
- 11 Mr W Lamond } Nominated in consultation with the Imperial Bank of India
- 12 Lala Harkishen Lal } Joint Stock Banker
- 13 Mr R. W Buckley } Representative Exchange Banker.  
Nominated in consultation with the Exchange Banks' Association.
- 14 The Hon'ble Raja Sir Annamalai Chettiar, Kt }  
15 Mr Jadu Nath Roy } Indigenous Bankers
- 16 Mr G K Devadhar, CIE }  
17 Mr R K Shanmukham Chetty, MLA }  
18 Choudhri Mukhtar Singh, MLA }  
19 Seth Haji Abdoola Haroon, MLA } Representatives of the general interests of the public from the side of those who require credit facilities
- 20 Mr Jamal Mahomed }  
21 Nawab Sir Salimzada Abdul Qayyum, KCIE, MLA }
- Mr V K Aravamudha Aiyangar, CIE } *Secretary*
- Mr R P Masani } *Joint Secretary*

8 The Committee suffered a severe loss by the sudden death of Mr B F Madon and the vacancy thus created was filled by Mr Nalin Ranjan Sarker, who was nominated by the Federation of

Indian Chambers of Commerce The Hon'ble Mr J H Fyfe had to resign from the Committee owing to his departure from India, and in his place Mr F V Rushforth was nominated by the Associated Chambers of Commerce We also regret that owing to considerations of health and private affairs we were deprived of the valuable services of the Hon'ble Raja Sir Annamalai Chettiar who resigned his membership of the Committee in December 1930 Rai Jammu Mohan Mitia Bahadur, one of the Co-operative experts, attended our first meeting in Bombay, but his services were not made available for our subsequent deliberations At the time of signing the report, the strength of the Committee was thus nineteen.

9 The terms of reference which were decided by the Government of India in consultation with us at our first meeting held in Bombay at the end of June 1929, are as follows —

“To investigate past records and existing conditions of banking in India including the organization of the Money Market and to consider the steps, if any, that are feasible and desirable under the following main headings —

- (a) the Development of Banking with a view to the expansion of indigenous, co-operative and joint-stock banking with special reference to the needs of agriculture, commerce and industry,
- (b) the Regulation of Banking with a view to protecting the interests of the public, and
- (c) Banking Education with a view to the provision of Indian personnel in adequate numbers and with the necessary qualifications to meet the increasing needs of the country for a sound and well-managed national system of banking ”

10 Our first task on appointment was to prepare a questionnaire both in regard to the subjects reserved for our own direct investigation and also for the subjects allocated to the Provincial Committees The issue of a standard questionnaire for the use of Provincial Committees was considered necessary in order to facilitate tabulation of the results of the provincial enquiry These two forms of questionnaire were settled at our first meeting in Bombay and the provincial questionnaire was forwarded to the Provincial Committees through the Government of India and the Provincial Governments concerned The Provincial Committees were requested to add questions which they considered necessary for the purpose of eliciting information regarding special local or provincial features All the Committees have availed themselves of this suggestion

11 As stated above, we held our first meeting in Bombay in June 1929 for settling, among other things, the questionnaire for

both the Central and the Provincial Committees. Our next meeting was held in Delhi in February 1930 to consider our future programme and we decided that the headquarters of the Committee should be located at Bangalore up to the end of June 1930 and transferred to Poona for the rest of the period. Under the guidance of the Chairman, Sir B. N. Mitra, who assumed charge in April 1930 at Bangalore, the secretariat of the Committee spent the early months of the official year in preparing a summary of the Provincial Committees's reports for the use of the members of the Central Committee. In view of the vastness of the material we had to study and examine, such a summary was essential. The examination of witnesses began from the middle of August 1930 and lasted till the middle of October. We examined three more witnesses, including two officials, in March 1931 at New Delhi. In all 55 witnesses were examined. The witnesses were sufficiently representative and included 8 Chambers of Commerce, 5 trade associations, 8 economists, 6 bankers and 7 representatives of the co-operative movement.

Towards the end of October 1930, in response to an invitation from His Majesty's Government, the Chairman had to leave India to attend the Round Table Conference in London. He returned to India on the 23rd January 1931.

12. In their communiqué dated the 6th of October 1930, the Government of India announced the appointment of the following foreign experts:

(1) *Mr G. C. Cassels*—

Manager of the Bank of Montreal, London

(2) *Mr B. Currie*—

Partner in Glyn, Mills and Company

(3) *Dr A. Friederich*—

General Secretary of the Union Co-operative Society, Darmstadt

(4) *Dr O. Jendels*—

A managing partner of the Berliner Handels-Gesellschaft, Berlin, Member of the Board of German National Railway Company, and Director of various other companies in Germany

(5) *Mr A. P. McDougall, C. B. E.*—

Chairman and Managing Director of Midland Marts Limited and Chairman of Midland Wool Groupers Limited, formerly President, Co-operative Farms Trading Society in Scotland

(6) *Dr L. J. A. Trip*—

Former Treasurer General at Department of Finance, the Hague, and former President of Bank of Java

They arrived in Bombay on the 12th of December 1930 and after a few weeks' tour about the country, reached Delhi on the 9th of January 1931. Meantime, to suit the convenience of certain members of the Committee who were also members of the Legislative Assembly, it had been decided to move the Committee's secretariat from Poona to Delhi.

13 Owing to the unexpected delay in the return of Sir B. N. Mitra from London, it was not possible for us to meet the experts before the 26th of January 1931. Our joint discussions with them lasted till the 16th of February 1931 after which date we were occupied with the drawing up of our provisional conclusions on the subjects already discussed with them. Our discussions were resumed on the 4th of March and continued for a fortnight. Dr Jeldels left for Germany on the 7th February, and the remaining experts left India on the 14th March except Mr McDougall and Dr Friederich who sailed a week later.

14 According to paragraph 5 of the Government of India's Resolution, dated the 22nd July 1929, the experts were entitled to submit to us a report of their own, if necessary, and in that case we were required to submit their report together with our own report to the Government of India. The report submitted by the experts is accordingly printed as an appendix to our report and is submitted to Government.

15 In order to complete the blank picture for the whole of India, the Government of India announced in their press communiqué dated the 12th June 1929, that they wished to offer facilities to any of the Indian States that might desire to associate themselves with our Enquiry. In accordance with this offer the following States appointed their own Committees —

- |             |               |
|-------------|---------------|
| 1 Akalkote  | 10 Jodhpur    |
| 2 Aundh     | 11 Kolhapur   |
| 3 Baroda    | 12 Orcha      |
| 4 Bhopal    | 13 Patiala    |
| 5 Bikaner   | 14 Phaltan    |
| 6 Dhar      | 15 Porbandar  |
| 7 Dholpur   | 16 Pudukottah |
| 8 Gwalior   | 17 Ratlam     |
| 9 Hyderabad | 18 Savanur    |

#### 19 Travancore

These Committees were supplied with the questionnaire prepared by us and were also furnished from time to time with all material that was placed at the disposal of the Provincial Committees.



The reports of the following Committees have been received —

- |            |               |
|------------|---------------|
| 1 Akalkote | 8 Hyderabad   |
| 2 Aundh    | 9 Kolhapur    |
| 3 Baroda   | 10 Orcha      |
| 4 Bhopal   | 11 Phaltan    |
| 5 Bikaner  | 12 Poibandai  |
| 6 Dhar     | 13 Ratlam     |
| 7 Gwalior  | 14 Savanur    |
|            | 15 Travancore |

We understand that the Jodhpur, Puddukottah and Dholpur Darbais have not prepared any reports of their enquiry

We desire to place on record our grateful appreciation of the care and thoroughness with which the States Committees have done their work

16 We should like here to refer to a point which has engaged our serious attention in the course of our deliberations, namely, the constitutional problem of India and its bearing on the questions under our consideration. Although it was felt by some of us that a good banking system should function independently of any form of constitution, we all felt nevertheless the necessity at many points of our Enquiry of knowing what the future constitution of India was going to be. In order that our discussions might proceed on the basis of a common angle of vision, we agreed that the fundamental basis for making our recommendations should be that the administration of the provinces and the Central Government would be wholly in the hands of Ministers fully responsible to the respective legislatures. It should be clearly understood that all our recommendations are based on this fundamental assumption.

17 We append to our report three separate minutes or notes of dissent. The first of these is by Mr. Ramadas Pantulu and deals with indigenous bankers, the second is by Mr. Nalin Ranjan Sarker and deals mainly with the financial requirements of industries and the financing of foreign trade, the third is signed by six of our colleagues, viz., Mr. Prashotamdas Thakurdas, Mr. Khairan, Mr. Jamal Mahomed, Mr. Ramadas Pantulu, Mr. Shanmukham Chetty and Mr. Mukhtar Singh, and deals mostly with the financing of foreign trade. We shall deal with the subject matter of these various minutes in the appropriate chapters of our report.

18 We also append a separate report by Mr. Manu Subedar. This report is a tome by itself and covers ground which is common to both his report and ours. It was received too late for us to give detailed consideration to it and make our comments on it. The deliberations of the Committee ceased on 11th April 1931 and by the 2nd June we had not received the signed copy of Mr. Manu

Subedar's report,\* though portions of the report became available to us in proof from 25th May, the last portion being placed in our hands on 28th May

It is not correct, as stated by Mr Manu Subedar in paragraph 2 of his report, that he had no opportunities for discussion of the whole problem with the other members of the Committee. The volumes of evidence bear ample testimony to the contrary. He also remained associated with us when we were formulating our conclusions and participated actively in the discussions thereon.

As we have already stated, it has not been possible for us to comment on the report at length as we would have desired. In so far as he considers that the value of our work has suffered from lack of any direct link between our Committee and the Provincial Committees or doubts the reliability of facts incorporated in the reports of the latter, we disagree with his criticism in this connection. The acting Chairman of our Committee maintained necessary contact with the Provincial Committees. The members of our Committee were invited to join the deliberations of the Provincial Committees and some members took advantage of such invitation. The acting Chairman, as well as several of our members also met the Chairmen and the Secretaries of the Provincial Committees in a conference at Calcutta in January 1930 and discussed various matters relating to the Enquiry. By this means personal contact was maintained between the Central Committee and the Provincial Committees.

As regards Mr Manu Subedar's remarks about the banking experts from abroad, we consider these to be unfortunate. These gentlemen came out to India at some sacrifice to themselves in response to invitations from the Government of India. The party leaders in the Assembly had agreed to this feature of the Enquiry and we think it is to be regretted that one of our colleagues should have thought it right to criticize the assistance that these gentlemen took pains to give us in the short space of time at their disposal. Mr Manu Subedar was aware of the procedure laid down by the Government of India for the prosecution of the Enquiry before he joined the Committee.

19 We desire to add that our colleagues, Sir Purnshotamdas Thakurdas and Mr Lamond, in view of their position respectively as a Governor of the Imperial Bank and an officer of that Bank and therefore directly interested in the affairs of the Bank, have not taken any part in the voting in regard to our recommendations affecting that Bank.

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\* The signed report was handed over to the Chairman on the afternoon of the 2nd June after the Committee had held its last meeting and dispersed.

20 We desire to express our sincere gratitude to our Secretary, Mr V K Aravamudha Ayangar, C.I.E., whose intimate knowledge of currency, finance and banking, and the zealous and efficient manner in which he has carried out his duties, have made his services a source of considerable strength to the Committee. Our grateful acknowledgments are also due to our Joint Secretary, Mr R P Masani, for useful assistance, the value of which has been enhanced by his practical experience as a banker and in business generally. We desire further to record our high appreciation of the manner in which Mr K C Seth, Superintendent, and the staff of the Committee have discharged their duties.

## CHAPTER II.

### DEVELOPMENT OF BANKING IN INDIA

21 Information in regard to banks established in India on European lines up to the beginning of the second half of the nineteenth century is given in Cooke's book on 'The Rise, Progress and Present Condition of Banking in India', and full information in regard to the Presidency Banks of Bengal, Bombay and Madras is contained in J B Bhunyat's Account of the Presidency Banks. Researches made by Indian economists in recent years have thrown considerable light on the gradual development of banking in India from earliest times, and much valuable information on the subject will be found in the books published within the last five years by Messrs B T Thakur, H Sinha, L C Jain and Ramchandria Rau, though a portion of the field, namely, from the sixth to the sixteenth centuries, still remains to be explored. Considerable amount of useful information is also contained in the reports of some of the Provincial Banking Enquiry Committees as well as in those of some of the Committees appointed by the Indian States. It may be of interest to bring together in this report some of the more important facts.

#### INDIGENOUS BANKING.

22 It is now generally admitted that from the earliest times India possessed a system of indigenous banking. It will suffice in this connection to give the following extract from "From the Remote Past to an Assured Future" by Mr W E Preston, Chief Manager of the Chartered Bank of India, Australia and China, and a member of the Royal Commission on Indian Currency and Finance, 1926, which is quoted on page 26 of Mr Thakur's book on "Organization of Indian Banking" —

"It may be accepted that a system of banking eminently suited to India's then requirements was in force in that country many centuries before the science of banking became an accomplished fact in England. It is true that the methods of old in force in India were vastly different from the European ideas of banking to-day and partook more of money-lending, money-changing and later of the *hundi* business; nevertheless as applied to the conditions then existing in India, they admirably acted their part, and must be recognised as having rendered immense services to the country as a whole, particularly when we keep in view the enormous agricultural interests of India."

Indeed, money-lending can be traced back to the Vedic period which is taken by some authorities to range from at least 2,000 to 1,400 B C, but no evidence of its then being followed as a profession by any section of the people, or details about the terms on which money was lent, are available. It is from the fifth century B C that Indian literature supplies us with definite evidence of the details of money-lending and of remittance of money in cash or by credit instruments. The Buddhist works and recent archaeological discoveries reveal the existence of associations or guilds carrying on various commercial and industrial activities. The *sresthis* or bankers occupied prominent positions in these guilds. In each of the important trade-centres of the Buddhist period, *e g*, Champa, Rajagriha, Sravasti, Kausambi and Avanti, there lived many *sresthis* of great influence. Their main function was to finance the traders for the ordinary purposes of their trades, the merchant adventurers who went out by sea to foreign countries or explorers who traversed forests in search of valuable materials, and the kings in times of war and other financial stress. The Buddhist texts abound in references to the practice of lending money on or without interest. The more common practice was lending money on interest, the loans being secured by mortgage, by pledge of movables or by surety. The *Artha Shastra* (Kautilya) prescribes the maximum legal rate of interest on secured loans as 15 per cent and that on unsecured loans as 60 per cent, without any discrimination as to caste, though the rate might go up to 120 and 240 per cent per annum according to the risk involved in special circumstances. The *Dharma Shastras* are in general agreement with the *Artha Shastra* except that they introduce caste as an important factor in money-lending. They lay down that a particular caste (the *vaisya*) alone can take to the profession of money-lending, and they also prescribe a variation from 15 per cent to 60 per cent in the interest on unsecured loans according to the caste of the borrower (4).

23 There is no continuous account of indigenous banking extant from the sixth to the sixteenth centuries (2). But references are traceable to the use of *hundis* as early as the twelfth century A. D. (3), we have also evidence in the writing of Muhammadan historians like Bami, author of "Tarikh-i Firuz-Shahi", and Shamsafif, of the existence of Multanis and *shroffs* who financed not only internal trade and commerce between various centres but also acted as bankers of the early dynasties of the Moslem period. During the Moghul period, it appears from the Am-i-Akbari and other internal records, as well as from

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(1) Bengal, paras 346-56    Bombay, para 252    Baroda, para 211

(2) L C Jain's "Indigenous Banking in India", page 10

(3) United Provinces, para 410

Tavernier's Travels, that indigenous bankers continued their business of money-lending and played an important part in financing the trade of the country by means of credit instruments. Tavernier also mentions how the foreign trade of the country in the seventeenth century was financed partly by cash and partly by bills drawn on Surat and payable in two months, and he gives the rate of exchange on Surat at Lahore, Agra, Ahmedabad, Sironj, Bulhanpur, Dacca, Patna and Benares (1). There is no definite information available about the rates of interest charged in those days by the indigenous bankers on loans. The fact that according to the *Am-i-Akbari* the State granted loans to officials at rates of interest varying from 6½ per cent in the second year to 50 per cent in the fifth year, and 100 per cent in the tenth year in order to operate as a check on the usurers, however, shows that a still higher rate of interest had to be paid by these people on loans obtained from other sources. There is also evidence to show that in the last quarter of the sixteenth century the *vaniks* in Bengal used to charge needy persons interest at the rate of more than 500 per cent (2). The system of currency and coinage during the Moghul period, with its large number of mints scattered all over the country which issued metallic currency of various classes, also provided the indigenous banker with the important and profitable business of money-changing. Further, it became the practice during this period of employing some of the important indigenous bankers in various parts of the empire as revenue collectors, bankers and money-changers to Government. These bankers naturally acquired considerable influence and power, and as has been pointed out in the report of the United Provinces Banking Enquiry Committee (paragraph 410), "the *Jagat Seths* (world bankers) of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, for their power and influence, are comparable with any private banking house in any other country, and indeed, they seem to have fulfilled many of the functions of a central bank—essentially a modern institution."

24 When the English traders came to India in the seventeenth century, the indigenous banking-system was already established. But while they required some machinery to satisfy their credit needs, they could not easily make use of the indigenous system. They on their side were not conversant with the language of the indigenous bankers, while the bankers had no experience of the finance of western trade. In order to overcome these two-fold difficulties, two remedies were adopted. In the first place, the English agency houses which were established in Calcutta and

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(1) *Jam*, page 14.

(2) *Bengal*, paras. 358 and 362.

Bombay took upon themselves the business of banking in addition to their commercial and trading activities. In the second place, the importance of forming connections with the indigenous bankers, who held a high place in the financial and political activities of the country, was not ignored (1). Indeed, in the earlier years after their rise to power, the East India Company did not favour the establishment in India of European banks, and they held the opinion that the agency houses and the indigenous bankers were better fitted to meet the banking needs of the community. These measures, however, failed to arrest the decline in the business and influence of the indigenous banker. The incessant wars and the disorder which followed on the downfall of the Moghul Empire severely affected their business. Not infrequently were they cheated by their customers which involved them in serious losses and sometimes resulted in their inability to redeem their promises. The unification of the coinage in 1835 deprived the indigenous banker of his profitable business of money-changing. The development of the means of communication by land and sea, and the consequent deflection of trade and commerce from former trade routes and the alteration in the whole basis of the commercial relations of the country with other countries, all contributed to his downfall. With the decline of the indigenous bankers and the gradual progress of English trade and dominion in India, the need was felt by the East India Company for the establishment of banks which would meet both administrative requirements and the demands of trade. The result was the creation of Government treasuries and the foundation of early banking institutions on western lines, and these have operated to the further disadvantage of the indigenous banker (2). As has been observed in the report of the Punjab Banking Enquiry Committee, (3) compared with institutions of the western type, the indigenous banker is at a disadvantage in respect of large-scale operations. With diminishing resources the volume of his business is declining when success demands that it should increase. Accordingly, just as in England the old family bank has had to give way to the large joint-stock bank, the indigenous banker is being obliged to give way to the commercial bank. Despite the establishment of joint-stock banks, however, a good deal of banking business still remains in the hands of the indigenous bankers in all parts of the country. The operations of the former are confined largely to the provision of banking facilities at the ports and more important urban centres, so that throughout the

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(1) Jain, pages 16 17

(2) Jain, page 23

(3) Punjab, para 188

country the indigenous bankers have filled the gap left uncovered by these banks and financed agriculture and the internal trade of the country. Especially in rural areas their help is as indispensable as before. With the altered conditions, however, the indigenous banker in some cases acts as a middleman between the Imperial Bank of India and the joint-stock banks on the one hand, and the Indian trading community on the other. He buys and sells *hundis* and then rediscounts them at the big banks whenever necessary and thus performs functions analogous to those of the bill brokers of the London money market <sup>(1)</sup>

25 No definite information is available as to whether the indigenous banker adopted the practice of receiving regularly deposits from the public on payment of interest at any stage of his existence, and if so, when this transition took place. At the time when the indigenous banker came into existence, the custom seems to have been to hoard capital wealth or deposit it with a friend rather than with the bankers. There is evidence that the associations of bankers in ancient times used to receive permanent deposits and to hold them as trust properties. It is also true that Manu devotes a special section to the subject of "deposits and pledges". But there is no mention in his book of the payment of interest on such deposits, and it is possible that the deposits which he refers to were deposits for safe custody only. The *Artha Shastra* lays down definite rules for the hoarding and utilization of wealth on interest, but is silent on the subject of deposit-banking. In western countries deposit-banking did not come into vogue until at a later stage of the development of banking, and in England banks did not undertake this work until the year 1645. In India many of the indigenous bankers do not, even at the present day, accept deposits from the public, and it is reported from a State like Bikaner, which does not possess a single joint-stock bank, that "generally the indigenous bankers and money-lenders in villages and towns do not keep any deposits and those at the capital do keep deposits of some of the people". The reason why the indigenous banker in India has not generally taken to deposit banking is probably furnished by B. T. Thakur, who states on page 5 of his "Organization of Indian Banking" that "Indian Bankers in the past have generally carried on ordinary trade with their banking business, with the result that this dual activity has greatly reacted upon the banking development of this country". It is only very lately that private Indian bankers have realized the strong necessity of not adding ordinary commercial transactions to their credit business."

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(1) Bombay, para, 252.



## ESTABLISHMENT OF BANKS WORKING ON EUROPEAN LINES

26 Reference has been made in paragraph 24 above to the establishment of English agency houses in Calcutta and Bombay which took upon themselves the business of banking in addition to their commercial and trading activities. These houses became the agents for the whole civil and military services and also for European bankers and merchants settled in the country. They had originally no capital of their own, and they depended almost wholly on the savings of the servants of the East India Company. They received deposits, made advances for the movement of crops, and issued paper money which was considered extremely beneficial for carrying on their operations. The banking business of the East India Company was entrusted to some of these concerns in Calcutta and Bombay. These agency houses thus became the forerunners of joint-stock banks established on European lines. In his book on "The Rise, Progress and Present Condition of Banking in India," Cooke has stated that probably the first banking institution in India on European lines was the Bank of Hindusthan which was founded in 1770 by one of the agency houses in Calcutta. Later investigations have thrown doubt on the accuracy of this statement, and it is possible that one or two other banks of this type came into existence before the Bank of Hindusthan, though it is doubtful whether they continued in existence for any length of time. These banks, and others which followed them, were local institutions chartered by the East India Company. They are the forerunners of banks formed under the provision of enactments of the Indian legislature which are now divided into two categories, namely (1) the Imperial Bank of India, formed on the amalgamation of the three Presidency Banks, and (2) the Indian joint-stock banks. It will be convenient to deal with these two classes separately.

## THE PRESIDENCY BANKS AND THE IMPERIAL BANK OF INDIA

27 The Bank of Bengal, which was the first of the Presidency Banks, was started in the year 1806 under the name of the Bank of Calcutta. It obtained its first charter in 1809 when it assumed the name of the Bank of Bengal. It was considered essential in the interests of Government and of the mercantile community to have such a bank. Money then used to be raised by treasury bills which often had to be sold at a heavy discount. To facilitate the borrowings of Government and for the maintenance of credit, a State-aided bank was deemed indispensable. Government, therefore, subscribed one-fifth of its capital and shared in the privilege of voting and direction. The charter prescribed certain restrictions on the constitution as well as the operations of the Bank. The Bank's rate of interest was limited to a maximum of 12 per

cent with a view to bringing about a permanent reduction in the rate of interest. In 1823 the Bank was given the power to issue notes. In 1839 the Bank was given the power to open branches and to deal in inland exchange. It was at this time that the present restriction against dealing in foreign exchange was introduced into the Bank Act, but it was a restriction which, we are told, was introduced by the Bank authorities themselves. There was no legal bar at any time to joint stock banks registered in India engaging in the financing of foreign trade and in operations connected with foreign exchange except such restrictions as were placed on the Presidency Banks. The Bank of Bombay was established in 1840 and the Bank of Madras in 1843, with a share capital of Rs. 50 lakhs and Rs. 30 lakhs respectively, of which Government subscribed Rs. 3 lakhs in each case, and both were given the right of note issue. The major portion of the shares in all the three Banks was originally subscribed by Europeans. The Bank of Bombay became involved in the speculative crisis of 1862-65 and it went into liquidation in 1868. But in the same year a new bank with the same name was formed with a capital of Rs. 100 lakhs. All these Banks were deprived of the power of note issue in 1862 and were given as compensation the free use of Government balances. The Presidency Banks Act of 1876 regulated and restricted the business of these Banks and these restrictions and regulations continued up to the amalgamation of the three Presidency Banks in 1921. The Government disposed of their shares in all the three Banks in the year 1876, and the Act of 1876 did not, therefore, provide for Government directors on the Boards of the Banks. On the 27th January 1921 when the three Banks were amalgamated, they had among themselves 59 branches and a total paid-up capital of Rs. 375 lakhs and a total reserve of Rs. 345 lakhs. The Imperial Bank of India which was founded, as a result of the amalgamation is governed by Act XLVII of 1920, which also imposes certain restrictions on its operations.

#### JOINT-STOCK BANKS

28 The history of joint-stock banking in India from the days of the East India Company down to the present day may be divided into ~~five~~ <sup>three</sup> periods, namely—

- (i) from the early days of the East India Company to the year 1833, the last year of the crisis that overtook some of the joint-stock banks started mainly by the English agency houses,
- (ii) from 1833 to 1860 when joint-stock banks with unlimited liability continued to be established mostly by European houses,
- (iii) from 1860, when the principle of limited liability was introduced, to the present day

29 The banks started in the first period were on the basis of unlimited liability. They transacted ordinary banking business and financed internal trade. They also issued notes for circulation. One of them made advances against the security of indigo factories and the stock of other industries. The same Bank had London exchange business as a very important branch of its activities though it lost heavily owing to the purchase of bills of certain insolvent firms. Some of these banks were helped by the East India Company in times of crisis and one of them acted as banker to the Company. Most of the banks ended in failure owing to the combination of banking with other business and speculation.

The banks that were started during the second period were still constituted on the principle of unlimited liability and there is a mass of interesting facts and figures in regard to these institutions in Cooke's "The Rise, Progress and Present Condition of Banking in India" which gives the history of Indian banking up to 1863. Half of the banks that came into being during this period failed on account of speculation and mismanagement rendered possible by ineffective audit. Some of the banks, however, were very successful and two had branches in India and in London and one had branches in China.

The year 1860 constitutes a landmark in the history of Indian Banking. By Act VII of 1860 the principle of limited liability which is indispensable to the raising of large amounts of capital required by modern business concerns, was first applied to the joint-stock banks. The privilege of note issue was also withdrawn from joint-stock banks about the same time. Soon afterwards, the American Civil War cut off the supply of American staple and there was an unprecedented demand in England for cotton. There was a boom in the cotton trade in India which led to a wave of speculation. Banking companies, financial associations and land reclamation companies and industrial concerns of all sorts were launched in large numbers. Almost every one of them went into liquidation. Even the original Bank of Bombay, as we have seen, was involved in the disaster and had to face liquidation proceedings. This crisis shook the confidence of the public in banking concerns. Between 1865 and 1870 only one bank was established, namely, the Allahabad Bank. The progress in the establishment of joint-stock banks was scarcely satisfactory up to the end of the last century, when there were only 9 banks with capital and reserve of over Rs. 5 lakhs, then total paid-up capital and reserves amounting to Rs. 1½ crores and their total deposits to Rs. 8 crores. During the period 1871—1900 the Oudh Commercial Bank and the Punjab National Bank were established, besides the now defunct Alliance Bank of Simla.

With the wave of the *swadeshi* movement in 1906, however, there was considerable activity in banking. Between the years 1906 and 1913 the number of banks with capital and reserve of over Rs 5 lakhs increased from 9 to 18. Their paid-up capital and reserves amounted to Rs 4 crores and then total deposits to Rs 22 crores. The number of smaller banks that were launched during the period was considerably larger. Some of the flourishing Indian banks of to-day were established during this period, namely, the Bank of India, the Indian Bank (Madras), the Punjab and Sindh Bank, the Central Bank of India, the Bank of Baroda and the Bank of Mysore.

The years 1913 to 1924 were a critical period for joint-stock banking in India. As many as 161 banks failed during the period, and the paid-up capital of these banks amounted to about Rs 6½ crores. The causes of their failure are examined in a later chapter.

In the year 1925 the banks with capital and reserve of Rs 5 lakhs and over numbered 28. The number in 1928, being the latest year for which statistics are available, is the same. The number of banks with capital and reserve between Rs 1 lakh and less than Rs 5 lakhs was 46 in the year 1925, and the same in 1928. In all 60 banks failed during the period, but in the case of most of them the capital and reserve was less than Rs 1 lakh. An important Indian joint-stock bank which was established during this period was the Peoples' Bank of Northern India, Limited.

### FOREIGN BANKS \*

30 Apart from banks established in India under the Charter of the East India Company or under enactments of the Indian legislature, a number of foreign banks have operated in India from time to time. The most important of these are British banks established under a Royal Charter or English legislation. It was about the year 1836 that systematic efforts were being made in England to complete the chain of Empire Banks by the inclusion of India, especially as the popularity of overseas investment in general was increasing with the return of prosperity after the Napoleonic wars. But until 1853, the East India Company was generally successful in preserving banks in India chartered by it from the competition of English banks, though as regards the former the three Presidency Banks were not allowed to, and the other banks did not usually, transact exchange and remittance business between India and the countries overseas. Such business was considered to be commercial business attended with risk and was carried on by what were called 'Agency Houses'.

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\*We are indebted to Baster's 'The Imperial Banks' for a great deal of the matter in paragraph 30.

It is also possible that the relations that existed between the 'Agency Houses' and the East India Company which are referred to later on also operated as a handicap against any banks in India undertaking this class of business. The first proposal for the incorporation in London of an Anglo-Indian bank, called the Bank of India, was made in 1836 after the private agency houses had all come to grief by speculation in the thirties of the century. It was proposed that the new bank should do all banking business for the State, including foreign exchange business. Both the Government of India and the Bank of Bengal, which was the Government bank at the time, were against the new project. The former were apprehensive that the new Bank would make a profit at their expense on their annual remittances for home expenditure, and the latter stated that they would be able to extend their services to the Government and the country in all directions contemplated by the proposed Bank. The charter was therefore refused to the promoters of the new Bank. The next project was the Bank of Asia of 1840, but it also met with the same fate as the Bank of India owing to the opposition of the Agency Houses which had recovered from the disastrous failures of 1829-1832. The Agency Houses were firmly allied to the East India Company and their opposition on the ground of possible injury to their profits by the competition of the new Bank in their remittance operations was shared by the East India Company who thought that it was not necessary to have a bank for the purpose of exchange operations. The first Anglo-Indian commercial bank to receive a Royal Charter was the Oriental Banking Corporation, which was formed by amalgamation with the Bank of Western India in 1842 at Bombay. In 1845, the Bank moved its head office from Bombay to London. The Bank obtained its charter from the Imperial Government without any reference to the Indian authorities. After the Oriental Bank came the Chartered Bank of India, Australia and China, and the Chartered Bank of Asia (afterwards the Mercantile Bank of India, London and China), both incorporated in 1853. The East India Company took up its old attitude and went so far as to doubt the Royal prerogative to grant charters to banks for operating in India on the ground that under Act 47 Geo. III it had been empowered to incorporate such banks and that that Act formed a limitation on the Royal prerogative. His Majesty's Attorney and Solicitor-General, however, drew a distinction between the business of general banking within the territories under the Government of the East India Company and the business of exchange, deposit and remittance which could be carried on by any bank under Royal Charter. Although the East India Company did not concur in this view, it considered it undesirable to give a monopoly in exchange business to the Oriental Bank and it recommended the incorporation of the

other banks without delay. Of the three chartered banks, the Oriental Bank failed in 1884, and the Mercantile Bank had to relinquish its charter in 1893 and reconstruct itself under the English Companies Act as the Mercantile Bank of India. The only English bank now operating in India under a Royal Charter is, therefore, the Chartered Bank of India, Australia and China. None of these chartered banks appears to have enjoyed the privilege of issuing notes in India.

31 Other foreign banks now operating in India are (1) the Mercantile Bank of India, (2) the National Bank of India, (3) the Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation, (4) the Eastern Bank, (5) the National City Bank of New York (with which is amalgamated the International Banking Corporation), (6) the Yokohama Specie Bank, (7) Lloyds Bank (which has taken over the business of Messrs Cox and Co, the latter having previously absorbed Messrs King, King and Co), (8) the Compton National d'Escompte de Paris, (9) the P & O Banking Corporation, (10) the Imperial Bank of Persia, (11) Nederlandsche Handel Maatschappij (popularly known as Netherlands Trading Society), (12) the Nederlandsch Indische Handels Bank (popularly known as the Netherlands India Commercial Bank), (13) Banco Nacional Ultramarino, (14) Bank of Taiwan, (15) Sumitomo Bank, (16) Thomas Cook and Son (Bankers), and (17) the American Express Company. The National Bank of India was established in 1863 under the name of the Calcutta Banking Corporation with its head office at Calcutta. The name was changed to its present name in 1864 and the head office was transferred to London in 1866.

#### STATISTICS.

32 A table giving certain statistics relating to banks now operating in India and registered under the Indian Companies Act will be found in Appendix II.

## CHAPTER III.

### EXISTING CREDIT AGENCIES

33 It will be useful at the outset to give a general description of the existing credit agencies including their functions, resources and their operations. These agencies can broadly be classified as follows —

- (1) Imperial Bank of India
- (2) Joint-stock banks
- (3) Exchange banks
- (4) Co-operative banks
- (5) Indigenous banking system consisting of money-lenders, *shroffs* and other agencies doing banking business
- (6) Land mortgage banks
- (7) Loan offices in Bengal
- (8) *Nidhis* and Chit Funds in Madras
- (9) Government
- (10) Insurance companies

#### IMPERIAL BANK OF INDIA

34 The Imperial Bank of India was formed in January 1921 by the amalgamation of the three Presidency Banks of Madras, Bombay and Bengal. It is governed by the Imperial Bank of India Act, No XLVII of 1920. It is a commercial bank with private shareholders and competes to some extent with other banks. It inherited from its three predecessors certain functions as a bankers' bank, which, together with its increased responsibilities as the Government bankers, accounts for some of the existing restrictions imposed on its activities by its present charter and for the control exercised by the Government over the Bank. The important restrictions are —

- (i) The Bank cannot make any loan or advance—
  - (a) for a longer period than six months,
  - (b) upon the security of stock or shares of the bank,
  - (c) on the original security of immovable property

- (ii) The Bank cannot discount bills for, or lend on advance in any way to, any individual or partnership firm an amount exceeding at any one time Rs 20 lakhs except on the security of trustee stocks, funds and securities, securities issued by certain State-aided Railways, the debentures and other securities issued by district boards under the authority of the legislature, and goods or documents of title thereto
- (iii) The Bank cannot discount or advance on the security of any negotiable instrument of any individual or partnership firm payable at the town or place where it is presented for discount, which does not carry on it the several responsibilities of at least two persons or firms unconnected with each other in general partnership
- (iv) The Bank cannot grant unsecured overdrafts in excess of Rs 1 lakh
- (v) The Bank cannot open accounts in the London office for persons other than its own constituents

The Bank is generally prohibited from transacting any business not specified in the Act, foreign exchange business being one of the excluded items

35 The Government exercise control over the Bank in the following ways —

- (1) They have power to issue instructions to the Bank in respect of any matter, which, in their opinion, vitally affects their financial policy or the safety of Government balances
- (2) They can appoint four Governors to the Central Board of the Bank
- (3) They appoint the Managing Governors who are two in number and who are the Chief Executive Officers at the head of the Bank, after consideration of the recommendations of the Central Board of the Bank
- (4) They are entitled to require the Central Board to furnish any information touching the affairs of the Bank, and to produce any document of the Bank, and may require the publication of the statement of the Bank's assets and liabilities at such intervals and in such form and manner as they think fit
- (5) They may appoint such auditors as they think fit to examine and report on the accounts of the Bank.



36 Government business transacted by the Imperial Bank of India and its branches may broadly be summarised as under —

- (a) It does the treasury work of Government free of cost. It receives all collections from the general public for credit to Government and Government may draw on any of its head offices or branches in India.
- (b) It manages the public debt of the Government of India and provides the machinery for the flotation of loans. The London office of the Bank also manages the rupee debt in London, receiving a fixed remuneration for this work.

37 The other banking functions performed by the Imperial Bank of India are —

- (a) It is the bankers' bank. Most of the leading banks in India keep their cash balances other than till money with the Imperial Bank of India. In 1925 these balances fluctuated between such wide limits as Rs 13½ crores and Rs 2 crores. The following later figures were furnished by the Bank —

*Total Bankers' balances with the Imperial Bank of India*

(In lakhs)

Date	Exchange Banks	Indian Joint Stock Banks
31st March 1928	Rs 3,20	Rs 81
30th September 1928	4,71	1,12
31st March 1929	3,28	81
30th September 1929	2,02	90
31st March 1930	1,88	81
30th September 1930	1,88	1,05

- (b) It manages the Clearing Houses. There are eleven Clearing Houses in India in the principal cities. These conduct their operations in the precincts of the Imperial Bank of India which supplies the necessary supervising staff.
- (c) With a view to increasing banking facilities and to fostering among the Indian people the habit of banking and investment, the Imperial Bank of India was placed by

Government under a statutory obligation to open not less than 100 new branches within the first five years of its inauguration. This obligation was duly fulfilled and 102 new branches were opened by 31st March 1926 of which 50 were opened at places where there was already a branch of one or other of the Indian joint-stock banks. Several of the branches, however, have not yet reached a profit-earning stage.

At places where the Imperial Bank of India has no branches, it utilizes the services of joint-stock banks or a leading local merchant or *shroff* for the collection of bills and cheques. A list of the places where the Bank has recognised agents for collection business is given in Appendix III of the Volume of Written Evidence.

38 During the busy season when the Bank rate is 6 per cent or above, the Paper Currency Department may grant loans to the Imperial Bank of India to an amount not exceeding Rs 12 crores by transferring to that Department internal bills of exchange or *hundis* of an equivalent amount. The Bank also provides remittance facilities to the exchange and other banks and also to the public. The rates charged by the Bank are subject to maxima laid down by Government and differ according to circumstances.

- (a) When the purchaser is a member of the public, the rates are  $1/4$  per cent on sums up to Rs 1,000,  $1/8$  per cent on sums between Rs 1,000 and Rs 10,000, and  $1/16$  per cent on sums above Rs 10,000.
- (b) If another bank wishes to purchase remittance through the Imperial Bank of India to a place where the purchaser has no branch, it pays the usual rates, mentioned above.
- (c) Where a bank purchases a transfer from one of its branches to another, the rate for sums above Rs 10,000 is reduced to  $1/32$  per cent.

39 As a result of the recommendations of the Royal Commission on Indian Currency and Finance, 1926, a Bill was introduced into the Indian Legislative Assembly in January 1927 providing among other things for the establishment of a Reserve Bank for India. For reasons which are now well-known, the Bill failed to become law. The present position regarding the control of currency and credit is, therefore, the same as that described by the Royal Commission on Indian Currency and Finance, 1926. "The Government controls the currency. The credit situation is controlled as far as it is controlled at all, by the Imperial Bank. With divided control, there is likelihood of divided counsels, and failure to co-ordinate."

The two tables below give in a convenient form some available statistics relating to the Imperial Bank.

*I—Capital, Reserve, Deposits and Cash Balances of the Imperial Bank of India*

(In lakhs of rupees)

31st December	Capital.	Reserve and Rest	Government or Public Deposits	Private Deposits	Proportion per cent of Government Deposits (column 3) to		Cash Balances.
					Total Capital and Deposits (columns 1 to 4)	Private Deposits (column 4)	
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
	Rs	Rs	Rs	Rs	Per cent	Per cent	Rs.
1922 .	5,62	4,33	11,16	57,00	17.4	24.8	15,07
1923 .	5,62	4,55	8,57	74,19	9.2	11.5	15,01
1924 .	5,62	4,80	7,50	76,71	7.9	9.9	15,60
1925 .	5,62	4,93	5,46	77,83	5.8	7.0	17,47
1926 .	5,62	5,09	6,45	73,90	7.1	8.7	20,90
1927 .	5,62	5,24	7,20	72,07	8.0	10.0	10,89
1928 . .	5,62	5,39	7,95	71,30	8.9	11.1	10,57

*II - Figures of public and other deposits, loans, etc., of the Imperial Bank of India in the last week of March and September each year from 1921*

(In lakhs of rupees)

	Public Deposits	General Deposits	Loan from Paper Currency	Banks Investments	Loans	Cash Credits	Bills	Cash	Percentage of cash to Liabilities	Bank rate cent
March 19 1	5,31	72,19		13,17	16,88	22 94	9,63	2,06	25 32	6
September	8,50	88,75		15,77	22,80	23,18	8,03	29,71	31 70	5
March 1922	10 08	57 08	2,00	0,33	18,11	20,11	0,02	20,48	25 47	8
September	13,36	73,19		10,01	17,94	26,72	4,22	36,73	41 34	4
March 1923	23,53	13,63		9,49	18,79	31 30	8,56	14,41	16 08	8
September	15 09	78,49		12,70	15,15	30,55	4,71	30,40	41 18	4
March 1924	26,02	71,21	12,00	11,83	27 21	43,07	15,30	19,20	16 49	9
September	24,23	73,68		16 78	16,13	37,67	5,78	28,30	28 11	5
March 1925	26,11	69, 2	8,60	16,02	21,80	34,19	18,07	19,34	16 44	7
September	9,67	78,99		16,10	13 97	28,15	5,50	31,98	35 95	5
March 1926	19,79	73,77		15,97	17,87	35,52	6,08	25,23	26 85	6
September	19,50	81,18		10,72	11 84	21,00	4,05	50,30	43 63	4
March 1927	22,35	67 30	2,00	20,74	18,49	24,12	7,60	18,50	20 34	7
September	12,85	71,61		21,53	10,02	28,72	5,98	30,37	5 64	5
March 1928	4,91	72,08	7,60	21,73	12,55	31, 0	16,91	11,67	13 60	7
September	6,91	71,06		23, 9	10,81	25 80	4,80	23,47	29 46	5
March 19 0	5,03	71,70	2,00	21 89	10,64	32,43	11,64	10,84	13 46	8
September	20,61	69,64		32,77	8,50	22,93	3,45	30,83	33 84	5
March 1930	20,11	70 01		30,10	10,05	31 74	7,52	19,11	21 00	7
September	13,18	75,01		23,85	17,45	25,66	2,41	25,61	28 32	5
March 1931	11,92	70,43		29,71	12,11	20,33	5,32	11,33	15 03	7

#### JOINT-STOCK BANKS

40 At the end of 1928, which is the latest year for which statistics are available, there were 28 joint-stock banks in India which had capital and reserve of Rs 5 lakhs and over. Of these, nine, namely, the Central Bank of India, the Allahabad Bank, the Bank of India, the Punjab National Bank, the Bank of Baroda, the Peoples Bank of Northern India, the Bank of Mysore, the Indian Bank and the Punjab and Sind Bank had deposits of

Rs 1 crore and over The deposits of the first five exceeded Rs 5 crores in each case

41 All the Indian joint-stock banks are registered under the Indian Companies Act A complete statement of all banking institutions in the various provinces registered under the Indian Companies Act is printed as Appendix II to this report The Act imposes no restrictions on the business which these banks may do The bigger banks perform the ordinary business of banking and, among other services, receive deposits and make loans and advances including the discounting of bills They also take part in the movement of produce from the village to the exporting port and in the distribution of imports from the ports of entry to the distributing centres The business of these banks so far as the agriculturists are concerned is usually confined to the larger landholders, the planting community and others who possess tangible and marketable security The smaller banks are generally loan offices which advance money to the professional and agricultural classes One or two Indian joint-stock banks undertake business in foreign exchange, but their turnover in this is so small that they are not ordinarily classed as exchange banks

The following statement gives certain statistics relating to joint-stock banks with capital and reserves of Rs 1 lakh and over for a number of years No statistics are available regarding joint-stock banks with capital and reserves of less than Rs 1 lakh

*Capital and Reserves, Deposits and Cash Balances of Indian Joint-Stock Banks*

Year	CLASS A				CLASS B			
	Banks with Capital and Reserves of Rs 5 lakhs and over				Banks with Capital and Reserves of Rs 1 lakh and over but less than Rs 5 lakhs			
	No of Banks	Capital and Reserves	Deposits	Cash balances	No of Banks	Capital and Reserves	Deposits	Cash balances
		Rs (Lakhs)	Rs (Lakhs)	Rs (Lakhs)		Rs (Lakhs)	Rs (Lakhs)	Rs (Lakhs)
1922	27	10,64	61,64	12,04	41	1,11	3,38	56
1923	26	9,73	44,43	7,37	43	1,11	3,26	61
1924	29	10,71	52,50	11,30	11	1,08	2,69	35
1925	28	10,60	54,49	10,10	46	1,18	3,12	68
1926	28	10,84	59,68	9,12	47	1,26	3,47	82
1927	29	11,08	60,84	7,70	48	1,22	3,46	52
1928	28	11,10	62,85	8,19	46	1,20	3,50	52

## EXCHANGE BANKS.

42 There are in all 18 exchange banks doing foreign exchange business in India. All of them are non-Indian, and two are concerned mainly with tourist traffic. The principal business of the other banks is the financing of India's foreign trade. They receive deposits both on current and savings bank account, receive fixed deposits, purchase bills in foreign currencies, make loans against shipping and other documents, and finance imports of bullion. They also play some part in the financing of the inland trade, mainly on account of goods or produce in transit prior to export or immediately subsequent to import. But having regard to the fact that all the information that is available to the Committee is the consolidated statement for all the foreign banks given on page 336, it is not possible for us to state what portion of the funds of these banks is employed in the foreign trade of India and what portion in inland business. The table on page 336 shows that out of the total resources of Rs 88 crores Rs 10 crores were invested in bills of exchange in transit to London and elsewhere overseas. The terms for the deposits of these banks are, as a rule, higher than those of the Imperial Bank of India but lower than those of the Indian joint-stock banks. While the Imperial Bank of India does not allow interest on current accounts, the exchange banks generally allow 2 per cent on daily balances exceeding a minimum limit up to Rs 1 lakh. The exchange banks do not publish any statements relating to their Indian business separately. The table below gives such figures as are available.

*Capital and Reserves, Indian Deposits and Cash Balances of the Exchange Banks in India*

Year	Number of banks	Capital, Reserve and Rest	Deposits in India	Cash balances in India
		(£1,000)	(£1,000)	(£1,000)
1922	18	112,221	55,038	12,132
1923	18	140,103	51,332	10,859
1924	18	130,464	52,976	12,275
1925	18	138,311	52,909	7,062
1926	18	145,003	53,658	8,016
1927	18	180,919	51,647	6,098
1928	18	187,923	53,354	6,042

## CO-OPERATIVE BANKS

43 Co-operative banks are established under the Co-operative Societies Acts. They consist of the provincial bank at the apex, the central banks which are affiliated to the provincial bank, and the primary societies which are mostly affiliated to the central banks. At the end of 1929 there were 18 co-operative banks with capital and reserves of Rs 5 lakhs and over, and 140 with capital and reserves of between Rs 1 lakh and Rs 5 lakhs. Under the Acts and the rules of the Co-operative Department, the co-operative banks and societies are debarred, except with the general or special sanction of the Registrar, from lending to anyone who is not a member of the institution. Most of the primary societies are agricultural and their main function is to supply credit to the agriculturist and educate him in the principles and practice of co-operation and thrift. The provincial banks assist the central banks by advancing funds for use as part of their working capital and also by the grant of ordinary and special cash credits to enable the central banks to work on a low level of till money. The provincial banks obtain their finance mainly from deposits from the public, but central banks and primary societies also contribute to the resources of the provincial banks in the shape of share capital and deposits of their surplus funds. The provincial banks have also arrangements for cash credits and overdrafts with the Imperial Bank of India.

44 The principal function of the central banks is to supply the working capital needed by their affiliated primary societies. They obtain their finance partly from the apex provincial bank and partly from deposits by the public. The majority of shares in central banks are held by affiliated societies. The more successful central banks have built up substantial reserves. The primary societies maintain a register of assets and liabilities of each individual member and a copy of this is kept by the central bank.

45 There are also non-agricultural societies both with limited and unlimited liability which cater to the needs of a great variety of persons including officers of Government, employees of industrial companies, contractors, small traders, fishermen, weavers, artisans and depressed classes. Prominent among these societies, from the point of view of banking, are co-operative urban banks. These are generally institutions with limited liability, drawing their funds largely from deposits and financing the small trader and the small industrialist.

The following table gives certain statistics relating to the number, capital and reserves, and deposits and loans of co-operative banks for a number of years —

*Capital and Reserves, and Deposits and Loans received, of  
Co-operative Banks*

(In lakhs of rupees)

Year	Class A			Class B		
	Banks with Capital and Reserves of Rs 5 lakhs and over			Banks with Capital and Reserves of Rs 1 lakh and over, but less than Rs 5 lakhs		
	Number	Capital and reserves	Deposits and loans received	Number	Capital and reserves	Deposits and loans received
1922-23	5	44	3,41	63	1,31	5,02
1923-24	8	62	4,14	72	1,73	5,87
1924-25	8	69	4,51	93	1,70	8,04
1925-26	10	91	5,38	104	2,03	9,30
1926-27	12	1,12	7,01	119	2,25	11,98
1927-28	16	1,50	8,83	125	2,47	13,16
1928-29	16	1,63	9,01	140	2,77	14,87

46 The Government help the co-operative organization in various ways

(1) They give occasional assistance by means of money grants or loans to particular banks or societies.

(2) They give subsidies to co-operative federations which are organizations formed by the societies themselves for the purposes of auditing primary societies, supervising primary societies in backward areas, and training probationers

(3) They provide a staff of officials to direct the audit of co-operative societies and to supervise and stimulate their activities

The avowed policy of Government towards the movement is to encourage non-official administration, so far as this is consistent with their ultimate responsibility to secure the advance of the movement on sound lines, though there is still, particularly in some provinces, a large measure of official control

(4) They have guaranteed interest on long-term debentures in certain cases

(5) They have granted the following general concessions —

(i) Exemption from various taxes, e g , income-tax, stamp duty and registration fees



- (ii) Transfer of funds at par (through the agency of Government) from one society or bank to another for co-operative purposes
- (iii) Freedom of the shares or interest of members in co-operative societies from liability to attachment by the decree of a civil court
- (iv) Prior claim over other creditors in enforcing recovery of their dues in certain cases. In Bombay the prior claim has been replaced by a 'first charge'

### INDIGENOUS BANKING SYSTEM

47 *Shroffs* and money-lenders form an important credit agency in the Indian banking system. In many parts of India they are still the only source of credit. The difference between *shroffs* and money-lenders is that while the latter work generally with their own capital, the former use also borrowed money either in the form of deposits from the public or by drawing and discounting *hundis*. At times the village money-lender borrows from the urban money-lender or a city *shroff*. The various classes of money-lenders and *shroffs* and their methods of business are described in later chapters.

48 A certain number of indigenous *shroffs* and bankers work largely on modern lines and transact all kinds of business which the ordinary joint-stock banks transact including the issue of pass-books and cheque books. They do not, however, publish balance-sheets and their management is entirely in the hands of a single proprietor or a firm of proprietors. A reference may be made in this connection to the Bank of Chettinad, Limited, recently registered in the Madras Presidency under the Indian Companies Act for carrying on the business of banking and all other lines of business which Nattukkottai Chettivars have been accustomed to do, with a subscribed capital of Rs. 2 crores and a paid-up capital of Rs. 1 crore and with the head office in Chettinad.

### LAND MORTGAGE BANKS

49 Land mortgage banks have been started under the ægis of the co-operative movement in the Punjab, Madras, Bombay, Bengal and Assam, but they are not sufficiently large in number or in size to meet fully the requirements of the Indian agriculturists for long-term credit for the redemption of mortgages of land, for the clearance of debt and for land improvements. The number of existing institutions and their membership and capital are given below.

*Land Mortgage Banks (on the 30th June 1930) \**

	Number of Socie ties	Membership	In thousands			
			Share Capital and Reserve	Depo- sits	Loans	Total Work- ing Capital
			Rs	Rs	Rs	Rs
Ajmer Merwara	13	757	8		60	68
Assam .	5	1,593	88	3,00	74	4,62
Bengal .	4	2,099	78	2	3,30	4,10
Bihar and Orissa .	No land mortgage banks					
Bombay .	3	749	51	24	75	1,50
Burma . . . . .	2	281	4	47	.	51
Central Provinces .	No land mortgage banks					
Delhi .	No land mortgage banks					
Madras . . . . .	28	3,004	2,28	2,43	7,97	12,68
North-West Frontier Pro vince	No land mortgage banks					
Punjab .	12	5,625	1,75	14,19	6,84	22,78
United Provinces .	1	34	1		8	9
Total	68	14,142	6,33	20,35	20,28	46,96

## LOAN OFFICES IN BENGAL.(1)

50 Of a different class from the land mortgage banks referred to above, which have as their object the amelioration of the conditions of the agriculturist, are the loan offices in Bengal started originally along the lines of land mortgage banking. On the 31st of March 1929 there were 782 loan offices at work, out of which only 26 were in Calcutta and the rest in the mofussil. Their paid-up capital is generally small and only 13 have a paid-up capital of Rs 1 lakh or more. They attract funds by deposits and the total working funds with loan offices on the 31st March 1929 are estimated at about Rs 9 crores. The majority of loan offices carry on land mortgage banking in a greater or less degree and also grant loans against ornaments. Some loans are on personal security. A

\* The dates vary with reference to the Co operative year in each province, the latest figures available are given.

(1) Bengal, paras 420—463

few carry on trading with banking, but this practice is being gradually abandoned. Many loan offices in Calcutta advance money against Calcutta house properties, while some, both in Calcutta as well as in the mofussil, undertake commercial banking operations. Some loan offices grant loans against crops in godowns or in transit. A few finance industries by advances against block

Some of these loan offices are called "banks" in the annual reports of the Registrar of Joint Stock Companies while the rest are styled as loan offices. We are told that this classification is based on the memoranda of association.

#### *Nidhis* AND CHIT FUNDS IN MADRAS (1)

51 The *nidhis* were originally started as mutual loan societies, but in the course of years they have developed into semi-banking institutions. They receive deposits either in the form of deposits proper, or of withdrawable share capital paid in monthly instalments, and they make loans for all purposes. All of them are registered under the Indian Companies Act, five as banks and the rest as *nidhis*. On the 31st March 1929, there were 228 *nidhis* in the Presidency of which 123 were in one district alone. The total paid-up capital of these 228 institutions is about Rs. 2½ crores and their deposits and reserve funds amount to about Rs. 1½ crores. The loans are generally made to members, but surplus funds are made available to non-members also.

52 The "chit fund" is a loose organization of a small number of people and is a very useful institution for facilitating savings. These savings are pooled together and made available to members in various ways which depend upon the particular system followed. The chit funds are found chiefly in the south and south-west of the Madras Presidency, and to a lesser extent in other parts. They are also very numerous in the Travancore State.

#### GOVERNMENT

53 The operations of the Government as a credit agency fall under several heads —

- (i) They grant *takavi* loans to agriculturists for agricultural operations, land improvement, and other prescribed objects.
- (ii) They grant loans under the State Aid to Industries Acts in the provinces of Bihar and Orissa and Madras, and under the Industrial Loans Act in the Punjab, for the purpose of promoting nascent and cottage industries.
- (iii) They purchase debentures issued by land mortgage banks.
- (iv) They grant loans to co-operative societies for various purposes.

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(1) Madras, paras. 438—496.

- (v) They grant loans to municipalities and district boards. They advance small sums of money to their own officers against the security of their provident funds and for the purchase of means of conveyance. Loans are also granted to land holders under exceptional circumstances.

The financial assistance rendered by Government under all the above heads is, however, of no great magnitude.

54 In addition to floating annual loans mainly for their capital expenditure the Government are continually in the market for short-term funds through the medium of treasury bills. They also provide facilities for savings by the small investor through postal savings banks and postal cash certificates. The following statements give some statistics relating to the borrowing operations of Government during the five years ending with 1929-30.

*New Loan Issues*

(In lakhs of rupees)

—	Cash	Conversions	Total	Description
1925-26 . . .	No cash subscriptions invited.	30,61	30,61	5th issue of 5 per cent income tax free loan 1945-55 and 5 per cent taxable ten-year bonds 1935
1926-27 . . .	16,77	12,73	29,50	4 per cent taxable loan 1960-70 at issue price Rs 88 per cent
1927-28 . . .	8,21	11,33	19,54	4 per cent taxable 1934-37 loan at issue price Rs 94.8 per cent
1928-29 . . .	23,92	11,12	35,04	4½ per cent taxable 1955-60 loan at issue price Rs 94 per cent and 4½ per cent taxable (1934) bonds at Rs 97.8 per cent.
1929-30 . . .	13.60	23,65	37,25	5 per cent taxable 1939-44 loan at issue price Rs 96.8 per cent and 2nd issue of 5 per cent taxable 1935 bonds at issue price Rs 98 per cent.

During 1930-31 the loan issued was in the form of 6 per cent taxable 1933-36 bonds at par and amounted to Rs 29,71 lakhs, made up of cash subscriptions Rs 21,39 lakhs and conversions Rs 8,32 lakhs.

*Statement of Treasury Bills issued and paid off*

(In lakhs of rupees)

	Issued	Paid off	Net issued
1925-26			.
1926-27	.	.	..
1927-28	30,37	22,78	7,59
1928-29	22,38	25,97	—3,59
1929-30	64,74	32,70	32,04

The amount of treasury bills outstanding on 31st March, 1930, stood at Rs 36,04 lakhs \*

*Issues and discharges of the Postal Cash Certificates.*

(In lakhs of rupees)

	Issues	Discharges	Net	Outstandings at the end of the year
1925-26	9,55	1,70	7,85	20,97
1926-27	7,53	1,82	5,71	26,68
1927-28	6,09	2,07	4,02	30,70
1928-29	4,91	3,31	1,60	32,30
1929-30	7,16	4,46	2,70	35,00

*Postal Savings Banks*

(In lakhs of rupees)

	Receipts	Withdrawals	Net Deposits	Outstandings at the end of the year
1925-26	19,79	18,20	1,59	27,23
1926-27	21,17	18,89	2,28	29,51
1927-28	24,00	20,84	3,16	32,67
1928-29	26,22	24,40	1,82	34,49
1929-30	27,28	24,64	2,64	37,13

\* On the 31st March 1931, the amount of treasury bills outstanding stood at Rs 55,38 lakhs

## INSURANCE COMPANIES

55 The total number of companies transacting life, fire, marine and other classes of insurance business in India, according to the Insurance Blue Book of 1929, is 245, of which 97 are Indian and 148 non-Indian (including 72 British)

Insurance companies, both Indian and non-Indian, occupy a very important place in the Indian financial system, as they hold for long periods a considerable portion of the savings of the people. The net premium income from business done in India under all classes of insurance, received by both Indian and non-Indian companies, stood at the close of the year 1928 at about Rs 10 crores, of which over Rs 5 crores went to non-Indian companies. The total assets in India of non-Indian companies on the same date were Rs 30 crores, while those of Indian companies were about Rs 23 crores

Besides lending a certain amount to their policy-holders, these companies invest a substantial portion of their resources in Government securities and treasury bills, thereby relieving the stringency in the money market to a large extent. Some of the Indian companies also (1) invest their funds in mortgage of landed properties, and in purchasing debentures of co-operative banks, and shares and debentures of industrial banks, or otherwise financing the latter, and (2) make deposits with, or grant loans to, mofussil banks and loan offices which in their turn often utilize these resources in financing indigenous industries. A few Life Offices also invest a portion of their funds in land development somewhat on the lines of Building Societies in England

## CHAPTER IV.

### RURAL FINANCE.

#### INTRODUCTORY.

56 The problem of rural finance and certain allied questions have been thoroughly investigated by the Provincial Banking Enquiry Committees. It is not necessary to recapitulate all the facts and figures that find a place in the provincial reports. Only the salient points which will have a bearing on our final recommendations are here discussed. The recommendations of the Provincial Committees have been brought together in Appendix III and an indication is given therein as to how each recommendation has been dealt with by us.

#### THE ECONOMIC POSITION OF THE AGRICULTURIST.

57 Before we proceed to discuss the problem of rural finance proper, we desire to give a very brief account of the economic position of the agriculturist, as it has an obvious bearing on the problem. There are no reliable economic data giving anything like a precise estimate of the cost of production, the value of produce raised and the income of the agriculturists from subsidiary occupations from which their family budgets can be constructed so as to enable us to furnish accurate statistical information regarding their actual economic condition. Nevertheless the reports of the Royal Commission on Agriculture and other Commissions and Committees\* which have reported from time to time on the general condition of the people, and the reports of the Provincial Banking Enquiry Committees and the evidence and other materials collected by the Provincial Committees, contain a mass of useful information bearing on the general economic position of the Indian agriculturist. It is unnecessary for us here to reproduce the whole of that information or to enter into a detailed examination of the various aspects of this important question. Our main purpose will be served by sketching in broad outlines some of the salient features emerging from the information referred to above. The outstanding feature of Indian rural economy which is bound to arrest the attention of any one who enters on an investigation of the question is the appalling poverty of the rural population. The Simon Commission make the following observations at page 334, Vol. I of their Report on the general condition of the people —

“The low standard of living to which the mass of India's population attain is one of the first things that strike

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\* Indian Famine Commissions, 1880, 1898 and 1901, Indian Irrigation Commission, 1903, Indian Taxation Enquiry Committee, 1925, Economic Enquiry Committee, Madras, 1931, and Depression Enquiry Committee, Madras, 1931.

a Western visitor. Wants are few, diet is simple, climate is usually kind, and a deep-rooted tradition tends to make the countrymen content with things as they are. But the depth of the poverty, the pervading presence of which cannot escape notice, is not so easily realised. There have been no official estimates of income per head since 1901-2, when Lord Curzon stated in his budget speech that the average income per inhabitant of British India had been estimated at Rs 30, i.e., £2 a year. Since the War, certain Indian and European professors of economics attached to Indian Universities have, by different statistical methods, attempted to measure the total income of the country in particular years \* \* \*. Such estimates are necessarily based on inadequate data, for the unsatisfactory nature of the statistical material available has been the subject of comment by almost every committee or commission that has enquired into the economic affairs of India \* \* \*. Even if the most optimistic of the above estimates is adopted, the result is that the average income of India per head in 1922 was equivalent, at the prevailing rate of exchange to less than £8, while the corresponding figure for Great Britain was £95. The contrast remains startling, even after allowing for the difference between the range of needs to be satisfied."

"This estimate does not give a picture of rural India separately. The income of the agricultural population per head when separately assessed will be much smaller. From the reports of the Provincial Committees and other published statistical information, the total gross value of the annual agricultural produce would work to about Rs 1,200 crores on the basis of the 1928 price levels. On this basis and taking into consideration the probable income from certain subsidiary occupations estimated at 20 per cent of the agricultural income, and ignoring the rise in population in the last decade and the fall in prices since 1928, the average income of an agriculturist in British India does not work out at a higher figure than about Rs 42 or a little over £3 a year. Thus the general poverty of the agricultural classes is a matter which is beyond dispute."

58 The proportion of the population of India living on agriculture is very large and it has been steadily on the increase. This proportion was 61 per cent in the year 1891. It rose to 66 per cent in 1901 and to 73 per cent in 1921. The census figures for 1931 are not available to us, but it may fairly be presumed that the proportion has risen still higher in 1931. The average extent of land that the Indian agriculturist cultivates is comparatively



very small and the individual fields which make up his "holding" are generally scattered. The total net area sown with crop in 1927-28 was about 220 million acres, which gives roughly a little over an acre per head of the agricultural population or about 6 acres to an agricultural family of five persons. Many authorities, among whom Mr. Darling may be mentioned, consider that this extent of an average holding is inadequate to maintain an agricultural family in ordinary comfort in the conditions which exist in India at the present day. Various estimates have been attempted as to what an economic holding in India should be and the minimum extent of land which is required for the subsistence of an average agricultural family. But having regard to the widely differing conditions of the soils and other factors in the several parts of the country, we do not consider that any useful purpose will be served by an examination of these estimates. Practically all Provincial Banking Enquiry Committees agree that the bulk of the agricultural holdings in India are too small and agricultural incomes are very low.

59 Moreover, nature exercises a powerful influence on the fortunes of the agriculturist, and the Indian cultivator is in a large measure exposed to the vicissitudes of seasons. The land in areas which are not protected by irrigation works cannot be cultivated, if the monsoon is not favourable. Of the total cultivated area in the country about 16 per cent. only has irrigation facilities from rivers, tanks or wells, while the remaining 84 per cent. depends merely on rainfall. These unfavourable conditions might have been mitigated to some extent by a well-conceived policy of irrigation by the State, particularly in regard to minor works, to which reference has been made in paragraph 279 of the report of the Royal Commission on Agriculture in India. There is water in many localities which are now not productive owing to the want of irrigation facilities, and the problem of making water available to cultivators is one on the solution of which by the State, the prosperity of the agriculturist as such undoubtedly depends largely. The frequency of failure of crops owing to drought and flood and pests, and the low vitality and high mortality of the live stock render the economic position of the cultivator worse still.

60 The produce from land per head of the population and per acre is low compared with that of many other countries. There has been no substantial increase in recent years in the total area of the cultivated land, the average annual net area sown with crops in the five years ending with 1927-28 being 225 million acres against 217 million acres in the preceding quinquennium. The consequence is that the average cultivator still continues to live on an insufficiency of food which reacts on his physical capacity for work and largely accounts for the high percentage of mortality in the country. Dr. Harold M. Mann, for sometime Director of Agriculture in Bombay, drew very pointed attention to this aspect of Indian

rural economy These conditions cannot be wholly ascribed to an undue increase in population and consequent pressure on land Let us compare the growth of population in India with that in England Taking the three decades for which census figures are available for both countries, we find that in England and Wales the increase of population between 1891 to 1901 was 12.17 per cent, between 1901 to 1911, 10.91 per cent and between 1911 to 1921, 4.8 per cent, while the increase of population in British India during the same decades was respectively 2.4 per cent, 5.5 per cent and 1.3 per cent \* Nor can the low productivity be justly ascribed to the inefficiency or ignorance of the Indian cultivator The standard of inherited skill in husbandry of the Indian cultivator is high, but the farmers of other countries are undoubtedly in a position of greater advantage inasmuch as they are aided by the discoveries of scientific research made available to them by an enlightened State policy in regard to agriculture

In this connection we should like to invite attention to the comparatively low expenditure on agriculture in India by the Central and Provincial Governments The following table which is given on page 176 in "The Punjab Peasant" by Mr Darling will be found interesting in Pro and D.

Country	Per 1,000 of population	Per 1,000 acres cultivated.
	Rs	Rs
United States (1919-20)	1,020	210
United Kingdom (1921)	960	1,380
Germany (1910)	945	705
Italy (1925-26)	255	184
British India (1924-25)	34	30

61 Another potent factor which contributes to the extreme economic weakness of the Indian agriculturist is the inadequacy of subsidiary occupations which supplement his slender income from agriculture As early as 1880, the Indian Famille Commission pointed out that "A main cause of the disastrous consequences of Indian famines and one of the greatest difficulties in the way of providing reliefs in an effectual shape is to be found in the fact that the great mass of the population directly depends on agriculture and that there is no other industry from which any considerable part of the community derives its support The failure of the

\* "A Study in Indian Economics" by Pramathanath Banerjee, M.A. 1928, page 37

usual rains thus deprives the labouring classes as a whole not only of the ordinary supplies of food obtainable at prices within their reach, but also of the sole employment by which they can earn the means of procuring it. The complete remedy for this condition of things will be found only in the development of industries other than agriculture, and independent of fluctuations of seasons. With a population so dense as that of India, these considerations are of the greatest weight and they are rendered still more serious by the fact that the numbers who have no other employment than agriculture are in large parts of the country greatly in excess of what is really required for the cultivation of the land. So far as this is the case, the result must be that the part of the population which is in excess of the requirements of agriculture eats up the profit that would otherwise spring from the industry of the community. It is not surprising in a country thus situated that material progress is slow."

62 A recent investigation into the economic condition of the agriculturist in certain districts of the province of Madras was made by a Committee appointed by the Madras Government with the concurrence of the provincial legislature and their report was published this year. That committee summarized certain factors affecting the economic position of the cultivator in the area of their investigation. Some of the conclusions of that Committee will probably be found to apply to other parts of India also, and therefore we reproduce the relevant portions below. (Pages 98 and 99 of the report)

- (1) While population has increased, extension of cultivation has not kept pace with it
- (2) There is no improvement in the condition of un-employment of agricultural labour
- (3) Fragmentation of holdings has increased and the average area of holdings has gone down
- (4) The indebtedness of the agricultural population is heavy hampers cultivation and reduces incomes
- (5) Land is changing hands rapidly owing to many causes and ryots are unable to repay their debts except by the sale of their lands
- (6) The margins available for maintenance of the cultivator's family, after paying the assessments, are either inadequate or nil
- (7) In most rural parts the value of the agricultural produce is insufficient, after meeting the demands of the Government revenue, for the maintenance of the agriculturists, so that, while a few rich people get richer,

and a small number remain on the margin of subsistence, the majority are running into debt and losing their hold on land which is frequently changing hands

- (8) The system of land revenue is based too much on *averages* (average rainfalls, average supply of water, average outturns, average prices, etc.) The inelasticity of the system leads to low production and indebtedness. It is antiquated, and is not in keeping with the trend of land revenue policy in civilised countries. Land revenue in India is much heavier in its incidence than other taxes

We should like to add the following other factors which affect the economic position of the cultivator in India —

- (a) the comparatively small spread of literacy,
- (b) the existence of social habits which do not conduce to progress,
- (c) limited opportunities for fuller life and for initiative and enterprise, and
- (d) absence of definite efforts made by the Government or the people on a large scale to raise the status of the agriculturist and to effect an all-round improvement and uplift

Among the recommendations of the committee referred to in the preceding paragraph is to be found the following —

“To relieve unemployment, cottage industries and industries connected with agriculture (conversion of raw materials into finished products) should be started under government auspices, or private enterprises encouraged with liberal State aid”

The agriculturist has sufficient spare time on his hands to devote himself to subsidiary occupations to supplement his income from agriculture if such occupations can be pursued profitably. But he has been exposed to the full blast of competition of forces from the rest of the world and many of the industries on which he relied in the past in a system of self-sufficing economy have suffered largely from, or been wiped out by, the competition of machine-made articles

63 It is necessary to add that the effects of the world competition are felt not only in the cottage industries but also in agriculture itself. The recent fall in the world prices of cotton, rice, wheat, jute and groundnut, only to mention a few of the principal commodities, has made the cultivator conscious of forces operating from

afar and affecting him powerfully. Here again there is no effective action by the State for avoiding or mitigating the adverse influences which affect the farmer.

64 In all parts of India the cultivator is steeped in indebtedness. We have dealt at length on the extent and effects of rural debt on the economic condition of the cultivator elsewhere in the report, as the question is intimately connected with our Enquiry. His credit needs are satisfied, if at all, inadequately and at ruinous prices. The nature of the interest in the land he cultivates varies from ownership to mere tenancy at will, and the efficiency of agriculture over large parts of the country is in consequence adversely affected by his possessing a restricted and precarious right in the land he cultivates, thus giving him no incentive to improve the land. Under the circumstances mentioned above agricultural land in parts of India can scarcely be said to form valuable security for raising capital and credit that the agriculturist certainly needs.

65 Further, the Indian agriculturist is now being drawn slowly but steadily in the sphere of influence of markets, both national and international. But here again he has neither organization nor the credit facilities to help him as in countries like the United States of America, Canada, Denmark, Germany and other European countries. The disorganized condition of the cultivators which in certain cases is accentuated by the existence of the powerful organizations of the buyers, and the lack of proper credit facilities enabling them to hold on to their crops in time of plenty, often prevent them in India from obtaining a fair price for their produce.

66 In addition to these numerous difficulties from which the agriculturist suffers, he has another serious handicap namely illiteracy. The percentage of literacy in India is still very low, and technical education in agriculture can hardly be expected to make any progress without the back-ground of general education.

#### THE PROBLEM OF RURAL FINANCE.

67 Agriculture is an industry and, like other industries, requires both short-term and long-term finance, but there are certain fundamental differences between agricultural and industrial finance —

(1) In agriculture, the units of production are essentially a one-man concern—and the credit available for the concern is limited to the credit of one man or one family. The method of raising capital by the device of joint-stock enterprise namely, by subscription, is not open to this industry. The limited extent to which

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\*Vide Report of the Committee on Agricultural Credit in England 1923 and Report on Agricultural Credit in England 1927 'The Condition of Agriculture in the United States and Measures for its improvement', being a report by the Businessmen's Commission on Agriculture, and 'Agricultural Economics' by G. O'Brien

a recourse to this method is recommended by some Provincial Committees in connection with the land mortgage banks is referred to later. The peculiar feature which renders farming more helpless than other branches of industries is its persistent small scale organization. While other industries tend to become concentrated in units of ever-expanding size, agriculture remains scattered, individualistic, small scale and chaotic. These peculiarities reflect themselves in the supply of capital to the agriculturist. Generally speaking, as a producer, the farmer thus remains dependent on his own resources. The savings of the general community are relatively inaccessible to him. Further, while the industrialist can capitalize the future, or raise money on "estimated" earning power, the agriculturist cannot, there being no commercial measure of these things in agriculture acceptable to the ordinary investor. While, therefore, the manufacturer raises his capital by subscription, the farmer must raise much of his capital by credit.

(2) As pointed out by the Committee on Agricultural Credit in England (1923), "in the very nature of things the agriculturist is often isolated and remote from the normal opportunities for obtaining credit. Compared with those of the manufacturer and the trader, his operations are complex, long in their cycle and subject to exceptional risks from weather and disease beyond the ordinary ups and downs of prices and wages which he suffers in common with industrialists. For the greater part of the year, and especially when he is most in need of credit, his capital is sunk in forms of wealth, difficult for any one but an expert to value and not readily chargeable as security for an advance, while his personal training and method of life are not such as to fit him to surmount these natural disadvantages and to establish that position in the credit market to which his financial stability and high standard of probity generally entitle him."

(3) Another feature of agricultural production in general, and also of particular agricultural crops, is inelasticity of supply and the comparative difficulty of adjusting the supply to fluctuations in demand. Devices which are open to the industrialist are not available, in the same degree, to the agriculturist in controlling production. On the decline of demand, an industrialist can slow down or cease production altogether but not the farmer. Output cannot be stopped on a farm as it can be in a factory, if the land is not cultivated by man, it will produce its own crops of weeds. Moreover the abandonment of the farm implies the abandonment of the home and will be undertaken far less readily than the abandonment of a workshop. The need for finance thus remains constant, though production may be unprofitable. This feature of inelasticity in production leads to a lowering in the standard of living and ultimately, to the morass of indebtedness. Indebtedness is not *per se* an evil, but the trouble arises when the debt is incurred by

a farmer who does not know the two cardinal points of farming, *viz.*, what farming costs, and what it brings him. This position becomes worse, specially in a country like India, with an illiterate peasantry

(4) The phenomenon of over-production which may occur both in industry and agriculture creates some special difficulties for the latter. As a rule, industries are more centralised and can avail themselves of adequate credit facilities from existing machinery enabling them to withhold from the market a part of their supply and exercise a certain degree of control over the price by agreement on some scheme of restriction of production. The agriculturists, on the other hand, are totally disorganised, being scattered over a wide area, and having generally speaking, no such credit institution as can undertake the enormous task of providing them with the necessary credit for regulating the supply of their produce. Their necessity for such help is thus much greater than that of industries and the circumstances call for some special arrangement through State assistance to extend cheap facilities for credit to the cultivators in order that they may hold on to their crop for better prices. This is particularly needed in a country like India where the absence of necessary credit facilities and the illiteracy of the cultivators have made it impossible for them to safeguard their own economic interests, while their poverty, ignorance and debt obligations compel them to sell their crops for whatever price these may fetch immediately the harvesting is over.

(5) The principal security for long-term credit, which the farmer can usually offer, is the land itself. In all countries agricultural land and other forms of real property are a most unsuitable form of security in commercial banking, for land is not a readily realizable asset and its price is liable to peculiar influences, and necessitates a special machinery for ascertainment. Moreover, investments in them are so much frozen credit, so far as commercial banking is concerned. Again, there may be difficulties in connection with titles and restrictions, customary or statutory, on the right of transfer. In India, the existing restrictions on the right of transfer operate to reduce the agriculturist's credit and to increase the interest charges by increasing the risks of lending money to him. In fact, the word agriculturist as used in India comprehends a variety of persons from the cultivating proprietor (the landlord who has an absolute free-hold interest in the holding, subject only to meeting the demands of the State on the land) to a landless agricultural labourer. Indeed agricultural interests in the land may, and not infrequently do, comprise numerous intermediate interests in between the State and the actual cultivator as a result of the systems of tenures, under-tenures and sub-tenancies, which are recognised by custom or law or both. It is perfectly obvious that all these agriculturists cannot

get the same kind of financial accommodation and that in the case of some, it may not be possible to get any accommodation at all.

(6) The accomplishment of the task of successfully constructing and maintaining the machinery of rural finance, that is to say, establishing a satisfactory link between agricultural industry and the money market, between the farmer seeking credit and the capitalist seeking investment, has been found to be by no means easy in any part of the world. It is much less easy in India where farming is essentially in the hands of small farmers and is so different from other forms of productive industries that the ordinary credit machinery which serves the needs of industrialists and the traders is *prima facie* unsuitable to agriculture. Effectively to finance the cultivators of a single district or even of a taluka, the resources of a commercial bank have to be distributed amongst thousands of small borrowers. Comparatively more liquid and more easily realisable assets of the cultivator to back up a banking credit are his crops or live stock or dairy produce. Even these are precarious forms of security owing to the physical risks to which production is subject, such as floods, failure of monsoon, pestilence among live-stock and so forth. The most honest and thrifty farmer cannot under such contingencies always pay back punctually his debt, and if agricultural credit should have beneficial effects, the creditor should postpone his demand until the effects of a devastating visitation are over or a more favourable season comes round. Again, if the credit, advanced to a farmer, of a substantial sum cannot wholly be recovered from a year's harvest without starving his other economic needs, his limited repaying capacity necessitates the recovery of the same in small dribblets over a number of years, out of the margin of the profits of his farming. The rapid circulation of money being essential to the success of a commercial bank and the bulk of its working capital being derived from short-term deposits or call money, a commercial bank cannot, generally speaking, obviously afford to postpone its recoveries or tie up its resources to accommodate the farmers' needs. The commercial banks therefore do not, to any appreciable extent, directly connect the agriculturists with the money market, although they can render valuable financial assistance to the agriculturists in indirect ways, as will be shown later.

68 These important differences between agriculture and other industries give rise to special problems of rural finance requiring special treatment all the world over. As stated in the Report on Agricultural Credit in England (1927), "Credit and the machinery of borrowing and lending now form an integral part of the industrial system of all civilised countries, but in almost every agricultural country, credit for agriculture has come to be treated as a special question requiring, in many cases, special organization and, generally, special legislation." Even in America, where farms are



large and agriculture much more organized, the need for special treatment of agriculture in the matter of capital and credit has been fully recognized as borne out by the following short extract from the Report of the Businessmen's Commission on Agriculture

"Assuming that the essential facts have been ascertained and are understood, it is commonly accepted that the farmer's problem may be approached and solved like any other business, industrial or economic question. This, it is submitted, involves a fallacy and if acted upon must invite confusion worse confounded. Elements of business are, however, present. It is true, and business methods must be observed, but the pursuit of agriculture presents other features so peculiar, indeed so unique, that the failure to take account of them must lead to gravest miscalculation"

69 In some western countries, especially England, a very large volume of rural credit is provided by the commercial banks. This is due mainly to the penetration into the country-side of the branch banking system. The Committee on Agricultural Credit in England (1923) ascertained from each of the five leading banks in England and Wales the precise extent of their loans to agriculturists and found that a sum of £46½ millions was the amount of loans outstanding against farmers, of which £26 millions represented loans for the purchase of agricultural land and £20 millions normal loans for current trading. The uneconomic nature of the majority of the holdings, the slenderness of the security that the agriculturist can offer and certain other causes perhaps account for the joint-stock banks in India not having provided any substantial amount of rural credit. It is chiefly on this account that the sowcar or the money-lender has been, and is still, the main source from which the cultivator derives his financial accommodation, however, uneconomic the conditions on which it is obtained may be. In order, therefore, to leave the farmer some part of the profits of his farming effort, it is necessary to devise a satisfactory system of rural finance.

70 There is also another broad aspect of the problem of rural finance. It arises out of the interest of the nation as a whole to maintain agriculture in an efficient condition and the obligation of the State in that matter. The Businessmen's Commission on Agriculture in America emphasises this aspect of Rural Finance in their report where they say "Agriculture is not merely a way of making money by raising crops, it is not merely an industry or a business, it is essentially a public function or service performed by private individuals for the care and use of the land in the national interest, and farmers in the course of their pursuit of a living and a private profit are the custodians of the basis of the national life. Agriculture is therefore affected with a clear and unquestionable public interest, and its status is a matter of national concern calling for deliberate and far sighted national policies, not only to conserve the natural and human resources involved in it,

but to provide for the national security, promote a well-rounded prosperity, and secure social and political stability ”

#### THE FUNCTION OF CREDIT AND THE PART IT PLAYS IN AGRICULTURE.

71 The Royal Commission on Agriculture and many of the Provincial Banking Enquiry Committees have pointed out that it would be a mistake to suppose that in an easily obtainable credit alone lies the panacea for all the ills from which the Indian agriculturist suffers to-day. This is also the conclusion at which the Committees on Agricultural Credit and the Agricultural Tribunal of Investigation in England have arrived. The former at page 5 of their Report (1923) observe as follows —

“Credit alone cannot convert an unprofitable industry into a profitable one. Credit may enable an individual to make a certain operation pay which might not otherwise pay or might not otherwise be undertaken at all and the price which the producer has to pay may just turn the scale towards profit or loss in his own case. Viewed in this way credit may be an important factor in the cost of production in individual cases but it is mainly in other directions that a solution must be sought of the difficult problem of how agriculture generally can be made to pay and these lie beyond our province ”

72 The Agricultural Tribunal of Investigation whose terms of reference were wider have very lucidly analysed the factors that go to make agriculture a paying industry and they have said that the study of foreign systems of agriculture show that a large number of forces contribute to the well-being of the agricultural industry in any country. The Tribunal singled out some of those factors which in their opinion were sufficiently important to deserve special mention. With some modifications these factors are equally applicable to Indian conditions and we may briefly enumerate them as follows —

(1) *Removing the existing impediments to efficient production* — We have already referred to the necessity of improving irrigation facilities, particularly in regard to minor works, in order to increase both the area under crop and the yield. Other impediments are fragmentation and sub-division of holdings and the prevailing system of land tenure, which stands in the way of the growth in India of a class of peasant proprietors. The example of Denmark shows what the creation of peasant proprietors in land can do. Many competent observers regard the system of ownership in agricultural land as one of the influential causes in Denmark's prosperity. There the farm tenancy decreased from 42.5 per cent in 1800 to 10 per cent in 1905 and 92 per cent of the farmers in Denmark now own their farms. We have already referred in paragraph 64 to the detrimental effect which the present system

of land tenure in many parts of India has on the capability of the agriculturist to raise capital and credit to the extent required. The Central Provinces Committee are of opinion that any form of restriction on the right to transfer land must have injurious reactions on the efficiency of the cultivator. It has also been suggested that the most urgent requirement before the country today is the passing of legislation to bring consolidation of holdings into being at the earliest possible moment, and that without consolidation progressive farming is impossible.

In this connection one of our colleagues, Mr. Devadhar, has obtained some interesting statistics about the working of the Act which was passed in 1928 for the consolidation of holdings in the Chhatisgarh Division of the Central Provinces (*vide* para 1615 *et seq* of the report of the Central Provinces Provincial Banking Enquiry Committee). According to his figures, during the short period of a little over three years, during which the Act has been in operation, 502 villages have come forward to secure the benefit of the Act, 174 villages out of 502 have so far been dealt with, in all 156,500 acres of land parcelled out into thousands of small holdings have been consolidated, the expenditure to Government has been comparatively small and in view of the attractiveness of the scheme to the agriculturist, Government have now decided to recover from him one-half of the cost of consolidation.

Mr. Devadhar also suggests that in the task of rural up-lift work which is appealing to the imagination of the educated people interested in the betterment of the agriculturist, the work of consolidation of uneconomic holdings or the prevention of further fragmentation of land must be vigorously undertaken.

(ii) *The fiscal organization of the country and in particular the assistance to agriculture by tariffs and subsidies*—India has kept its door open for the import of agricultural produce from other countries and this policy, to quote a recent instance, has inflicted great hardship on the wheat producers of the country. The Royal Commission on Agriculture which considered the question of tariffs in connection with their enquiry recommended certain concessions in regard to the import duty on agricultural implements and articles used in the manufacture of such implements in India. Similarly, the grant of subsidies by the State for a limited period has been considered in certain other countries to be quite legitimate for fostering the production of certain crops and for various other purposes.

(iii) *Lowering the burdens of taxation*

(iv) *The economic organization of the industry and in particular the development among farmers of methods of purchase and sale and co-operative insurance*—Some of the Provincial Committees have emphasized the need for insurance against the unforeseen risks to which agriculture is exposed and have recommended that

the prospects of schemes of insurance of cattle and crops by Government or by co-operative organizations should be considered. We shall show in a later chapter how the existing system of purchase and sale of agricultural produce leaves a great deal to be desired. We would only mention here that we agree with the foreign banking experts that little will be gained by bringing millions of acres under cultivation, or increasing the agricultural production of the country, unless the necessary steps are taken to ensure that the commodities produced will secure a ready sale at a profitable rate.

(v) *Instituting schemes for the improvement of land, live-stock and crops, elimination and control of pests of plants and animals, provision of power and other assistance to industries subsidiary to agriculture and developing afforestation*—It is not necessary to quote here all the recommendations of the Royal Commission in regard to the several items included in this factor. To quote only a few instances, the cultivation of improved varieties of seed does not confer sufficient advantage on the producer until arrangements are made for ensuring the purity of the article sold in the market. It has been urged that legislation should be undertaken to avoid adulteration of commodities in the market and that the Government should see that such legislation is enforced. Again, the import of hydro-generated oil into this country and its sale as ghee is reported to be responsible for the very slender chance of the revival of the dairy industry in India. Further it has been suggested that the difficulties of climatic conditions in India are not insurmountable and that if arrangements for cheap power be made, a very large area under cultivation can be protected against the vagaries of nature and the existing risks of agricultural industry minimised to a great extent. The improvement of the fertility of the soil, which has been reduced by continuous cropping without manure, is another urgent requisite of agricultural prosperity.

(vi) *Organizing the transport system of the country with due regard to the interests of agriculture*—That the railway freight on the requirements of the agriculturists such as fuel and fertilisers, and on agricultural produce itself, is very high is a standing complaint against the present working of the transport system of the country. This policy is said to place a very great handicap on the agricultural produce of this country in competition with imported articles from other countries. For instance, it is understood that at the time of our report the freight per maund of wheat from Australia to Calcutta is six annas while the railway freight from Lyallpur to Calcutta is Rs 1-3-3. Similarly, it has been pointed out that chemical manures in India are not produced as by-products of other industries and that on account of prohibitive prices they cannot be profitably used for ordinary crops in India. Other manures, like bone-meal, leaf-mould and potassium nitrate, cannot be used, as the transportation charges are very heavy. We

understand that bone-meal and potassium nitrate which are manures locally produced have to pay higher freight rates than imported artificial manures. Moreover, a large quantity of farm-yard manure has to be burnt as there is no other fuel available and the cheap fuel from the forests cannot be brought to the cultivator's door on account of prohibitive freight rates. Unless these handicaps are removed, the cultivator has no chance of improving his productive capacity. We may in this connection refer to our discussions with the foreign banking experts where it was admitted that in Germany the railway freight rates are adjusted for the special benefit of agriculture.

(vii) *Establishing a system of sound general education and special provision for agricultural education and research and for embodying the results of such research within the practice of the agriculturist*—We understand that Denmark in less than half a century has raised herself to the height of prosperity by the education of her children and the improvement of her land. The spread of education among the rural population in India is of the foremost importance to agricultural development. We emphasize the necessity of embodying the results of agricultural research within the practice of the agriculturist. As it is, even the Royal Commission on Agriculture reported that although manual experiments have been carried out on every agricultural station in India, satisfactory advice to the cultivator in regard to the use of manures had not reached the stage of practical politics.

(viii) *The developing of State or voluntary organization to provide the necessary central and local machinery for carrying out measures of agricultural policy and for influencing that policy*

73 To sum up the position, we think that besides the provision of credit, the active pursuit of a progressive and constructive agricultural policy is necessary for the purpose of fostering profitable agriculture under modern conditions. In order to provide Government with the information it requires to pursue such a policy it is necessary to have a provincial organization on a permanent basis. The Provincial Committees during the course of their enquiry were confronted with the absence of any reliable or complete economic data and some of them had to enlist the assistance of a few university graduates in connection with their intensive surveys in individual villages. More than one Provincial Committee have recommended the establishment of a provincial organization on the lines of the Punjab Board of Economic Enquiry. We understand that this Board was formed in 1919 and has carried out a large number of village surveys and collected information in varied subjects such as the size and distribution of agricultural holdings, the rates of food consumed, mortgages of agricultural land, farm accounts and family budgets, and has provided a mass of useful data on the

economic position of the agriculturist. We support the recommendations of the Provincial Committees that a Provincial Board of Economic Enquiry should be started in each province to collect, correlate and analyse all the economic factors influencing the agriculturist and to present the results of the enquiry in a convenient form. As pointed out by the United Provinces Committee, the work of this Board must be of a practical rather than of a theoretical nature and the Board itself should act as a hand-maid to the Government Departments whose duty it is to promote the welfare and prosperity of the agricultural population. We do not think it is necessary for us to indicate how the Board should be constituted. This we would leave to the Provincial Governments to decide. We understand that in the Punjab it is a non-official body consisting of both officials and non-officials interested in economic studies and practically depending on a Government grant for funds.

74 Nicholson in his report on agricultural banks in India draws pointed attention to the necessity to couple credit with the promotion, almost enforcement, of thrift, providence and heedfulness in borrowing. The Irish co-operators also lay considerable emphasis on the fact that the producer cannot be dissociated from the man and that in order to bring about a change in his standard of living and in his outlook on life, the agriculturist should be tackled as a whole. Their well-known formula of rural economy is 'Better Farming, Better Business and Better Living'. The United Provinces Committee have also struck the same note in their Report where they suggest that rural reconstruction and better living societies should go hand in hand with Co-operative Credit Societies. The Royal Commission on Agriculture in dealing with the history of the Agricultural Bank of Egypt draw some lessons for the guidance of those who wish to reform the system of rural finance in India. They say "The history of this institution provides a wholesome corrective to the views of those who hold that the problems of rural debt are to be solved at a stroke by the provision of cheap and abundant credit."

75 The difficulties in dealing with the problem of the Indian agriculturist seem to be further complicated by the circumstance that in India agriculture is, with most cultivators with uneconomic holdings, more a mode of living than a business. The Royal Commission on Agriculture summed up the position in these words "To a very great extent the cultivator in India labours not for profit nor for a net return but for subsistence. The crowding of the people on the land, the lack of alternative means of securing a living, the difficulty of finding any avenue of escape and the early age at which a man is burdened with dependents combine to force the cultivator to grow food wherever he can and on whatever terms he can." Even elsewhere the farmer's chief aim is to provide the necessaries of life for his own household. He

is both the proprietor and the wage-earner and this position of mixed interest offers "a stubborn challenge to the economist's enquiries as well as to the programmes of administrators and legislators" Whatever may be the actual figure, it is generally conceded that the income of the agriculturist per head is the lowest in India as compared with most other countries. The Bombay Provincial Committee's observations may be taken as typical of the analysis of the position by other committees also. They say — 'No improvement in the existing credit system and banking facilities is likely to be effective unless it is accompanied by measures for raising the standard of living and economic condition of the mass of the population and for building up its productive strength. It is beyond our terms of reference to make specific suggestions in the matter, but we consider it essential to point out that progress of banking will depend on the spread of education and the promotion of agricultural improvement and the encouragement of industrial effort. Economic progress and development of banking being inter-dependent, banking cannot make any advance in a community sunk in poverty, ignorance and helplessness. Credit would merely supply grease to the economic machine and it is essential that all possible measures should be taken to ensure the efficient working of the entire mechanism''

70 We are, however, aware that the poor economic condition of the peasantry in India in general and the lack of proper credit facilities available to them involve them in a vicious circle. The position of many of the cultivators makes it difficult for them to furnish any security readily acceptable from the point of view of sound, safe and easily realisable investment. On the other hand the lack of cheap facilities for credit is responsible for the circumstances which compel these cultivators to resort to such money-lending agencies as impose on them quite ruinous terms regarding the conditions and rates of the loans and weaken their economic position still further through enhancement of their pre-existing debt. We do recognise that, although the economic position of these cultivators is due to various factors which do not strictly come under our purview, unless some effective measures are taken to furnish them with proper credit facilities, their economic position will grow worse day by day. We have, therefore, proposed in subsequent chapters better provision for rural credit through suitable organization of agencies like co-operative societies, land mortgage banks and money-lenders and have also suggested the creation of new facilities such as the establishment of licensed warehouses.

## CHAPTER V.

### RURAL FINANCE—(continued)

#### RURAL INDEBTEDNESS

77 The question of rural indebtedness is one of the most important questions with which we have to deal. The prosperity of the country and the successful development of trade, industry and commerce entirely depend upon the improvement in the general economic condition and in the increase in the buying power of its population engaged in, and dependent on, agriculture. To achieve this it is necessary that the problem of indebtedness, its causes and its liquidation should be effectively solved. The Provincial Banking Enquiry Committees have attempted an estimate of rural indebtedness in their respective provinces. For the reasons mentioned in the provincial reports, estimates of rural indebtedness cannot be accurate. A total of about Rs. 900 crores made up of the figures for different provinces given in the provincial reports may, however, be taken as a very rough estimate of the total rural indebtedness of India. The figures for different provinces are —

Province	Total rural indebtedness
	Rs
Assam . . . . .	22 crores
Bengal . . . . .	100 crores
Bihar and Orissa . . . . .	155 crores
Bombay . . . . .	81 crores
Burma . . . . .	50—60 crores
Central Areas . . . . .	18 crores
Central Provinces . . . . .	36 crores
Coorg . . . . .	35—55 lakhs
Madras . . . . .	150 crores.
Punjab . . . . .	135 crores
United Provinces . . . . .	124 crores

78 On the question whether the volume of agricultural indebtedness is increasing or decreasing, there is a general consensus of opinion that the volume has been increasing in the course of the last century. Sir Edward Maclagan writing in 1911 observed as follows — "It has long been recognised that indebtedness is no new thing in India. The writings of Munro, Elphinstone and others make it clear that there was much debt even at the beginning of our rule. But it is also acknowledged that the indebtedness has



risen considerably during our rule and more especially during the last half century. The reports received from time to time and the evidence of annual sale and mortgage data show clearly there has been a very considerable increase of debt during the last half a century." The Royal Commission on Agriculture in India summed up the position in these words: "It is more than probable that the total rural indebtedness has increased in the provinces, whether the proportion it bears to the growing assets of the people has remained at the same level or whether it is a heavier burden or lighter burden on the more prosperous cultivator than of old are questions to which the evidence we have received does not provide an answer." The Punjab Committee have, for example, estimated that the total agricultural debt in the province has increased from Rs. 90 crores in 1921 to Rs. 135 crores in 1929. The burden of indebtedness has really become much more crushing than can be judged from a comparison of the growth of its volume in rupees, when we take into account the fact that the fall in the price of the crops since 1921 has been roughly 50 per cent. To understand the full effect of this burden, we may state, for instance, that the increase of rural debt in the Punjab from Rs. 90 crores in 1921 to Rs. 135 crores in 1929 really represents a debt of Rs. 270 crores in 1930.

Some of the Provincial Committees attempt to distribute the debt *per capita* and *per acre* of cultivated land, but the figures arrived at are not such as are calculated to convey an accurate idea of the economic position of the agriculturist. Regarding the distribution of debt on the acreage of cultivable agricultural land, the Bombay Committee which attempts to arrive at a figure points out that it is of little practical value, and what applies to Bombay applies equally to all other provinces. After pointing out that the debt works out to 15 times the total land assessment and at Rs. 25 and Rs. 20 *per net cropped acre* and *cultivated acre* respectively, the Committee proceeds to say that the figures vary in regard to the several parts of the Bombay Presidency like Southern Gujarat, Khandesh, Sind and Konkan, and that higher indebtedness *per acre* does not necessarily mean a correspondingly heavier burden. In their own words "An acre of good land may require larger capital and yield good income whereas an acre of inferior land may require less capital and yield less. From the point of view of assets also, an acre of land denotes different values at different places." In view of the difficulties pointed out above in regard to the incidence of debt *per capita* or *per acre*, we have not further examined the question.

79 As regards the number of agriculturists who are free from debt, different Committees have adopted different methods of ascertaining the percentage of those who are free from debt to the total

rural population The figures so worked out for four provinces are given below —

Province	Percentage free from debt
Assam	varying from 9 per cent to 38 per cent in different districts (1)
Bihar and Orissa	varying from 19 per cent to 21 per cent (2)
Central Provinces	varying from 14 per cent to 72 per cent in the case of landlords and from 13 per cent to 70 per cent in the case of cultivators (3)
United Provinces	varying from 33 per cent to 61 per cent (4)

This being the first effort by a Committee to arrive at even approximate figures of freedom from indebtedness in rural areas, and in view of the differing methods employed in each of the four provinces figures for which are available as above, we feel that it would be erroneous to attach any importance to the value of these figures as being of general application even in the whole of the respective provinces. But it is to be hoped that the provinces may be able, in their subsequent efforts, to make more definite enquiries following the spade work done by their Banking Enquiry Committees last year.

80 As early as 1875 the Commission appointed to enquire into the causes of the agrarian riots in the Deccan went into the causes of agricultural indebtedness. The findings of that Commission were later tested by Nicholson, by investigation into the causes of poverty in the province of Madras, who summarised them as follows —

“First, poverty with unproductive soil, precarious climate, and irregularity of income,

Second, ignorance and improvidence,

Third, extravagance,

Fourth, ancestral debt,

Fifth, expansion of credit,

Sixth, increase of population without corresponding increase of return,

Seventh, facilities for borrowing owing to influence of money-lenders,

Eighth, the limitation laws, as leading to renewals on usurious terms including compound interest, and

Ninth, revenue system of a fixed demand ”

(1) Assam, para 33

(2) Bihar and Orissa, paras. 83 and 91

(3) Central Provinces, paras 703 and 716.

(4) United Provinces, para 183

81 The Provincial Committees have made detailed investigations into the causes of rural indebtedness and their conclusions tally in the main with those mentioned by the Deccan Commission and by Nicholson. According to the Provincial Committees there are many reasons why the agriculturist in India is obliged to borrow. The most important and common reason is past indebtedness, which occasions fresh borrowing due mainly to the high rates of interest charged. These high rates of interest are partly the cause and partly the effect of indebtedness. The other main reasons are the small size of his holding and the way it is split up, making it almost impossible for him to live within his small income without getting into debt unless he is exceptionally frugal and industrious, or has some extraneous source of income, his constantly recurring losses of cattle from drought and disease and the insecurity of crops which aggravates the cumulative effects of the other factors. To the agriculturist's extravagant expenditure upon marriage and other domestic ceremonies is attributed some part of the indebtedness, though many of the Provincial Committees think that the picture of extravagance is overdrawn. Both the Central Provinces and the Burma Committees have, however, pointed out that in times of prosperity owing to the absence of proper investment facilities, cultivators do spend larger sums upon social ceremonies than would be spent in lean years. Improvidence and purchase of land at heavy prices and taking up leases of land at high rentals during periods of boom have also been mentioned among the causes. In many cases the purchase of land at heavy competitive prices or obtaining lands on lease at high rents is said to be due to want of other occupations besides agriculture. The amount borrowed for improvements is generally small, but in lower Burma a large part of the indebtedness of the agriculturists is said to be due to the clearing and improvements carried out by the aid of borrowed capital. Borrowing for speculative trading is said to be one of the most frequent causes of indebtedness in Burma. Another cause of indebtedness in Burma is reported to be the necessity for one member of the family of a deceased person under the Buddhist Inheritance Law, sometimes to purchase the holding of the deceased person if it is not large enough to be shared among all the members of the family. It is believed that a considerable amount is borrowed in Bihar and Orissa for trade purposes, *e.g.*, for collecting village produce and selling it at large centres. The Punjab Committee point out that while the reasons given above explain the existence of debt, the money-lender and his vicious system of business explain the continuance of such indebtedness and that the great expansion of credit that has taken place due to high prices and the inflated value of land account for the volume of indebtedness. The Committee have also referred to the increase in population without any corresponding

increase in production While in all countries of the world during the last fifty years the percentage of population living on land has decreased, in India the percentage has considerably increased. According to the census figures, the percentage of the population following the occupation of pasture and agriculture has steadily risen from 61 per cent in 1891 to 66 per cent in 1901, 71 per cent in 1911 and 72 per cent in 1921. The Assam Committee have added another very potent cause which appears to have contributed largely to the increase of indebtedness, namely, the decline of the cottage industries and the loss of income to the ryot by a subsidiary occupation in the off-season.

82 To this state of indebtedness are attributed many of the evils to which the peasant is now subject. It is said that the indebtedness leads ultimately to the transfer of land from the agricultural class to the non-agricultural money-lender, leading to the creation of a landless proletariat with a reduced economic status. The result is said to be loss of agricultural efficiency, as the money-lender sublets at a rate which leaves the cultivator with a reduced incentive to raise a good crop. It is reported that this is confirmed by widespread crop-cutting experiments in Bihar and Orissa and Bombay. It is also added that as a result of this inefficiency the ryot is unable to get enough money to put in cultivation to yield first class crops and that he thus moves in a vicious circle. The United Provinces Committee, however, do not think that transfer of land from agriculturists to non-agriculturists is always necessarily for the worse, and they do not recommend the extension of the Bundelkhand Act to other parts of the province, but they recognize the need for a further and fuller inquiry into the matter. In some provinces, such as Madras and the Punjab, money-lending business is also done by the ryot money-lenders and any resulting change in the ownership of land has no detrimental effect on agricultural efficiency. The evil is said to be very prevalent in Bengal where it is believed the lenders are non-agriculturists in the majority of cases. No recent figures regarding the gains and losses of the agriculturist class by sale of land are available and it is not safe to draw any conclusion as to the present position in this matter. The Central Provinces Committee have, however, stated that the village surveys made by them showed that the number of persons who had lost their land through indebtedness was extremely small and that the money-lender at present at any rate, has no desire to take land in satisfaction of debts.

83 The Provincial Committees have also gone into the allegation that is generally made that the cultivator is obliged by reason of his indebtedness to sell his produce to his creditor at an unfavourable season and at a price detrimental to himself. When money-lenders are also shopkeepers and commission agents, they often make it a condition that the agriculturists' produce must be sold

through them. This very seriously affects the liberty of action in marketing the produce and is undesirable when the parties to the bargain are not matched. The evil effects of this system are felt more in Madras, Bengal and Assam than in other provinces. A word may be said in explanation of the attitude of the money-lender who, as stated by the Bengal Provincial Committee, is not always wholly to blame. Even when the money-lender is not a trader, and does not want to buy the produce, he knows that if the debtor does not pay after selling his produce, it will not be possible for the latter to pay till after the next harvest. He has, therefore, to put pressure on the debtor immediately after the harvest, and the effect of this pressure is so great that the borrower is compelled to dispose of his harvest as quickly as he can. As every grower is equally pressed for cash and has to sell at the same time, the price obtained by the cultivator is naturally depressed in consequence.

84 It is not necessary to repeat here some of the instances of economic servitude that arise from the money-lender's grip over the cultivator as these are mentioned in the report of the Agricultural Commission (paragraph 363), but such instances are now reported to be rare. It is reported that the charges that the money-lenders used to impose are gradually disappearing and that services rendered to creditors are generally paid for to a substantial extent.

85 To the chronic state of indebtedness on the part of the Indian cultivator may also be attributed the existing unsatisfactory system of agricultural finance, under which no clear distinction is drawn between loans required for short and long periods. When large sums of money are borrowed, say, for capital improvements or for repaying old debt, which could not in ordinary circumstances be repaid within a short period of time, the period of repayment fixed in the bond of agreement does not ordinarily exceed a short period, for instance, it is three years in the Central Provinces. The result is that the income of the cultivator has to be utilised towards the payment of the loan to a greater extent than is possible or desirable and he is left without sufficient margin even for his subsistence. This involves running the farms on less productive methods than would otherwise have been possible, and its reactions on national welfare are detrimental. The Central Provinces Committee feel very strongly that the creation of facilities for liquidation of debts, when they assume serious proportions, by dispensing long-term loans through an appropriate agency at low rates of interest would not only act as a safety-valve against the individual agriculturist becoming hopelessly indebted and unable to follow productive methods of cultivation, but would also of itself react upon the money market so as to reduce the general rates of interest charged on the short-term loans themselves.

## DEBT CONCILIATION AND LIQUIDATION

86 Among the causes responsible for the low standard of living of the agriculturists and the continued impoverishment of this class, even in areas which are blessed with good seasons and normal crops, indebtedness must be given a high place. Rural credit, broadly speaking, falls into two categories, the current debt incurred annually with the intention of repayment after the harvest, and the standing or prior debt. As a matter of fact owing to the high, and not infrequently usurious, rate of interest which has generally to be paid on the current debt, and various other causes, the whole of it cannot often be repaid after the harvest, and the consequence is that the portion outstanding adds to the standing debt. The strengthening and expanding of the co-operative credit organizations, and controlling usury in the manner we have indicated in later chapters, are in our opinion the most potent remedies for arresting the future growth of unproductive debt. But the liquidation of the standing indebtedness presents an altogether different problem. It has to be remembered that in the majority of cases this chronic debt is inherited. We find children born in debt and making every feasible effort to pay the debt of the fathers and forefathers. This social tradition and the custom of succeeding generations acknowledging and paying the debts of forefathers have been exalted into a legal doctrine of the "pious obligation", to pay an ancestor's debts, enforceable in courts of law. Even when no assets pass and debts are not legally inherited, the debt is generally treated by the son or the heir as a debt of honour by force of tradition.

87 The only facility which is now available to the agriculturist for redeeming his standing debt, apart from borrowing from one money-lender to repay another, is supplied by the co-operative credit organizations, mostly land mortgage banks. The limited extent to which these organizations assist in the redemption of prior debt is discussed later on in chapters IX and X. Nevertheless, valuable work in redeeming the standing debt of the agriculturist can be done by co-operative land mortgage banks in localities where they exist, and the further establishment of these banks should be encouraged where there is a reasonable prospect of their working successfully having regard to all the local conditions. In order, however, to satisfy the credit requirements of the large class of agriculturists who are outside the co-operative movement and to provide for substantial loans to big landlords, provincial land mortgage corporations on a joint stock basis or on the model of the English Land Mortgage Corporation will be necessary. We shall deal with the subject of land mortgage banks fully in Chapter X.

88 Land mortgage banks can, however, be utilized for the purpose of redemption of standing debt only by those who can produce adequate security based on land and who have got an adequate amount of surplus income (*i.e.*, after paying for their cultivation expenses and other current needs) which can be used for the payment towards the redemption of the debt of annual instalments spread over a long period of years, and who will not have to seek further assistance from a money-lender for meeting their current needs and for the payment of such instalments. A large number of agriculturists, however, cannot produce adequate security based on land or where they can do so, do not possess the surplus income, and it is therefore impossible for them to have recourse to land mortgage banks. It follows that under existing conditions a large number of agriculturists have no facilities for getting rid of their standing debt, and this circumstance is resulting in a progressive and serious deterioration in their economic condition. We consider that it is incumbent on Government to devise measures to meet the situation. The Royal Commission on Agriculture uttered a serious note of warning when they said "It must be clearly recognized that the worst policy towards debt is to ignore it and do nothing"

89 One method by which the problem can be tackled is by bringing about conciliation between debtors and creditors with the object of securing a composition of the standing debt. Several of the Provincial Committees deal with this method of solution of the problem.

(i) The Central Provinces Committee have given some facts and figures relating to the debt conciliation proceedings which were undertaken by the local Government in various parts of the province during the period of economic depression resulting from the famine years of 1897—1900. The Provincial Committee have collected certain figures with regard to the proceedings carried out in Damoh (two-thirds of the District), Balagnat, Bhandara, Hoshangabad, Betul and Jubbulpore areas. The total debt whose composition was attempted amounted to Rs 2,06,29,512 at the inception of the proceedings, and the amount remitted was Rs 1,21,70,904. The Committee point out that there may have been some debt conciliation in other districts of the province as well, but that the figures in respect of them are not now forthcoming. The details of the figures mentioned above are given at page 149 of the Committee's report. What is of greater interest is the method of conciliation work and the following extract elucidates it —

"The agency used consisted of local panchayats under the direction of a Government officer. Debtors and creditors were collected in every village and after the

objects of the proceedings were explained to them, they were called upon to sign an agreement to abide by the decision of the conciliators. The creditors were also required to sign a certificate that the statement of their claims was complete, and that any item omitted from it should be considered void. The paying capacity of the debtor was then ascertained and the liabilities distributed. In the case of tenants, instalments were spread over a period of 5 to 10 years and in the case of malguzars 15 years. The instalments in each case were fixed on the basis of 1 per cent or revenue paid. Six per cent interest was allowed in the case of overdue instalments of cash loans and 12½ per cent on grain loans. In any year in which Government revenue was remitted or suspended by reason of failure of crops, default in payment of instalments did not incur interest. No special agency was created for discharging the debts as compounded, and no cash payments were made to the creditors. The proceedings amounted largely to writing-off a good deal of unrecoverable debt."

One of the officers who conducted these operations reported that the creditors soon repented of the wave of generous enthusiasm and relapsed into their usual methods of collection of debts. The Committee further point out that the results were in any case only made possible by the exercise of considerable executive pressure and that similar methods would be unsuitable under present conditions.

(11) The Punjab Committee do not refer to this subject in the body of their report, but describe some of the operations of composition of old debt carried on in their province in part III of note C appended to the Report (*vide* pages 173-174). It appears from that note that conciliation was attempted in Lyallpur, Lahore, Rohtak, Gujranwala, Ferozepore and Sialkot areas and that in some areas the results were satisfactory, while in others they were not. It was generally found in some of the areas that the money-lender agreed to composition only in bad cases. The following account of the method adopted by the Debt Composition Committee in Sialkot area where results were most satisfactory will serve to elucidate the process —

"The Committee approach the money-lender and ask him to settle the accounts of certain members of the (co-operative) society. The money-lender will then tell them the amount including interest up-to-date. A round sum is offered to him and after some haggling,



agreement is reached and composition is effected as follows —

- (1) cattle are given to *sahukars* for amounts which are sometimes higher than market prices,
- (2) grain, *bhusa*, etc., are handed over to the *sahukars*,
- (3) partial payments are made in cash, and
- (4) in some cases concessions are also obtained regarding the amount of interest, etc

In some cases instalments are fixed after making a substantial repayment and at times interest ceases to run from the time of payment of a lump sum"

(iii) The Bihar and Orissa Committee describe an experiment at debt clearance in the Ranchi District where during 1906—12 the local Government made a determined attempt to redeem debt. The details of the scheme and its progress are given in a very interesting memorandum by Mr Houlton, Settlement Officer, which is printed in the evidence volume of the Committee's report. The scheme was tried on a moderately large scale and the Government advanced about Rs 1½ lakhs to the debtors to enable them to satisfy their creditors. In 1912, however, it was decided not to proceed further with the scheme. It was generally accepted to be a failure, principally owing to the fact that many of the cultivators could not maintain regularity of repayment and ultimately contracted fresh debts from the village money-lenders in order to pay off Government instalments.

90 The general experience recorded in all these provinces has been that any scheme of debt conciliation could not succeed until adequate organization for carrying out debt clearance has been built up, and unless some agency like the Government or the co-operative credit societies or land mortgage banks where they exist, is forthcoming to make cash advances to the debtors in order to enable them to pay the compounded debt, at least in part, to the creditor. The Central Provinces Committee are satisfied that many creditors would readily agree to accept in full satisfaction of their dues considerably less sums if paid down in cash. They also express the hope that District Development Boards and those assisting in the campaign of rural reconstruction would be able to help in evolving a scheme of debt redemption. The Punjab Committee report that their evidence leads them to believe that in many areas the money-lender is finding recovery increasingly difficult and is more disposed than ever before to compound his claims. It is thought, they say, that he would agree to substantial reductions if he were given an assurance that the amount finally settled would be repaid by a fixed date without further effort on his part, and it is suggested that the best way of giving him this assurance would be to allow him to transfer his debt, or such part of it as could not be paid at

once, to the co-operative society as a deposit which would be repayable *pari passu* with the instalments fixed for the debtor, subject to a maximum period of, say, ten years

### OUR RECOMMENDATIONS

91 We consider it to be a matter of supreme importance from the point of view of the economic prosperity of the country, as well as for the purpose of stemming the growth of discontent among a large section of the population, that a serious effort should be made to find a remedy for the chronic indebtedness of the agriculturist, so far as it relates to his unproductive debt. We recognize that the problem does not admit of an easy solution, and that even the provision of cheap and abundant credit will not solve it at a stroke and will not be of tangible benefit if the borrower does not understand the economic value of the credit and does not exercise prudence and judgment in its use. In our opinion the most effective remedy will be found in the pursuit by the local Governments of a vigorous policy of debt conciliation on a voluntary basis, and we commend for their consideration a scheme on the following lines —

- (1) Special officers should be appointed in each province whose function would be by propaganda to persuade the lender and the borrower to agree to a redemption of standing debt on the basis of a cash payment or equated payments spread over a number of years. It should be one of the functions of these officers to advise the agriculturist debtors of the existing facilities for lightening the burden of indebtedness, such as those provided for in the Usurious Loans Act and the Civil Procedure Code for repayment of loans by instalments. If it is considered desirable that Conciliation Boards would facilitate the operations of these officers, local Governments should arrange for their appointment.
- (2) The existing co-operative credit societies should be utilized as the agency for the payment to the lender of the amounts payable under the terms of the settlement, and it will be a part of the arrangement that the borrower should become a member of the co-operative society, so that the society may provide finance for his current needs in future.
- (3) Where the lender is willing to take in annual instalments such part of the debt as will have to be repaid to him under the terms of the settlement less any amount which the borrower can repay forthwith, the outstanding part of the settled debt will be

treated as a deposit by the lender with the co-operative society, the understanding being that the society will refund it to him through the annual instalments settled

- (4) Where the lender wants a cash payment in regard to the part of the debt which will have to be repaid to him under the terms of the settlement, Government should advance to the co-operative society the necessary funds which will be repaid by the society in annual instalments. Government should for this purpose have a regular programme of advances to co-operative societies in selected areas for purposes of debt redemption.
- (5) In fixing the annual instalments to be paid by the borrower, due regard will have to be made for his paying capacity after making full allowance for his current expenses both for cultivation and maintenance.
- (6) It is possible that the borrower may default in paying regularly his annual instalments. In that case, the society will be subjected to a loss, and it is desirable that Government should come to the assistance of the society in all cases where the loss is not due to any negligence or mismanagement on the part of the latter.
- (7) If necessary, the whole arrangement should have the backing of a legislative enactment.

As in effect, the repayment of the settled amount of the debt will be made from long-term deposits either from the lender or the Government, there cannot be any objection in principle to an ordinary co-operative society undertaking the work.

92 There will, however, be cases in which the lender will not agree to a voluntary settlement of the debt. In such cases it will be necessary to take action to secure a compulsory settlement by means of legislative enactment.

93 The Royal Commission on Agriculture approached the question of redemption of ancestral debt from the standpoint of debtors who are prepared to give up all their assets in discharge of the inherited debt. The force of tradition and the legal fiction of moral and pious obligations to discharge ancestral debt, even where the assets are insufficient to cover the debt, have proved serious obstacles to the clearance of a large volume of inherited debt. The debtors are at present unable to avail themselves of the complex machinery of the present insolvency law which was primarily designed for mercantile cases. The Royal Commission, therefore,

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recommended that the case for a simple Rural Insolvency Act should be considered in every province. They stated the justification for their recommendation in these words: "Just as creditors have the right to insist that all the debtor's assets should be impounded and applied towards the payment of the debts, so also the debtor who has given up all his assets should have the clear right to be allowed to earn his living if he can and to be free to make a new start in life." The Civil Justice Committee in dealing with the suitability of the existing Provincial Insolvency Law for rural debtors have more or less given expression to the view that the existing law does not suit agriculturist debtors. We are in agreement with the recommendations of the Royal Commission on Agriculture and the Civil Justice Committee that the case for a simple Rural Insolvency Act should be considered in every province. The adjudication of the claims under the Act should be made as speedy and inexpensive as possible and the debtor should be given facilities to obtain his discharge as quickly as possible. There should be a special provision in the Rural Insolvency Act for enforcing a scheme of composition before an order of adjudication is made. Provision should also be made for exemption from sale of properties indispensably necessary for the family of the insolvent as provided in section 60 of the Civil Procedure Code.

94 We are also of the opinion that, in view of the importance of the subject, the Governments concerned should explore the possibility and desirability of undertaking other legislation to secure the settlement of debts on a compulsory basis

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## CHAPTER VI.

### RURAL FINANCE (*Contd*)

#### NORMAL CREDIT NEEDS OF AGRICULTURE

95 The normal credit needs of the cultivator may be classified, taking the time factor for analysis, into two broad classes, viz —

(i) Short-term credit and intermediate credit to meet current outgoings and to facilitate production. The current outgoings and expenses of production include the buying of cattle and agricultural implements (or hiring them), purchase of manure and seeds, expenses of transplantation in the case of wet cultivation and weeding and hoeing of dry crops and of reaping, gathering and threshing, maintenance of the farmer, his family and live-stock and payment of revenue and rent, and outlay on various items of improvements effected in the ordinary course of husbandry such as levelling, deep ploughing, irrigation, clearance, drainage fencing, and installation of pumping plant

(ii) Long-term credit for obtaining fixed capital to be invested permanently or for long periods. The fixed capital is required for the purchase of land, acquisition of costly equipments, consolidation and improvement of holdings and repayment of past debt

96 The cultivator also requires credit, which may be either short-term, intermediate or long-term,

(1) for marketing and movement of produce, and

(2) for small rural and cottage industries

We think it will be convenient to treat these latter requirements separately, not because they are less important than those mentioned in paragraph 95 but because they lend themselves to separate treatment

#### SHORT-TERM CREDIT.

97 The Madras Committee \* have analysed the four requisites of the short-term credit required by cultivators as follows —

(i) As the loans are required for the expenses of cultivation including rent and domestic expenditure, they should be available in comparatively small sums spread over a period of eight or nine months and should be repayable only after the crops are sold

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\* Madras, paras 129—132

- (ii) The loans must be available at short notice so as to enable the cultivator to take advantage of the rains and do the ploughing and transplantation as soon as they are possible
- (iii) The finance must be adequate As pointed out by the Madras Committee, it is useless to lend money to plant a crop and to refuse a loan for further expenses connected with cultivation as the first loan is only jeopardised by such refusal
- (iv) The loans must carry a reasonable rate of interest, as otherwise agriculture may not be profitable even when other circumstances are favourable

98 As already stated, short-term loans are purely seasonal in character and normally they should be repaid in full some time after the harvest If there is a partial or total failure of the crops, an extension of the period is, however, required

#### INTERMEDIATE CREDIT

99 The cultivator also requires intermediate credit for the purchase of cattle and farming implements These loans are required normally for a period of from one to three years

#### LONG-TERM CREDIT.

100 The first essential feature of long-term rural credit is that the sum advanced to the cultivator should be sufficient effectively to start him on his business In India he requires long-term funds mainly to redeem his prior debts and to improve his lands and methods of cultivation so as to obtain increased returns from agriculture In the second place, the long-term loan thus advanced should be repayable from the margin of profit of the borrower's holding without putting him to the necessity of starving his current financial needs (domestic and occupational), or of borrowing from another source, or of selling his holding to discharge the loan In other words, the purpose of the loan and the repaying capacity of the borrower determine the period of the loan In certain other countries the loans are spread over a long term of years and are recovered in easy instalments which usually amount to a small percentage of the principal amount of the loan For instance, the maximum period allowed for repaying such loans is 30 years in Finland, 33 years in Chile, 36½ years in New Zealand, 42 years in Australia, 50 years in Italy and Japan, 54½ years in Austria, 57 years in Switzerland, 60 years in Denmark, 63 years in Hungary, 68½ years in Ireland and 75 years in France (1)

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(1) "Rural Credits" by Herrick, page 211

## ESTIMATE OF REQUIREMENTS.

101 For the purpose of our report it is not altogether necessary to frame any accurate estimates of the requirements of cultivators for credit of various classes

102 Some of the Provincial Committees have devoted attention to the calculation of the short-term and intermediate credit required by cultivators in India. In making such calculations they were handicapped by the shortness of time at their disposal. They were in addition confronted with various difficulties, such as the illiteracy of the agriculturists who very rarely kept accounts, the difficulty of distinguishing between borrowed money and owned capital, the allowance to be made for household expenses, etc. The estimates which they have given, and which are stated to be very rough, relate mostly to short-term loans though they seem to include, in the case of some of the provinces at any rate, requirements for the purchase of cattle and the replacement of implements, which should be met from intermediate credit. The fact is that in India it has not been usual to make a hard and fast distinction between short-term and intermediate credit. A rough idea in regard to requirements for short-term and intermediate credit for cultivators for the whole of India may be obtained by comparing the figures of rural indebtedness and the rough estimates of short-term credit given by some of the Provincial Committees. For example, the Madras, Bombay and Burma Committees have estimated the amount of short-term loans as follows —

	Estimated amount of short-term loans (Rs crores)	Estimated total rural indebtedness of province (Rs crores)
Madras . . .	70	150
Bombay . . .	32.5	81
Burma . . .	20	50-60

From the above figures, we may perhaps take a figure of 300 to 400 crores of rupees as a lower limit for the whole of British India of the cultivators' requirements for short-term and intermediate working capital. We, however, propose not to put forward even a rough estimate of this kind, as we are keenly aware of the obvious short-comings of such estimates.

103 It is not easy to make even a rough estimate of the long-term credit requirements of the cultivators. According to the estimates given by the various Provincial Committees, rural indebtedness in India at the present day amounts to at least Rs 900 crores. If at least Rs 400 crores of this sum represents short-term and intermediate credit, the requirement for long-term credit to pay off old debts

amounts to at least Rs 500 crores. In addition, we have the items of improvement of land and methods of cultivation which require very large sums having regard to the fact that the cultivated acreage of agricultural land in India is more than 200 million acres. Next come the long-term requirements for purchase of land and building houses, setting up of irrigation plants and the like. No estimate is possible of the requirements of these various classes even in an approximate measure. We can only say that there is an almost unlimited scope for the grant of long-term loans to the cultivators in India.

### CREDIT AGENCIES

104 The sources from which rural finance is now obtained are —

- (1) Money-lenders (including sellers on credit), both professional and non-professional.
- (2) Indigenous bankers
- (3) Co-operative organizations
- (4) Government
- (5) Commercial banks including the Imperial Bank of India, the exchange banks and other joint-stock banks
- (6) Loan offices in Bengal
- (7) *Nidhis* and Chit funds in Madras

We shall deal with each of these agencies separately in the succeeding chapters

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## CHAPTER VII.

### RURAL FINANCE—(continued)

#### MONEY-LENDERS

105 Money-lenders may broadly be classified into—

- (1) Professional money-lenders, either rural or urban, including itinerant money-lenders, and
- (2) non-professional money-lenders of various kinds, such as,
  - (a) landowners and agriculturists, these have come into prominence in some provinces, especially Madras and the Punjab,
  - (b) merchants and traders,
  - (c) other casual money-lenders who are persons pursuing various occupations but lending out their surplus money, such as pleaders, pensioners, priests and widows. In this class may be included persons who do petty money-lending of a friendly character, usually without interest, among members of the same caste or tribe

106 The Provincial Committees have attempted to obtain all available statistics in regard to money-lenders and indigenous bankers, but their reports show that reliable statistics are not available. For instance, as regards the number of money-lenders, the following statement shows the position —

Province	Number
Madras	No information
Bengal	45,000 (estimated at 50 per cent of the total of 50,000 roughly shown under "Bank Managers, money lenders, etc" in the Census of 1921)
Bombay	20,000 (estimated including indigenous bankers)
United Provinces	No information
The Punjab	55,000 (estimated number of those who depend solely or in part on money-lending including 19,000 agriculturist money lenders)
Central Provinces	43,000 (roughly according to last census, but not including the marginal or big cultivators, and numerous Government servants and others who do money-lending)
Burma	No information
Assam	
Punjab and Orissa	105,000 (estimated number of persons conducting money-lending business in the rural area. Besides, there are about 700 shraffs and urban money lenders paying income tax and a large number, not estimated, who do not pay income tax)
Delhi	101 (indigenous bankers and money-lenders paying income tax in 1928-29)
Ajmer-Merwara	17 do
North-West Frontier Province	657 do

Similarly no reliable figures are available regarding the capital invested by money lenders

107 It will be seen from the preceding paragraph that some of the Provincial Committees have found it difficult to give separately the number of money-lenders as distinguished from indigenous bankers. We suggested to the Committees the advisability of dealing with the problem of the money-lender separately from that of the indigenous banker. For this purpose we defined that by "indigenous bankers" is meant all bankers other than the Imperial Bank of India; the exchange banks, the joint stock banks and the Co-operative societies, and that the expression includes any individual or private firm receiving deposits and dealing in hundis or lending money. We are aware that while there are money-lenders who receive deposits, there are certain classes of banking communities who, though they do not, as a class, receive deposits, have been regarded by the public for all practical purposes as bankers. Both the banker and the money-lender generally carry on other forms of business such as commission-agency and trading. For the purposes of our enquiry, we propose to include under the class of money-lenders those whose primary business is not banking but money-lending. We may quote in this connection a passage from the report of the Punjab Provincial Banking Enquiry Committee which brings out the distinction between the banker and the money-lender, especially the urban money-lender —

"The indigenous banker, as defined in the last chapter, may also combine banking and business, but in his case banking is primary. This is largely a difference of degree, and the other differences between the two (the indigenous banker and the urban money-lender) are of much the same nature. The indigenous banker finances trade and industry rather than consumption; the urban money-lender consumption rather than trade. Both banker and money-lender advance partly with, and partly without, security but the banker more often with than without, and the money-lender probably more often without than with. The banker is generally particular about the objects for which money is required. the money-lender is less careful. A further difference, and one, no doubt, arising from the last two, is that most of the banker's clients repay punctually, and most of the money-lender's have to be pressed. The banker, therefore, can afford to lend at 6 to 9 per cent and rarely goes beyond 12 per cent, but the money-lender commonly charges 9 to 12 per cent and goes up to 18 per cent. The difference is a reflection of the greater trouble and risk involved in the urban money-lender's system."

## THEIR METHODS OF BUSINESS

108 *Professional money-lenders* — (a) *Village money-lenders* — The methods of business and system of accounts of these people are simple, but, as observed by one of the Provincial Committees, infinitely diverse, varying with the idiosyncracies of the money-lender, the circumstances of the debtor, the nature of the security and the locality. Generally speaking, loans are given on mutual trust without a document or even a witness. Loans are made on promissory notes when the amounts are large or when it is a case of renewal of an old loan. Loans are also granted on mortgages of land, houses, and ornaments and on rare occasions of cattle. Conditional sale-deeds are often taken and the oral arrangement is that the land would be re-transferred on the repayment of the debt. Possessory mortgages are common in some places and rare in others. For current agricultural needs, the money-lender usually accepts personal security on the understanding, expressed or implied, that the produce is to be sold to or through him. In many cases the security is mortgage of crops, but where the amount is large or the loan is for a long period, the security is the mortgage of land. The money-lender is not interested in the purpose for which the loan is taken or the manner in which the amount is spent. Interest is added at interest rates. This form of compound interest produces prodigious results in a short time. Even where the courts still apply the rule of *damdapat* in some cases, instalments of interest previously paid are not taken into account. The village money-lender does shop-keeping and trading, in addition to money-lending, and he is also engaged in agriculture. His advances to the cultivator are both in cash and in kind. Smaller money-lenders have nothing more than a scrap note-book in which they jot down a few details, or a loose bundle of bonds and decrees on the back of which entries are made of the amounts paid by the borrowers but the more substantial money-lenders maintain both a day-book and a ledger. The relations between the village money-lender and the agriculturist borrower are said to be not so good as in the olden days when the constitution of the village society ensured fellow-feeling and inter-dependence. Further, the change in the system of law and administration of justice is said to have encouraged litigation. The debtor tries to take advantage of the existing provisions of the law to evade repayment and the money-lender resorts to various devices such as taking bonds for larger amounts than are actually lent and conditional sale-deeds. One of the Committees report that it is not unheard of for a rivot to hypothecate the crop to one person and sell it quietly to another. These handicaps are said to react on the borrower as the money-lender regulates his dealings so as to indemnify himself against such risks and losses.

(b) *Urban money-lenders*—The methods of business of the urban money-lender are almost the same as those of the village money-lender. The urban money-lender also advances on *hundis*. His operations are on a larger scale than those of the village money-lender. He also combines the business of money-lending with other functions such as trading.

(c) *Itinerant money-lenders*—These serve as credit agencies only for those persons who cannot obtain credit elsewhere. They comprise the Pathan money-lenders in the various provinces, the Rohillas in the Central Provinces and the *qistwala* and the cattle dealers in the United Provinces. The Pathan money-lender is found in small or large numbers in almost all parts of India. His business is confined more to particular classes of people than to particular tracts. Large classes of indigent people and poor wage-earners, such as factory workers, menial servants, peons and low-paid clerks, form his usual clientele. Sometimes, men in better positions, such as railway servants receiving good salaries, also invoke his assistance. The usual limits of advance are from Rs 5 to Rs 50. Promissory notes and signatures or thumb impressions in *khata* books are the most common forms of acknowledgment obtained from debtors. In cases of default, the money-lender uses force and seldom resorts to law courts. Actual cases of violence may not be many, but the methods employed are such as to keep the borrower in perpetual fear of being victimized. The people who usually deal with these money-lenders are so ignorant and so terror-stricken that they scarcely dare file a complaint against them. The Bengal Committee report that advances by itinerant money-lenders used to be very informal, but that in recent years books of printed promissory notes in English are used in which the signatures or thumb impressions of borrowers are taken. Loans are also given under the instalment or *kist* system, the first instalment being in some cases deducted at the time the loan is advanced. In some cases the borrower is made to sign a promissory note stipulating that the loan shall be repaid in any of the several districts mentioned therein, so that if the borrower defaults, the money-lender can sue and obtain an uncontested decree in a distant place and then execute it at the place where the debtor resides. Almost all itinerant money-lenders sell goods, specially cloth, on credit, usually recovering the value in the next cold weather. ✓

109 *Non-professional money-lenders*—(a) *Land-owners and agriculturists*—The Bombay Committee report that the agriculturist money-lender is often more exacting than the professional money-lender. He usually lends seed secured against future crops, or cash against the security of land, and eagerly seizes the opportunity to pounce upon it. The Punjab Committee report that there is no great difference between the methods of the agriculturist

money-lender and those of the professional money-lender, though his rates are probably lower. He is said to be avaricious and exacting, and being to some extent in a stronger position than the professional money-lender, he recovers a large proportion of his dues. His main and sometimes his sole object is to get possession of the land of his debtors. The United Provinces Committee also report that the methods of the agriculturist money-lenders may not differ materially from those of the professional money-lenders in such matters as security, the renewal of bonds, the rates and calculation of interest, but they necessarily regard their operations in a somewhat different light. Money-lending to them is not always a mere investment, it often has an ulterior motive. It is also common for landlords to finance their tenants. The United Provinces Committee point out that landlords are most dangerous creditors, as they acquire a double hold over the tenant borrower. If a tenant pays his rent, but not the interest on his debt, a landlord can sue him in a civil court. If the tenant pays the interest on his debt, but not his rent, the landlord can sue him in a revenue court. Worse, still, the landlord can, if he chooses, credit all payments to the debt and so keep the tenant in arrears with his rent, which puts the latter's crops in his power by distraint, and gives him the right to eject him if he pleases. They add that occupancy tenants have occasionally been compelled to surrender their rights to their landlords in liquidation of debts. As against this general picture, it is stated that in parts of the North West Frontier Province the landlord advances money to his tenants for seed and plough without interest, sometimes such advances are made to attract and retain tenants. The Central Areas Committee however report that generally speaking the rates of the agriculturist money-lender are never lower than those of the non-agriculturist creditor.

(b) *Merchants and traders*—These sometimes lend money to the agriculturist on the understanding that his crops should be sold through them. Gin-owners also sometimes finance the agriculturist on condition that he sells his crop to the lender's factory or gets it ginned there. The Bombay Committee point out that the terms offered by this class are generally easier, as the process of marketing affords them an opportunity to secure a sufficient profit.

(c) *Miscellaneous money-lenders*—This heterogeneous class consisting of pleaders, pensioners, widows, etc., lend money only to those whom they know fairly well and on good security which consists generally of land or ornaments.

#### PERIOD OF LOANS

110 The Provincial Committees report that the money-lender is usually accommodating. His loan has ordinarily to be repaid at

harvest time or at any rate from the sale proceeds of the crop. If there is a partial or total failure of the crops, he readily grants an extension or takes a new bond for a higher amount. In Ajmer-Merwara, it is said, the local money-lenders advance loans for cultivation purposes and for special needs, such as maintenance during scarcity or famine for a period of from 6 months to 1 year. They give loans for capital expenditure for periods up to 3 years. The Bengal Committee report that in the case of mortgage by conditional sale or English mortgage, the period of loan is usually six years or more. In the North West Frontier Province the private money-lender gives loans usually for an indefinite period. The Central Provinces Committee report that the period of short-term loans extends to the time of the marketing of the crops and that the period of intermediate loans does not extend beyond three years in ordinary circumstances. The Assam Committee report that small loans are given for a few months but are allowed to run on for years. Most of the loans of itinerant money-lenders are for short periods. It is said that the degree of rigidity of recovery depends much upon the personal characteristics of the lender himself, and the Central Areas Committee point out that recovery is not insisted on so long as it is felt that the money is safe.

#### QUESTIONABLE PRACTICES CONNECTED WITH MONEY-LENDERS.

111. The Provincial Committees have dealt with various questionable practices connected with money-lending. The most common forms are —

- (a) demand for advance interest,
- (b) demand for a present for doing business, known as *giral kholar* (purse-opening),
- (c) taking of thumb impression on a blank paper with a view to inserting any arbitrary amount at a later date if the debtor becomes irregular in payment of interest,
- (d) general manipulation of the account to the disadvantage of the debtor,
- (e) insertion in written documents of sums considerably in excess of the actual money lent, and
- (f) taking of conditional sale deeds in order to provide against possible evasion of payment by the debtor.

The Central Areas Committee refer to a charge called *multana* of 5 annas on each loan of Rs. 10 made by itinerant money-lenders. The Central Provinces Committee refer to another form of exaction from the debtor in the shape of charges for writing the document. They also refer to the practice of the borrower being forced to pay a certain percentage to the money-lender's *munim* or agent before he can obtain a loan, specially if the borrower's credit is not very good.

The Royal Commission on Agriculture refer to certain forms of services exacted by the money-lenders in Bihar and Orissa and certain other parts of India leading to the economic servitude of the borrower. The Central Provinces Committee have referred to the system which prevails in the more backward tracts of the province, but which is becoming less common, under which the debtor or a member of his family renders service to the creditor with or without payment for a certain fixed period. There is also evidence of dishonesty or fraud in the advance and collection of loans in kind, in cattle credit, and in the working of the instalment system. Some of the Provincial Committees find that the evils are slightly exaggerated. For instance, the Bihar and Orissa Committee remark that though they fully believe that there are many dishonest money-lenders, they are not convinced that dishonesty is the rule. They are inclined to the view that such misdeeds, when they come to light in court or in an examination of debts preparatory to the formation of a credit society, are apt to leave an exaggerated impression on the mind. The prevalence of these questionable practices in varying degrees is, however, generally conceded by the various Provincial Committees. At the same time, we should like to observe that similar practices are known to be prevalent in all countries amongst certain sections of the money lending class and that these practices are not peculiar to India.

### RATES OF INTEREST

112 *Assam* — Rates vary from 12 to 75 per cent. In the case of paddy loans in Assam, if the repayment is not made at the end of the year, the principal and interest are compounded and a bond is taken with further interest at 24 or 37½ per cent. The average rate of interest charged by the village money-lender or by produce merchants is 37½ per cent throughout the province. Where loans are large in amount and security is good, rates of 24 and even 18 per cent are common. The rate of 12 per cent would apply only to a solvent landowner or trader.

*Bombay* — The interest charged varies from 12 to 25 per cent or even more according to varying conditions. The rate is highest in Sind rising to 50 per cent, lower in Konkan, the Deccan, Khandesh and the Kainatak, being 12 to 24 per cent; and the lowest in Gujerat, 9 to 15 per cent. Loans secured by land or other property carry interest at about 12 per cent, and loans advanced against the security of ornaments, 9 to 12 per cent. The rate of interest charged by the urban money-lender is not so high as that of the rural money-lender, while that charged by the agriculturist money-lender is generally about the same as that of the village money-lender, though a substantial land-owner may lend money to his tenant or servant on easier terms. *Choksis* and

*sarafs* who specialise in lending against ornaments charge interest at rates varying from 9 to 12 per cent. The rate of interest charged by merchants varies from 9 to 12 per cent. The Pathan money-lender's rates vary from 75 to 360 per cent.

*Bengal*—The rate of interest varies with the security and the amount of the loan, as well as with the total amount of capital available in the vicinity. It is lower in western and central Bengal than in eastern and northern Bengal. The minimum rate varies in different districts from 10 to  $37\frac{1}{2}$  per cent, and the maximum from  $37\frac{1}{2}$  to 300 per cent. Loans on mortgages of Calcutta house property or *zemindaris* are usually given at 8 to 12 per cent. Loans on promissory notes taken from the better class of money-lenders by respectable clients carry interest from 9 to 18 per cent. Large loans on mortgage of *zemindaris* are given at as low a rate as even  $5\frac{1}{2}$  per cent. Loans to agriculturists given on the security of their holding generally bear interest from  $18\frac{1}{2}$  to  $37\frac{1}{2}$  per cent. Loans given without any security often bear much higher rates, going up to 300 per cent. When interest is levied in kind, the rates are much higher than in the case of cash repayments.

*Bihar and Orissa*—The prevailing rate for grain loans is 25 per cent in the Orissa-speaking districts and 50 per cent in the rest of the province. For seed, double the prevailing rate is charged. These rates have to be paid over a period which does not usually exceed 8 months, and a failure means, as a rule, compound interest. It must, however, be remembered that the borrower gets the benefit, if any, of the drop in price between July when he borrows, and January when he repays. The rate for cash loans in Orissa averages 25 per cent or a little higher, that in the Chota Nagpur plateau is mostly  $37\frac{1}{2}$  per cent and this rate extends into the southern parts of Monghyr and Bhagalpur. Elsewhere in Bihar the far more moderate rate of  $18\frac{1}{2}$  per cent prevails.

*Burma*—Loans by village money-lenders may be one quarter to one half higher than Chettiyar rates, which are  $1\frac{1}{2}$  to 2 per cent per mensem, varying generally according as mortgage security is given or a promissory note. There are wide variations from the standards, the rate going up to 4 or 5 per cent per mensem for small unsecured loans.

*Central Provinces and Berar*—The ordinary rate of interest varies between 12 and 24 per cent. On good security, such as mortgage of transferable land, it varies usually between 9 and 15 per cent in the Central Provinces, while it is slightly higher in Berar, between 12 and 18 per cent. The rate of interest charged for small loans given to occupancy tenants is ordinarily 24 per cent, while in the case of the ryots of Government ryotwari villages who have no right of transfer in their land and who are also liable to ejectment on breach of certain conditions, the rate charged is, as often as not,  $37\frac{1}{2}$  per cent. There is nearly always a stipulation



that in case of default in repayment on the fixed date, a higher or penal rate of interest will be charged. The rate for grain loans varies considerably in different parts of the province and according to the kind of grain borrowed. It may be 25 per cent, 50 per cent, or even 100 per cent. The most common rate for wheat advances is 25 per cent although in years of crop failure and in the case of cultivators with very poor credit the rate may sometimes be higher. The rate of interest on paddy loans is also usually 25 per cent though 50 per cent is less uncommon for rice than for wheat.

*Central Arcas* —In Ajmer-Merwara the ordinary rate of interest on mortgage of agricultural land varies from 6 to 13½ per cent per annum, and on unsecured loans from 12 to 18 per cent. The rates in Delhi range from 12 to 24 per cent and in the North West Frontier Province from 6 to 18 per cent in the case of mortgage loans and from 12 to 36½ per cent in other cases. Evidence is, however, very strong that the rates actually realised are substantially lower. As regards grain loans, the rates differ in different parts according to local custom. In Ajmer-Merwara the *sawai* system or repayment with addition of 25 per cent of the borrowed amount prevails, but it is declining. The rates of the agriculturist money-lender are never lower than those of the non agriculturist creditor. The rates of the trans-border money-lenders vary from 75 to 100 per cent.

*Madras* —The common rate of interest varies from 12 to 24 per cent, occasionally rising to 36 or even 48 per cent. There is a downward trend in the rate of interest on mortgages, 12 per cent being commonly charged on good first mortgages. The rate on pro-notes and on pledge of goods including gold and jewels is higher. The reason for this higher rate is stated to be the borrower's urgent need. Landlords and other nots carry on lending business on similar terms. They commonly give loans in kind and also loans in cash with a stipulation of repayment in kind and such loans involve repayment with 25 to 50 per cent interest for the season.

*The Punjab* —In both town and village, the rates for first class security range from 6 to 9 per cent, and for good second class security from 9 to 12 per cent, in both, when material security is not forthcoming, the rate may rise to any figure. Against ornaments and stock in trade, which after Government securities provide the best security, 9 per cent is charged, against house property, the rates are 9 to 12 per cent and on pro-notes 10½ per cent to 12 per cent. The maximum rate is 13½ per cent but is rarely charged, since few unsecured loans are made. The lowest rate charged by the Pathan is 75 per cent per annum and his actual rate may be twice as much.

*United Provinces* —The merchants and traders usually charge 7½ to 9 per cent interest and urban money-lenders between 7½ and 12 per cent on *hundis* and pro-notes, 9 per cent being the most

common rate Interest on mortgages of house property varies between  $7\frac{1}{2}$  and  $12\frac{1}{2}$  per cent, on mortgages of *zemindari* the interest ranges between 9 and 12 per cent Village money-lenders charge between 18 and  $37\frac{1}{2}$  per cent, but the general rate is 24 per cent For mortgages of smaller amounts 9 to 18 per cent is charged, 12 per cent being the usual rate The rate of interest generally charged by the *qistwala* works out at 44 per cent, whilst the rate charged by the Kabuli varies from 75 to 300 per cent The normal rates of interest charged on grain loans are 25 to 50 per cent The cattle dealers sell their animals on credit and the price is payable in four half-yearly instalments usually at the rate of Rs 150 for Rs 100 They also make petty loans at extortionate rates of interest

113 The money-lenders generally work with their own capital The village money-lenders supplement their capital by borrowing from the urban money-lenders and rarely take deposits from the public Some of the urban money-lenders, on the other hand, do take deposits and sometimes borrow from indigenous bankers Merchants and traders have dealings with joint-stock banks as well. It is said that some of the itinerant money-lenders in Bihar and Orissa add to their resources by borrowing from co-operative societies of which they are members in their own districts Owing to the absence of a rational system of rural finance differentiating between short and intermediate credit needs on the one hand and long-term needs on the other, the capital of the village money-lender who is the mainstay of the agriculturist is becoming frozen from year to year

114 It will be seen from the figures in paragraph 112 that the rates of interest generally prevalent throughout India are high Various circumstances contribute to this state of affairs —

- (1) The assets of the farmer consist of his land, his cattle, his crop, his house property and his movable possessions including ornaments Land is the only security for procuring long-term credit to the borrower and of the other assets available as cover for short-term borrowings, the most valuable is the ornaments of the female members of the family But ornaments in the case of a large proportion of the agricultural class are not worth speaking of and there is in addition a sentimental objection, which seems to be gradually decreasing, to pledge them as security for loans The other assets are generally flimsy in the extreme The money-lenders who lend money in these circumstances are taking a risk which other organized credit agencies do not take and they have,

therefore, to protect themselves against loss by charging high rates of interest. The fact that the high rates of interest are of the nature of an insurance against risk is forcibly brought out in some of the Provincial Committees' reports where the money-lenders' stipulated rates of interest have been compared with what they actually receive by way of net profit. We quote below some figures of returns on capital invested which are given by the Central Areas Committee, picked up at random from the files of decided cases in law courts :

Serial No.	Stipulated rate of interest	Realized rate of interest on assumption that decreed amount was realized	
		Per cent	Per cent
Delhi.			
1	18	9 7	
2	24	7 8	
3	6	3½	
4	24	9 3	
5	24	16 1	
6	75	2	
7	37½	8 4	
8	37½	6 9	
9	37½	26½	
10	75	67	(exceptional case.)
11	37½	15 8	
12	37½	17 4	
Ajmer-Merwara			
1	37½	Nil	
2	37	18 7	
3	15	12 1	
4	15	11 2	
5	15	7	
6	21	13 8	
7	25	Nil	
8	18¾	9 3	
9	15	7 9	
10	12	4	
11	15	Nil	
12	18	5 3	
13	75	9 3	
14	100	13 7	
15	150	12 1	
16	24	12 3	
North-West Frontier Province			
1	41 (roughly)	7	
2	50	Nil	
3	28	7 8	
4	37½	10 9	
5	18	11 9	
6	30	19 7	
7	24	19 5	
8	15	5 3	
9	70 (roughly)	7 9	
10	50	1 8	
11	18	1½	
12	33	1½	
13	37½	8 8	
14	16 (roughly)	9½	

- (ii) In many parts of India the money-lender is the only financing agency available to the agriculturist There are places where even this financing agency is non-existent and where the villager has to go to a neighbouring village in search of the money-lender At places where the money-lender works side by side with other organized credit agencies, the latter do not touch all classes of population and do not even fully meet the requirements of the people they finance. On all these accounts, the money-lender holds a semi-monopolistic position and his rates of interest are naturally high
- (iii) The money-lender himself is suffering from shortness of capital He rarely receives deposits and has generally no connection with the money market with the result that competition among borrowers drives up the rates
- (iv) The lack of education and the conservative habits of the people are also responsible for the high rates of interest charged by the money-lender The people have neither the ability nor the desire to enquire into the possibilities of getting cheaper money from urban centres and the Bengal Committee go so far as to say that although an individual money-lender may be disliked in the locality for his excessive rates or the severity of his treatment, the public on the whole do not condemn the high rates of interest ordinarily charged by money-lenders
- (v) The money-lender's expenses of collection and management of loans given to innumerable small borrowers are much higher than similar expenses of, say, a joint-stock bank, and this fact accounts for the maximum limit of interest being fixed as high as 48 per cent in the English Moneylender's Act, 1927, and 42 per cent in the Uniform Small Loan Law in the United States of America \*

115 We agree with the Provincial Committees that the money-lender is an indispensable feature of Indian rural economy He is easily accessible His methods of business are simple and elastic He maintains a close personal contact with the borrower, often having hereditary relations with the family of the borrower His local knowledge and experience and his presence on the spot enable him to accommodate persons without tangible assets and yet protect himself against losses More than one Provincial Committee have, however, referred to the gradual decline in the business

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\* Rusticus Loquitor by M. L. Darling, pages 329 and 330

of the professional money-lender in recent times as evidenced among other things from the number of indigenous bankers and money-lenders declared insolvent. This is attributed to various causes, the most important of which are the following

- (i) the general economic depression which has affected him both in his capacity as an agriculturist and trader and as a lender to the agriculturists,
- (ii) the legal protection given to the agricultural borrower by legislation such as the Land Alienation Acts, the Usurious Loans Act, the Civil Procedure Code, etc., to which we shall refer in a later chapter,
- (iii) the growth of the co-operative societies,
- (iv) the courts' delays, both in the matter of awarding decrees and in their execution, and
- (v) the prevalent suspicion in some quarters against the whole money-lending class on account of the questionable practices of some of them

#### SOME EXISTING LEGISLATION.

116 With a view to protecting the honest borrowers and lenders, various measures have been recommended by the Provincial Committees. Before proceeding to examine these recommendations we should like to refer to some existing legislation dealing with money-lenders and usury

(1) *The Punjab Regulation of Accounts Act, 1930* — This Act was passed in 1930 and will come into force on the date to be notified by the Provincial Government not earlier than 6 months or later than one year after the date of final publication of certain rules under the Act. These rules have only recently been published. The Act imposes certain obligations on creditors, by which is meant persons who in the regular course of business advance loans, whether of money or in kind, at interest, excluding, however, loans made to traders, *i e*, wholesale or retail merchant, commission agent, broker, manufacturer or factory-owner. The duties imposed are the regular record and maintenance of the account of each debtor separately in a manner prescribed by the local Government, and furnishing each debtor every six months with a legible statement of account signed by himself or his agent, showing the amount of loan outstanding and all transactions relating to the loan entered into during the six months to which the statement relates. The accounts have to show interest separately from principal and the creditor cannot, in the absence of agreement, include the interest in whole or in part in the principal sum. In any suit or proceedings relating to a loan, the Court is empowered

to disallow the whole or a portion of the interest found due if the creditor has not regularly recorded and maintained his accounts. The Court is further empowered, in cases where the creditor has not furnished the six-monthly statement to the debtor, to exclude, in computing the amount of interest due, every period for which the creditor has omitted to furnish the account or has delayed it and has not been able to show sufficient cause to the satisfaction of the Court for the delay. The Act is said to be an experiment in controlling and reforming the money-lender by law and is not yet in operation. We commend this piece of legislation to the other Provincial Governments for consideration. We desire to bring to their notice certain difficulties which have to be surmounted in this connection and which have been referred to in paragraph 176 of the Report of the Punjab Committee. We wish further to add that such legislation may usefully provide for the money-lender invariably granting receipts for all repayments made by the borrower, maintaining counterfoils thereof. An alternative arrangement would be to prescribe that the money-lender should give to each of his borrowers a pass-book which should record all receipts and payments as well as the interest charged periodically.

(2) *The Usurious Loans Act of 1918*—Before 1918, the legal position regarding usury was that Courts were obliged to decree interest at the rate fixed between the parties and the only remedy against unfair bargains was for the debtor to plead undue influence. This provision was not, however, of much help to the agriculturist. The Usurious Loans Act of 1918 attempted to improve the legal position of the borrower in various ways. It empowered the Court to reopen and examine all loan transactions, even when they came before it in insolvency proceedings, if in its opinion the interest was excessive or the transaction between the lender and the borrower substantially unfair. The Act covered cases of both money and grain loans and though it did not define the terms 'excessive' interest and 'unfair' transactions, it laid down certain criteria for the guidance of courts who have been told to take into account in deciding such cases the following considerations—

- (i) the risk taken by the creditor, including the presence or absence of security and the financial condition of the borrower,
- (ii) the various other charges besides interest made by the creditor such as charges, in money or in kind, for expenses, inquiries, fines, bonuses, premia and renewals,
- (iii) the compound interest, if any, charged, and
- (iv) all the circumstances attending the loan including the need of the debtor

The Royal Commission on Agriculture reported that the evidence tendered before them conclusively showed that the Act was practically a dead letter, but as they had heard no evidence from Civil Judges, they recommended that an enquiry be made in every province into the causes of the failure to utilize the Act. We requested the Provincial Committees to make this enquiry and the results of such enquiry will be found in the Provincial reports. These show that the Act is not a dead letter as suggested by the Royal Commission, though most of the Committees admit that there are various defects in the Act which require to be remedied.

We are of opinion that the Act is capable of being worked to the advantage of the debtors in many provinces and should be retained. In Bombay, the Act may not have been resorted to frequently because the Deccan Agriculturists' Relief Act gives greater relief to the agriculturist. With regard to other borrowers, the Act would, however, be useful. We are unable to agree with the suggestion to amend the Act so as to fix a definite statutory limit to the rate of interest. This will be neither practicable nor effective. If such a limit is considered necessary, we think that the provision should be made in a different way, *viz*, that interest up to 12 per cent per annum shall not be considered excessive within the meaning of section 3 of the Act. The difficulties mentioned by the Bengal Committee in their report, namely, want of sufficient evidence to show the usual prevalent rate in the locality, the difficulty of establishing that a transaction is substantially unfair, the difficulty of securing sufficient evidence to prove that consent was obtained by undue influence or unfair means, are really matters relating to questions of fact and the courts should decide them as best as they could on the material placed before them. We also agree with the Royal Commission that if the Act were fully utilized, it would go far to relieve the country of some of the worst evils of uncontrolled usury and further, that a special report on the working of the Act should be included in the annual reports on the administration of civil justice.

(3) *The rule of damdupat*—This is a rule in the Hindu Law of Contract according to which interest exceeding the amount of the principal cannot be recovered at any one time. This rule is said to be in force in certain parts of Bombay and in the town of Calcutta, but it is not recognised in the Bengal Presidency outside Calcutta or in the Madras Presidency. It is understood that there is a difference of opinion as to whether the rule is in force in regard to interest on mortgages governed by the Transfer of Property Act. The rule is also recognised by the courts in Berar. According to the Central Provinces Provincial Banking Enquiry Committee, this rule has not been of much service to the people as the courts do not go below the last agreement or contract. The Bengal Provincial Banking Enquiry Committee have recommended that a

general legislation limiting the total accrual of the interest to the amount of principal originally lent should be enacted. In Santal Parganas it is reported that in no case the accrued interest can exceed the principal and the restriction is said to be effective because the administration is still of a personal character. We do not think that legislation on the lines recommended by the Bengal Provincial Banking Enquiry Committee is practicable.

#### SUGGESTIONS REGARDING LICENSING AND CONTROL OF MONEY-LENDERS \*

117. We will now proceed to deal with the general recommendations of the Provincial Committees in regard to money-lenders. The Central Provinces and Bengal Committees are in favour of compulsory registration of money-lenders. The Madras, Bihar and Orissa, Burma, and Central Areas Committees, on the other hand have recommended only optional registration, while the Punjab, Bombay, and Assam Committees do not at all support the proposal. The United Provinces Committee have received various proposals for restricting the money-lenders' operations, but have approved of none of them and have nothing concrete to suggest.

118. The arguments for compulsory registration are as follows —

- (1) It is in the interests of the large mass of agricultural population that such defects as exist in the present system of money-lending should be removed and that the temptations of unscrupulous persons to practise dishonesty should be minimised. These interests should over-ride considerations of personal inconvenience or prestige. The proposal is less drastic than other legislative remedies such as the Deccan Agriculturists' Relief Act and the Punjab and Bundelkhand Land Alienation Acts.
- (2) The Central Provinces Committee believe that very few among the responsible persons in the class of money-lenders are likely to offer any objections to the introduction of a system of compulsory licensing, but other Committees do not share this view (*vide* paragraph 119 below).
- (3) The members of one of the liberal professions, *viz*, the lawyers, are all registered and have to take out licences in the public interests before they can practise in their profession. The members of the medical profession are also registered. There can, therefore,



be no legitimate complaint on the part of professional money-lenders against registration

119 The following are the arguments against compulsory registration of money-lenders —

- (1) Few money-lenders would be willing to submit to any restrictions unless they were given special facilities for recovering their debts from defaulters. This could not be done without prejudicing other interests of equal, if not greater, importance, nor could it be done at all unless the number of money-lenders' licenses were restricted to comparatively a few in each district, a course to which there are obvious objections.
- (2) In India we have to deal with an illiterate class of borrowers who cannot afford to lose the goodwill of the creditors on whom they are dependent. It is little use passing legislation which on account of the strong position of the money-lender can be easily evaded. As shown by the experience of the Deccan 'Agriculturists' Relief Act, the more restraints are placed on the money-lenders, the worse becomes the position of the borrower.
- (3) It would also be difficult to make provision for the inclusion of a class of people who, though not money-lenders themselves, lend their surplus money to others.

120 Various conditions of licence have been suggested in connection with compulsory or optional registration. They are —

- (1) Fixing the maximum rate of interest. One suggestion is that the money-lenders' rate should not be more than 3 per cent above the bank rate. Another suggestion is to fix the maximum rate according to the special circumstances of each province and, if necessary, for different parts of the same province and for the different classes of borrowers, such as agriculturists and non-agriculturists.
- (2) The money-lender should keep his accounts in a standard form and allow them to be inspected by a Government auditor once or twice a year.
- (3) Receipts should always be granted on counterfoils for all payments made.
- (4) The account of each individual borrower should be separately maintained and a copy of it furnished

whenever demanded by the money-lender's clients, on payment of writing charges, subject to not more than one copy of the account for six months

- (5) The money-lender should be encouraged to advance loans as far as possible against receipts issued by warehouses and agricultural *hundis* of not more than six months' usance. The object of this is to use the money-lender, by affording special banking facilities for him, to create that large amount of self-liquidating agricultural paper which the country needs for the efficient working of its banking and currency system.
- (6) Compound interest should not be prohibited, but the period of rests should be not less than one year.
- (7) The practising of money-lending without a licence should be an offence punishable by law.

121 The following privileges have been recommended for the licensed money-lenders —

- (1) The procedure already in force for the recovery of public demands should be made available to registered money-lenders for the recovery of loans made against agricultural *hundis* and warehouse receipts. It is suggested that the quick procedure is absolutely necessary not only in the interests of debtors and creditors alike, but also for the smooth working of the entire banking and currency machinery, as the failure of the registered money-lenders to realise their just dues might make it impossible for the banks to discount their agricultural paper.
- (2) Banks should be persuaded to advance money to registered money-lenders on the security of their agricultural paper. Should banks be slow to respond, Government should use its good offices to induce the joint-stock banks, and failing them the Imperial Bank of India to discount this paper. Failing all these alternatives, the utilization of the postal savings bank deposits for financing registered money-lenders is suggested. It is, however, hoped that such special measures will not be necessary.
- (3) Registered money-lenders should be given the same remittance facilities as are allowed to banks by the Imperial Bank of India and to co-operative societies by the post office.

- (4) The registered money-lender should be allowed to open current accounts with the post office withdrawable by cheque within the area of the sub-division in which he operates. Payments to this account by his customers may also be accepted at any post office within that sub-division.

### OUR PROPOSALS.

122 The main objectives of the proposal to introduce a system of licensing money-lenders are two to reduce the high rates of interest charged by them and to control, and to remove the dishonest practices among certain members of their class. As regards the question of interest, we have already referred to the monopolistic position of the money-lender in large areas and to the various other factors such as risk and the expenses of collection that contribute to the present high interest rates. In our opinion, a real and lasting solution can only be found by the spread of education, the extensión of co-operative and joint-stock banking and by the training of the borrower in habits of thrift and saving. Meanwhile we feel that if the Usurious Loans Act can be more fully utilized and if the measures we recommend are carried out, we shall have done all that is desirable and practicable in the present circumstances in regard to this matter. As regards the second objective, namely, to stop the fraudulent practices of the money-lending class, we have already made a recommendation that the enactment of the provisions of the Punjab Regulation of Accounts Act might be considered by other Provincial Governments. We hope that if similar legislation were introduced and worked successfully in other provinces, many of the complaints against the money-lenders such as manipulation of accounts, insertion in written documents of sums in excess of the actual money lent, and taking of thumb impression on blank paper and insertion of arbitrary amounts later, would soon disappear. We further consider that the periodical receipt of statements of debt and interest due would in a sense begin the financial education of the agriculturist who is an imprudent borrower. He will learn, sooner or later, to scrutinize the account, to realize the advantages of prompt repayment and the necessity of reducing his expenditure to be able to meet the demands of his creditors and last but not least, to save against a rainy day and avoid getting deeper into debt in a hopeless spirit of fatalism when bad times overtake him. We are therefore not in favour of the proposal to introduce a system of licensing money-lenders, either compulsory or voluntary.

The other fraudulent practices which have been already mentioned are the petty exactions for writing and other charges and of certain forms of services and the demand for presents for doing business. The courts are empowered to take these into account

under the Usurious Loans Act in the disposal of cases coming before them. In the English Moneylenders Act there are certain salutary provisions in regard to these and some other important matters. We summarize these provisions below —

- (i) No amount shall be charged by the money-lender for expenses, incidental to or relating to the negotiations for or the granting of a loan by a money-lender
- (ii) The enhancement of interest for default in repayment shall be illegal
- (iii) No contract for the repayment of money lent by a money-lender shall be enforceable if there is no note or memorandum in writing of the contract made and signed by the borrower or if it is proved that the note or memorandum mentioned above was not signed before the money was lent

We recommend that similar provisions should be introduced in India by legislation in regard to money-lenders as defined in the Punjab Regulation of Accounts Act, 1930. This definition will exclude from the operation of the Act financial transactions between merchants and loans to traders. If it is found necessary in connection with the first of these provisions to permit the money-lender to recover certain classes of expenditure from the borrower, these should clearly be specified in the legislative enactment.

The English Act also goes so far as to prohibit compound interest. We are not prepared to recommend such prohibition as it will only lead to frequent and unnecessary renewals of loans on fresh bonds with interest added to principal and may force the money-lender to have recourse to the courts oftener than at present, thereby increasing his expenses and the interest charged to the borrower.

123 Other important suggestions made for improving the present position are —

- (1) Money-lenders may be induced to join co-operative societies on the condition that they cease lending privately to the members of such societies. We approve of this proposal which is in effect an attempt to bring the wealth and experience of the money-lender inside the co-operative movement. He may fill any position to which he may be elected by the vote of the members. His presence may be invaluable in the managing committees of co-operative societies.
- (2) Experiments may be tried to form co-operative societies of money-lenders which should lend to the primary societies and not to individuals. We are not sure

how far such a scheme will be popular among the money-lending class. Although we are told that the money-lender's realized rate of interest is considerably less than his stipulated rate, we do not think that the net return on his capital is so low as to tempt him to confine his loan operations to primary societies and be content with a rate of interest which cannot in the nature of things exceed the rate charged to societies by central banks

- (3) In course of time, joint-stock banks may entrust registered money-lenders as they grow in strength and inspire more confidence, with such agency functions as accepting deposits, making remittances and payments. This would remedy one of the obstacles to branch banking in India, namely, the complete ignorance of the urban banker as to the conditions prevailing in the mufassil and the high cost of running a full-fledged branch in the interior with a responsible manager. We shall deal with this and the proposal in the succeeding clause in the chapter on indigenous bankers
- (4) If business develops, the registered money-lender may be transformed into a full-fledged branch of the financing bank, or if it is desired to limit the liabilities of the bank in a certain place, the bank may enter into a partnership with the registered money-lender on what is known in Germany as the "Kommandit" principle, under which, instead of opening a branch in a place, a bank becomes the financing partner of a local private money-lender, whose advantages of unlimited liability and local knowledge are thus retained without involving the bank in the expense and heavy liabilities of a new branch
- (5) The Bombay Committee recommend that district authorities should watch the conduct of the Pathans engaged in money-lending and take, wherever necessary, the initiative in prosecuting the Pathans if they are found to harass the people. Where complaints about Pathans are common and no proceedings can be taken against them under the ordinary law, they recommend that Government should take action under Section 3 of the Foreigners Act or under some special legislation and deport such money-lending Pathans as are found to be a menace to society. So far as Pathans and other itinerant money-lenders follow in common with other money-lenders some of

the dishonest and fraudulent practices mentioned in our Report, we consider that the measures that we have recommended are sufficient to deal with them. But where these people take extra-legal steps for the recovery of their money as brought out prominently in the report of the Bombay Committee, we consider that special action is necessary for protecting the borrower from the methods employed by them. We readily support the proposals of the Bombay Committee in this matter and we hope that Provincial Governments will take early steps to deal with any such insidious menace to society. We strongly disapprove of the practice brought to light by the Bengal Committee, under which the borrower is made to sign a promissory note stipulating that the loan shall be repaid in any of the several districts mentioned therein, so that in case of default of the borrower the money-lender could sue and obtain an uncontested decree in a distant district and thereafter execute it in the district of residence. We, therefore, suggest that courts should be empowered to dismiss cases of this kind brought before them by money-lenders for recovery of sums due from borrowers in distant districts.

- (6) Although there may be no justification for the grant of special facilities to money-lenders for the recovery of their dues which are not available to other classes of lenders, various Provincial Committees have pointed out that the existing hardships experienced by an honest money-lender in recovering his dues are so great that in the interests of both the honest money-lender and the honest borrower it is necessary to take steps to improve the position. The recommendations made by the Provincial Committees in this connection will be found in Appendix III where we have indicated our own views in the matter. On the whole we are satisfied that most of these recommendations will tend to reduce the expenses of the better class of money-lenders and result generally in a reduction of the burden of interest charges now borne by the honest borrower.

## CHAPTER VIII.

### RURAL FINANCE—(continued)

#### INDIGENOUS BANKERS \*

124 We referred in the previous chapter to the absence of reliable statistics regarding money-lenders. We are confronted with a similar difficulty in the case of indigenous bankers. The following statement gives the information collected by the Provincial Committees :—

<i>Province</i>	<i>Number</i>
Madras . . . .	No figure is given, the communities that do banking business are the Nattukkottai Chettis, the Multanis, the Marwaris, the Kalladaikurichi Brahmans and the Komaties (Vaisyas)
Bombay . . . .	20,000 (estimated, including money-lenders)
Bengal . . . .	Number not ascertained, but it is stated that there are only a few indigenous bankers. Number is decreasing
United Provinces . . . .	250 (estimated number of indigenous bankers who are willing to receive deposits, the number of modern indigenous firms is 7)
The Punjab . . . .	66 (according to information obtained from income tax officers, distributed over 11 districts, in 18 districts there is not a single indigenous banker)
Burma . . . .	Total number of Chettivar offices in Burma is estimated at 1,650
Bihar and Orissa . . . .	100,000 (estimated number of persons conducting the money lending part of banking business. Besides, there are about 700 shroffs and urban money-lenders paying income tax and a large number not estimated, who do not pay income-tax)
Central Provinces . . . .	There is only one indigenous firm which habitually receives deposits as a matter of ordinary business
Assam . . . .	No information
Central Arcas . . . .	29 in Ajmer Merwara, 43 in Delhi and 29 Hindu bankers in the North-West Frontier Province, besides a larger number of Muslims. These figures are, however, not reliable, as they are not based on the definition given in paragraph 107.

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\* For the difference between indigenous bankers and money-lenders see paragraph 107

125 No reliable estimates of the capital employed have been given for all the provinces, but it is recognized that amongst the agencies financing agriculture and the internal trade and small industries, the indigenous bankers occupy a prominent position. The Burma Committee have estimated the total of Chettiyar capital employed in Burma at Rs 75 crores, of which Rs 53½ crores are supplied by the proprietors of the firms, about Rs 10 crores are borrowed from non-Chettiyar sources including banks and about Rs 11½ crores obtained from deposits. The Madras Committee estimates the capital (owned and borrowed) employed in the Presidency by the Nattukkottai-Chettiyar agencies at Rs 11 crores.

126 As the acceptance of deposits is one of the features that distinguish a banker from a money-lender, we examine below the practice with regard to acceptance of deposits by the various classes of indigenous bankers in the provinces, indicating at the same time the other sources from which these bankers supplement their capital.

*Assam*—Indigenous bankers in Assam do not invite deposits and some of them do not accept them. Deposits, if any, are mostly on current accounts and interest is paid generally from 4 to 9 per cent per annum. Fixed deposits are also received by some firms at an interest of 6 to 7½ per cent per annum.

*Bombay*—The Bombay shroffs receive call money, short-term deposits and fixed deposits, and keep current deposit accounts as well as fixed deposit accounts. During the busy season they have to replenish their resources by borrowing, which is generally between shroff and shroff, except in Bombay and other big cities where such accommodation is obtained to a certain extent from the Imperial Bank of India and the joint-stock banks on demand promissory notes drawn by two approved shroffs, or by discounting hundis endorsed by them. The rate of interest which the shroffs allow their customers for deposits varies from 4 to 6 per cent in the busy season and from 3 to 4 per cent in the slack season. The official rate of interest of the Marwadi Chamber of Commerce for current accounts is now 6¼ per cent per annum. It is, however, open to shroffs to increase or decrease the rate by mutual agreement so that the rate usually varies from 3 to 8¼ per cent. The borrowing shroff has also the option to return the money whenever he desires. The call money rate in the Multani bazar varies between 3 to 6 per cent per annum according to the conditions of the money market. The Bombay and Ahmedabad shroffs lend money among themselves at a comparatively low rate of interest, 4½ to 6 per cent in Bombay and not more than 6 per cent in Ahmedabad.

*Bengal*—The receipt of deposits was once one of the important functions of the indigenous bankers, but this branch of their business has been steadily dwindling owing to the competition of



the large joint-stock banks and of Government on the one hand, and of the co-operative banks and loan offices on the other. The rates of interest paid vary from 6 to 12 per cent on fixed deposits and 3 to 9 per cent on current accounts. It is said that the depositors are attracted to other institutions on account of the sense of security engendered by publicity of operations and businesslike methods of such institutions.

*Burma* —The Chettiyars take deposits from non-Chettiyars, amounting at times to as much as 6 crores. The bulk of the deposits are fixed deposits, for three, six or twelve months, either at a fixed rate of interest or at a fluctuating monthly rate of an anna or two below the Chettiyar current rate. The customary period of deposit is three months, and fixed rates of interest are the general practice, being generally 7 to 10 per cent per annum. Current account deposits taken mostly from traders and shopkeepers carry interest ranging from 5 to 11 per cent per annum. There is also inter-Chettiyar borrowing both in the form of fixed deposits and call money. Further, the Chettiyars borrow money from the Imperial Bank of India and joint-stock banks in the form of loans and overdrafts. This is estimated at a maximum of Rs 3 crores in the busy season. The rate of interest is  $1\frac{1}{2}$  to 2 per cent above the bank rate in the case of the Imperial Bank and 2 to 3 per cent above the bank rate in the case of other banks.

*Bihar and Orissa* —Some shroffs are able to attract deposits, but generally speaking this business has declined and is declining since the shroff, with his present methods of banking business and the combination of such business with trade and other activities cannot inspire the same confidence as attaches to Government, Government-aided institutions, or joint-stock banks with their open methods of business and audited balance-sheets. Most of these deposits come from the shroffs' acquaintances or those with whom they have business dealings. Some shroffs are however able to attract deposits from the general public. All deposits are on current account, and the interest rates vary from 4 to 6 per cent in the case of first-class shroffs and from 6 to 9 per cent in the case of second-class shroffs depending upon the amount of the deposit, its probable duration, the personal relations existing between the shroff and the depositor and the state of the market. Shroffs also borrow money from banks and other shroffs on cash credits and *khata peta* advances against hundis.

*Central Provinces* —The firm of Bansilal Abirchand is the only indigenous firm in the province which habitually receives deposits as a matter of ordinary business. Deposits are more often taken by bankers who have extensive business of other sorts and are used for financing their business other than banking. All indigenous bankers state that deposits constitute a very small fraction of

then working capital. Current deposits are very rare and the rate of interest on such deposits seldom exceeds 3 to 4 per cent per annum. Fixed deposits are generally for six months or for twelve months. The rate of interest is about 5 to 6 per cent per annum on fixed deposits for twelve months, and in regard to fixed deposits for six months, it is 6 to  $7\frac{1}{2}$  per cent in the case of the best bankers in the busy season and  $2\frac{1}{2}$  to  $3\frac{1}{2}$  per cent in the slack season. Bankers who have surplus cash utilise it by buying *muddati* hundis from other bankers, the rate for such transactions being about 5 per cent per annum.

*Central Areas*—(i) *Ajmer-Merwara*—Only 3 of the indigenous bankers in Ajmer-Merwara raise substantial amounts by deposits. The general tendency is to avoid receiving deposits except from personal friends and relatives who are not likely to embarrass the bankers by demanding back money at inconvenient times. Some of the indigenous bankers are reluctant to give even 3 per cent on deposits but those who depend for their finance on deposits pay interest varying between 3 and  $5\frac{1}{2}$  per cent. The rate of interest on loans among bankers is 3 per cent in the dull season and goes up to 6 per cent in the busy season.

(ii) *Delhi*.—Indigenous bankers in Delhi do not generally take deposits except from personal friends and relatives and the more substantial of them do not accept any deposits. Only about five or six accept demand deposits. The rate of interest on deposits varies between 3 and 5 per cent. The total deposits taken are estimated at less than Rs. 5 lakhs. Funds are raised mainly by the sale of hundis, and also to some extent by the rediscounting of usance and demand bills and on cash credits from banks. Cash credits are also quite common as a form of inter-lending among the indigenous bankers themselves. The rate of inter-lending among bankers is usually under 6 per cent per annum.

(iii) *North-West Frontier Province*—The amount of deposits taken by indigenous bankers in the North-West Frontier Province appears to be substantial in the aggregate. The rate of interest varies between 3 and 8 per cent according to the standing of the shroff. Though some of the shroffs do not vary the rate in different seasons, generally speaking there is a difference of about 2 per cent in the rates between the busy season and the slack season. Big shroffs, however, avoid deposits. Some of the shroffs borrow from the Imperial Bank of India and rediscount their bills in the busy season.

*Madras*—The Chettiyars take deposits, both current and fixed, but they do not now take much of the former as they do not keep fluid resources. The rates of interest allowed for deposits vary and the average rate for current deposits during 1928-29 was 8.92

per cent per annum The Chettiyar bankers borrow from the Imperial Bank of India on joint signatures usually at 1 per cent above the bank rate

The Multanis rely for their funds mainly on their own personal resources They also borrow at comparatively low rates, namely, 4 to 6 per cent, from their community at Shikarpur They do not receive large sums in deposit, but they take current deposits locally at rates varying from 3 to 6 per cent They also borrow at the bank rate from the joint stock banks, chiefly the Imperial Bank, the Indian Bank and the foreign exchange banks

The Marwaris do not obtain large funds by local deposits, nor do they borrow on a large scale from other banks They rely on the funds of the community in Rajputana which are usually available at the rate of 4 to 7 per cent

The Kalladaikurichi Brahmans take fixed deposits at 6 to 8 per cent and current deposits at 5 to 7 per cent They also borrow and their borrowings roughly equal their owned capital

*Punjab*—Funds are raised by deposits, by drawing hundis and rediscounting them, and by loans and cash credits secured on house property or Government securities The owned funds of the indigenous bankers in most cases are less than their borrowings All do not take deposits, but those who take them pay anything up to 6 per cent according to market conditions and the period of deposits On hundis and loans, the rates vary with the bazar or the bank rate according as the dealings are with the bazar or a bank The bazar rate for first class hundis is  $\frac{1}{2}$  to 1 per cent below the bank rate

*United Provinces*—Although indigenous bankers are reluctant to accept deposits and rely more on their own capital, on such deposits as they receive they pay interest at rates which vary with the demand of the season They borrow from one another at rates varying from  $4\frac{1}{2}$  to 9 per cent, 6 per cent being the most common rate

#### NATURE, EXTENT AND METHODS OF BUSINESS

127 As in the case of money-lenders, the indigenous banker's operations are not attended with formalities and delays His accounts are kept in a simple and economical way but are accurate and efficient He is easily and always accessible His establishment is not costly and there is no elaborate staff Generally speaking he receives no special banking education, except what is picked up in the course of business and from past experiences of his firm

128 It is not ordinarily practicable for the indigenous banker to establish direct business relations with the ryot. He finances agriculture through local sahukais or money-lenders. In Burma most of the Chettiyai's loans are made to agriculture and a peculiar feature of the finance is that the Chettiyai sends out one of his clerks to the villages to deal with local borrowers. In Bihar and Orissa the indigenous banker lends to grain merchants and goladars, and advances directly to zemindars and ryots who have an easy access to towns. In all provinces, he also indirectly finances agriculture by financing internal trade. In provinces where the Land Alienation Acts are in force, the indigenous banker has ceased to advance against agricultural land.

129 While his relations to agriculture are generally, except in Burma, indirect, he has always maintained a close personal touch with the trader and the small industrialist. We shall deal in a later chapter more fully with the important part played by the indigenous banker in financing trade and industry, but it may be pointed out here that in connection with such financing operations he does a good deal of general banking business which is done by joint-stock banks, such as buying and selling remittance, discounting hundis, receiving deposits, and advancing loans against stock in trade. Some of the indigenous bankers issue cheque books, but the cheques have only a limited local circulation.

130 The majority of indigenous bankers combine banking with some form of trade, and the capital employed in banking is not distinguished from that employed in trade. The Punjab Committee observe, and this is confirmed by other Committees as well, that their banking business has considerably declined owing to the competition of the joint-stock and co-operative banks and that they have been tempted to make up for their lost ground in banking by developing trading activities. Other reasons given for the decline are the loss of agency business in *manchis* by the indigenous bankers, owing to the establishment of branches of exporting firms, the heavy stamp duty on bills which has led to a restriction of their bill business, and to some extent the temptation to speculate, which exists in trade to a very much larger extent than in banking. There are at the present day three kinds of indigenous bankers —

- (i) those who confine their business to banking proper or whose principal business is banking,
- (ii) those who are principally traders or merchants but employ their surplus funds in banking business, and
- (iii) those who are both bankers and traders and cannot be easily classified as principally bankers or principally traders.

## RATES OF INTEREST

131 The rates of interest charged by indigenous bankers on advances are summarized below —

Name of Province	Nature of Security	Rates of interest	Remarks
		Per cent	
Assam . . .	(1) Village money-lender on condition of receiving crops for sale	9—12	
	(2) Other customers	18	
Bengal . . .	(1) Secured loans	7½—15	
	(2) Unsecured loans	18—37½	
	(3) <i>Khata Peta</i>	6½—9	
	(4) Promissory notes or <i>Purjas</i> or <i>hundis</i>	2—9	
Bihar and Orissa .	(1) <i>Khata Peta</i> (Money at call)	6½—9	
	(2) <i>Muddati hundis</i>	4—12	
	(3) To non traders (depends on the position of the parties)	12—18	
Bombay	For internal trade and other purposes	6—12	
Burma	Above Rs 5,000 in Rangoon	10 5—12 75	
	Elsewhere—		
	(1) Against gold	15—21	} Varying with reference to amount of loan.
	(2) Against land, house property or paddy in godown	12—24	
	(3) On prom notes without security	16 5—30	
Central Areas	<i>Ajmer Meruara</i>		
	(1) Ornaments	6—7½	} Rates do not vary with the seasons
	(2) Produce and Railway receipts	7	
	(3) Landed property	9	
	(4) Personal security (according to standing of parties)	6—9	

Name of Province	Nature of Security	Rates of interest	Remarks
Central Areas— <i>contd</i>	<i>Delhi</i>	Per cent	
	(1) Mortgage of property	9—12	
	(2) Ornaments	9—10½	
	(3) Verbal security for 8 to 10 days	6	
	(4) Loans to <i>artias</i> and cloth merchants	7½	
	(5) To grain dealers, fruit and vegetable merchants	9—12	
	<i>North West Frontier Province</i>		
	(1) Ornaments	9	
	(2) Verbal security	8—9	
	(3) Pro notes for 60 days	5—8½	
	(4) <i>Muddat hundis</i>	4½—8½	
Central Provinces	(1) Gold and silver ornaments	7½—9	
	(2) Grain and other produce kept in the godown of the lender	7—7½	
	(3) Other cases	7—18	
Madras	(1) First class mortgages in towns	9—12	} Chettiyars
	(2) First class mortgages in villages	9—15	
	(3) Clean loans— (a) town	9—12	
	(b) villages	9—18	
	(1) Small loans	9—13	} Multanis
	(2) Weak Security	18—24	
	(1) Mortgages	9—12	} Marwaris
	(2) Produce	12—15	
	(3) Pro notes	12—18	
	(1) <i>Hundis</i>	9—12	} Kalladaikurichi Brahmins
	(2) Other loans	up to 15	

Name of Province	Nature of Security	Rates of interest	Remarks
Punjab	For short-term loans from 2 to 6 months for trade and industry or in the case of agriculture till the next harvest	Per cent 8—9	Advances are made against all the usual forms of security, but principally against house property and ornaments. A few give advances on personal credit.
United Provinces	(1) Pro-notes and mortgage of landed and house property	7½—12	Usual rate is 9 per cent
	(2) Ornaments	7½—12	According to amount and material

#### RELATIONS WITH ORGANIZED BANKING INSTITUTIONS

132 In Bombay, indigenous bankers whose names are on the approved lists of joint-stock banks including the Imperial Bank of India get advances from these banks up to certain limits assigned to each. In fixing these limits, the Imperial Bank takes into account other factors besides a party's worth. Banks also make advances against *shroffs'* *hundis*, the period of which is usually 60 days. In Bihar and Orissa, the local joint-stock banks do very little *hundi* business with indigenous bankers, who are rivals rather than customers of these banks. The Imperial Bank, however, affords them facilities to rediscount their *hundis* in the busy season. In Bengal, the indigenous banking firms of repute avail themselves of the rediscounting facilities offered by the Imperial Bank, the joint-stock banks and in some cases by exchange banks. The indigenous bankers in Assam have practically no dealings with the joint-stock banks, nor do they make much use of the Imperial Bank branches. Some of the *Maiwaris*, however, have current accounts at these branches and can get cheques and *hundis* cashed there. The Imperial Bank and joint-stock banks make advances to *Chettiyars* in Rangoon in the form of loans and over-drafts, on the security of Government paper and on promissory notes payable on demand. The rate of interest is based on the bank rate and varies according to the season. The Imperial Bank is prepared to rediscount the *hundis* of indigenous bankers in the Punjab at about ½ per cent above the bank rate but it is reported that the indigenous bankers do not resort much

to the bank. In the United Provinces, the accommodation which the indigenous bankers receive from joint-stock banks is neither free nor regular, but is sought occasionally and only in the last resort when the bankers' own funds are exhausted and other bankers give no further credit. This is explained as due to their inability to furnish adequate security and then refusal to disclose their accounts or publish a balance sheet, making it impossible for the banks to assess the true financial position of the indigenous bankers. In Delhi, the indigenous bankers rediscount about 25 per cent of *muddati hundis* with the Indian joint-stock banks including the Imperial Bank and keep deposits with them when the market rate of interest is low. On the whole, in Delhi, the indigenous bankers get in times of need more credit from the Indian joint-stock banks than from the Imperial Bank.

133 In all the provinces, the indigenous bankers get remittance facilities from the Imperial Bank, on the same terms as the general public do. The special concessions given to the joint-stock banks are not extended to the indigenous bankers, as the indigenous bankers do not keep any balances with the Imperial Bank and do much less business with that bank than the joint-stock banks do.

#### ORGANIZATION

134 In a few centres in the Bombay Presidency indigenous bankers have organized themselves into associations, *e.g.*, the Bombay Shroffs' Association, the Ahmedabad Shroffs' Association, and the Marwadi Chamber of Commerce. There is also an association of *shroffs* at Calcutta. Each association conducts its business on well-defined lines and is governed by its own regulations. Members of one association have dealings with those of another, but there is no organization for interchange of intelligence. The indigenous bankers work independently of one another. Co-ordination is lacking among the various classes of bankers, though certain sections of them, such as the Marwadi bankers and the Vaishya bankers at Agra, are always prepared to help the members of their fraternity out of trouble.

#### LINKING THE INDIGENOUS BANKERS WITH THE GENERAL BANKING SYSTEM

135 Various proposals have been made for linking the indigenous bankers with the general banking system. This is considered necessary as it will be long before it is possible to have properly organized branches of commercial or co-operative banks scattered all over India. Moreover, the indigenous bankers have been traditionally dealing with *hundis* and it is thought that their training, experience and resources will be helpful to encourage and



develop the bill habit. The Assam Committee, however, observe that the indigenous banker will be a useful link in rural finance only when conditions are brought about under which the village money-lender will finance cultivation on reasonable terms against reasonably good securities. From this point of view it has been suggested that if any increased facilities are to be made available, they should preferably be given to co-operative organizations, as the benefit would more directly descend to the cultivators than if the facilities were given, say, to indigenous bankers. It may also be mentioned in this connection that in the opinion of the Punjab Committee, the indigenous banker is bound to give way as commercial banking expands and that if such expansion continues, it is only a matter of time before the indigenous banker becomes extinct.

136 The proposals made by Provincial Committees are briefly summarized below —

(1) The indigenous banker should be linked with the Central Banking Institution of the country as its agents at least in places where no other type of banking organisation is functioning and should be subjected to restrictions which will eliminate risks arising from speculation and his own business. As regards the Imperial Bank of India, the Managing Governor states in his evidence that at present that Bank utilizes the services of leading merchants and shroffs in the mofussil for the collection of bills and cheques, the Bank has found this arrangement very convenient and has never lost anything by using that agency, but the Bank has consistently opposed their agents undertaking any business on their own account. He adds that if a *shroff* were appointed as agent of the Bank to do general banking business on behalf of the Bank, the *shroff* would not only expect to carry on his own business but also to do business which would be in competition with the Bank. Further the Bank could not very well differentiate and, if its other agents wished to do money-lending business, it would almost be impossible to stop them. Another aspect of the proposal as brought out by him is that, if the *shroff* guaranteed the business he put through for the Bank, the Bank would have to allow him to take any steps he desired in times of stress to protect his own interests. These steps might conflict with the Bank's policy and result in undue pressure being put on constituents at a time when a more lenient course would be in the interest of the country as a whole.

(2) Indigenous bankers satisfying certain conditions should be treated as 'member banks' on the approved list of the Reserve Bank when created. They should be required to keep a proportion of their deposits with the Reserve Bank and should get the same facilities for rediscounting commercial paper as other joint-stock banks who are member banks, subject to certain obligations,

such as the submission of their account books to periodical inspection and conforming to the standard prescribed by the Reserve Bank

(3) Commercial banks including the Imperial Bank might discount the bills of indigenous bankers more freely. It has, however, been pointed out by the Managing Governor of the Imperial Bank that the question of discounting and rediscounting is largely a matter of security, and that good security commands all the banking facilities to which it is entitled. The following extract from the Report of the Bengal Committee tells a different tale —

“In the mofussil it has been stated that the branches of the Imperial Bank evince a lack of sympathy in their attitude towards the indigenous bankers. Evidence has been received from two firms in Dacca that the local branch of the Imperial Bank refuses to rediscount *hundis* bearing the endorsements of even the firms of highest repute in Dacca town. A complaint has also been made that the Imperial Bank does not afford any special facility or consideration even to the old, reliable and substantial Indian firms

(4) In order to retain public confidence, indigenous bankers should re-organize themselves on modern lines and become whole-time bankers by combination and other suitable devices, if necessary. They might follow their own system of account keeping, and Government should encourage re-organization on these lines by appointing such institutions, when formed, to be Government bankers leaving the Government balances with them at those places where there is no branch of the Imperial Bank

(5) With a view to creating public confidence in the indigenous banker, a class of licensed bankers should be instituted on whom certain privileges should be bestowed in return for certain definite obligations imposed on them. The privileges are (1) a special summary procedure for determination of their suits and for the execution of the decrees, (2) special legal enactment or directions laying down that no court shall be at liberty to vary the rates of interest stipulated in the transactions to which these licensed bankers are parties so long as these rates are within a prescribed schedule, (3) a definite assurance that the Imperial Bank shall not ordinarily open a branch at any place where the licensed indigenous banker is working, (4) facilities to remit free of charge through the post office, under certain conditions, (5) facilities for remittance of funds through the Imperial Bank or the Reserve Bank at the same rates as are charged to all joint-stock banks, (6) grant of a substantial rebate of duty on *muddati hundis* under certain conditions, (7) grant of rediscount facilities by the Imperial or the Reserve Bank on the same terms as those enjoyed by the joint-stock banks

subject to certain maximum limits fixed by the Imperial or the Reserve Bank, (8) grant of advances against gold and silver ornaments by the Imperial or the Reserve Bank at a profitable rate under certain conditions prescribed by the bank, and (9) provision for the satisfactory examination and audit of account books of licensed indigenous bankers by a committee elected by the local Shroffs' Association in cases of applications for declaration of insolvency by a licensed indigenous banker. The obligations to be imposed in view of the above-mentioned privileges relate to (i) proper audit of their accounts, (ii) proper conduct of their business in accordance with the rules drawn up by a local Indigenous Bankers' Association, (iii) limitation of the maximum rates of interest to be charged for different kinds of business to be fixed from time to time by the licensing authority, on the recommendation of the local Shroffs' Association, and (iv) the maintenance of a cash reserve on a prescribed scale.

### OUR PROPOSALS

137 We have carefully considered the suggestions in the foregoing paragraphs and we have come to the conclusion that for various reasons it is important that some action should be taken to improve the position of the indigenous banker and to make him a useful member of the Indian banking system. In the first place, some of the indigenous bankers, at any rate, deserve encouragement and help. Generally speaking, the indigenous banker's rates of interest do not compare unfavourably with those of ordinary joint-stock banks and his beneficent sphere of influence is wider than theirs, but he has fallen on evil days. At a time when margins between borrowing and lending rates are diminishing and there is an urgent need for more funds for enabling him to have a larger turnover of business, he finds the sources dried up, due, no doubt, partly to his own fault but partly to circumstances beyond his control. Secondly, action is necessary in the interests of agriculture, trade and industry of the country. We are impressed by the fact that out of 2,500 towns\* in India, joint-stock banks and their branches exist in less than 400 places, and for banking facilities elsewhere, agriculturists, traders, merchants and small industrialists have to depend largely on indigenous bankers and money-lenders. In many provinces, even in localities where a joint-stock bank or its branch exists, the indigenous bankers continue to render valuable service in connection with the financing of internal trade and middle-sized and small industries and inland remittance work. A large section of the community is thus still dependent on the

\* As defined in the Census Report. They include every municipality, all civil lines not included within municipal limits, every cantonment, and every other continuous collection of houses inhabited by not less than 5,000 persons which the provincial superintendent may decide to treat as a town for census purposes.

indigenous bankers for the financial facilities it requires From a study of the history of the progress of joint-stock banks in India, we are convinced that it will be a long time before India will have a widespread network of joint-stock banks or branches of such banks. Further, although co-operation has, as pointed out in a later chapter, made remarkable progress in the country since the movement first started in 1904, its extension on such a scale as to replace the indigenous bankers cannot be envisaged within a measurable distance of time. The Imperial Bank of India which has opened 100 branches during the last ten years in accordance with the agreement entered into with Government under the Act governing ~~their~~ operations, in view of the fact that many branches have not yet reached the profit-earning stage is not likely to go in for further schemes of expansion for some years to come. We think it therefore of the greatest importance that, in the interests of both the general public and the indigenous bankers themselves, steps should be devised to strengthen the position of these bankers.

138 We are not in favour of any compulsory measures with a view to reform or help the indigenous bankers, nor do we think that any such measures will be welcomed by the indigenous bankers themselves. On the other hand from the evidence that we have received we gather that any such compulsion would only accelerate the process of driving out these bankers from banking proper to other spheres of business. This would create a large gap in the banking system of the country which would be detrimental to national interests. Our aim on the contrary should be to try to restore these bankers to the place which they enjoyed in India until the middle of the last century.

139 Our first proposal therefore is that as soon as the Reserve Bank is established the indigenous banker should along with joint-stock and co-operative banks be brought into direct relations with the Reserve Bank and thereby provided with rediscount facilities from that institution. It must, however, be remembered that the Reserve Bank can only rediscount bank-endorsed paper. We therefore propose that only such indigenous bankers as are engaged in banking proper, or are prepared to shed their business other than banking, should be eligible to be placed on the approved list of the Reserve Bank in the same manner as joint-stock banks. In the case of the latter, the Reserve Bank Bill of 1928 fixed a certain standard, that is, that the member bank should have a capital and reserve of Rs 3 lakhs and over. Similarly in the case of the indigenous bankers we admit that it is necessary to have a standard. As our object, however, is to bring into the scheme of the Reserve Bank as many sound indigenous bankers as possible, and as we are not in a position to arrive at any figure of owned capital which would achieve this end, we prefer to leave it to the Reserve Bank to prescribe a standard which an indigenous banker must

satisfy before he can be given the concession which we are recommending in this paragraph. At the same time it must not be understood that we contemplate that the standard of owned capital for indigenous bankers would be as high as that for joint-stock banks. Such an indigenous banker must also agree to have proper books of accounts kept in the usual recognized manner and to have them audited annually by recognized auditors, that is, auditors holding a Government diploma who are permitted by Government to audit the accounts of any public company. These books should also be available to the Reserve Bank for inspection and audit.

140 We are aware that in the Reserve Bank Bill referred to above there is a provision requiring member banks to maintain a certain percentage of their time and demand liabilities as interest-free balances with the Reserve Bank. We have carefully considered the question whether we should insist on the indigenous bankers in our proposed scheme following a similar rule. On the one hand it is argued that if the indigenous banker desired to have facilities from the Reserve Bank in the same manner as a joint-stock bank, he should be prepared to fulfil the same obligations. On the other hand it is suggested that the *raison d'être* of these compulsory deposits is to enable the Reserve Bank to control the credit policy of its member banks and that so far as the majority of indigenous bankers are concerned, the deposits they receive and the operations they carry on, though large in the aggregate, are individually small and that, therefore, the principle of compulsory deposits cannot apply with the same force as it applies to joint-stock banks. We further recognize that it is difficult for small indigenous bankers in rural areas with no elaborate staff to make the calculations and to furnish the returns necessary for the observance of this rule. We see a great deal of force in these arguments and we also feel that any measure compelling all the indigenous bankers big and small, to leave certain interest-free balances with the Reserve Bank will rob our proposal of much of its attractiveness and instead of resulting in indigenous bankers coming within the sphere of the Reserve Bank system in large numbers will only bring in a few. We, therefore, propose that such of the indigenous bankers whose deposits do not exceed five times their capital should during the first five years of the working of the Reserve Bank be exempt from the rule relating to compulsory deposits. At the end of that period it would be left open to the Reserve Bank to take such action in the matter as it may consider necessary in order to make its credit policy effective.

141 We have given full details in a previous paragraph of the lending and borrowing rates of indigenous bankers. These compare favourably with the rates of joint-stock banks and it is our firm belief that when the rediscounting facilities which we have proposed are offered, the indigenous bankers will be able to

reduce still further their rates on advances to the public. We do not, therefore, feel any necessity to impose any condition as to the maximum rate of interest to be charged by these bankers as a *quid pro quo* for the facilities we offer, nor do we think it advisable to impose on the indigenous bankers any conditions which would not equally apply to the other member banks of the Reserve Bank. With a view to meet the apprehensions of those who want to be assured that the facilities afforded to these member banks will be passed on in a large measure to the public, we propose to leave it to the Reserve Bank to see that institutions receiving rediscount facilities from it should not charge to the public rates which in its opinion are unduly high.

142 The proposals that we have made above will go far to improve and raise the status of the class of indigenous bankers in India. With the same purpose in view, the Reserve Bank and the commercial banks in India may use such indigenous bankers who are members of the Reserve Bank system as agents for collection of cheques and bills in the same manner as they may use a joint-stock bank or a co-operative bank. We do not recommend the grant of any other privileges mentioned in clause (5) of paragraph 136 above except that relating to facilities for remittance of funds through the Imperial Bank of India or the Reserve Bank at the same rates as are charged to all joint-stock banks. This latter privilege should automatically be accorded to the indigenous bankers who are included in the schedule of member banks of the Reserve Bank. Further the benefits of the Bankers' Books Evidence Act should be extended to such indigenous bankers as are placed on the approved list of the Reserve Bank.

143 We have already pointed out in paragraph 107 that the dividing line between an indigenous banker and a money-lender is rather thin. That being the position, we desire it to be clearly understood that the proposals made by us in paragraphs 137 to 142 should apply equally to money-lenders who satisfy all the conditions which we have prescribed for indigenous bankers.

144 It is quite conceivable that a large number of indigenous bankers whose principal business is not banking, or who do not take to banking as their principal business as soon as the Reserve Bank is established, will still remain outside the scope of our proposals. These will continue to obtain their banking facilities from the existing joint-stock banks, including the Imperial Bank of India. We have already referred to the complaint that good security does not always command all the banking facilities to which it is entitled, and some of the Provincial Banking Enquiry Committees have pleaded for the adoption of a more liberal policy by the Imperial Bank of India. We strongly support this plea and commend it for the sympathetic consideration of the Imperial Bank and other joint-stock banks in the country.

145 We may in this connection refer to a recommendation we have made elsewhere, namely, that an Association of all banks and bankers should be formed as early as possible and that such indigenous bankers whose bills the Reserve Bank decides to accept should become full members of the All-India Bankers' Association and in addition be entitled to use the designation "Member of the Central Bankers' Association" Such of the banks and indigenous bankers as are outside the Reserve Bank system might be made associate members We are sure that this proposal, in addition to giving these indigenous bankers a status, will also tend to raise the standard and improve their banking methods This proposal will not stand in the way of the formation of local indigenous bankers' associations such as those that now exist in Bombay and other centres for facilitating co-operation and joint action by indigenous bankers of the locality

146 Other lines of advance suggested are —

- (a) Amalgamation of the business of local indigenous bankers into joint-stock banks,
- (b) Establishment of what are known in Germany as "Kommandit" principle banks,
- (c) Formation of a co-operative bank of indigenous bankers, which would discount the *hundis* of the members and rediscount the same with the Reserve Bank, and
- (d) Adoption of bill-broking as an integral part of the indigenous bankers' business

We consider that it is for the indigenous bankers themselves to carry out reforms on the lines suggested above We are of the opinion that if they bring their system of operations more into line with the customs and practices of commercial banks in the matter of audit and accounts, use of bills and cheques, prompt payment and receipt of moneys and conduct of business strictly in accordance with legal requirements, they can take their proper place in the banking system of the country We have already referred to the suggested introduction of the "Kommandit" principle in the proposals of the preceding chapter relating to money-lenders We agree that the suggestion is one which should receive the serious consideration of existing banks in India in order to extend the sphere of their activities without the risk and expense of opening new branches We feel that if the better class of both money-lender and indigenous banker would carry out the reform we have suggested, there are considerable possibilities of mutual benefit for both joint-stock banks and their indigenous agencies, as well as benefit to the trading community as a whole by the provision of improved banking facilities

147 Mr Ramadas Pantulu has put in a supplementary minute in which he apparently wants action to be taken beyond what we have recommended in our report We see no reason to modify the recommendations which we have already made

## CHAPTER IX.

### RURAL FINANCE— contd

#### CO-OPERATIVE ORGANIZATION

##### HISTORY OF MOVEMENT

148 'Co-operation' was officially set up in India with the passing of the Act of 1904. Co-operation was not defined in that Act, but it is generally understood as a voluntary organisation of persons who associate on equal terms for the satisfaction of their common economic needs. Before the passing of the Act of 1904, experiments were made by various officials including Sir Edward MacLagan and Captain Closthwaite in the Punjab, Mr Dupernex in the United Provinces and Mr Lyon in Bengal. The societies organized by them could at that time be registered only under the ordinary Company Law. A few societies then organized still survive in the Punjab. The Act of 1904 was restricted mainly to credit co-operation. We are told that the general impression that co-operative credit alone was the object kept in view at the outset by the Imperial legislators is not correct and that the restrictive scope of the Act of 1904 was "a slip" which was sought to be remedied as quickly as possible. In the course of 7 or 8 years of working of the Act of 1904, it became evident that much progress could not be made under it in the matter of developing rural credit. The entire working capital of the movement in the year 1912 was less than Rs 75 lakhs. In that year, a second Act was passed in supersession of the Act of 1904. The new Act of 1912 expressly recognized the extension of co-operative activity to more complex forms such as secondary bodies like central banks and unions to finance and supervise the primary societies. Provision was also made for the registration of societies of various types aiming at the promotion of economic interest of their members, e.g., societies dealing not only with credit but also with purchase and sale, insurance and other various specialized functions carried out by the most recent types of societies elsewhere.

149 With the passing of the Act of 1912 the movement entered on the second stage of its progress. It must, however, be mentioned that in spite of the removal of the limitations imposed by the original Act, and the creation of scope for several forms of non-credit activities, the preponderating element in Indian co-operation is still credit. This appears to be natural not only because credit is the simplest example of co-operative endeavour that can be introduced among a rural population which is largely illiterate, but also because credit continues to be the most insistent need of the Indian cultivator, who is weighed down by the burden of usury and chronic debt which crush "the life and thought" of rural India.



150 The movement entered on its third stage of development after the publication of the classic report of the MacLagan Committee on Co-operation in 1915. That Committee examined the movement in all its aspects and made many constructive proposals of a far-reaching character for the further development of co-operation. Provincial co-operative banks have since been established in all the provinces except the United Provinces, largely as a result of the recommendations of that Committee.

151 On the passing of the Government of India Act of 1919, Co-operation became a provincial subject ~~to~~<sup>in</sup> the Transferred Departments, and the movement can be said to have entered on the fourth stage of its development since it began to be administered by the ministers under the reformed constitution of the Provincial Governments. During the earlier years of the working of the reformed constitution, the development ministers evinced much interest in the expansion of the movement, and since 1921 there has been a large addition to the number of societies all over India. Later efforts are, however, being directed more largely to the consolidation and rectification of existing societies than to further rapid expansion. The provinces of Bombay and Burma have replaced the Act of 1912 by local legislation in 1925 and 1927 respectively. In Madras a Bill to replace the all-India Act has been introduced into the local legislature. Another important step taken in connection with encouraging co-operation after it became a provincial subject, has been the institution of committees of enquiry by various provinces. The Oakden Committee of the United Provinces of Agra and Oudh, the King Committee of the Central Provinces, the Townsend Committee of Madras and the Calvert Committee of Burma have already published their reports. The appointment of similar committees in other provinces is under contemplation. Some of the Provincial Banking Enquiry Committees have definitely recommended the appointment of such committees.

#### THE PRESENT POSITION

152 Started in 1904 with no antecedent record and having made but negligible progress till 1912, the movement has today assumed large proportions particularly in regard to the aggregate numbers of societies, their membership and working capital. The number of societies in British India and the Indian States is now nearly 100,000, of which about 15,000 are in nine or ten Mahar States. The credit societies alone in British India number over 73,000 on the 30th June 1930 and count more than three million members with a working capital of over Rs. 40 crores. Their average membership is somewhere between 30 and 40. The number of non-credit societies on the same date is about 16,000 with a membership of 650,000 and working capital of about Rs. 6

crores. The central financing institutions like the central banks and the banking unions are nearly 600 in number, of which about 500 are in British India. The entire working capital in the movement is about Rs. 50 crores (excluding loans made by secondary bodies to primary societies and deposits made by the latter with the former). Of this amount, about Rs. 14 crores consist of share-capital and reserve, and the rest of deposits and loans from members and non-members. On the familiar assumption that a rural family consists of 5 members on the average, the membership of three million means that 15 million people in India have been touched by the co-operative credit movement, the percentage of the population benefited by the movement in various provinces is as follows—

Province	* Proportion of members of agricultural societies to families in rural areas	
	All societies	Credit societies
	Per cent	Per cent
Ajmer-Merwara . . . . .	15.4	15.0
Assam . . . . .	2.9	2.9
Bengal . . . . .	4.4	3.5
Bihar and Orissa . . . . .	3.2	3.1
Bombay . . . . .	10.0	8.7
Burma . . . . .	3.9	3.7
Central Provinces and Berar . . . . .	2.4	2.3
Coorg . . . . .	36.2	36.2
Delhi . . . . .	11.5	11.5
Madras . . . . .	8.3	7.9
North-West Frontier Province . . . . .	0.2	0.2
Punjab . . . . .	10.9	10.2
United Provinces . . . . .	1.8	1.8

\* Report of the Royal Commission on Agriculture in India, 1928 paragraph 372

153 We give below certain recent statistics (as on the 30th June 1930) relating to the co-operative movement in India —

I—Agricultural Credit Societies (including mortgage banks)

	Number of Societies	Membership	In thousands			
			Share Capital and Reserve	Deposits	Loans	Total Working Capital
			Rs	Rs	Rs	Rs
Ajmer-Merwara	513	11,203	7,83	41	8,64	16,88
Assam	1,282	52,579	7,57	5,02	16,57	29,16
Bengal	19,156	456,139	1,27,39	34,38	3,28,55	4,90,32
Bihar and Orissa	8,624	211,778	42,04	8,19	1,88,40	2,38,63
Bombay	4,526	265,325	77,37	1,16,65	1,93,28	3,87,30
Burma	2,282	52,945	86,78	9,61	61,17	1,57,56
Central Provinces	3,950	59,308	31,79	7,66	1,32,11	1,71,56
Delhi	217	5,173	2,12	32	5,92	8,36
Madras	12,540	674,590	1,27,55	9,72	5,26,89	6,64,16
N W F P	152	4,122	57	3	2,80	3,40
Punjab	16,125	483,423	2,57,40	70,20	4,51,30	7,78,90
United Provinces	5,043	117,661	46,14	2,61	51,28	1,00,03
Total	74,410	3,334,246	8,14,55	2,64,80	19,66,91	30,46,26

II—Non-Agricultural Credit Societies (including urban banks)

	Number of Societies	Membership	In thousands			
			Share Capital and Reserve	Deposits	Loans	Total Working Capital
			Rs	Rs	Rs	Rs
Ajmer Merwara	67	2,176	1,00	3,26	42	4,68
Assam	11	186	5		3	8
Bengal	456	147,573	74,81	1,75,21	6,48	2,56,50
Bihar and Orissa	56	1,247	96	10	2,36	3,42
Bombay	580	194,421	91,82	2,29,31	10,94	3,32,07
Burma	77	17,458	33,17	26	7	33,50
Central Provinces	70	16,097	6,47	6,25	91	13,63
Delhi	38	1,582	39	1,09	38	1,86
Madras	1,151	221,475	88,52	65,53	1,11,68	2,65,73
N W F P	3	714	59	85		1,44
Punjab	1,092	50,366	25,04	44,45	26,66	96,15
United Provinces	156	3,138	1,24	8	1,54	2,86
Total	3,757	656,433	3,24,06	5,26,39	1,61,47	10,11,92

\* The dates vary with reference to the Co operative year in each province the latest figures available are given.

## III —Non-Credit Societies of all kinds (including Sale Societies)

	Number of Societies	Membership	In thousands			
			Share Capital and Reserve	Deposits	Loans	Total Working Capital
			Rs	Rs	Rs	Rs.
Ajmer Merwara	51	5,126	1,67	29	1,40	3,36
Assam	26	3,034	68	42	7	1,17
Bengal	2,736	122,424	23,36	7,48	51,67	82,51
Bihar and Orissa	8,949	258,944	58,47	21,93	1,95,81	2,76,21
Bombay	504	102,994	34,87	36,67	56,05	1,27,59
Burma	15	1,411	71	5	2	78
Central Provinces	55	3,732	1,78	1 84	80	4,42
Delhi	15	442	14	8	2	24
Madras	437	40,147	8,37	2,54	7,36	18,27
N W F P	10	839	49	15		64
Punjab	2,959	105,141	41,67	9,32	4,72	55,71
United Provinces	163	5,562	55	22	43	1,20
Total	15,920	649,796	1,72,76	80,99	3,18,35	5,72,10

## IV —Central Banks and Banking Unions

	Number	Members		In thousands			
		Individuals	Societies	Share Capital and Reserve	Deposits	Loans	Total Working Capital
				Rs	Rs	Rs	Rs
Ajmer Merwara	7	800	780	4,17	15,53	4	19,74
Assam	15	462	1,118	2,63	13,58	2,75	18,96
Bengal	116	4,652	19,071	78,03	2,64,91	1,12,76	4,55,70
Bihar and Orissa	67	2,742	9,077	36,31	1,52,99	39,48	2,28,78
Bombay	19	6,535	4,001	36,24	1,93,54	54,83	2,84,61
Burma	12	1,072	992	18,43	28,05	4,75	51,23
Central Provinces*	34	48,848	3,955	48,00	1,77,53	15,02	2,40,55
Delhi	1	66	426	1,50	12,20	1	13,71
Madras	31	3,484	12,923	76,60	3,53,01	1,97,57	6,27,18
N W F P	1	36	114	21	2,29	92	3,42
Punjab	118	3,472	18,928	63,23	5,75,37	66,88	7,05,48
United Provinces	69	5,498	5,168	35,25	53,76	4,04	93,05
Total	400	77,667	76,553	4,00,60	18,42,76	4,99,05	27,42,41

\* The practice in Central Provinces seems to be that the individual members of Central banks are generally members of the primary societies

## V — Provincial Banks.

	Members		In thousands				
	Individuals	Societies	Share Capital and Reserve	Debentures	Deposits	Loans	Total Working Capital
			Rs	Rs	Rs	Rs	Rs
Ajmer Merwara	No Provincial Bank in the Area						
Assam	31	35	99		2,37	12	3,48
Bengal		168	20,78		1,63,25	.	1,84,03
Bihar and Orissa	29	79	9,33		63,80	38	73,51
Bombay	808	1,632	18,83	9,80	1,20,51	66	1,49,80
Burma	188	1,648	58,41		27,29		85,70
Central Provinces	40	2,499	10,48		95,99		1,06,47
Delhi	No Provincial Bank in the Province						
Madras	184	58	15,81	2,15	75,87	85,43	1,79,26
N W F P.	No Provincial Bank in the Province						
Punjab		13,008	10,91	5,00	63,13	16,74	95,78
United Provinces	No Provincial Bank in the Province						
Total	1,280	19,127	1,45,54	16,95	6,12,21	1,03,33	8,78,03

## METHODS OF RAISING CREDIT

154 In describing the credit needs of the farmer in Chapter VI, it was pointed out that rural credit fell into two broad categories (1) short-term and intermediate credit, in which loans were secured mostly on personal guarantee and temporary agricultural wealth, and (2) long-term credit which was based upon the permanent agricultural wealth in the shape of land or buildings. Opinion on co-operative credit has now crystallized round the idea that these two varieties of credit cannot be supplied by the same type of co-operative organization and that two different types of them are indispensable. Almost all the Provincial Committees, and almost every competent authority on co-operative credit in India, are agreed that the existing primary societies, central banks and provincial banks, by reason of the character of their resources and other obvious limitations from a banking point of view, can supply only the short and intermediate credit. They are also agreed that the type of co-operative organization most suited to rural credit is the co-operative land mortgage bank. The first

Page 116, for the third line from bottom of the page—Substitute  
 'rural credit is the co-operative land mortgage bank. The  
 first'

the second type of co-operative credit is the co-operative land mortgage bank in both cases

being only a small portion of the working capital. We shall deal in this chapter with the first type of institutions,—primary societies, central banks and provincial banks,—and leave the other to the next chapter.

### THE PRIMARY SOCIETIES.

155 The financial structure of co-operative credit is based upon what are popularly known as the primary societies. These societies, which are associations of borrowers and non-borrowers, consist of the residents of a locality who know one another and may naturally be expected to take interest in one another's affairs. This arrangement brings together persons of different status in life into a common economic organization and helps to foster a true spirit of co-operative brotherhood, and we agree with the recommendation of the foreign banking experts that membership of primary societies should not be confined to a special creed, caste or calling or to a certain number of people resident in a locality. The rural credit societies are mostly shaped on what is known as the Raiffeisen model, after Raiffeisen, the famous German Co-operator, whose rural credit system proved a great factor in the economic regeneration of the German farmers. The structure of these societies is simple. Every resident of a village who in the opinion of his fellow-members, is a person of good character is eligible for membership. The tangible assets of the society consist of the property possessed by all the members thereof, the details of which are required to be entered in a list called the "Property Statement" (Haisiyat) of the society. This is periodically revised, usually once a year, and brought up to date. The careful preparation and revision of this statement is of the utmost importance for the proper working of the society. In some localities members contribute a small share capital and in others they do not. In the Punjab and the United Provinces, the society based on shares has from the first prevailed to a great extent in Madras and Burma also. In other provinces, the share and non-share societies flourish side by side. We are of the opinion that the encouragement of subscription to share capital by members as a method of collection of savings is to be preferred to a system of compulsory deposits. These societies are expected to raise locally (on the joint liability of the members) capital to be lent out to the members and, whenever necessary, the local capital so raised may be supplemented by small loans from the State, deposits made by friends and sympathisers of the movement who are non-members, and loans obtained from central and provincial banks. We do not recommend under existing conditions that primary societies should make any special effort to attract deposits from non-members by offering high rates of interest, for this would frustrate the aims of

the movement to bring down the general high level of interest rates and to provide the rural co-operators with cheap and controlled credit. Moreover without the aid of an efficient and well-organized Central Banking System which can act as a true balancing centre for primary societies, the latter cannot receive and utilize non-members' deposits without risk and with profit. These societies should, however, serve as savings banks for their members and promote thrift. The liability in the agricultural rural societies is generally unlimited. The urban primary societies which are modelled on Luzzati's People's Banks in Italy and Schulze Delitzsch societies in Germany adopt the principle of limited liability, but otherwise, they follow the essential principles of co-operative credit which characterize the rural societies based on the Raiffeisen model. Certain very definite and rigid principles are laid down in the matter of the grant, utilization and recovery of loans. The most important of them are —

(1) The maximum borrowing power of the society is fixed on some understandable basis, such as a definite fraction of the net assets of all the members composing it. It varies between  $\frac{1}{4}$ th to  $\frac{1}{8}$ th of the value of the net assets in the several parts of India.

(2) No loans should be advanced for an unproductive or wasteful object, and the scrutiny of the purpose of the loan is an important function of the Panchayat or the Managing Committee.

(3) In fixing the individual maximum borrowing power of the members fair latitude is allowed according to their needs. Such maximum bears a definite proportion to the individual assets of the member and does not ordinarily exceed fifty per cent of the value thereof. The purpose of the loan and the repaying capacity of the borrower constitute the important factors, in determining the amount of the loan within the prescribed maximum limit of the borrowing power.

(4) The members should keep mutual watch over one another in regard to putting the loan to beneficial use and in the matter of the timely discharge of the dues to the Society.

(5) The instalments of repayment of the loan should be fixed with due regard to the repaying capacity of the borrower, when the borrower is unable to repay on account of any just cause, like failure of crop, a suitable extension of the period of repayment is made and no undue pressure is brought to bear on the borrower.

(6) The shareholding and the rate of dividend are restricted. The principle of 'one man, one vote' is observed almost universally,

irrespective of the holding of shares. There are also rigid restrictions on the right of the member to transfer or charge his share or interest in the capital of a registered society. Such share or interest is also not liable to attachment or sale by courts or in insolvency proceedings. The liability of a member for the debts of the society continues until the expiry of two years after he ceases to be a member.

(7) The society has a prior claim, subject to that of the Government's dues, over other creditors of the members in the matter of enforcing any outstanding demands due to the society from a member or past member for moneys advanced for agricultural requisites. There is, however, no specific charge nor does the prior claim extend to all advances relating to crop finance. In Bombay, the prior claim under the All-India Act is converted into a *first charge* by the local Act. We do not consider that the present legal provision in Section 19 of the All-India Act giving to the society a prior claim is satisfactory. We recommend that, as in Bombay, the prior claim should be converted into a first charge.

(8) The societies are placed under statutory obligation to build up reserve funds. Section 33 of the Act deals with reserve funds. In non-share societies the entire surplus profit is carried to the indivisible reserve. In share societies also the idea that the reserve fund is one and indivisible is recognised, and no distribution of profits is permitted without a substantial portion being carried to the reserve fund, such portion being not less than 25 per cent of the profits. In Madras, in the case of the unlimited liability societies the rule is that not less than one-half of the profits shall be carried to a reserve fund until that fund is equal to one-half of the total liabilities of the society other than reserve and share capital. The value of the reserve fund as a safeguard against the unlimited liability of the members to make good any probable loss is appreciated and the desire to build up reserve funds is in evidence. These reserve funds are generally invested by primary societies in central co-operative banks. The United Provinces Provincial Banking Enquiry Committee report that in some societies it is the practice to lend money to their members out of the reserve funds and as the members themselves are owners of these funds, it has been possible for 400 societies which have adopted this procedure to reduce their rate of interest. The question whether societies should be permitted to use a portion of the reserve fund as their working capital has arisen from the fact that the Central Banks pay a low rate of interest on the reserve fund to societies while the rate charged on loans is much higher. The Townsend Committee recommended that Central Banks should lend to societies at concessional rate sums up to the extent of the reserve fund in deposit



with them, and that after the reserve fund of a society aggregates to an appreciable percentage of the society's total working capital the excess may be permitted to be used in the society's business. We recommend the former proposal for the consideration of the authorities concerned. In the present stage of the development of the movement it is safer to keep the reserve fund invested in the central banks and not to permit the societies to lend it to their members.

156 In a registered society, unlimited liability, whatever may be its implications in strict legal theory, amounts in co-operative practice merely to the contributions which a liquidator may levy in the process of liquidation, in other words it is an ultimate contributory liability which arises when a society is wound up. It does not mean that any or all the creditors may sue any member for the debt due to them. As explained clearly by Mr. Calvert, the loss in a co-operative society will fall *firstly* on the member, *secondly* on his surties, *thirdly* on the reserve, *fourthly* on the share capital, *fifthly* on the unlimited liability of the members and *finally* on the creditors of the society.\* Experience has shown that the protection to the creditors is ample, and this mainly accounts for the readiness with which the public invest their moneys in co-operative banks. It is true that the unlimited liability does not carry with it an obligation against alienation and that if a member having acknowledged his unlimited liability to his society proceeds to encumber or dispose of his material possessions, the security to depositors will *pro tanto* be diminished. In practice, however, there are many safeguards against recourse to such dishonesty, which entail prompt steps being taken to recover any outstanding loan and to expel the member. It is this liability that subjects members to mutual watch over each member. Mr. Wolff very aptly points out that "Raiffeisen adopted unlimited liability in order that society should stand on no etiquette with candidates, consider well whether such were eligible and unsparingly supervise them"† Co-operators find that with the observance of these precautions, and the restriction of loans to members selected for their honesty, the unlimited liability is of great practical value in raising and dispensing co-operative rural credit, instead of being a danger or a snare. We have, however, no objection to limited liability societies being encouraged in places where the co-operative movement cannot make a great headway under the unlimited liability system.

#### THE CENTRAL BANKS

157 The co-operative primary societies in a specified area are federated into a central society which is called a

\* "The Law and Principles of Co-operation" by Calvert, page 40

† "Co-operation in India" by Wolff, page 63

“Central Bank” or a “Banking Union” Historically speaking, the appellation “Central bank” is used when the central society admits as its members not only primary societies, but also individuals. The phrase “Banking Union” is used when membership is confined to societies only and individual members are excluded. In practice the differentiation is gradually disappearing and individuals are to be found as members in most co-operative banks everywhere. We shall therefore refer to both of these institutions as central banks. These central banking organizations are generally located at headquarters of, or other important towns in, the districts and have on their boards of management some individuals of influence and business capacity, besides representatives of primary societies. They have, therefore, very soon won the confidence of the public and are today a factor to be reckoned with in the Indian money market. We do not recommend the exclusion of individual members from central co-operative banks, but we agree with the MacLagan Committee on Co-operation, that societies’ representatives should have a preponderating voice in their management. These banks finance the primary credit societies and also act as balancing centres to them, and as a rule do little commercial banking. Their resources consist of their owned capital (share capital and reserve funds), deposits of various kinds, such as fixed, current, recurring, and prudent, provident and savings deposits, overdrafts and short term loans from the Imperial Bank of India and some joint stock banks, and loans and advances made by the provincial bank and sometimes by other central co-operative banks. Another source of deposits for central banks is the surplus funds of primary societies affiliated to them, more particularly the contributions to the reserve fund which are required to be separately invested in the central bank. Their position in certain provinces has become so stable that municipalities, local bodies, universities and other *quasi*-public bodies are allowed to deposit their surplus funds with them. The central banks are able to attract capital which at present is ample for the requirements of the movement, and in some provinces they obtain deposits at as low a rate of interest as 4 per cent. In making loans, they observe in the main the principles of co-operative credit which were enumerated in dealing with the primary society. The dividend paid by them is restricted by statutory rules, and does not generally exceed 9 per cent, though in a few provinces it is as high as 12 per cent. By legislation the maximum rate is fixed at 10 per cent in Bombay. As in the case of the limited liability societies, 25 per cent of the central bank’s net profits are required to be carried to a reserve fund. These banks are required to maintain adequate fluid resources to meet the depositors’ claims, the standard of such resources being fixed by the Registrar, and generally speaking they are expected to follow the rules of prudent banking like commercial banks. In practice the standard is even

more rigid The banks are required to maintain a fluid resource register showing from day to day the amount of fluid resource required and the amount maintained The fluid resources are maintained in the shape of (1) cash balances on hand, (2) undrawn cash credit with the Imperial Bank of India and with the provincial co-operative bank and (3) Government promissory notes

In order to protect the depositors, and to create confidence in the minds of the public and of the commercial banks that have dealings with Co-operative banks, it has been suggested that the limited liability of shareholders in central banks should be coupled with a reserve liability of about 5 to 10 times the share capital. Though we agree that the reserve liability may be permissible in the case of shares held by societies, we do not approve of the suggestion in so far as it applies to individuals who are members. Even in the case of societies, we consider that such reserve liability should be restricted to the face value of the shares and not to some multiple of it We would in this connection invite a reference to paragraphs 121 and 122 of the MacLagan Committee's report which support our conclusion

In order to provide against losses which may arise from part of the funds invested in primary societies proving ultimately irrecoverable, we recommend that central banks should start a bad debt fund, carrying a reasonable amount of the profits to that fund, in addition to the statutory allocation to reserve funds We are aware that the reserve fund itself is intended to meet irrecoverable losses But in our opinion this arrangement is not a sufficient protection to creditors In the first place, the reserve fund in *practice* is not drawn upon to recoup losses until the bank is put into liquidation In the next place, the temptation to pay dividends on shares at the maximum rates allowed even in years when there is a depreciation of assets by the deterioration of debtor societies can only be checked by carrying over an adequate portion of the profits to a bad debt fund The question of dividend does not arise at the time when the statutory allocation is made to the reserve fund

### THE PROVINCIAL BANKS

158 The central co-operative banks in all the Governors' provinces in India with the exception of the United Provinces of Agra and Oudh have in their turn federated themselves into higher central societies called apex banks or provincial banks The United Provinces Committee have recommended the establishment of a provincial bank for the province a recommendation which we strongly support One Indian State at least (Mysore) has an organization approximating to a provincial bank These provincial banks are able to attract the capital required for

the movement by means of deposits at fairly cheap rates of interest. The provincial banks act as financing agencies and balancing centres to the central banks. They derive their funds much in the same way as the central banks do. Many of them enjoy cash credit and over-draft arrangements with the Imperial Bank of India and in certain provinces with other joint-stock banks. They also get short-term money and call-money from many commercial banks. Some provincial banks are known to lend their surplus funds to other provincial banks. The Indian Provincial Co-operative Banks' Association co-ordinates the activities of the various provincial banks and supplies them with information about the financial requirements of the banks. In short, money flows from the provincial bank to the central bank and from the central bank to the rural societies and from them to the individual borrowers. The underlying idea of this financial distributory system is that the resources of the society should be made available to thousands of small cultivators who need accommodation "channeling out the stream of the water collected" as Mr Wolff figuratively puts it "sending it in rills over a broad surface, so that irrigation may be perfect and reaching every root to be watered"\* The question whether the structure should not be completed by an All-India Co-operative Bank at its apex has often been considered, but we think that when the Reserve Bank is established, the need for an apex bank for the provincial banks will no longer be felt, as the provincial banks will then be provided by the Reserve Bank with all the financial facilities required by them. At any rate we see no need for an apex bank for the present.

159 It has been suggested that as the failure of a provincial bank might very seriously affect, if not destroy, the whole co-operative movement in the province, it is desirable to transform the existing institutions into special registered institutions with part of the share capital subscribed by the Provincial Governments. We are not in favour of such transformation. We recommend that provincial banks should continue to be bodies incorporated under the Co-operative Societies' Act. Provincial banks are best suited for linking up the co-operative credit organization with the general money market and commercial banks, and should be managed on ordinary business principles with due regard to the special requirements of co-operation. These banks should not deal directly with primary credit societies and should consolidate and strengthen their position as financing agencies and balancing centres for the central banks. We consider it desirable that the executive head of a provincial bank should be a thoroughly trained banker with competent knowledge of the principles and practice of co-operative credit.

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\* "Co operation in India" by Wolff, page 134

160 This credit structure of co-operative organization is further buttressed by certain forms of statutory control vested in the Registrar, the most important of which is compulsory audit. The Act lays down that the Registrar shall audit or cause to be audited by some person authorized by him, by general or special order in writing, in this behalf, the accounts of every registered society once at least every year, and that the audit shall include an examination of overdue debts if any, and a valuation of the assets and liabilities of the society. The audit is, therefore, not a mere examination of books and preparation of balance sheets. The full implications of this statutory definition of co-operative audit have been expounded at length by the MacLagan Committee in paragraphs 91 to 93 of their report. We reproduce paragraph 91.

“91 The terms of the Act expressly require that the audit shall include an examination of overdue debts and a valuation of assets and liabilities. By this latter we understand not merely the preparation of the balance sheets of societies but also a sufficient check, in accordance with such rules as the Registrar may lay down, of the list of the material assets of the members. The audit should, in our opinion, extend somewhat beyond the bare requirements of the Act, and *should embrace an enquiry into all the circumstances which determine the general position of a society*. It would for instance be the duty of the auditor to notice any instances in which the Act, Rules, or By-laws have been infringed, to verify the cash balance and certify the correctness of the accounts, to ascertain that loans are made fairly, for proper periods and objects, and on adequate security, to examine repayments in order to check book adjustments or improper extensions, and generally to see that the society is working on sound lines and that the Committee, the officers, and the ordinary members, understand their duties and responsibilities.”

#### ALL-INDIA CO-OPERATIVE ORGANIZATIONS

161 To complete the picture we must refer to the Indian Provincial Co-operative Banks' Association and the All-India Co-operative Institutes' Association. The former Association, which comprises all provincial banks in its membership, has for its object, among other things, the furtherance of common interests, especially in matters of finance, legislation and administration. The main object of the latter is to promote and extend co-operation through the member institutes and to furnish advice and assistance to member institutes on all co-operative questions. We understand that the present Co-operative Societies Act does not provide for

the registration of societies of an all-India character like those mentioned above or societies operating over more than one province. We recommend that the Act should be amended to provide for such registration. If this is done and the working of the two institutions strengthened so as to make them serve as co-ordinating agencies in the matter of finance and research, we think that it will not be necessary to set up another all-India body, e.g., an all-India Co-operative Council with administrative or controlling functions as suggested by the foreign banking experts.

162 It will be seen from the preceding paragraphs that the soundness and stability of the co-operative structure described therein depends on the observance of the principles and practice of co-operative credit mentioned above, with a realisation that co-operation is an organization or method of doing business, on the efficiency of the statutory audit, and on collective internal supervision.

#### NATURE AND PURPOSES OF ADVANCES

163 The rural co-operative societies which are worked on the basis of mutual guarantee and on unlimited liability are now generally employed as agencies for granting short and intermediate credit to agriculturists. This form of credit is dispensed on personal guarantee and on suretyship. Mortgage security is also taken and in some provincial areas like the southern districts of the Madras Presidency loans on mortgage of immovable property constitute a considerable portion of the total outstandings. The Bihar and Orissa Committee report that the central banks and the rural credit societies in the province have generally adopted in the last few years the plan of taking collateral security in the case of loans above Rs. 200 with the principal object of preventing a borrower from mortgaging his property to a money-lender. Many Provincial Committees are of opinion that mortgage loans for long periods are unsuitable business for the rural credit societies. The evidence of the representatives of the Indian Provincial Co-operative Banks' Association and of the provincial banks was much to the same effect. The reasons for this view are (1) the overshadowing of personal credit by mortgage may entail a neglect of co-operative principles, (2) the deposits of co-operative societies including central and provincial banks are for short periods and it is unsound finance to utilise them for long-term loans, (3) the enquiry and the valuation preliminary to the grant of long-term loans have to be entrusted to a trained agency controlled by and responsible to some central organization, (4) the maintenance of valuable documents and title deeds cannot be entrusted to ordinary village societies and (5) when defaults occur in the repayment of mortgage loans, the assets of the society

become frozen and the obtaining and execution of mortgage decrees for the recovery of overdue loans becomes an extremely difficult operation

#### FACILITIES GIVEN BY CO-OPERATIVE SOCIETIES FOR DISCHARGING OLD DEBTS

164 By far the most important question connected with the nature of the advances relates to facilities given by co-operative societies for the discharge of prior debts. The co-operative credit movement in a way owes its origin to the belief that the natural development of the progress of the movement will be the eradication of the evil of usury and the lightening of the burden of rural indebtedness. While the evidence available to us tends to show, that rates of interest have come down wherever the co-operative credit movement has been successful, there is very little evidence about the reduction of total indebtedness through the agency of co-operative credit societies. Indeed the study of Provincial Reports leads to the irresistible conclusion that the primary societies, central banks and provincial banks are not in a position to finance the agriculturists adequately for the discharge of old debts. The following is a summary of the position as brought out in the reports of the Provincial Committees —

(i) *Assam* — Rural societies give loans for clearing off debts but the practice of long-term loans from short-term deposits is not commended

(ii) *Bengal* — Most of the central co-operative banks in Bengal grant loans to rural societies for repayment of old debts for three years only. A few extend the period to five years and one bank only grants loans for as long a period as ten years. There is in all no effective check against the purpose of the loans

(iii) *Bihar and Orissa* — Co-operative societies give loans for discharging debt, but the period of redemption in the case of these long-term loans has been fixed under instructions from the Registrar of Co-operative Societies at a period from two to ten years according to circumstances. The limit for the grant of long-term loans has also been stated as the total of the central bank's paid up share capital, its own reserve, the primary societies' reserves excluding the portion held as shares in the central bank and 25 per cent of the central bank's deposits. The Bihar and Orissa Committee have recommended that the period of repayment should never be less than five years in such cases and might well be extended to 15 years, and that it would be desirable to arrange equated payments so as to cover both principal and interest and to let the loans run through the first one or two years without any repayment whatever. The Committee have great doubts

whether co-operation will ever supply a complete solution by itself even after these recommendations are carried out

An experiment to redeem debt was made in the Ranchi district from 1906 to 1912, confined to the more substantial cultivators among the *Mundas* (an aboriginal tribe). It is referred to in paragraph 111 of the Bihar and Orissa Report, wherein it is stated that the experiment was generally accepted to be a failure. The Committee have, however, added that they have had no definite information on the period fixed for individual cases of repayment, and that it is impossible to say whether the credit given was sufficiently long to enable a reasonably thrifty cultivator to repay out of the profits of his holding, including the land redeemed. The experience gathered in the course of the Committee's enquiry has demonstrated that most cultivators have to borrow to some extent for seasonal needs, and as long as that borrowing is extremely expensive the margin for the repayment of debt is greatly restricted.

(iv) *Bombay* —The village co-operative societies in Bombay advance loans up to Rs 750 to their members for redemption of debt, but the Registrar can increase the limit. Some co-operative societies have worked out schemes for redemption of their members' debt and have been advancing loans for this purpose from funds borrowed from central banks. Not much progress has, however, been made as the funds at their disposal are short-term funds.

(v) *Burma* —Co-operative credit societies, ostensibly lending only up to four years and chiefly for crop-loans, have often in the past lent where there was no prospect of repayment in four years or less, so that really they were giving long-term loans, a considerable amount has been lent on these conditions and is now unrecoverable, and accordingly such loans are no longer given. The question of restriction of loans by primary societies to crop-loans was considered by the Calvert Committee. Government came to the conclusion that co-operative credit need not be restricted to crop-loans. They have, however, directed that crop-loans should be regarded as the principal business of primary agricultural societies and that, while loans for two or three years should continue to be provided, great care should be exercised in the grant of these loans.

(vi) *Central Provinces* —Attempts have been made to discharge prior debts by advances through the primary societies. This has resulted in the majority of cases in accumulation of overdues. The amortisation of old debts was in any case beyond the capacity of the financial machinery of the co-operative credit movement. It has now been generally recognized that the central banks cannot



devote more than a very small percentage of their working capital to long-term business. The Committee have recommended that long-term loans for repayment of previous debts should be made by the land mortgage bank proposed by them.

(iii) *Madras*—Loans can be had from co-operative societies at 9½ per cent. to be repaid within five years.

(iv) *The Punjab*—The only credit agency with a declared object of granting loans for the discharge of old debts, is the co-operative mortgage bank, which has so far advanced only about Rs. 15 lakhs for this purpose. The efforts of the ordinary primary societies in this respect have been sporadic and usually insufficiently controlled. Though there has been little concerted effort, every year large sums are advanced in the ordinary course of business for the repayment of old debts. The Committee add that last year Rs. 50 lakhs were lent in this way and the experience of a large number of primary societies of ten years' standing showed that a very large number of their members were found to be free from debt. The Committee recommend that the Registrar should consider the possibility of further experiments on more cautious lines than hitherto followed. They, therefore, suggest that the operations should be restricted to A and B class\* societies, that the period of loan should not exceed 5 years, and that experiments should not be made where there is a mortgage bank, as the Committee feel that a mortgage bank is more fitted than a village society to make advances of this kind.

165 We have carefully considered the question whether the ordinary credit societies are a suitable agency for supplying long-term credit to the agriculturists and we have come to the conclusion that in the interests of both the movement and the borrowers these institutions should confine themselves to dispensing short and intermediate credit the nature of which we have already described. Long-term credit can be provided with any degree of safety and success only by land mortgage banks, and these we deal with in the next chapter. The absence of such a rational system of rural finance has seriously interfered with the successful working of co-operative credit societies in some cases.

#### RATES OF INTEREST

166 We may now proceed to summarize the rates of interest charged ultimately to the cultivator by the primary societies and in order to judge whether these rates are reasonable, we have to

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\* Societies in the Punjab are divided into four classes, A, B, C and D of which A and B are efficient financially and more or less fully co-operative, C in varying stages of tutelage, and D in various stages of decay (Punjab Report, para 149).

look also into their borrowing rates. The following table gives the information in a consolidated form —

*Rates of interest*

	Rate charged to cultivators by Primary Societies	Primary Societies		Central Banks		Provincial Banks	
		Rate paid on Deposits	Rate paid to Central Banks on loans	Rate paid on Deposits	Rate paid to Provincial Bank on loans	Rate paid on Deposits	Rate on accommodation from Imperial Bank
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Ajmer-Merwara	Generally 9 to 12	4 to 8	6 to 9	1½ to 7½		.	
Assam	15½ or 16½ (Generally 12½ in the case of old Societies in the Assam Valley)	8	11	8	8½	7½	7
Bengal .	7½ to 15½	4½ to 9½	9½ to 12½	2 to 8½	7 to 8	4 to 6½	Bank rate
Bihar and Orissa	12½ to 16½	7 to 9	10½ to 12½	4½ to 6	6	3 to 5	Bank rate
Bombay	6½ to 12½	2 to 8	6 to 8	1½ to 7½	5½ to 8	2 to 4½	No accommodation is available at present
Burma .	15	6 to 12	10	6 to 9	10	5 to 7½	
Central Provinces	Generally 12	3 to 10	9 to 10	3 to 7	6 to 6½	2 to 5½	7
Delhi . .		6 to 7	8 to 9	4 to 6½			
Madras . .	9½ to 10 ½	3 to 6½	7½ to 8	2 to 5½	6 to 6½	2 to 4½	6½ (overdrafts)
North West Frontier Province		6 to 7	8	4½ to 7½			
Punjab .	9½ to 12½	6 to 7	8 to 9	5 to 6½	6½	3½ to 5½	Bank rate
United Provinces	15	9	12	6 to 7			

THE SERVICE TO THE AGRICULTURIST.

167 The working of the co-operative movement and its present capacity and future possibilities to meet the credit needs of the agriculturists have been the subject of several important enquiries, both of an all-India and provincial character. Soon after the passing of the Co-operative Societies' Act II of 1912, the Government of India set up a Committee presided over by Sir Edward Maclagan, and the report of that Committee which was published in 1915 is still a classic on the subject of co-operation in India. Recently the Royal Commission on Agriculture made a fairly comprehensive survey of the movement and made useful recommendations. As already mentioned four provinces have also appointed their own committees of enquiry to examine the progress made by the

movement in those provinces and to report on the existing conditions and future lines of development. These are the United Provinces of Agra and Oudh, the Central Provinces, Madras and Burma. The several Provincial Banking Enquiry Committees have brought under review the recommendations of most of these committees and as far as the information was available, also indicated the action taken by the official and non-official agencies on those recommendations. The Royal Commission on Agriculture have summarized the results of the working of the movement in these words — "The main results achieved may be said to be the provision of a large amount of capital at reasonable rates of interest and the organization of a system of rural credit which, carefully fostered, may yet relieve the cultivator of that burden of debt which he has borne so patiently throughout the ages. Knowledge of the co-operative system is now widespread, thrift is being encouraged, training in the handling of money, and in elementary banking principles is being given. Where the co-operative movement is strongly established there has been a general lowering of the rate of interest charged by money-lenders, the hold of the money-lender has been loosened, with the result that a marked change has been brought about in the outlook of the people." The Royal Commission's faith in the potentialities of the movement is expressed in these words — "The greatest hope of the salvation of the rural classes from their crushing burden of debt rests in the growth and spread of a healthy and well-organised co-operative movement based on the careful education and systematic training of the villagers themselves." They proceed to say that if co-operation fails the hope of the agriculturist also fails. On a consideration of the good and the weak points of the working of the co-operative organization, the Royal Commission came to the conclusion that "The financial solvency of the movement is beyond dispute, it is the working of the societies that is defective." The reports received from the Provincial Committees do not show that the financial position of the primary societies has deteriorated in any way since the Royal Commission reported. On the other hand in almost all provinces it is reported that the rapidity of expansion of the movement has been suspended with a view to consolidate and rectify the progress already made, to speed up recoveries, to reduce overdues and to otherwise strengthen the financial soundness and stability of the primary and the central societies.

168 In order to popularize the co-operative movement in the country and to promote a sense of responsibility among the members of the society it is important that the official control that now exists in certain provinces should be slackened. For example the fixing of the limits of the borrowing powers of the societies and of

then members and the policy regarding the grant of the loans should be left to the central and provincial banks. We should like to quote in this connection the following extract from the resolution of the Government of Burma on the report of the Calvert Committee —

“It is clearly necessary that Government should take precautions about the effectiveness of which there can be no doubt against any recurrence of such entanglement on their part in the financial liabilities of co-operative institutions. They desire to lay it down clearly therefore that the primary functions of the Co-operative Department are education (Recommendation 4) supervision, (Recommendation 16) and control of audit to the extent stated in Recommendation 26. They entirely agree with the principle stated by the Committee in paragraph 64 that the financing agencies must be entirely responsible for loans, deposits and internal working. A more controversial point is raised when the Committee proceed to recommend that the Co-operative staff should attempt to advise the financing body whether the maximum normal credit limit of a society is reasonable or not in view of rural conditions and that applications for loans other than crop loans should be submitted through the Junior Assistant Registrar. The suggestion of course is that though the responsibility for granting a loan must rest entirely with the financing agency, the advice of the Co-operative staff should be at the disposal of the financing agency. As at present advised, however, though they have not yet arrived at a final conclusion, the Government are disposed to feel that even the giving of official advice as to the granting of loans would weaken the Bank's sense of responsibility and might end in placing the Department in much the same relation to the financing agency as that in which it was involved in the case of the Provincial Bank, and provisionally they are of opinion that Recommendations 55 and 56 should not be accepted.”

169 In judging the extent and value of the services of the movement to the agriculturist, the two obvious tests that suggest themselves are (1) the proportion of the population whose needs are attended to by the co-operative credit agency, and (2) the proportion of the finance required for agriculture which the co-operative movement provides. With reference to the first, the percentage of the population touched by the movement in each province has already been set forth. Regarding the proportion of the

rural finance provided by the movement, the survey is not complete, but some of the provincial committees give a rough idea of the position. For instance, the Bombay Committee have estimated the financial requirements of the agriculturist in their province for the current needs of agriculture at about Rs 32½ crores. Out of this, about Rs 220 lakhs only are said to have been provided in a year by co-operative organisations. The co-operative movement therefore provides about 7 per cent of the finance required for current agricultural needs in Bombay. The Madras Committee have made no such general estimate for that province but have given certain data from which an estimate can be arrived at. In estimating the total indebtedness of the province at Rs 150 crores, they point out that about Rs 70 crores of it represent debt which continues from year to year, i.e., debt contracted for the agricultural needs and domestic expenses of the cultivator which is repaid out of the annual harvest. The share of this sum of Rs 70 crores which is provided by the co-operative movement can be gauged from certain figures which they have given for one district, viz., Tanjore. The cost of cultivating one crop of paddy in the wet delta area of the district is estimated at Rs 3½ crores. Out of this only Rs 17½ lakhs are said to be advanced by the Co-operative Credit Societies. The Punjab Committee have made more intensive enquiries into the matter. They estimate the current needs of the agriculturist to finance cultivation as well as cultivators at 52 to 65 crores and point out that only a small fraction of it is supplied by Co-operative Societies and that the bulk of it is still borrowed from money-lenders. These figures are enough to show that the credit facilities now provided by the co-operative movement to agriculturists cover but a very small proportion of their needs.

#### DEFECTS IN EXISTING SYSTEM.

170 It is not, however, denied that there are several defects in the working of the movement, some of them of a grave nature. The Managing Governor of the Imperial Bank who offered the severest criticism said that, in his opinion, the business of the co-operative movement as a whole could not be considered to have been conducted in a satisfactory manner. According to him "The fundamental principle of true co-operation is lacking. Overdues are highly excessive. Audit is defective. Control is inefficient." The Royal Commission on Agriculture, which as already stated took stock of the situation as recently as 1923, also pointed out that the "members of societies delay payment even when able to repay, understanding of the principles of co-operation and knowledge of the essentials of rural credit are lacking, office holders refrain from taking action against defaulters and the spirit of self-help is not as prominent as it should be, if the movement is to

be a live force in the village. Even where defects are obvious and admitted, there is reluctance, as dangerous as it is regrettable, to liquidate societies whose condition is beyond remedy." The Provincial Committees substantially endorse these observations, and these defects are more or less common to the working of the societies in all provinces. The feature of overdues and its evil effects are specially emphasized by the Provincial Committees and the figures for overdues are given by almost all Committees. We strongly emphasize the need for carefully scrutinising the economic purpose of the loan and the repaying capacity of the borrower, in dispensing co-operative loans. Extensions for repayment should be given only in circumstances of exceptional difficulty and any tenderness in dealing with defaulting members should be avoided. At the same time, we desire to emphasize that repayments of loans should not be restricted to the same period for all debtors, but should be fixed according to the special needs of individual borrowers.

171 It will be seen from these tables that the chief activity of the co-operative movement has so far been the establishment of credit societies these being the simplest to be formed and to be managed and supervised. The time has now come to break new ground in the larger economic interests of the mass of agriculturists. We are of opinion that provincial Registrars should encourage the development of non-credit societies and register them when properly organized. The Royal Commission on Agriculture have pointed out the need for the application of the co-operative principle in other directions and for educating the people to accept the teaching of the agricultural and veterinary experts and preparing the ground for the adoption of the experts' advice, for example, if societies for joint cultivation be started under capable guidance, a great deal of the cost of cultivation can be cut down and there will be a greater possibility of the smaller agriculturist enjoying the benefits of any improved marketing facilities. Such societies require continuous efforts and in order to ensure their success and to propagate the idea it is necessary that the efforts should, at the outset, be concentrated in selected places and the improvements effected patiently and continuously watched. Again, societies which provide manure and seeds or other agricultural requirements should in the same way be encouraged, especially as the staff of the agricultural departments could not make any substantial advance in these directions by their own unaided efforts alone. Similarly the provision of implements on hire or on a system of hire-purchase offers another useful line of development. The great scope for processing societies in rural areas also requires mention. Rice-hulling, cotton-ginning, peeling of grains, preparing milk products and the like are various methods in which the agriculturist can be helped and his outlook widened. Co-operative societies in

Bombay and Madras have already taken to processing with advantage and we recommend strongly that the non-official leaders of the movement and the officials of the Co-operative Department should make special efforts in promoting societies of such special types. We have dealt with co-operative sale societies and artisans' societies in later chapters.

### AUDIT.

172 As regards audit, in Burma where the Calvert Committee on Co-operation submitted their report after the Royal Commission had reported, the position is shown to be very unsatisfactory. There is evidence before us to the effect that audit in most places elsewhere than in Burma is also defective and does not conform to the statutory requirements as explained and amplified by the MacLagan Committee.

173 It is of the greatest importance to have an efficient and thorough audit in order to prevent bad management and embezzlement and to inspire confidence of the investing public. The existing arrangements vary from province to province and are said to be unsatisfactory in most provinces. We draw attention to the fact that under the Act audit should include an examination of overdue debts and a valuation of the assets and liabilities of the societies, which indicates that more than a mechanical audit is required. Audit, supervision and inspection of societies which are closely allied functions are now vested in two and sometimes three different agencies, resulting in much overlapping of work and waste of effort and money. After a full consideration of these points, and of the efficiency of the auditing system in European countries like Germany and Austria, we recommend that for the due discharge of the statutory functions of audit special district unions should be formed to carry out audit, supervision and inspection of the societies. The district need not necessarily be an administrative (revenue) district, but it may be an area with a conveniently manageable number of societies which can be affiliated to the District Union. These Unions must be registered under the Co-operative Societies' Act and formed of the co-operative societies (primary, central, credit and non-credit) in the area of the district union. The representation of societies would ensure local touch and non-official initiative and enterprise. The registration may be withdrawn in case the Union does not discharge its duties properly. The staff employed by the Union shall be recruited from persons certified or licensed by the Registrar and the licence of any employee shall be liable to be withdrawn by the Registrar for sufficient cause. There must, however, be no interference by the Registrar in the internal management of such a Union. There may be specially trained Government officials on

the Board of these Unions, which shall consist otherwise of the representatives of the affiliated societies, and Government officials may also be deputed to serve on their staff. The staff of these Unions should however be employed and paid for by the Unions. Besides audit, supervision and inspection of the affiliated societies, these Unions should also provide practical training to candidates for recruitment to the audit, supervision and inspection staff of the co-operative movement. The general work of co-operative education and propaganda, organization of co-operative societies and expanding the movement should be done by the Provincial Co-operative Institutes. The staff of co-operative organizations should consist of men thoroughly trained from bottom to top. It should be a rule that no auditor, supervisor, inspector or a higher officer of a Union shall be employed without having passed the prescribed tests and through a prescribed apprenticeship. There should be close connection between the auditing union and the central banks concerned, by interchange of important reports and statements on primary societies, leaving the central banks to make such arrangements only for inspection as may be necessary to safeguard their financial interests, such inspection being not only the responsibility but also the duty of the central banks.

The District Unions may be federated into a separate provincial (Apex) Union or may be affiliated to the existing Provincial Co-operative Institutes as a special branch thereof according to local conditions. In the Punjab and in Bihar and Orissa the Provincial Institute employs all the audit staff which works under Governmental control. The staff of the Apex Union or the audit branch of the Provincial Institute shall be non-official employees of the Union or Institute. The licensing of the staff by the Registrar shall be on the same lines as for the District Union. The District Unions and the Provincial Co-operative Bank shall be represented on the management.

The main tasks of the Provincial Union or the Audit branch of the Provincial Institute shall be (a) supervision of district Unions, (b) audit of central banks and other central associations and (c) audit of provincial bank, provincial institute and other provincial co-operative organizations such as the Provincial Land Mortgage Corporation.

The expenses of audit of district Unions and of the provincial Union or audit branch of the Provincial Institute shall be met from the contributions of the affiliated societies (primary and central) and subsidies from the Government, which should be pooled to form the resources of the provincial Union or Audit branch of the Provincial Institute.



## OTHER DEFECTS

174 One of the weaknesses of co-operative finance is said to consist in its inelasticity, dilatoriness and inadequacy. Almost all the Provincial Committees have adverted to this weakness in the organization and more or less admit its prevalence. One result is that the cultivator who is a member of a credit society has to resort frequently to the money-lender as well for accommodation. Another result is that a habit has grown up among societies of taking up as much as they can from the central banks once a year and giving out the money to their members in a lump sum in the hope that it may last during the whole year, without putting the member to the inconvenience of applying in instalments as need arises, for compliance with such applications is not forthcoming promptly in many areas. The money received in a lump sum is spent as soon as received, and when other needs arise, money is again borrowed at exorbitant rates from any other credit agency available. To a certain extent, it must be conceded that the co-operative system cannot be made as elastic as the money-lenders' as certain formalities have necessarily to be observed, but it has also been admitted by Provincial Committees that the system of working should not be rigid and should be such as can be understood and followed without difficulty by a population not very conversant with business practice. The remedy that is suggested by more than one Committee, and with which we agree, is the introduction of the normal credit system in the societies. This system requires a society to fix the credit limit of each member in advance of the season and to make arrangements for securing the necessary finance in time. The amount so sanctioned will be at the disposal of the society, and members will be at liberty to draw as and when necessity arises, interest being chargeable on the loan only from the time the money is actually drawn. Applications for crop-finance can be made and sanctioned in advance. The supervising and inspecting authorities should see that these credits are fixed by the societies at the proper time and sanctioned by the banks without delay. This practice is gaining currency in Bombay and Madras. Granting credits on current account and cheque transactions should also be introduced wherever possible. This would to some extent obviate the evils which arise from agriculturists not being able to get promptly the finance required by them. The very limited extent to which the co-operative societies can afford financial facilities for discharge of prior debts, the most insistent of the purposes for which loans are required, has already been stated. This incapacity of the existing organizations is inherent in their constitution and the nature of their resources. Long-term credit cannot be forthcoming until land mortgage banks are greatly multiplied and it will take some considerable

time before this can be done. The present difficulties, it must be pointed out, are said to be also due not infrequently to the inefficiency or selfishness of many a managing committee and to a lack of understanding of co-operative principles by the bulk of the members.

175 One of the main requisites of agricultural credit is that it should not be too costly. From the tabular statement given in paragraph 166 it will be seen that credit provided by the co-operative organization is still much too dear for the cultivator in some provinces. This is to a certain extent inevitable, for two or three intermediate agencies, each requiring separate margins of working, have to be interposed between the ultimate borrower seeking credit and the original lender or depositor seeking investment, the primary society, the central bank and the provincial bank have each to absorb a portion of the difference between the rate of interest at which money is attracted into the movement and that at which it is lent out to the ultimate borrower. Under ideal conditions, the rural credit societies are expected to attract locally all the capital needed for the requirements of the members, preferably from members' deposits out of their savings by the practice of thrift. But these ideal conditions are not to be found anywhere. It may be admitted that conditions in India fall short of the ideal to a much greater degree than elsewhere. Hence the greater necessity for secondary bodies like the central and provincial banks to attract comparatively cheap money from urban areas and to act as financing agencies and balancing centres to the primaries. The secondary agencies which are themselves constituted on co-operative basis are now found indispensable in every province, for it would be impossible for the agriculturist to get loans even at the present rate of interest without the help of these intermediary organizations. The point is forcibly illustrated by the tendencies noticed in the United Provinces and in Bombay. In the United Provinces where there is no provincial bank at present, thereby reducing the intermediaries, by at least one agency, the need for the establishment of a provincial bank has been emphasized by the provincial Committee. On the other hand, in Bombay where the idea that the intermediate agency of the central bank may be partially dispensed with and the cost of running the credit organization reduced is tried, the later tendency has been to reinstate and strengthen the central bank. The Bombay Committee recommend the conversion of branches of the provincial bank into independent banking unions, provided that the banking union with the assistance of the provincial bank should be in a position to give the same facilities to the constituent societies as are obtained by them at present and that two-thirds of the societies in the area should agree to the conversion. The Bengal Committee disapprove

of the idea of the central banks being branches of the provincial bank

176 Various suggestions which have been made for a further reduction in the present rates of interest are

- (1) Punctual repayment of loans by the members of the society and effective reduction of overdrafts, thereby making the central and apex banks financially sounder and consequently able to get money at cheaper rates
- (2) Reduction of the working expenses of central banks in some provinces where they are now unduly high. While for instance in the Punjab their working expenses in 1928-29 were less than  $\frac{1}{2}$  per cent of their working capital, in Bihar and Orissa on the other hand, the percentage was as high as 2.37
- (3) Borrowing by central banks at cheaper rates for short terms and utilization of urban slack money
- (4) Establishment of more intimate relations between the provincial banks and the central banks so that the latter may follow the lead of the provincial banks in the matter of the regulation of their deposit rates. The provincial banks must be vested with certain powers of control and supervision over the central banks, of course with the willing consent of the latter and with due safeguards for ensuring a predominant voice to the central banks in the management of the affairs of the provincial bank
- (5) A direct tapping of savings by rural societies wherever it is possible

We commend these suggestions to the Provincial Governments and the non-official co-operators for careful consideration. We consider that if a rural society charges its members a rate higher than 12 per cent per annum, it should form the subject of careful enquiry by the Provincial Government and the provincial bank concerned and steps should be taken to reduce the rate of interest.

177 It has already been pointed out that the assets of the majority of agriculturists are not such as would be accepted as suitable security for financial accommodation by joint-stock banks. The co-operative organization aims at overcoming this difficulty by converting the honesty and thrift of the agriculturist into an eligible asset on which he can raise credit. In order that the system should work properly it is essential that a co-operative society should eliminate all differences in the status of the members and avoid the danger of the control becoming concentrated in the hands of some powerful interests, a tendency which is

noticed in some places and commented on by some of the provincial committees. The emergence of these phenomena in the working of the central banks necessarily leads to undesirable results such as the over-financing of societies to keep up dividends, the maintenance of high interest on deposits and the receipt of superfluous deposits with a view to providing remunerative and safe investments to the controlling interests, and interference in the working of the primary societies in the matter of sanctioning loans. The same phenomena in the primary societies tend to the interests of the small producer being neglected in favour of his more powerful colleagues. The co-operative organization provides a most convenient and cheap method of raising finance for agriculture only so long as the members of the organization appreciate the principles and meaning of co-operation and realize the value of their practical application to the daily needs of their life.

178 Besides the defects mentioned above as being more or less common features of the movement, the various Provincial Committees specify several defects as being more pronounced in their provinces

(i) *Assam*—

- (1) Inadequacy and want of trained staff and honorary workers and want of banking knowledge among directors
- (2) Frequency of benami loans and defalcations in societies
- (3) Inadequate provision for fluid resources
- (4) Co-operative stores allowing purchase on credit largely instead of insisting on cash payments
- (5) Indiscreet extensions of loans

(ii) *Bengal*—

- (1) Lack of training of the official staff
- (2) Paucity of the inspecting and auditing officers
- (3) Tendency to make central banks too small

(iii) *Bihar and Orissa*—

- (1) Preponderance of middle-class urban element in the direction of policy
- (2) Mixing up of short and long term finance in the central banks
- (3) High rates of interest charged to ultimate borrowers

(iv) *Bombay* —

- (1) Careful selection of members not universal.

- (2) Short, intermediate and long term loans not clearly distinguished

(v) *Burma*—

- (1) Excessive tenderness in dealing with members and societies that did not repay loans
- (2) Failure to observe fundamental banking principles.
- (3) Failure to train the staff
- (4) General delay in liquidation of bad societies
- (5) Insufficient connection with the commercial banking system of the country

(vi) *Central Areas*—

- (1) Feeling of irresponsibility among its officials and managing bodies of central co-operative banks for anything that goes wrong
- (2) Selection of dishonest and highly indebted members
- (3) Selection of selfish, partial and irresponsible members of the managing committees
- (4) Lavish borrowing by committee members
- (5) Inadequacy of co-operative staff and absence of honorary workers

(vii) *Central Provinces*—

Recklessness in advancing money

(viii) *Madras*—

- (1) The knowledge of banking in the staff and the directors generally inadequate
- (2) Tendency to mix up philanthropy, business and politics.

(ix) *The Punjab*—

- (1) The inefficiency and selfishness of many managing committees and the consequent delays in making loans
- (2) Borrowing more than necessary

(x) *United Provinces*—

- (1) Accounts not accurately maintained
- (2) The inclusion of zemindars and money-lenders in the societies, disturbing the feeling of equality of status
- (3) Absence of a provincial bank

179 We agree that the co-operative movement is now suffering from lack of training on the part of both the official and the non-official co-operative staff and we recommend that special steps should be taken for their efficient and adequate training. We further suggest that endeavours should be made to get trained secretaries for the societies. The experience of other countries employing in that capacity school masters and retired officials residing in villages has been very satisfactory.

With a view to avoid the evils of bad management in the rural societies, it has been suggested to us that a special supervising board should be created in these societies in addition to the managing committee or *panchayat*, and that personal responsibility should be fixed on the members of the managing committee in regard to the grant and recovery of loans. We have carefully considered this suggestion and we do not approve of it. We are, however, prepared to agree that if the *panchayat* of a society should advance loans in excess of the limits prescribed by the by-laws of the society or otherwise, they should be held personally liable as guarantors of the loan and the rules under the Act should, if necessary, be amended accordingly.

We further recommend that generally speaking central banks should operate over fairly large areas with a good number of societies affiliated to them, and should not be too small. The management of a central bank should be in accordance with businesslike and co-operative principles. Full-time secretaries or managers of the best character well trained in banking and co-operation are essential.

#### RELATIONS BETWEEN CO-OPERATIVE BANKS AND IMPERIAL BANK OF INDIA AND OTHER JOINT-STOCK BANKS

180 The various provincial banks and central banks have cash credit and overdraft arrangements with the Imperial Bank of India as shown below —

- (i) *Bihar and Orissa* —The Provincial Bank has two cash credit accounts at bank rate (one for Rs 4 lakhs against pro-notes of the provincial bank guaranteed by the guarantee shareholders and another for Rs 3 lakhs against pro-notes of the central banks) and an arrangement for overdraft for Rs 2.85 lakhs also at bank rate secured by Government paper.
- (ii) *Bombay* —The provincial bank had a cash credit of Rs 8 lakhs which was curtailed 2 years ago and has now been completely stopped.
- (iii) *Burma* —Some central banks had arrangements for advances against Government paper as well as societies' pro-notes. The total of advances is only Rs 2 lakhs actually given plus Rs 1 lakh for which arrangements are practically complete.
- (iv) *Central Provinces* —The provincial bank had cash credit up to Rs 4 lakhs against societies' pro notes but this has recently been withdrawn. Central banks at several places get advances on the security of Government paper.

- (v) *Madras* —The Madras Central Urban Bank and the central banks are granted cash credits on the security of rural credit societies' promotes both for the purposes of granting short-term agricultural loans and for being utilized as fluid resources. The credit so made available was at a flat rate of  $6\frac{1}{2}$  per cent. The Imperial Bank of India has recently notified its intention to discontinue the accommodation for fluid resources on the security of agricultural societies' promotes and it has required the substitution in 5 years at the rate of 20 per cent each year, of Government paper in place of societies' promotes. The rate of interest is no longer a fixed one but is the fluctuating bank rate. During the last two years two-fifths of the accommodation for fluid resources on co-operative paper has actually been withdrawn.
- (vi) *The Punjab* —All central institutions have overdraft facilities against Government paper, used almost entirely for the purpose of repaying deposits and hardly at all for lending to primary societies.

The following statement gives the total amount of advances to co-operative banks by the Imperial Bank of India as on the 31st December 1928

Province	Limit of credit		Total
	Against Government and other authorized securities, etc	Against the borrower's D P Notes and D P Notes of Rural Credit Societies	
Bengal .	33,34,525	2,10,000	35,44,525
Bombay	8,31,750	4,00,000	12,31,750
Bihar and Orissa	2,85,000	6,00,000	8,85,000
Burma	29,72,410	1,00,000	30,72,410
Central Provinces	6,00,000	2,00,000	8,00,000
Delhi	7,89,612		7,89,612
Madras	21,71,900	54,16 000	75,87,900
Punjab .	83,41,781	3,66,262	87,08,043
United Provinces	20,600		20,600
Total	1,93,47,578	72,92,262	2,66,39,840

181 The policy of the Imperial Bank of India in regard to the grant of financial assistance to some of the provincial and central co-operative banks seems of late to have undergone a definite change and it is stated that it shows to-day a much smaller measure of readiness to help them than it used to do in the past. From the evidence received it appears that the Imperial Bank of India is prepared to continue the accommodation hitherto given against societies' promissory notes so long as such accommodation is required for short-term agricultural loans. An application made by the Madras Central Urban Bank this year for such accommodation and supported by the Registrar was, however, rejected by the Imperial Bank. In so far as the accommodation is utilized for the purpose of fund resources, the Imperial Bank insists on the replacement of the promissory notes of societies by Government promissory notes. The object of the Bank in taking this step is said to be to induce the co-operative banks to build up fund resources within the movement itself and not depend on outside sources of help for it may not always be possible to depend on the Imperial Bank in a time of crisis as that may happen to be a time when the Imperial Bank itself may find it necessary to guard its own fund resources. The Imperial Bank has also indicated two other objections to the present system, viz, (1) that the value of the security depends on the sound working of the primary societies, and the complaints received of enormous overdues and inefficient audit and control show that all is not well with the primary societies everywhere, and (2) that the security afforded by societies' promissory notes is not in the long run a first class and desirable security as in the last resort any sales by the Imperial Bank of land of the cultivators which is the ultimate backing to the societies' paper will not be a practical proposition and may be *politically* undesirable. The view of the co-operators on the other hand is that there is nothing more secure than rural societies' paper, backed as it is by the joint and unlimited liability of the members, which is a real and a powerful factor in co-operative credit, that in practice the central and provincial banks accept as collateral security and transfer to the Imperial Bank only the promissory notes of good societies and of short maturity, that the conditions\* which regulate the overdrafts

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\*The conditions are —

- (i) As a general rule, the amount of the cash credit is not allowed to exceed the owned capital of the central bank concerned. (It is much less in practice under the existing arrangements)
- (ii) The actual value of the collateral securities furnished should be in excess of the cash credit sanctioned by at least 33½ per cent
- (iii) Each central bank should forward to the Imperial Bank every quarter a list of promissory notes lodged as collateral securities showing the amount outstanding on each promissory note together with a certificate to the effect that the promissory notes lodged as collateral securities are in order. The list and the certificate are verified every half-year by the Deputy Registrar concerned, and the certificate of each verification is forwarded to the Imperial Bank through the Registrar.



are very stringent, and that ultimate recourse to land sales to liquidate such paper will generally not arise and that the risk is therefore imaginary. Co-operators further urge that the maintenance of fund resources means cost and that if such cost is to come from the income of the co-operative banks the margin of their profits will be considerably reduced and the attempts at further reduction of rates of interest to agriculturists will fail. The ultimate result therefore of the action of the Imperial Bank will probably be to make money dearer to the agriculturists. It is also pointed out that the entire limit of credit hitherto allowed to all the co-operative banks in India on the cover of societies' promotes is no more than Rs 73 lakhs, part of which was used for short term loans and the rest was mostly left undrawn to serve as fund resources. Thus was a comparatively small sum for the Imperial Bank with its large resources. Moreover, as the Bank enjoys the benefit of the large free balances of Government there is a moral obligation on the part of the Bank to finance the agricultural co-operative societies and if any change in the existing arrangements is at all called for, it is in the direction of turning that moral obligation into a contractual guarantee or a statutory liability. We have discussed this matter fully with Sir Osborne Smith, Senior Managing Governor of the Imperial Bank of India and we emphasized in our discussion the importance of these facilities being generously given on proper co-operative paper satisfying the standards prescribed by the Bank. We are glad to note that Sir Osborne Smith has assured the Committee that if the co-operative banks offered as security only the paper of A and B class societies,\* the Imperial Bank of India would be prepared to give the matter serious and sympathetic consideration. We desire again to emphasize the importance of these facilities to the co-operative movement. We feel that the change of policy to which we have referred is unfortunate, especially at a time when the co-operative movement is growing in vitality and is extending the scope of its usefulness towards the social and economic uplift of the rural population and when its financial needs are therefore likely to increase rapidly.

182 Complaints have also been received about the difficulties raised by the Imperial Bank of India in regard to the free remittance of funds by co-operative banks. The Government of India have held the view that buying and selling of remittance for other than co-operative purposes, is not consistent with the principles of co-operative banking and have ordered that remittance transfer receipts for *bona fide* co-operative purposes may be issued if the co-operative banks certify that the transfer is for co-operative

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\* For classification of Societies into A, B, C and D, see Appendix II Townsend Report, page 147

purpose It has been stated that even the certificates of co-operative banks to this effect are not accepted by certain branches of the Imperial Bank, and it is urged that this attitude is uncalled for and unjustifiable The action taken by the Imperial Bank in the matter has been justified by its Managing Governor in his evidence before us as warranted in the interests not only of the Imperial Bank but also of the Indian joint-stock banks which do not enjoy the facility of free transfers He thinks it is irregular for co-operative banks subsidized by the tax-payer to the extent of the cost of the Co-operative Department and exemption from income-tax, to compete in ordinary banking business with commercial banks which have no such advantage We consider that free remittance of funds for co-operative purposes is of the utmost importance to the co-operative movement and that no attempt should be made to curtail the privileges under the rules of the Government of India in this matter As regards remittance facilities for other than co-operative purposes we recommend that co-operative banks should be entitled to the same privileges as joint-stock banks We may in this connection invite attention to the following extract from the memorandum of the foreign banking experts on Commercial Banking with which we whole-heartedly agree —

“The co-operative movement in spite of imperfections and of unavoidable setbacks deserves every possible assistance from all quarters, because there is no better instrument for raising the level of the agriculturist of this country than the co-operative effort, and a strong appeal to the banking interests of the country to assist this movement seems not at all out of place The Imperial Bank particularly ought to continue and to increase its endeavours to supplement the present organization of co-operative credit with expert advice in a business spirit and with financial assistance ”

183 It has been brought to our notice that the Imperial Bank has withdrawn the cash credit in the case of the Bombay Provincial Bank even against Government paper because under the Provincial Bank's debenture trust deed, the trustees have a floating charge on all the general assets of the bank The Royal Commission on Agriculture held the view that in the absence of special conditions a simple floating charge does not prevent the assets from being pledged as cover for loans from, or overdrafts with, the Imperial Bank The Managing Governor of the Imperial Bank, has, however, pointed out that the debenture trust deed is not free from special conditions, *vide* the prohibitory clause against subsequent charges contained in paragraph 6 of the deed He has reported that the Imperial Bank's decision was come to after obtaining legal advice on the point and that the proper course for the Bombay Provincial Co-operative Bank is to amend their debenture

ture trust deed in such a way as to cause the security offered to the Imperial Bank to rank prior to that created under the deed. While we agree that the trust deed might require to be amended so as to remove the special conditions referred to above, we do not think that in this case the authorities of the Imperial Bank are justified in demanding that the security offered to them should rank prior to that created under the deed.

184 Our colleague, Mr G K Devadhar, does not wholly agree with the conclusion in the preceding paragraph. He holds that the Imperial Bank of India is putting too technical and narrow an interpretation on the debenture trust deed of the Bombay Provincial Co-operative Bank, which is not borne out by the authoritative legal opinion and current banking practice. He holds that (1) the debenture deed is of the essence of a floating charge on the general assets, for the time being, of a going concern, which remains dormant until the undertaking charged ceases to be a going concern or until the person in whose favour the charge is created intervenes, (2) until such intervention, the body concerned has a free hand to dispose of assets, such as those represented in the present instance by 'agricultural paper' or Government securities, in the ordinary course of its business and the institution is at liberty to create specific mortgages ranking in priority to the floating charge, (3) with the development of banking and the proper appreciation of the legal significance of a floating charge, it is not the practice now to insist, as used to be not uncommon previously, on provision being made in debenture trust deeds specifically empowering companies to deal freely with their assets in the ordinary course of their business, and (4) accordingly the Imperial Bank of India may well be requested and again approached to reconsider its decision in the matter of allowing such credits to the Bombay Provincial Co-operative Bank. In view of the fact that the trust deed of the Provincial Co-operative Bank contains a special condition that the bank cannot create any subsequent mortgage which will rank *pari passu* or prior to the charge created in favour of the debenture-holder, the rest of the Committee feel unable to go beyond the recommendation they have made in the preceding paragraph, until the legal position arising out of the special condition referred to is cleared up by a competent legal authority acceptable to both parties to the dispute.

185 As regards the relations of co-operative banks with other joint-stock banks, no serious complaints have been made by joint-stock banks of unfair competition. In fact, their respective spheres of activity are so widely apart that there does not exist at present scope for a close competition between them. There is, however, a feeling that in the matter of deposits the co-operative banks with the help of Government assistance and prestige are competing unfairly. But figures furnished by various Provincial

Committees tend to show that the allegation of unfair competition is not well founded. For example, the deposit rates of co-operative banks in Bihar and Orissa, where rates are higher than many other provinces, compare as follows with the joint-stock banks' rates —

Banks	Current account	Savings bank	Fixed deposit 1 year
Imperial Bank	nil	3 per cent	3½ per cent
Provincial Co-operative Bank	2 per cent	4 „	4½ „
Orissa Co-operative Central Banks	-	4 „	7 „
Other Co-operative Central Banks		4 „	6 „
Orissa Joint Stock Banks		3½ „	6½—7½ „
Other joint stock banks	2—3 per cent	3½—4 „	5—6 „

Moreover, at present the amount of deposits which the central banks accept are limited, and the rates of interest offered for them are not likely to be higher than the lending rate of the provincial banks which is mostly 6 per cent, for no purpose will be served by attracting dearer local money when cheaper money can be had from the provincial banks. Generally speaking, it is, therefore, doubtful if there could be any serious competition between them and the joint-stock banks. The Secretary and Treasurer of the Imperial Bank of India at Calcutta has himself admitted this before the United Provinces Committee.

The Madras Committee have pointed out that there is one direction in which there is some competition which is bound to grow in future. It is in the matter of produce loans. It has not reached an acute stage yet, but the co-operative banks cannot in the end fail to affect the lending business of other institutions so far as it relates to loans against produce. But the Committee add that the extension of the co-operative activity in this sphere is in the ultimate interests of the cultivator to whom it would secure with more certainty and in a much larger measure the profits of agriculture. We consider that loans against produce to the members of co-operative societies are of great economic benefit to the cultivators and we recommend that such loans should be encouraged subject to storage accommodation being available and subject also to the provisions of the by-laws of these societies.

186 The Managing Governor of the Imperial Bank of India in his evidence suggested that co-operative banks should confine their activities to co-operative banking and should not be allowed to compete in other forms of banking with commercial banks and indigenous bankers. They do not compete at present to any great

extent, but he referred to the considerable body of opinion among those interested in the movement which wanted co-operative banks to undertake all forms of banking. He expressed the opinion that co-operative banks have not the necessary knowledge or organization safely to undertake the business. The forms of banking he had in mind were opening of current accounts, purchase of drafts and sale of remittance. Co-operators, specially those from Bombay, disputed his statement about the want of knowledge and business capacity of co-operative banks to do these items of business. We have already recommended that granting credits on current account and cheque transactions should be introduced in co-operative institutions wherever possible. As regards remittance business we do not desire to place any restrictions on the activities of co-operative societies, but we have recommended that the special facilities for fixed remittances granted by the Government should be restricted to remittances for co-operative purposes only and that in regard to other remittances the co-operative banks should be given the rates enjoyed by the joint-stock banks.

187 In connection with the relations between the co-operative banks and the other banking institutions, a question is often raised as to the ultimate relations of the Government with the co-operative movement. The Managing Governor of the Imperial Bank of India has stated in his evidence that the credit which the co-operative movement enjoys in the money market is chiefly based on the connection of Government with the movement and the implications of that connection have not, so far as he knows, been clearly defined. As pointed out by the Central Areas Committee, in theory the co-operative department of Government is responsible for nothing except propaganda and audit, but in practice the responsibility actually goes much further. It is suggested that the undefined responsibility of Government is perhaps the reason for co-operative banks in Madras being required by the Registrar to have dealings only with the Imperial Bank for purposes of cash credits and overdrafts. When the Central Provinces provincial bank suspended payment in 1920-21, 24 out of 34 central banks were compelled to seek financial assistance from Government which arranged to provide sums to be utilized in giving loans to members of societies on the guarantee of the societies as corporate bodies on behalf of their members. The gesture was interpreted by the public as an implied Government guarantee of the solvency of the banks and it did more than anything else to restore the confidence of the depositors. The financial solvency of the provincial bank was restored in 1923. In Burma, where the movement has practically collapsed, the Government has taken the responsibility to attempt the salvage. The collapse of the provincial bank had to be averted by an overdraft which the Imperial Bank allowed it on the guarantee of Government. Government has in fact undertaken to contribute a sum of Rs. 35

lakhs to repay all its depositors in full, and this is estimated to be sufficient for the purpose. On the whole, the position is that ordinarily the Government does not at present assume any financial responsibility in case of failure of any co-operative organization. We recommend that when the movement requires State aid in any exceptional circumstances as in the case of Central Provinces and Burma in the past, it should continue to render such assistance as may in its opinion be necessary. But in the interest of the general taxpayer and to encourage self-help and self-reliance in the co-operators themselves we would suggest that the State aid should be of a temporary nature, sufficient to enable the societies to tide over the crisis.

188 So far as the indigenous bankers and money-lenders are concerned, co-operative societies have seriously competed with them. The Punjab Committee have broadly summarized the position of the indigenous banker in the following words: "The indigenous banker has found it impossible to compete with the Imperial Bank in remittance, with the co-operative banks in deposits, and the joint-stock banks in advances. With deposits it is less a matter of rates than of confidence. His rates, 5 to 6 per cent, are not very different from those of leading co-operative banks, but he does not, and cannot inspire as much confidence as banks which are under the ægis (though not under the management) of Government. He has felt their competition the more keenly inasmuch as like them he draws most of his depositors from the official and professional classes." This has not, however, embittered their relations. Many indigenous bankers are directors of co-operative banks. Some of the bigger bankers have also placed money on fixed deposit with co-operative banks. A few act as treasurers and keep cash balances of the bank in current account with themselves. In many cases, co-operative banks depend for their very existence on the help and support received from the indigenous bankers and are even sometimes run by them. We look forward to the continuance of these relations in the future.

#### PRESENT ADEQUACY OF FUNDS AND FUTURE NEEDS

189 In recent years the co-operative movement in most provinces has had more money than it could utilize in advances to borrowers. We give below certain figures relating to provincial banks which bear out this statement.

Provincial Bank	Amount invested in Government Securities (Rs. in lakhs)	Date
Bengal . . . . .	54	31st December 1928.
Bombay . . . . .	49	31st March 1929
Bihar and Orissa . . . . .	15	15th November 1928.
Central Provinces . . . . .	72	30th June 1929
Madras . . . . .	53	30th June 1929

But during the last six months or so, owing to the fall in prices of agricultural produce, the resources of some of the provincial banks have proved inadequate to meet the requirements of the societies and advances have been given by or asked for from Provincial Governments. We recommend that when a Provincial Government is satisfied that for meeting the needs of the movement in exceptional circumstances, or for the development of the agricultural industry, it is necessary to make loanable capital available to the co-operative banks, the Provincial Government with the concurrence of its legislature should place at the disposal of the movement such loans as may be necessary to meet the requirements. Such funds shall be placed at the disposal of the provincial banks to be loaned out to central banks and primary societies.

We further recommend that contributions from Government funds to the expenses of the co-operative movement in backward tracts and among the backward classes should be continued and increased.

#### CERTAIN DEMANDS OF CO-OPERATIVE BANKS

190 The Co-operative Banks have put forward a claim for the following concessions --

- (1) Placing on a footing of statutory or contractual guarantee the financial facilities at present enjoyed by the co-operative banks at the hands of the Imperial Bank of India and the provision of finance on more favourable terms, and for longer periods, than at present. Loans for periods of over twelve months, but not exceeding twenty-four months, should be granted, on promissory notes or on bonds of provincial banks, at bank rate with fixed instalments for repayment, and short term loans for periods of 12 months and under should be granted on promissory notes at 1 per cent below the bank rate.
- (2) The grant to co-operative banks of <sup>cash</sup> such credits for agricultural operations and the discounting of their bills of exchange.
- (3) The recognition of approved co-operative central banks in areas where the Imperial Bank of India has no branches, as agencies for the management of Government sub-treasuries.
- (4) The recognition of inland exchange business as a legitimate part of the operations of the co-operative banks, and the grant of further facilities for transmission of funds through the treasuries, particularly in *taluka* towns, with a view to encourage the opening of urban banks and branches of provincial or central banks at these centres.

- (5) Provision of cheap capital for the acquisition or construction of godowns in rural areas in order to encourage the marketing of agricultural crops financed on co-operative basis
- (6) Exemption to co-operative societies from payment of income-tax on earnings from investments in public securities or land mortgage debentures

191 In regard to items (1) and (2) in paragraph 190, we have made in a previous paragraph certain recommendations regarding the facilities to be granted by the Imperial Bank of India to co-operative banks. Those recommendations are intended to cover the period before the establishment of the Reserve Bank of India. When this latter institution is established, we intend that provision should be made in the Reserve Bank Act itself for linking up the co-operative banks with the Central Bank of the country and for making the provision of agricultural finance one of the functions of the Reserve Bank. This matter will be dealt with more fully later on in chapter XXII. Broadly speaking, the Reserve Bank Act should make the following provisions:—

- (i) The provincial co-operative banks should along with joint-stock banks be included in the list of member banks and entitled to rediscount facilities from the Reserve Bank
- (ii) The Reserve Bank should be authorized to rediscount agricultural bills drawn or issued for the purpose of financing seasonal agricultural operations or the marketing of crops, and in order to meet the special conditions of agriculture in India these bills might be such as mature within 9 months from the date of their rediscount by the Reserve Bank
- (iii) Although in the interests of the liquidity of the Reserve Bank's assets it would be necessary to prescribe a maximum limit for the amount of agricultural bills rediscounted by the Reserve Bank, the fixation of the limit should take into account the requirements of agriculture and avoid the danger of making the provision nugatory
- (iv) The Reserve Bank should also be authorized to make loans and advances repayable on demand or on the expiry of fixed period not exceeding 90 days on the security of agricultural paper endorsed by the provincial bank
- (v) The Reserve Bank should be given power to make loans and advances on the security of movable goods, wares and merchandise, besides warehouse warrants or warehouse receipts representing the same. These



powers would enable the Reserve Bank to ensure the supply of cheap and adequate credit to agriculture

192 As regards item (3) in paragraph 190 we agree that it might possibly enhance their status if co-operative banks were entrusted with the management of sub-treasuries. But we do not think it advisable to entrust this work to co-operative banks in the present state of the working of the movement. We think that for some time to come co-operators will be well advised to turn all their energies to strengthen their present position by giving effect to the various measures that we have recommended, and that they should not attempt to take up additional work which lies outside the sphere of co-operation. We are, moreover, doubtful if the existing staff in the banks is capable of undertaking the suggested management of Government sub-treasuries.

193 As regards item (4) in paragraph 190 we have already indicated the extent to which the State should assist the co-operative movement for the supply of *free* remittance facilities. At present the Imperial Bank of India provides remittance facilities to joint-stock banks between places where these banks have branches at special concession rates which are half of the rates charged by the Bank to the public. Our recommendations in a previous paragraph that these concession rates should also be extended to co-operative banks will only cover the period before the establishment of the Reserve Bank. Thereafter the provincial bank, in view of its position as a member bank in the Reserve Bank system, will automatically be entitled to any special concession which the Reserve Bank might offer to its member banks. We do not recommend any further concession beyond those suggested above.

194 We are in full sympathy with demand No. (5) for the provision of cheap capital for the acquisition or construction of godowns in rural areas. We shall deal with this point a little more fully in connection with the co-operative sale societies.

195 There remains only the question of exemption from income-tax. The profits of the co-operative societies are already exempt from income-tax but they are not exempt from super-tax. The Bombay Co-operative Societies Act provides for exemption from payment of super-tax by the issue of a notification by the Government of India, and the Bombay Committee observe that they find no valid grounds for recovery of super-tax from co-operative societies. We agree that the profits of co-operative societies should be exempt from both income-tax and super-tax. The position in regard to income from Government securities stands on a different footing. Income from Government securities is not now treated as part of the profits of the business of co-operative banks. There is some dispute as to the exact intent and meaning of the existing Government Notification on the subject. The co-operative banks

contend that the Notification covers the income from Government securities also. This is a matter of pure legal interpretation and if the Notification covers such income, there is nothing further to be said. On the assumption that it does not cover the income from securities, representatives of the co-operative organizations have put forward a strong claim for the exemption of such income from the levy of income-tax. Their main contention is that they are required to invest their reserve funds in approved securities and also to maintain a certain proportion of their funds in Government securities for the purpose of fluid resources, that it is not possible at any particular time to state what exact amount is required for the purpose from day to day and that it is therefore unfair that such investments should be taxed at the source and treated as if the interest earned was income derived from business that lay outside the legitimate operations of co-operative banks.

196 Several Provincial Committees have supported this claim for exemption. When it was pointed out to the representatives of the co-operative banks that their claim could not reasonably be extended beyond the investments absolutely necessary for fluid resources and for the investment of reserve funds, they admitted the force of this contention. We recommend the exemption of co-operative societies from payment of income-tax and super-tax on earnings from investments in public securities or land mortgage debentures to the extent such investments are necessary for the purpose of their fluid resources and for the investment of reserve funds, as prescribed by the rules. Our recommendation is, however, based on the understanding that the co-operative banks will pass on the benefit of this concession towards the improvement of the position of the agriculturist.

## CHAPTER X.

### RURAL FINANCE—*contd*

#### LAND MORTGAGE BANKS

197 We have referred in Chapter VI to the nature of long-term credit required by the agriculturist, the substantial periods for which such credits are required, and the almost unlimited demand for it. Ordinary commercial banks and moneylenders cannot afford to tie up their capital for such long periods nor to recover the loans in small dribbles out of the earnings or savings of the borrower. Hence arises the need for special types of credit institutions generally called land mortgage banks.

#### DIFFERENT TYPES OF LAND MORTGAGE BANKS \*

198 Land mortgage banks are of various types and differ widely in their features in different countries. When we deal with co-operative organizations or land credit associations, it is well to remember that the organizations in other countries whose features we have copied in some measure have sprung up more as practical solutions of peculiar local difficulties and were not conceived at their inception as embodiments of any definite economic theories. So, in determining the type that suits us most, we must not proceed on mere *a priori* grounds or the inherent merits of any particular type, without regard to the peculiar needs of Indian rural economy and social and political conditions. Land mortgage banks may be classified in different ways on different principles. According to one basis of classification they may be *co-operative*, *non-co-operative*, or *quasi-co-operative*. The co-operative type is represented by the Prussian Farm Mortgage Mutual Credit Associations which are associations of borrowers. They have no capital. They endeavour to keep the rate of interest low and do not aim at profit. Each member pays a small entrance fee to meet the necessary expenses, initial cost of land valuations and other incidental charges. Credit is created by the issue of mortgage bonds bearing interest and made payable to bearer, and these bonds are regarded as perfect types of secure investment and are quoted on the Exchanges throughout Germany. These *Landschaften* are now combined into a 'Central *Landschaft*' which exercises the function of a central co-operative organisation. The Federal Farm Loan Banks of the United States of America are also illustrative of the co-operative type. The non-co-operative

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\* We are indebted to Herrick on "Rural credits", Morman on "Principles of Rural credits", Strickland's *Studies in European Co-operation*, the Report of the Baroda Land Mortgage Bank Committee, 1924-25, and the Reports of the various Provincial Committees for a great deal of the matter in this chapter.

type is represented by the numerous commercial and joint-stock land mortgage banks working all over the Continent of Europe. They work for profit and declare dividends, but the State exercises some measure of control over their operations in order to ensure that they do not cause hardship to borrowers and that they fulfil their obligations to their investors or debenture holders. They are based mostly on the French model of *Credit Foncier de France*. The Agricultural Bank of Egypt is also illustrative of the non-co-operative type. In between these two types, there are institutions which combine co-operative and commercial ideals in varying proportions and are thus of a quasi-co-operative character. Associations with membership of borrowers and non-borrowers, operating over fairly large areas and formed with share capital and on a limited liability basis, but in which each member has a single vote irrespective of his share capital and the dividend on share capital is fixed at a low figure, may be taken as illustrations of the quasi-co-operative type, of which the Hungarian Land Mortgage Institute for large land owners and the National Small Holdings Land Mortgage Institutes for small owners are examples.

#### THE TYPE THAT SUITS INDIA

199 What is the form of land mortgage bank that suits India best? The answer to this question depends partly upon the class of person whose long-term credit needs are to be served. The commercial land mortgage bank may perhaps be better suited to finance big landlords or *zemindars*. So far as relief to small agriculturists and owners of small holdings is concerned, the co-operative type is the most suitable. The poor ryots with small holdings cannot secure credit except through organizations based on mutual association and guarantee, and the co-operative land mortgage bank is a legitimate application of that principle. The funds of such a bank can best be raised only on the collective guarantee of the properties mortgaged by the members. It follows that the members who thus create the credit should have a voice in the management of their bank on well recognised principles of democratically controlled co-operative institutions. Agriculture will remain for a long time to come, in India, an individual effort or a family effort at best, but for specific purposes, associated effort of agriculturists can be and ought to be organized. The schemes adopted and worked in the Punjab, Madras and Bombay as well as in Assam and Bengal are in a sense of the co-operative type. In other provinces, there is as yet no action in the field of land mortgage banking.

200 Strictly speaking, however, the type which is in vogue in India is of the quasi-co-operative variety, because nowhere in India has it approached the fully co-operative type, although there are

substantial elements of the co-operative theory and practice in all of these banks. This will be evident from the detailed description of the land mortgage banks in different parts of India in the Provincial reports. They are conceived as limited liability associations of borrowers with a few non-borrowing individuals thrown in for attracting initial capital as well as the business talent and organising capacity needed to make the management efficient. The number of shares owned by the members is limited, the rule of 'one man, one vote' irrespective of the share capital subscribed by them, is generally adopted, dividends are restricted to a low figure and the goal of gradual elimination of non-borrowers is kept in view to impart a co-operative spirit into them. The fact however remains that the work of a mortgage bank "is recognised on all hands to be extremely impersonal as devoid of the human element as possible",\* and that the human and personal elements which are the chief characteristics of the Raiffeisen type of societies cannot be infused into them in any appreciable measure. While mutual knowledge of, and control over, one another among members is the insistent feature in the case of the unlimited liability credit society, the insistence in the case of a land mortgage credit society with limited liability is on the capacity and business habits of the directorate, in order to ensure sound valuation of security, careful investigation of titles, correct assessment of borrowers' credit and repaying capacity and efficient management of affairs.

201. The constitution that is to be prescribed for land mortgage banks in India has been a subject of prolonged discussions among official and non-official co-operators. It is unnecessary to go back to the discussions which preceded those at the Registrars' Conference of 1926, where a definite scheme was adopted by the Registrars with the concurrence of the non-official co-operators. The material portion of the resolution passed by that conference is reproduced below —

"(1) Mortgage banks based on co-operative principles are desirable in many parts of India. No transaction should be undertaken which is not economically profitable to the borrower.

(2) *Objects* — The principal objects should be —

- (a) the redemption of the land and houses of agriculturists,
- (b) the improvement of lands and methods of cultivation and the building of houses of agriculturists,
- (c) the liquidation of old debts, and
- (d) the purchase of land in special cases only to be prescribed in the by-laws. (The precaution is evidently to prevent land speculation and indiscriminate borrowing to buy land.)

(3) *Area and Management* —The area of operations should be the smallest unit consistent with competent management. The imposition of liability on village credit societies or the confinement of mortgage loans to members of such societies are not recommended, but the bank should consult the village societies in the case of all loans to members of such a society. Punctuality in repayment should be rigidly enforced in mortgage banks.

(4) *Finance* —A reasonable total of share money should be held by each bank in order to reassure the investing public. In provinces in which the property can be sold on foreclosure, no loan should exceed half the value of the mortgaged properties.

No excess liability is required beyond the amount actually borrowed by a member *plus* his share money. If no excess liability is imposed, the share money of a borrower should not be less than one-twentieth of his loan.

The minimum loan should be such as to repay the costs of the transaction to the bank. Each bank should prescribe in its by-laws a maximum loan from time to time according to its financial position.

Debentures should be issued by a central financing body in each province rather than by separate mortgage banks."

202 The Royal Commission on Agriculture in their chapter on Co-operation carefully considered the scheme embodied in the resolution of the Registrars' Conference (1926). They found themselves in substantial agreement with it and they said — "Such experience of the practical working of land mortgage banks as has been gained since this resolution was passed has not shown the need for any alteration in it, nor has our own examination of the case suggested any alteration." The recommendations of the Royal Commission are as follows —

(1) The resolution passed by the Conference of Registrars of 1926 in favour of the establishment of land mortgage banks is endorsed. (Para 381)

(2) Land mortgage banks should be established under the provisions of the Co-operative Acts. (Para 382)

(3) The guarantee of interest on the debentures of land mortgage banks is the most suitable form in which assistance to these banks can be given by Government. (Para 383)

(4) Government assistance to land mortgage banks in the form of subscription to their debentures is not recommended. (Para 383)

(5) The debentures of land mortgage banks, the interest on which is guaranteed by Government, should be added to the list of trustee securities under the Trustees' Act. (Para 383)

(6) The issue of the debentures of land mortgage banks should be controlled by a central organisation (Para 383)

(7) Land mortgage banks should only be organised after the most careful preliminary enquiry and their constitution and working should be as simple as possible (Para 384)

(8) For some years to come, there should be an official member on the committee of management of each bank (Para 384)

203 The Registrars' Conference of 1928 discussed in great detail the several recommendations of the Royal Commission, and the suggestions of the Conference, important as they are on some matters, do not materially alter the 1926 scheme of the Registrars' Conference as amplified and amended by the Royal Commission. The resolution of the Registrars' Conference of 1928 runs as follows —

(1) "The Conference entirely endorses the resolution passed by the Conference of Registrars in 1926 in favour of the establishment of land mortgage banks"

(2) "The Conference is of opinion that land mortgage banks should be established under the provisions of the Co-operative Acts now in force in British India".

(3) "A nominee of Government is necessary on the managing committee of a primary land mortgage bank, except where the interests of Government and debenture holders are sufficiently safeguarded by the appointment of a trustee acceptable to Government"

(4) "Government assistance to land mortgage banks in the form of subscriptions to their debentures is recommended while these banks are in their early stages, and assistance is also recommended in the form of loans"

(5) "The guarantee of interest on the debentures of land mortgage banks is the most suitable form in which assistance can be given by Government"

(6) "The debentures of land mortgage banks, the interest on which is guaranteed by Government, should be added to the list of trustee securities under the Indian Trusts Act, 1882"

(7) "The Conference is of opinion that land mortgage banks should be organised only after the most careful preliminary enquiry and that their constitution and working should be as simple as is consistent with adequate safeguards"

#### PRESENT POSITION

204 There are some land mortgage banks, under the Co-operative Societies' Act, now working in the provinces of Punjab, Madras and Bombay and to a small extent in Assam and Bengal. The

progress of working of these banks, and the proposals made by the several Banking Enquiry Committees for the further development of these banks in the light of the experience already gained, are summarized below. There are no land mortgage banks in existence in Bihar and Orissa, Burma, Central Provinces and Berar, the United Provinces and the Central Areas. In Burma, the attempt to pass a separate Act for land mortgage banks, apart from the Burma Co-operative Societies' Act, did not materialize and there is now a proposal before the Burma Government to make an experiment with two independent banks on a very small scale, so that their liabilities may not exceed Rs. 2½ lakhs. The Burma Government have provided Rs. 1 lakh for the working capital of these two banks. Further progress evidently depends upon the results of this small experiment. The Banking Enquiry Committees of those provinces in which there are no land mortgage banks, or ready schemes for their establishment in future, have also suggested some forms of constitution for their future banks.

205 The land mortgage banks actually in operation do not, however, anywhere fully carry out the scheme evolved by the Registrars and the Royal Commission on Agriculture in India. This is to be accounted for partly by the fact that in some provinces, in which land mortgage banks are now working, they were started before the Registrars' scheme of 1926 was formulated and even where they were actually registered subsequently, the plans for their establishment were matured before the 1926 scheme received its final touches.

### The Punjab.

206 There are 12 co-operative mortgage banks in the province. With the exception of the banks at Mianwali and Jhang which operate over the whole district, the rest confine their operations to a single *tehsil*. The Jhang co-operative land mortgage bank was the earliest. It was started in 1920. Apart from the agricultural credit societies, only owners of agricultural land may become members. Loans are made for the redemption of land, for the liquidation of unsecured debts and for the improvement of land. No one may be advanced more than 30 times the land revenue payable on the land mortgaged. Since the starting of these banks, nearly Rs. 32 lakhs have been advanced as follows —

Purpose	(Rs. in lakhs)
Repayment of old debts . . . . .	15
Land Redemption . . . . .	15
Land Improvement . . . . .	2
Total . . . . .	<u>32</u>



On the 1st March 1930 there were 499 defaulters out of about 1 500 borrowers and the large number of defaults is ascribed to bad harvests and imprudent loans

It is the policy of the department now to limit loans to Rs 5,000. Only four banks have agreed to do this and seven have a limit of Rs 10,000 and one Rs 15,000

In some banks directors are reported to be too indulgent in the matter of loans, to themselves and to their relatives. The result is considerable laxity and sometimes fraud. Five banks forbid them altogether and only one allows them without restriction. In six, they are only granted if, firstly, two-thirds of the directors are present and all agree to the loan, and secondly, the official member signifies his approval in writing.

Of the working capital of Rs 23 lakhs, Rs 14½ lakhs have been advanced by Government mostly through the Provincial Co-operative Bank. The latter has also raised Rs 5 lakhs of debentures at 6 per cent interest, the repayment of which has been guaranteed by Government for 25 years. These arrangements have been made to suit the experimental conditions under which the Mortgage Banks have been started. The Punjab Committee think a time will come when it will be possible for the mortgage banks to raise debentures on their collective assets through the Provincial Co-operative Bank or a Central Mortgage Bank.

### Madras.

207 In 1924-25 a scheme for special land mortgage banks was sanctioned and two were registered in that year. Ten such banks were constituted by the end of June 1927, operating over restricted areas of compact groups of villages within a radius of five miles. The reason for this limitation of area was to ensure that all land should be accessible to the investigators of the bank to make enquiries, and to enable the honorary directors to go to the villages concerned readily and check the reports. These banks were formed on a limited liability basis, with share capital, the borrowing power being limited to a multiple of the paid-up capital, ordinarily 8 to 10 times. The banks were expected to raise credit by issuing debentures on the security of agricultural lands which the borrowing members mortgaged to them. Debentures carried interest at 7 per cent when sold to the public. The Government agreed to purchase at 6½ per cent debentures equal in value to those which the banks were able to sell in the market, subject to a limit of Rs 50 000 to any one bank and Rs 2½ lakhs for the whole Presidency. The banks lent at 9 per cent and the maximum amount of the loan did not exceed Rs 2,000 for an individual. The loans which carried interest at 9 per cent were generally for 16½ years so that equated annual payments at 12 per cent of

the total loan would extinguish the debt in  $16\frac{1}{4}$  years. All banks did not adopt this mode of repayment, for some of them favoured the alternative system of payment by equal instalments of a specified portion of the principal with interest on the outstanding amount annually or semi-annually.

As regards the procedure for granting loans, the member presented a loan application to the bank and the loan was granted after assessing the value of the land and ascertaining the member's title to it, his right to alienate it, the necessity for the loan and his repaying capacity. On the mortgage of the land so obtained debentures were sold to the public and the Government, the debenture holder having a floating charge on the mortgages. The banks which had good local management found a fair amount of response for investment in debentures. Repayment by members was on the whole satisfactory. But there have been a few defaults in areas where the failure of crops was frequent.

The later tendency of these banks has been to extend their local area of operations and to increase the individual maximum borrowing power to Rs 3,000 and now to Rs 5,000. Many of the banks, however, have failed to sell debentures and it has been found that the existence of a number of independent banks floating a large number of different series of debentures militated not only against the success of debenture issues, but also against the whole scheme.

A Central Land Mortgage Bank has, therefore, been started recently in order to finance local mortgage banks by centralized debenture issues. The constitution of the central bank followed in the main, the recommendations of the Townsend Committee\* on Co-operation in Madras. It has collected Rs 70,400 as share capital up to the 30th June 1930 and debenture money to the value of Rs 46,000. This debenture money was received in advance while the Bank actually issued debentures only on the 15th September 1930. The Provincial Co-operative Bank purchased debentures of the Central Land Mortgage Bank to the value of Rs 1 lakh. The Government also are giving some facilities to the latter bank. They have lent Rs 15,000 without interest for initial working capital to be repaid in the course of a few years. They have also guaranteed interest up to 6 per cent on all debentures floated by the bank in the first five years up to the limit of Rs 50 lakhs, but for the full term of the issues. They have also lent the services of two Deputy Registrars to inspect local mortgage banks and of ten sub-Deputy Registrars to assist in all enquiries on behalf of the local land mortgage banks. It is proposed that all mortgages obtained by the primary land mortgage banks should be transferred to the central bank and that the latter should issue debentures with a floating charge on all such mortgages. The Registrar is to be the Trustee.

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\*Townsend Committee, page 65

for the present, to see that the bank fulfils its obligations to debenture holders. He and another nominee of his have places on the directorate of the bank. Since the starting of the Central Mortgage Bank, loans used to be advanced to the primary banks at 7 per cent, but the rate has been raised to  $7\frac{1}{2}$  per cent recently owing to monetary stringency. The primary banks, in their turn, are advancing loans to their borrowing members at 8 per cent. One direct result of the establishment of the Central Land Mortgage Bank has thus been the reduction of the rate of interest on long-term loans from 9 per cent to 8 per cent in the case of the ultimate borrower.

There are now 42 primary land mortgage banks established in the province on a co-operative basis, of which only 8 issued debentures before the Central Land Mortgage Bank was started. Of the primary banks 19 are members of the Central Land Mortgage Bank.

### Bombay.

203 There are three land mortgage societies (in the districts of Dhawai, Broach and East Khandesh) working in the province. These have only recently started their operations. The society in one district serves only a *taluka* while the other two serve the whole district. They have sanctioned loans so far to an amount of Rs 1,15,766. The membership of these societies consists of agriculturists. Loans may be granted for the following purposes —

- (1) the improvement of land and methods of cultivation,
- (2) the installation or purchase of costly agricultural plant and machinery,
- (3) the redemption of mortgaged lands and houses and liquidation of old debts, and,
- (4) the purchase of land for purposes of land improvement or for making better cultivation possible in the general interests of the community or bringing under cultivation cultivable waste or fallow land.

The members contribute as share capital 5 per cent of their borrowings and this capital is invested separately. The societies have power to advance loans to a maximum of 50 per cent of the value of the encumbered land, or in special circumstances of house property. The period of loans is from 10 to 30 years. There are representatives of the Registrar of Co-operative Societies and of the Bombay Provincial Co-operative Bank on the committee of management of these societies. The committee's recommendations regarding loans are subject to the approval of the Provincial Bank and the Registrar. Each of the societies has attached

to it an officer of the Revenue Department as Land Officer, whose services have been lent free of charge by Government for the initial period of working. The Provincial Co-operative Bank has undertaken, as a provisional arrangement, to raise additional debentures to finance co-operative land mortgage societies. Government have agreed to purchase to the extent of Rs 5 lakhs debentures of the Provincial Bank to be earmarked for land mortgage work, of which Rs 2 lakhs have already been subscribed. The three societies are expected to meet their expenses out of the interest on the investment of their own share capital supplemented by small grants from the Provincial Co-operative Bank.

### Bengal

209 There are two land mortgage banks in Bengal, one at Naogaon in the district of Rajshahi and the other at Bhola in the district of Bakarganj. The Naogaon Bank was registered in 1924 and the Bhola Bank in 1927. Both are limited liability institutions registered under the Co-operative Societies' Act. The Naogaon Bank has an area of operation of 50 square miles. Its membership is confined to persons owning agricultural lands or landed properties in the area. The authorised share capital is Rs 5 lakhs divided into 50,000 shares of Rs 10 each. No member is allowed to hold shares exceeding Rs 5,000 in value. On the 31st October 1929, the Bank had a paid-up share capital of Rs 52,480 and total deposits of Rs 2,60,851, of which 43 per cent was for 5 years, 41 per cent for 2 years and the rest for 1 year. Loans can be granted against mortgage for liquidation of old debts, for the improvement of land and methods of cultivation, for installation and purchase of agricultural machinery, for purchase of land and also for short-term requirements in the form of cash credit advances. The cash credits are now confined to those members who are not members of rural credit societies. Loans to members do not exceed ten times the value of their paid-up share capital and bear interest at a flat rate of 10 to 16 per cent per annum. The by-laws provide for loans being granted up to a certain proportion of the value of the land mortgaged, but in actual practice they are granted at a fixed rate of Rs 50 per *bigha* of land. The period of loans varies from 1 to 20 years. Out of the loan of Rs 3,49,706 outstanding on the 31st October 1929, only Rs 1,22,216 was payable within 5 years. Thus the bulk of the loans are for longer periods than the deposits from which they are financed. This has been recognized to be unsound and the Bank has recently been empowered to issue long-term debentures, none of which, however, has yet been floated. The Bank has got the strong financial support of the Ganja Cultivators' Co-operative Society, which has a big working capital and a strong reserve fund.

The Bhola Bank is much narrower in scope than the Naogaon Bank. Its paid up share capital is very small and it has not been able to attract any deposits. For its working capital, it is dependent on a loan of Rs 10,000 from the Barisal Central Bank at 9 per cent repayable in 10 years. The by-laws provide for loans for redemption of old debts, the purchase and improvement of land and also for cash credit advances for current expenses. All loans are secured by mortgages and no loan can exceed one-tenth of the value of the land. No member can borrow more than 5 times his paid up share capital. The maximum period for which loans are now given is 7 years. Interest is charged at a flat rate of 12½ per cent per annum. Not only actual cultivators, but *talukdars* and *houladars*, are now members of the Bank.

### Assam

210 There are 5 land mortgage banks registered under the Co-operative Societies Act on the basis of limited liability. The Surma Valley Muslim Bank which was only registered in 1930 has not started operations. The Jorhat and the Nowgong Banks which were registered in 1928 and 1929 respectively are reported by the Assam Committee to have done practically no work. The other two banks, *viz*, the Kamrup Bank which was registered in 1926 and the Sylhet Bank which was registered in 1927 are working with a paid up capital of Rs 44,590 and Rs 28,644 respectively and are said to have made some progress.

The objects for which loans may be granted by all the banks are practically identical, *viz* —

- (1) the redemption of land and houses previously mortgaged,
- (2) the improvement of land and methods of cultivation,
- (3) the liquidation of old debts,
- (4) the purchase of lands in special cases,
- (5) the construction of dwelling houses,
- (6) the sinking and repair of wells and excavation of tanks,
- (7) purchase of agricultural and manufacturing implements and machinery, and
- (8) other measures designed to encourage in the members the spirit and practice of thrift, mutual help and self-help.

The Kamrup Bank also provides for loans for purposes of trade, commerce, or the promotion of any industry.

In the case of the Kamrup and Sylhet banks no loans can be given exceeding 20 times the paid-up share money of the borrower or 50 per cent of the market value of the land. The maximum

period of repayment is 20 years and the individual maximum loan is limited to Rs 10,000. These two banks work on deposits and do not issue debentures. The rates paid on deposits range from  $6\frac{1}{4}$  to  $8\frac{1}{4}$  per cent. The Assam Government have granted loans to the Kamrup Bank. It is reported that overdues of both principal and interest are heavy in both these banks.

#### RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE PROVINCIAL COMMITTEES

211 The Punjab Committee recommend that the existing limits in the case of some banks, which are higher than Rs 5,000, should be reduced without delay. They are also impressed with the importance of restricting loans to directors. They think it is too early to give a definite opinion on the question of special facilities for recovery. But they consider that difficulties in recovery provide a useful restraint on careless or reckless lending and deprecate recoveries being made too easy. In the experimental stage they recommend that the period of loans should not exceed 10 years but after that stage is passed, it might be extended to 15 years subject to special precautions being taken to ensure regular payments. They agree with the Royal Commission on Agriculture that debentures of co-operative land mortgage banks should be included in the list of trustee securities. They consider that most of the defects in the existing system are due to lack of experience and can be remedied, given a good directorate. Co-operators, in their opinion, should rely as little as possible on the safeguard of a Government nominee on the management of the banks, and education and character should be sufficiently developed to ensure wise lending and punctual repayment.

212 The Madras Committee consider it advisable to restrict the new primary banks at the outset to the more fertile areas where the crops are more secure. They recommend that the central land mortgage banks should work in conjunction with the rural credit societies and that if there is a failure of crops, the latter should give an extension of time for the repayment of loans and that the former should receive the instalments annually with the utmost regularity. The Committee also consider that the central land mortgage bank should not ordinarily receive short-term deposits and that the debentures should be trustee securities.

213 The Bombay Committee recommend that Government should consider the formation of more co-operative land mortgage banks in different parts of the Province without awaiting the results of the work of the three existing institutions. The creation of a central land mortgage bank in the province is also recommended by them, as the provincial bank which had agreed provisionally to finance co-operative land mortgage societies is unwilling to shoulder further responsibility for the work. They suggest that

membership of the central land mortgage bank should be open to the Indian joint-stock banks, the Imperial Bank of India, the provincial and other co-operative banks and to land-holding classes. If any portion of the share capital is not subscribed by these bodies, they recommend that Government should take up the unsubscribed portion and gradually dispose of it and that the outside shareholders and Government should gradually withdraw as the shareholding of the local societies increases. They suggest that the representatives of the local societies should have a large and increasing share in the management of the bank and that the Registrar of Co-operative Societies or some other nominee of Government should have a seat on the directorate. The issue of debentures to the extent of 20 times the paid up capital is recommended by them, with the guarantee of Government both as regards the principal and interest. They also suggest that Government should undertake to subscribe a portion of the debentures and that the debentures should rank as trustee securities. They contemplate that in the fulness of time the central land mortgage bank should absorb the present long-term *tahani* operations of Government. They suggest that this bank should establish contact with the special agency for minor irrigation works and utilize its services for the extension of irrigation. They do not recommend the grant of the power of foreclosure in the absence of actual experience of the working of land mortgage societies and in view of the fact that such power would bring the system into discredit from the outset as an agency bent on expropriating from their lands those who resort to it for borrowings. They suggest that any joint-stock banking organisation which makes advances to agriculturists on the security of mortgage of land should be regulated by law and should not be given any facilities by Government. In view of the difference in agricultural, social and general economic conditions between Sind and the rest of the Presidency, the Committee recommend the formation of a separate land mortgage bank for Sind or if that is not possible, the opening of a branch of a central land mortgage bank with a local committee to assist in its working.

214 The Bengal Committee recommend that for the present central co-operative banks should be required to open land mortgage departments the extra share capital required being subscribed partly by affiliated rural credit societies and partly by other limited liability societies to be started for substantial agriculturists and rent receivers who are not now members of rural credit societies. They suggest that the period of the loans should extend from 5 to 20 years and the amount should not exceed half the value of the land mortgaged. In addition to share capital, they recommend that the land mortgage departments should obtain funds from long-term deposits and debentures

issued by the provincial co-operative banks which may make such underwriting arrangements with the Imperial Bank of India or any other bank as may be necessary. The debenture issue should be limited to half the value of land covered by mortgages and should not exceed 15 times the paid-up capital and reserve funds ear-marked for the land mortgage ~~bank~~ department of the central bank concerned. In regard to debentures they recommend that Government should guarantee interest and that the debentures should be included in the list of trustee securities, Government having such control as may be required by them for discharging their responsibilities. They suggest that two trustees elected by debenture holders should be associated with the persons appointed by the State in the administration of the Provincial bank. A sinking fund should be set up for the repayment of debenture bonds, which should be freely utilised to keep up the price of the bonds. The grant of summary powers for foreclosure and sale is not recommended as, apart from undue rigour to borrowers, it would lead to laxity in scrutinising the security and to carelessness in fixing the amount of the loan.

215 The Assam Committee are not in favour of multiplication of banks till the existing banks are placed on a sound footing. They suggest that loans should be confined for the present to the purpose of repayment of old debts. They place reliance on deposits to finance land mortgage banks in the initial stages and do not recommend the issue of debentures at present.

#### MAIN QUESTIONS AFFECTING LAND MORTGAGE BANKS

216 The main questions affecting the working of the co-operative land mortgage banks in India may be thus summarized —

- (1) What should be the economic purposes for which long-term land mortgage credit might beneficially be supplied to agriculturists?
- (2) What should be the maximum period for repayment and the mode of repayment?
- (3) Whence should mortgage banks derive their working capital? Should share capital be insisted on and if so, what proportion should it bear to the borrowings? Where the issue of land mortgage debentures for raising the bulk of the working capital is favoured, should the issue be by the primary land mortgage banks or by a central agency? If it is to be a central agency, should it be the existing Provincial Co-operative Bank or a separate central land mortgage bank, which should finance only the primary land mortgage banks?



- (4) Should land mortgage banks be permitted to receive deposits like co-operative central banks or joint-stock banks, and, if so, for what purposes and under what safeguards?
- (5) What should be the relation between the land mortgage bank and the ordinary credit society where they co-exist?
- (6) Should the Government give any financial assistance to these banks and if so, what form should it take? Direct loans, exemption from certain taxes and fees, guaranteeing principal or interest of debentures and making them trustee securities and purchase of a portion of debentures are suggested
- (7) Should these banks be invested by special legislation with summary powers of recovery such as the right to sell or foreclose without the intervention of the courts?

#### OUR RECOMMENDATIONS

217 We now proceed to make our recommendations. We realize that while these recommendations will be capable of fulfilment in respect of new institutions which may be established hereafter, they will have to be adopted with suitable modifications in the case of existing institutions. Further, these recommendations of ours relate wholly to co-operative land mortgage banks. We consider that there is a great field for these institutions in the immediate future. We have already recommended that in order to satisfy the credit requirements of the classes of agriculturists who are outside the co-operative movement, and to provide substantial loans to big landlords, commercial land mortgage banks on joint-stock basis or on the model of the English Land Mortgage Corporation should be established. We shall deal with these institutions separately at the end of this chapter.

218 As regards co-operative land mortgage banks, the first question relates to the economic purposes for which long-term credit should be supplied to agriculturists by these institutions. It is necessary at the outset to emphasize that no money should be advanced which is not economically profitable to the borrower. We consider that loans by land mortgage banks should be devoted to the following principal objects —

- (a) the redemption of land and houses of agriculturists, and the liquidation of old debts,
- (b) the improvement of land and methods of cultivation and the building of houses of agriculturists, and
- (c) the purchase of land in special cases

It will be seen that these objects are the same as those recommended by the Registrars' Conference of 1926, but we have changed the order of precedence for these loans, having regard to the present circumstances of the Indian agriculturist. We think that for a long time to come the resources of the land mortgage banks will be mainly required for enabling the cultivator to redeem his land and his house from mortgage and to pay off his old debts.

219 The amount and period of the loan should be fixed with due regard to the repaying capacity of the borrower and also to the purpose for which the money is advanced. Loans might be granted for stated periods of 5, 10, 15 or 20 years, and for the present the maximum period should be 20 years. We hope that with sound management the banks should be able to extend the period to 30 years if necessary. Until more experience is gained, we consider it desirable that the amount of individual loans should be limited to a maximum of Rs 5,000 and in no case should the amount of the loan exceed 50 per cent of the value of the mortgaged security. We have not laid down any minimum limit for loans as we consider that the facilities provided by these banks should be available even for the small agriculturist debtors.

220 We recommend that the repayment of loans should be by a system of equated payments, thereby amortising the loan at the end of a period of years. There are many advantages in this system and the amounts of instalment payable would not generally exceed the amounts ordinarily paid by most of the borrowers in the shape of interest alone. In Madras, we are told that one bank commenced its business with the clients by explaining to them that if they borrowed from that bank and merely paid regularly every year for  $16\frac{1}{2}$  years at 12 per cent on the amount borrowed which was the rate they were paying to moneylenders they would be let off without claiming the principal amount. The outstanding feature of this amortisation system is that the bank only charges 9 per cent interest on its long-term loan and that an equated payment on the basis of 12 per cent of the borrowed amount every year provides for the regular payment of interest and for a gradual extinction of the principal within the stated period of about 16 years. In dealing with agriculturists one has, however, to take into account the fact that when loans are taken for the improvement of land or of methods of cultivation, the increased earnings from these improvements would begin to accrue only after a certain period and that the earnings would be higher during the later years than in the beginning. We are, therefore, of the opinion that if local conditions require, a system of graduated payments may be adopted so as to provide for repayment by larger instalments commencing after the investment of the loan on the land has resulted in increased profit. In any case we consider that it is useful to provide alternative methods of repayment in the by-laws of the

bank with full power to the management to enforce that method of repayment which it considers suitable

221 Turning now to question (3) in paragraph 216 above, we consider that the working capital of the mortgage bank should be derived from two sources, *viz*, share capital and debentures. There are two ways in which share capital may be obtained. One is by initial subscription by the intending members before any loans are made. There is some advantage in acquiring share capital initially in this manner as it forms a good basis of security to the debentures that may be issued subsequently by the bank and as it further enables the bank to issue loans in anticipation of raising debentures. The second method of raising share capital is to deduct a certain percentage, say 5 per cent, of the amount borrowed by the members at the time the loan is advanced. This system prevails in Madras and enables the bank to raise its share capital gradually and thereby its borrowing capacity also. The percentage of share capital to loan need not be large as the loan is fully secured by the mortgage. The Baroda Committee have recommended in consonance with the American practice that 5 per cent of the loan will be a reasonable share capital. We agree with the principle of this suggestion. We also recommend that in order to ensure the supply of the initial resources wherewith to start the operations of the mortgage bank the provincial Government should, where necessary, make advances free of interest under a stipulation that the advances should be repaid out of the realizations of the debenture issues. These recommendations about share capital are intended to apply to the present stage of the development of these banks. When these banks develop their business very largely, an ideal which is earnestly aimed at, they may require large capital as the foreign banking experts have stated. These experts have recommended that the provincial Government should supply such share capital. We commend these proposals for the careful consideration of the Provincial Governments.

The larger part of the working capital of the mortgage bank should be raised by means of debentures. We do not think it necessary that the proportion of the debenture to the share capital should be limited in the manner suggested by the foreign banking experts, *viz*, 5 : 1. The proportion varies in the several provinces and we should leave it to the discretion of the co-operators in each province to raise debentures to the extent they consider necessary. But in no case should the value of debentures outstanding exceed the outstanding amount under mortgages given by the borrowers and over which the debenture holder has a floating charge. For the success of the debenture issue we do not consider a special guarantee of the principal by Government is required. We agree with the recommendations of the Royal Commission on Agriculture and of the Registrars' Conference that the best help that the

Government can render in this connection is to guarantee the interest on debentures for the whole period of their currency. We further agree that these debentures, the interest of which is guaranteed by Government as recommended above, should be included among trustee securities provided Government is satisfied that adequate arrangements have been made by the bank for the redemption of these debentures at regular intervals. If in any province it becomes necessary, and appears to be more advantageous for the movement, for the Government to purchase debentures of a certain value we are also in favour of such form of State assistance.

222 We contemplate that if our recommendations are accepted, the debentures should be issued by a central institution called the Provincial Land Mortgage Corporation and that the actual sale of debentures should be made not only by the Provincial Corporation but also by primary land mortgage banks which may be called district mortgage banks and which should operate over fairly large areas and must not be too small. The district mortgage banks should be entitled to obtain the necessary finance from the Provincial Land Mortgage Corporation against a transfer of the mortgage securities which should be available to the latter for issuing debentures. The Provincial Land Mortgage Corporation will be an institution entirely separate from the provincial co-operative bank. While short-term and intermediate credit would be dispensed by the primary credit societies with the help of central and provincial banks, long-term credit would be provided only by primary land mortgage banks with the help of a provincial land mortgage corporation. We are decidedly of the opinion that the provincial co-operative banks should not function, except as a temporary measure, as central land mortgage banks for the province and that there should be separate organizations of the kind we have proposed, but there is no objection, until the provincial land mortgage corporation is established in a province, to the provincial bank financing the primary land mortgage banks with long-term capital specially raised for the purpose. In Bombay, where the Provincial Bank has issued debentures to provide finance for co-operative land mortgage banks, a sinking fund has been created into which a payment has to be made before profits are arrived at. In the Punjab where the Provincial Bank has similarly issued debentures, the Bank has instituted under the terms of the trust deed a sinking fund to provide for the redemption of the principal of the debentures, to which is credited every pie of the profits of the Bank besides the interest accruing on the investment of the fund. This arrangement has resulted in the Bank not being able to build up a reserve fund or to pay any dividend to its shareholders. These two instances, we are told, partly influenced Madras in not adopting the Bombay and Punjab systems.

223 The management of the primary mortgage banks and that of the local credit societies should not overlap. When an application for a loan to a land mortgage bank is made by a member who is also a member of a credit society the opinion of the credit society should ordinarily be obtained in regard to the advancing of the mortgage loan, though the responsibility regarding the ascertainment of the financial standing of the applicant and the grant of the loans must rest with the land mortgage bank. While we agree that a certain amount of co-operation between the ordinary co-operative society and the land mortgage society will be of mutual advantage to both the institutions, we are convinced that the two classes of societies should work entirely apart and that the transactions of the ordinary society should not in any way be mixed up with those of the mortgage bank.

224 We are not in favour of permitting land mortgage banks to receive deposits ordinarily like co-operative central banks. We are, however, attracted by the recommendation of the Central Provinces Provincial Banking Enquiry Committee for the institution of a provident fund scheme in land mortgage banks under which the borrower will be required to contribute annually a fixed sum to the provident fund on the basis of his ordinary surplus in a normal year and the instalment for repayment of loans which he might be paying to the land mortgage bank. That Committee was influenced in this recommendation by a desire to provide, in addition to credit facilities for long-term loans, simultaneous facilities for investment and the development of the thrift habit. In addition to the provident deposits, that Committee has also recommended that the land mortgage bank might accept deposits for not less than 5 years and that the bank might also issue savings certificates payable after 3, 10 or 15 years. As we have stated in a previous paragraph, loans of the land mortgage banks will, in the beginning of their career, be mostly for liquidation of old debts in regard to which it is necessary to provide for a long period for repayment. It will, therefore, be dangerous for the land mortgage bank to depend on these short-term deposits for financing the borrowers. While, therefore, the receipt of deposits and the institution of schemes for savings certificates may come with the gradual development of land mortgage banks, we do not think it advisable to recommend these measures for obtaining working capital for the banks at the present stage of development.

225 We now come to the vexed question of whether the land mortgage banks should be vested with summary power of recovery by foreclosure and sale without the intervention of civil courts. Most of the Provincial Committees are not in favour of granting this power to the bank. One of the reasons given for this attitude is that the loss to debtors which it might entail might prejudice the bank in the eyes of the public. The Bengal Pro-

vincial Banking Enquiry Committee consider that, apart from undue rigour to borrowers, the proposal would lead to laxity on the part of the management of the banks in scrutinizing the security offered for loans and to carelessness in fixing the amount of the loan itself. In their opinion, consistent good management and proper fixing of the period of the loans would enable the land mortgage banks to avoid litigation. Some of the Committees are inclined to postpone consideration of this question until greater experience has been gained of the working of these banks as the limited experience available at present affords too narrow a basis for judging the difficulties to be faced by these banks or the provision that might be necessary. On the other hand, we are informed that, in the legislation which is now contemplated in Madras, provision has been made for powers of summary procedure for the recovery of arrears from defaulters. We consider that this question is of fundamental importance. In the absence of special legislation, the primary land mortgage bank will have to institute a suit in the civil courts for the recovery of the debt or it may institute it before an arbitrator appointed by the Registrar of Co-operative Societies. The elaborate provisions of the Transfer of Property Act and the Code of Civil Procedure will have to be involved for obtaining and executing mortgage decrees by the co-operative land mortgage banks and the time and cost involved in the process will considerably hamper the operations of these banks and react adversely on the market for the debentures issued by them. In view of these reasons the Townsend Committee on Co-operation in Madras recommended, in accordance with precedents in other countries, that the land mortgage banks should have the power of bringing mortgaged properties of defaulting mortgagors to sale without resort to civil courts. This power is necessary to make the debentures a popular and liquid form of security, and until it is given, the attempt of the mortgage banks to derive their working capital by debenture issues will not meet with success. At the same time, we recognize that the right of the aggrieved party to question in the civil courts the action of the bank should be fully safeguarded. We further recognize that provision should also be made to safeguard properly the interest of the mortgagor and not to contravene the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code in regard to the sales of mortgaged property. We, therefore, definitely recommend that the power of foreclosure and sale by the land mortgage bank without recourse to civil courts should be given to the land mortgage bank subject to the above safeguards. We do not attach much importance to the suggestions that such a power would weaken the responsibility of the management or make the mortgage banks unpopular with the public. In some countries foreclosure is not permitted unless the outstanding debt bears a substantial proportion to the value of the mortgaged property. We consider that this salutary safeguard should also be included in any legislation in connection with co-operative land mortgage banks in India.

It is apprehended that the exercise of the power of recovery by foreclosure and sale without the intervention of civil courts which we have recommended above might prejudice the title of the debtor's co-shares or the prior claims of other creditors. We have fully provided for this difficulty by allowing every aggrieved party the right to question in the civil courts the action of the bank and take any further steps that he may be advised to take in order fully to safeguard his rights.

226 A similar provision connected with the insolvency law, with the same end in view as that discussed in the preceding paragraph, seems to us to be necessary. We recommend that the law should be amended so as to give greater protection to the land mortgage banks against avoidance of mortgage by the unsecured creditors of the insolvent.

227 We may in this connection refer to an important point raised by the foreign banking experts which we have ourselves very carefully considered, namely, the operation of the Land Alienation Acts which makes it impossible for the lender to secure the right to a free sale of the land which through default of the mortgagor may have to be taken over by him. Land mortgage banks are institutions for the purpose of lending monies for long-term investment on the sound and realisable security of agricultural land in order to enable the agriculturist to secure the advantage of cheap money. Where the land is transferable without any legal or customary impediments it will naturally form a valid security, but where the policy of the State has placed impediments against such transfers, the credit of the cultivator is adversely affected. The policy of preventing the easy transfer of land so as to retain it in the hands of the agriculturist or the classified agriculturist has so far been declared or enacted in the Punjab, and certain parts of the Central Provinces, the United Provinces and the centrally administered areas. The experience gained has been summarized by the Provincial Committees in their reports and is briefly as follows —

*Central Areas* — These Areas are protected by special legislation on the lines of the Punjab Land Alienation Act. It has affected adversely the credit of the agriculturist with the non-agriculturist money-lenders though at the same time it has been of great use in restricting borrowing for wasteful purposes. The result is that the agriculturist lender is replacing the non-agriculturist lender in the rural areas to an appreciable extent and the tendency is noticed whereby the agriculturist with a surplus invests it in purchasing land or in advancing on mortgage of land with a view to purchasing eventually more land instead of investing his surplus in capital improvements on land or in intensive farming. The Committee have, therefore, urged the protection of the small peasant proprietor against the bigger agriculturist with a view to

diverting the rural savings to a more profitable channel of investment

*The Central Provinces* —The Gonds are the only tribes to whom the Land Alienation Act applies. The credit of these tribes has shrunk somewhat since the enactment of the law. Moneylenders are also springing up amongst these tribes. This Act, in the opinion of the Committee, operates to perpetuate the backwardness of this class of the population.

*The Punjab* —The Act hampers the operations of the non-agriculturist rural moneylender and gives the agriculturist moneylender a predominant interest in usufructuary mortgage business of the province. The greater freedom of the agriculturist moneylender enables him to advance a higher proportion of the value of the mortgaged land than the non-agriculturist lender. This is useful in the case of borrowers who understand the use of credit, but is very detrimental to the interests of the other borrowers. The rates of the non-agriculturist moneylender are enhanced and his loans are restricted, while the agricultural moneylender, who is also a big landlord, is taking advantage of the Act to add to his land at the expense of the peasantry.

*The United Provinces* —The general effects of the Bundelkhand Land Alienation Act are also similar. There has been a reduction in the supply of credit and an increase in its price which has led directly to a fall in land values. The non-agricultural moneylender has been replaced to a considerable extent by the agricultural moneylender and the richer landlord has increased his possessions at the expense of the poorer. On the whole it is doubtful whether the Act has benefited the tenant.

In addition to these Land Alienation Acts, there are various restrictions on free alienability of land in several Tenancy Acts in force in many of the provinces.

228 Reviewing these experiences we are of opinion that, from a purely banking point of view, it is necessary that steps should be taken to remove all impediments to the free transfer of lands. We recognise, however, that other considerations are involved and we recommend that the Provincial Governments and their Legislatures should properly weigh the various considerations in shaping their policy. While this recommendation is general and is intended to improve the credit of the agriculturist, a special provision in regard to land mortgage banks is necessary in those provinces where Land Alienation Acts are now in force. It will not be possible for the land mortgage bank to obtain its working capital from debenture issues unless the agricultural land which is the security at the back of these debentures can be freely sold in case of default in payment of principal and interest by the borrowers from the bank. Moreover, the



double object of preventing the free mortgage and sale of agricultural land, and the provision of credit for the economic benefit of the agriculturist through co-operative land mortgage banks, cannot easily be achieved. If there are restrictions on the alienability of the land for the recovery of dues in the case of one class of members while the land of the other class of members can be freely sold for such recovery, the essential feature of co-operation, namely, equality of the status of members, will be sacrificed. In view of these difficulties we recommend that an alteration should be made in the Land Alienation Acts,—all legislation which restricts the sale or mortgage or other forms of alienation in the several provinces is included in this expression,—which would give to the co-operative land mortgage banks the right to take possession of land through foreclosure on default of the payment of the instalment of the loan and to sell it. The sale may be restricted to the agricultural classes according to the provisions of prevailing legislation and no question of policy in regard to preventing expropriation of these classes is intended to be touched by this particular recommendation.

229 The question of establishing an All-India Central Land Mortgage Corporation has been considered by us. We do not think that there is at present any need for such an institution, though when land mortgage banks are started in large numbers in the various provinces and when the provincial land mortgage banks in the provinces feel a real need for a financing and balancing centre it may be necessary to reconsider this question.

### COMMERCIAL LAND MORTGAGE BANKS

230 Specialization in banking spheres is now a common feature in most countries. Generally speaking land mortgage banking, co-operative banking and industrial banking are being developed on a specialized basis. The most outstanding example of a joint stock land mortgage bank is the *Credit Foncier de France*. It enjoys certain legal privileges granted by statute and is supervised by the Government. Since 1920 it advances sums up to 40,000 francs repayable in 25 years at very low rates of interest. It acts as an apex bank for regional mortgage banks somewhat in the same manner as the Bank of France does for the commercial banks of the country. In Japan also there is the system of commercial land mortgage credit. The Hypothec Bank of Japan (Nippon Kwangyo Ginko) which was founded in 1895 has specialised in making long-term loans redeemable within a maximum period of 50 years on the security of immovable property. The Parker Willis Commission of the Irish Free State recommended the establishment of a big agricultural credit corporation with a capital of £500,000, the unsubscribed portion of which was to be taken up by the State and the commercial banks. In England, as a result

of the reports of the Committees set up by the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries to investigate into the problems of rural credit, the English Mortgage Credit Corporation was set up by the Agricultural Credits Act of 1928. The Mortgage Company formed under Part I of the Act is called the Agricultural Mortgage Corporation, Ltd, and the leading joint stock banks of England, namely, the Bank of England, Barclays Bank Ltd, District Bank Ltd, Glyn Mills & Co, Lloyds Bank Ltd, Manchester and County Bank Ltd, Martins Bank Ltd, National Provincial Bank Ltd, Westminster Bank Ltd and Williams Deacon's Bank Ltd are the share-holding banks in this Corporation. The Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries with the approval of the Treasury is authorized to advance up to an amount not exceeding £750,000 for the purpose of establishing a Guarantee Fund. These advances are free of interest for a period of 60 years. The Minister is empowered also to contribute £10,000 towards the cost of the administration of the Corporation. The Treasury is empowered to procure the under-writing of the debentures up to a sum not exceeding £5,000,000 and may itself subscribe to an amount not exceeding one-fourth of the net issue or £1,250,000 in all. The advances by the Corporation on agricultural mortgages must not exceed two-thirds of the estimated value of the property and must be repayable by equal yearly or half-yearly instalments of principal and interest spread over a period not exceeding 60 years the mortgage advance being thus automatically reduced. The Corporation may also make loans under the Land Improvement Acts. The debenture stock is trustee security. The Corporation commenced operations in January 1929 and has already transacted a very large volume of business. (See pages 439-442 of the "Practice and Law of Banking" by Sheldon, Edition 1930). The second part of the Act enables chattel mortgage on farm crops and live-stock being created in favour of joint-stock banks.

231 The Royal Commission on Agriculture have given a brief account of the origin and subsequent history of the Agricultural Bank of Egypt\*. This Bank was established in 1902. Advances were made by the bank to small farmers and were of two kinds, one up to £20 each for a period not exceeding 15 months without mortgage security, and the other not exceeding £300 each for not more than 5½ years against a first mortgage. Interest was limited to 9 per cent and recoveries were made, together with the Government land tax, by the official village accountants in return for a commission of one-half per cent paid by the bank. The Egyptian Government undertook to provide in any year such sum as might be necessary, after meeting all present claims and exhausting the reserve fund, to make up a profit of 3 per cent on the capital invested in loans. The Government also guaranteed interest at 3½ per cent on £4½ million of bonds issued by the bank. In four years the

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\* Report of the Royal Commission on Agriculture, para 357.

Bank advanced about £10 million, but over-borrowing and outlay on unproductive expenditure led to the failure of the scheme of cheap advances and a policy of foreclosure on the mortgage, with the sale of the land, was widely adopted against persistent defaulters. With the passing of the "five-feddan" law in 1912, the maximum limits for the two classes of loans were raised to £200 and £1,000 respectively and the period for the latter class of loans was also raised from  $5\frac{1}{2}$  to 20 years. The Royal Commission add that cheap long-term credit to small cultivators is a blessing only where the cultivator is possessed of the knowledge and strength of character required to induce him both to limit his borrowing within his repaying capacity and to apply the borrowed money to productive purposes.

232 Dawson's Bank in Burma, which is a commercial agricultural bank and operates in the Irrawaddy delta is the only important instance of an agricultural bank on a joint stock basis in this country. The Royal Commission on Agriculture have dealt with the working of this Bank and the causes of its success (*Vide* paragraph 422 of the Royal Commission's report). The Burma Committee have made a very definite recommendation in favour of well-planned joint-stock land mortgage banks for the benefit of larger land owners who are not served by the co-operative land mortgage banks which are essentially intended for the small scale cultivator. The Committee say "Joint stock land mortgage banks have succeeded in many countries in supplying long-term credit to substantial farmers and are needed to do this work in Burma. But joint-stock land mortgage banks have nowhere succeeded in dealing with small peasant proprietors. Sooner or later they confine their dealings to more substantial classes."

233 The need for such mortgage institutions is particularly felt in provinces where the permanent settlement prevails and where the estates (*zamindaris*) represent large investments of capital which are not employed in other directions owing to the security of the yield obtained from investments in land under the permanent settlement and the absence of a similar security of return from investments in the fields of industry and commerce. At present, the landowners in Bengal, as a rule, obtain credit from indigenous bankers, money-lenders and loan offices on mortgages. The rates of interest and terms of repayment insisted on by these agencies are, however, onerous. Land has thus been deprived of its proper credit value and it is difficult to raise funds for utilization in productive channels connected either with the development of the estates or with other lucrative industry or trade.

234 Indeed, the Bihar and Orissa Provincial Committee have recommended the establishment of a land mortgage bank for that province under Government control and with capital initially supplied by Government, for the redemption of debts of the landlord

class and for financing their long-term credit requirements. The Committee contemplate the ultimate reduction of Government control to a minimum by requiring all borrowers to take up a number of shares bearing a fixed proportion to their borrowings and thus giving them a voice in the management of the bank. They also lay considerable emphasis on the necessity for associating the officials engaged in land revenue administration with the Board of the bank, as the experience of these officials will be of the greatest possible use in supervising the valuation of security and in judging the general credit-worthiness of the borrowers. They have proposed that the bank should have its head office at the headquarters of the province and branches at each of the other four divisional headquarters.

235 We recommend the development of well-organized joint-stock land mortgage banks in this country for the benefit of the numerous classes of landowners who cannot be adequately served by the co-operative credit organizations. We also commend for the consideration of local Governments whether, with a view to improving the economic conditions prevailing in their provinces they should not take the initiative for the establishment of such banks and assist in ensuring the success of their operations, providing for this purpose a portion of the initial capital. Such action would be on the lines of that recently taken in England. We also agree generally with the recommendations of the Bihar and Orissa Committee. We contemplate that the working funds of such institutions should be derived from both shares and debentures. The limits up to which debentures may be issued should be fixed with reference to the conditions in each province. If, in any province, the provincial Government undertakes to guarantee the interest on the debentures issued by the bank, such debentures should be included among trustee securities on the same conditions as debentures of co-operative land mortgage banks. We do not desire to lay down any hard and fast rules in regard to the grant of loans as in the case of the latter, but we should like to lay down the principle that the loans should provide for a safe margin and the period and instalments of repayment should be fixed, as in the case of the co-operative banks, with reference to the repaying capacity of the borrower as judged from, among other things, the net income from the mortgaged land.

# CHAPTER XI.

## RURAL FINANCE—*continued*.

### GOVERNMENT

#### WORKING OF THE AGRICULTURISTS AND LAND IMPROVEMENT LOANS ACTS

236 The Government provide but a very small share of the finance required by agriculturists by loans under the Land Improvement Loans Act and the Agriculturists Loans Act, which are merely enabling Acts empowering local Governments to advance loans from State funds and to frame rules governing the issue of such loans. Complete figures of loans made by the various Governments under each of the two Acts for a year are not available. In fact, one of the provincial Governments, namely Bombay, does not keep separate accounts of the advances under each Act. We give below the figures furnished by the Provincial Committees which illustrate the very insignificant part played by Government in the matter of supplying rural finance —

(In thousands of rupees )

—	Land Improvement Loans Act	Agriculturists Loans Act	Remarks
Assam . . .	7	1,50	Average of five years
Bengal . . .	93	14,44	Relating to 1923-29
Bihar and Orissa	70	8,34	Average of five years
Bombay . . .	13,72 (in 1926)	9,57 (average of normal years)	Figures for each type of loan not separately available for all years.
Burma	20 (ordinary year)	1,90 (average of ten years)	
Central Areas	1,70	1,58	Average of three years
Madras	12,70	11,54	Relating to 1927-28
The Punjab . . .	5,00	11,00	Average of five years

237 The Royal Commission on Agriculture in India enquired into the working of these two Acts. They found that on the whole

the working of the two Acts was satisfactory, but that steps should be taken to make the benefits available under them more widely known to the cultivators. As regards the Land Improvement Loans Act, the Commission came to the conclusion that the rate of interest could not be reduced without involving the public finance in loss and that the period fixed for repayment was not too short. They did not find that in any province the work of land improvement was restricted by shortage of funds for loans under the Land Improvement Loans Act, but they proposed the appointment of a special staff to survey the possibilities of improvements. They were also satisfied with the working of the Agriculturists Loans Act. They held that the Act must remain on the statute book until the spread of thrift or of co-operative credit or of both rendered it obsolete. In regard to the working of both the Acts, the Commission found that delay in dealing with applications was a frequent cause of complaint, but they added that local Governments were fully alive to the defect. In view of what is stated below we think that the working of the Acts leaves much room for improvement and we are unable to share the general feeling of satisfaction expressed by the Royal Commission.

238 The Provincial Banking Committees have gone more fully into the working of these Acts. The rates of interest charged to individuals on loans under the two Acts vary from 6 per cent to  $6\frac{3}{4}$  per cent in all provinces except Burma where the rate was as high as 12 per cent, till recently and now stands at 10 per cent and Coorg where it is  $7\frac{1}{2}$  per cent. In Madras loans for relief of distress are given at 3 per cent and in Bijapur in the Bombay presidency, loans for sinking wells are given at a rate which is slightly higher than 5 per cent. The Provincial Committees generally have no recommendations to make in regard to the rates of interest\*. The maximum period of repayment under the Land Improvement Loans Act is 35 years, but local Governments have power to fix the period by rules under the Act not exceeding the above maximum limit. The loans under the Act are in practice generally restricted to 20 years or less in all the provinces. The Central Provinces Committee report that though the maximum period under the rules is 20 years, in practice the period fixed for repayment rarely exceeds 5 or 6 years. The period allowed for recovery of loans under the Agriculturists Loans Act is generally shorter than that for loans under the Land Improvement Loans Act. The ordinary practice in some provinces is to recover the loans at the next main harvest or at latest after two main harvests. The period is longer in the case of special loans for purchase of seed and for relief of distress. We do not consider

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\* Two of our colleagues Mr V Ramadhar Pantulu and Chowdhury Mukhtar Singh feel that for the beneficial administration of the Agriculturists' Loans Act the rates of interest must be lower than they are at present, specially in the case of loans dispensed in times of distress.

it to be a right policy to grant loans for improvement for a short period, though the rules provide that the loans might be given for a longer period' We think that normally loans for improvement should be spread over a period of years and that only in cases where the amount advanced is very small or the improvement effected is very temporary, the repayment should be required within a shorter period

239 The Provincial Committees have made various suggestions which may broadly be classified as follows —

- (a) those which are intended to remove certain existing administrative defects, and
- (b) those which are intended to improve and extend the benefits available to the cultivators under the Acts

240 The more important of the administrative defects which call for remedy are summarized below —

(1) *Delay in the disposal of loan applications and levy of illegal gratifications* — We recommend that Provincial Governments should take steps to minimize these delays and to lessen the opportunities for illegal gratifications. We understand that the question of expeditious distribution has already been taken in hand by some of the Governments. We agree that distributing officers should be of some standing and should be on the look-out for cases of illegal exactions. It has been reported by the United Provinces Committee that, as a result of such exactions, the effective cost of a *takavi* loan has been estimated at not less than 25 per cent

(2) *Insufficiency of loans* — It is reported for example that loans for the purchase of cattle are insufficient for the purpose and it has been suggested that where funds are insufficient the advances might be restricted to a smaller number of recipients whose need is greatest and that their requirements might be satisfied. We support this suggestion. We similarly support the recommendation that loans should be given on a more liberal acreage rate as restriction to smaller amounts might involve resort to moneylenders at exorbitant rates of interest

(3) *Strictness in realizations* — We do not approve of any laxity in realizations, though we are in favour of liberal suspensions and remissions when necessity arises, such as failure of crops, etc. We agree with Provincial Committees that dates of repayment should be fixed with due regard to the dates of harvest and that cattle loans should be allowed to be repaid in two kists instead of in one. Similarly, we agree that the recovery of loans advanced in times of distress should invariably be effected in more than one instalment

(4) *Unfairness in realizations of joint bonds* — When joint bonds are taken, we recommend that (1) the amount due from each individual borrower should be entered separately in the bonds,

(ii) every attempt should be made to realize from each individual the amount so shown and (iii) joint liability should be enforced only as a last resort and should even then be apportioned as fairly as possible

241 We give below certain suggestions made for improving and extending the benefits available to the cultivator from the two Acts —

(1) The facilities available are not widely known to the public. We recommend that steps should be taken to remove the general ignorance about the facilities of credit and the procedure to be followed in securing these facilities

(2) The Bombay Committee refer to the successful working of the Land Improvement Loans Act in the Bijapur district where a definite policy of agricultural improvements and famine protection is being followed. The details of the scheme are referred to in paragraph 107 of the Bombay Committee's report. We support the recommendation of the Bombay Committee that a similar policy should be followed elsewhere with suitable agencies for advice, guidance and supervision. We consider that the amount of loans granted under the Land Improvement Loans Act is very insignificant compared to the needs of the country. Although the Royal Commission on Agriculture reported that the work of land improvement was not restricted in any province by shortage of funds for loans under the Land Improvement Loans Act, the Bombay Committee have referred to the impression among witnesses that the amount that could be obtained as loans under the Act is insufficient and have further drawn pointed attention to the fact that Government have no well planned policy of promoting agricultural improvement by the grant of such loans. The Royal Commission have suggested various ways in which the possibility of improvement should be examined and suggested to cultivators. We cannot usefully suggest anything more than draw the attention of Provincial Governments to the recommendations of the Royal Commission and of the Provincial Banking Enquiry Committees.

(3) In backward tracts where the cultivators are not fitted to exercise the right of transfer of land and where co-operative credit societies cannot be successful and also in areas which frequently suffer from defective distribution of rainfall and water-supply, the free availability of facilities under the Agriculturists Loans Act has been strongly recommended. We support this recommendation which has also found favour with the Royal Commission on Agriculture.

242 There are various other detailed suggestions made by the Provincial Committees which we have not mentioned above. We have summarized them in the appendix to the Report and indicated our views on them. There is, however, one suggestion made by all



the Provincial Committees regarding the extent of financial assistance that is permissible or desirable under the Agriculturists Loans Act which we desire to refer to here. All the Committees are unanimously of opinion that the Act should be confined to times of emergency and stress and are not in favour of using the Act more extensively in normal circumstances. We agree that it is out of question for Government to provide the whole of the loan requirements of the agriculturists and that sporadic attempts on the part of Government to supply a fraction of such requirements are bound to meet with failure. We therefore recommend that the operation of the Agriculturists Loans Act should be generally restricted to relief of distress.

243 In respect of loans under the Agriculturists' Loans Act and the Land Improvement Loans Act we should like to draw the attention of Government to the weighty observations made by the Indian Famine Commission (1901) regarding the policy to be followed by Government in this matter. We quote below a few extracts from that Report —

“The importance of advances under Act XII of 1884 and Act XIX of 1883, is now generally admitted. It is necessary, however, to insist that these advances lose a great part of their value if they are not given at the proper time. Advances under the Agriculturists' Loans Act (XII of 1884) are most profitably given for the purchase of seed grain for the *rabi* harvest at the very commencement of the famine, and again for the purchase of plough cattle and seed in the months of May and June in anticipation of the *kharif* sowings. The periods during which advances may be most usefully distributed under the Land Improvement Loans Act (XIX of 1883) are less restricted, they may with advantage be given until the hot weather draws to a close, but we have already pointed out that they, as well as the advances under the sister Act, are specially required in the very earliest stages of the famine, as a measure of moral strategy and to put heart into the people.”

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(Para 250)

“The real justification of the policy (of Government advances to cultivators) lies”, said the Member in charge of the Bill, which became Act XII of 1884, “in the position of Government as the great landlord of the country, and the direct bearing which the welfare of the cultivator has on its revenues.” But a wider view may be taken of the responsibilities of

the Government and its interest in the cultivator as a citizen no less than as a contributor to its revenues justifies it in promoting his industry. The policy of the Takavi Acts should not be regarded as productive merely, but also as protective, and it is upon the protective aspects especially that we would insist. We recognize the progress that has been made since these measures were originally introduced, but we are convinced that there is both scope and need for a further extension of the policy in its protective aspect on lines of greater liberality \* \* \*

(Para 311)

We would add that the grant of advances under these Acts should not replace assistance for famine relief. The economic reactions of advancing loans under these Acts to the agriculturists who are affected by famine, instead of giving them relief under the Famine Relief Code, are too obvious to require emphasis.

244 The question of distribution of *takavi* loans through co-operative societies has also been discussed by the Agricultural Commission as well as some of the Provincial Committees. In Bombay, advances under the Land Improvement Loans Act can be made only through the agency of co-operative societies in villages where such societies exist. The Madras Committee have given some valid reasons against such distribution and the Assam and the Bihar and Orissa Committees have also, for reasons which are stated in their reports, not supported the Bombay practice. In the Punjab, no loans have been made by Government through co-operative societies in the last 5 years and the following recommendations have been made by the Provincial Committee in this connection —

(1) No loans should be made by Government through the co-operative societies so long as there are sufficient funds in the co-operative movement

(2) No loans should be made by the revenue staff to the members of a co-operative society without the knowledge and consent of their society

(3) This consent should not be given if co-operative funds are available

245 The co-operative credit organisations have normally sufficient funds to lend to their members and they do not require loans from the Government for the purpose. The societies can only lend to their members and it will be inadvisable to use the co-operative agency to advance loans to non-members on the responsibility of the society for their recovery and then proper application. We have, however, no objection to Government using the co-operative societies as mere agents for distribution. Moreover, it is not our intention that members of co-operative societies should not be

permitted to avail themselves of State aid under these Acts. In either case it must be clearly understood that the societies should not be responsible for watching the application of the loans or for their recovery.

#### OTHER FORMS OF ASSISTANCE TO RURAL CREDIT PROVIDED BY GOVERNMENTS IN INDIA.

246 As stated in paragraph 46, and in Chapters IX and X, Governments in India also assist in various ways co-operative organisations for the supply of credit to the agriculturist. The amount of such assistance has, however, been small, mainly because these organisations have not so far been compelled to curtail their activities owing to a shortage of capital resources.

#### STATE AND AGRICULTURAL CREDIT IN OTHER COUNTRIES.

247 Rural credit in almost all countries in the world has received, and is receiving, the special attention of their respective Governments. It will suffice to summarise here very briefly the position in certain parts of the British Commonwealth and in the United States of America —

(1) *Great Britain* — In Great Britain, the Small Holdings and Allotments' Act of 1908 empowered the Government of Great Britain to take all the land which any individual owns in England and Wales in excess of 50 acres and to sell or lease it to a farmer or labourer. In order to help the small holders and labourers to purchase these holdings the Government through the County Councils have undertaken substantial financial responsibilities. The arrangement is thus described by Herrick in his *Rural Credits*\*: "For each small holding sold outright by the County, a purchaser must pay not less than one-fifth of the price in cash, one-fourth may be secured by a perpetual rent charge redeemable in the manner provided by the English laws, and the balance may be secured by mortgage to be paid off half-yearly in instalments of principal and interest or by terminable annuity. The longest credit which a County may allow on such a sale is 50 years." A large sum of money was borrowed by the Counties for the purchase and adaptation of these lands. The Scottish Board of Agriculture by the legislation of 1911 was empowered not only to adjust the rights of tenants on the land, but also to enlarge small holdings and to acquire estates for sub-division and allotment to small holders. The Government of Great Britain appropriated a large sum to be used by the Scottish Board of Agriculture for carrying on its work. The incorporation of "The Agricultural Mortgage Corporation Limited" in England under the Agricultural Credits Act of 1928 constitutes a distinct land-mark in the rural

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\* *Rural Credits* by Herrick, page 150

credit organisation of England. These measures are the result mainly of the recommendations of the Agricultural Tribunal of Investigation and the Committees on Agricultural credit. We have already referred to them in Chapter X of our report.

(2) *Ireland* —In Ireland since the establishment of the Board of Works in 1831, large amounts have been advanced to farmers for various beneficial purposes. Under the Land Purchase Acts an authority known as the "Estates' Commissioners" was appointed to enable farmers to purchase holdings. Mr Herrick says that this body "is the greatest body not only in Ireland but in the world for using the aid and credit of the State for the purpose of enabling farmers to acquire real estate". The Land Purchase legislation to which this betterment of rural conditions is due comprises a series of Acts covering a long period of years from 1869. Four-fifths of the inhabitants of Ireland are farmers or are engaged in agricultural pursuits. Practically all farmers are now owners of the farms they till, or else occupy them at fair rents judicially fixed. Recently, rural credit in the Irish Free State was the subject of investigation by a special Commission. Its conclusions must be of special value to India as agriculture occupies an equally predominant position in the economic life of both countries. The Irish Commission says — "We believe, that the needs of the present situation can be most effectively met by establishing an institution whose duty shall be first of all to finance the needs of Agricultural Co-operative Societies and enterprises. To this end we commend the establishment of a central institution, for which we propose the name "Agricultural Credit Corporation", whose duty it shall be to obtain from the public the funds needed for agriculture and to lend funds for agricultural undertakings."

(3) *Australia* —In Australia, provision is made by the Commonwealth Bank (Rural Credits) Act 16 of 1925, for the dispensing of short term rural credit by the Bank. Section 7 of the principal Act which defines the general power of the Bank permits it to acquire and hold land on any tenure and Section 34 permits the Bank to invest any moneys held by it on loans on the security of land. This Act created a separate Department of Rural Credits as a part of the Commonwealth Bank. The new Department is provided with ample funds from various sources to finance agriculture. The Treasurer is empowered to lend to it up to £3 millions. In addition to this, 25 per cent of the net annual profits of the Note Issue Department of the Bank have to be paid into the Rural Credits Department up to a maximum of £2 millions. Besides these sources, the Bank is authorised to raise money for Rural Credits by the issue of debentures up to four times the sums lent by the Treasurer, moneys paid out of the profits of the Note Issue Department and the Reserve Fund of the Rural Credits Department. From all these sources, the

Department can make advances for periods not exceeding twelve months to other banks, co-operative associations, and corporations or unincorporate bodies specified by proclamation. The advances are made on the security of what is called "Primary Produce" which includes wool, grain, butter, cheese, fruits, hops, sugar and the like.

(4) *New Zealand*—In the Dominion of New Zealand, a "Long Term Mortgage Department" was added to the New Zealand Bank by a special enactment in 1926. The Department has a special share and debenture capital. The share capital was raised by the issue of shares to the share holders of the Bank, a third of which was bought by the Dominion Government. The Government get a dividend of 6 per cent on their preferential shares, while the other shareholders get  $7\frac{1}{2}$  per cent. Debentures may be raised up to thrice the amount of the special share capital and their repayment is secured against the long-term mortgage loans, which are advanced to agriculturists out of this working capital. The loans are advanced for periods extending to  $36\frac{1}{2}$  years on an amortization basis with interest at 6 per cent *plus* provision for sinking fund.

(5) *South Africa*—The Union of South Africa has a dual system of State Banks in relation to rural and non-rural credit. The "South African Reserve Bank" established by the Currency and Banking Act of 1920, does not itself deal with rural credit. But a "Land and Agricultural Bank" preceded the Reserve Bank, having been first established by the Union Parliament Act 18 of 1912. In the year 1926, another Act (40 of 1926) was passed to extend the powers of this Land Bank and to provide for the formation of a net work of what are called "Agricultural Loan Companies" and "Rural Credit Societies". This Act empowered the Central Board of the Land Bank to raise and use funds for effectively financing these agricultural loan companies, rural credit societies and individual farmers. Besides financing, the Central Board of the Land Bank renders many other valuable services to Rural Credit Organisations. For instance, Section 33 of the Act says that the Central Board of the Bank may lend to them the services of any of its officers or clerks and pay them salaries and allowances from the funds of the Bank and that the Bank may authorize any person approved by it to keep a warehouse or elevator, suitable for the storage of grain or other agricultural produce accepted by rural societies as security for loans advanced.

(6) *United States of America*—In the United States of America, three distinct banking systems, namely, the Federal Reserve Banking System, the Federal Farm Intermediate Credit System and the Federal Farm Loan System, help agricultural credit. The sections of the Federal Reserve Act most important

to the farmers are those governing the eligibility of agricultural paper for rediscount. Section 13 (a) of the Federal Reserve Act provides, subject to regulations and limitations to be prescribed by the Federal Reserve Board, for the Federal Reserve Banks discounting notes, drafts, and bills of exchange issued or drawn for agricultural purposes, or based upon live-stock, and having a maturity at the time of discount not exceeding nine months, exclusive of days of grace.

The Federal Intermediate Credit System grants loans for periods not less than six months and not more than three years. The Intermediate Credit Banks are Government Institutions. Their establishment was made mandatory by an Act of the Congress and the Secretary of the Treasury was directed to subscribe to their capital stock in such amounts as called for by the directors of the banks, not in excess of 5,000,000 dollars for each bank. To secure additional funds, these banks are empowered to issue and sell debentures secured by agricultural and livestock paper.

The loans of the Federal Farm Loan System range up to 40 years. Funds are raised by means of debentures. The Government of the United States was authorised by the Congress (1) to subscribe to the share capital of these banks, (2) to take up debentures issued by these banks, (3) to pay for organisation expenses up to 100,000 dollars and (4) to make temporary deposits for the use of any land bank. Further, the Federal Land banks are recognised as depositories of public money. The debentures of these banks are exempt from federal, state, municipal and local taxes, and are trustee securities. The Federal Reserve System has also been authorised to buy and sell farm loan bonds.

Further, under the Agricultural Marketing Act of 1929, Congress has made available a sum of 500 million dollars for the constitution of a revolving fund to be administered by the Farm Board and to be utilised for the grant of loans to co-operative associations engaged in the marketing of agricultural commodities and food products thereof.

248 We have made recommendations in Chapters IX and X on the subject of the financial assistance that Government should give to co-operative organisations, including land mortgage banks. We have also indicated in Chapter IX the financial facilities that the Reserve Bank should give to provincial co-operative banks in connection with the financing of seasonal agricultural operations and the marketing of crops. In paragraph 72, we have recognised that a substantial development of rural credit in India can only follow, and cannot usefully precede, the uplift of the cultivator in other directions. and in Chapter IV we have advocated the adoption of a progressive and constructive agricultural policy by Government. We can only hope that as the needs of beneficent rural

credit are found to grow in this country, the Governments will not be found failing in their duty to provide additional resources, if necessary, in order to make such credit available to the widest extent

## CHAPTER XII.

### RURAL FINANCE—continued

#### COMMERCIAL BANKS

249 We have already remarked that the joint-stock banks play little direct part, and the Imperial Bank much less, in the supply of credit to the agriculturists. These banks do not look upon agricultural finance as part of their general business. Banks, however, do finance agriculture indirectly by financing merchants who give advances to the small village dealers, and some banks lend direct on the pledge of produce and valuables and on mortgage. This indirect financing by intermediaries is, however, costly, as a price not always reasonable has to be paid for it. A few banks lend to landholders and to the more substantial cultivators.

250 The Bombay Committee have reported that the Imperial Bank of India has recently begun in the Bombay Presidency to finance big landlords on personal security with sureties, or on the security of produce or of gold\*. The Managing Governor of the Bank has stated in his evidence that the policy of the Bank since its inauguration has been to encourage advances at reasonable interest against personal security with at least two good names supported, if possible, by the hypothecation of crops and also against the pledge of agricultural produce and gold. This policy, he observed, has not been limited to big parties and has been extended to all, the only condition being that the borrower is a reliable party and the security suitable in the opinion of the Bank. It is reported that considerable reluctance to pledge stocks was experienced due to a feeling that such a course entailed loss of credit and standing by the borrower, this feeling is, however, being overcome and is less in evidence each year. The rate charged by the Imperial Bank on loans secured on gold ornaments is  $7\frac{1}{2}$  per cent in the Punjab. The Managing Governor, however, admitted that the Imperial Bank is not organized to deal with the small cultivators and that in the majority of cases the assistance given is indirect, but he informed us that definite instructions had been issued to the Agents of the Imperial Bank in various parts of the agricultural districts that they should encourage the small man. Advances on gold ornaments for amounts as low as Rs 100 are made by the Bank, but silver ornaments are not regarded as suitable security for advances. In reply to a request for some comparative statement showing the figures of the Bank's assistance to the agriculturists in recent years by direct and indirect advances, we were told that

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\* Bombay, para 83.



it was impossible to analyse the assistance given to the agriculturists in this way with any degree of accuracy. The Punjab Committee have mentioned that the Imperial Bank has 34 outstations in the Punjab where advances against produce are negotiated and attempts are made through the godown-keepers at those places to establish contact with local dealers of agricultural produce. Demand drafts arising from movement of produce are also purchased by the Bank's branches. The United Provinces Committee have given a detailed list of the items of indirect assistance given by the Imperial Bank to agriculture. They are (1) advances against produce to approved commission agents and dealers at all places where the Bank is established at rates varying from 7 to  $7\frac{1}{2}$  per cent based on the official bank rate, (2) financing the movement of produce from the *mandis* to the consuming centres, chiefly by the purchase of demand drafts representing the produce despatched from approved customers, (3) the financing of the movement of produce from the distributing centres to the exporting ports by purchase of drafts and telegraphic transfers drawn on port towns at low rates, (4) loans against gold ornaments at 7 per cent, which are, however, not popular in the United Provinces among the agriculturists. We understand that this description of the activities of the Imperial Bank applies more or less to other parts of India.

251 Among smaller banks, we understand that in the Punjab the Lyallpur Colony Bank with a working capital of Rs 6 lakhs does 50 per cent of its business with agriculturists and that the Rajwara Bank is experimenting in this direction. In Burma, the Dawson's Bank Ltd, is the only bank organized on western lines which works as an agricultural bank. It does not, however, lend for indefinitely long periods, and of its advances amounting to nearly Rs 70 lakhs, 35 to 40 per cent are given as crop-loans. The principal advances are made to owners of considerable estates, some of whom have a paddy mill or carry on a large trade in paddy. In fact, the principal function of the Rangoon branch of this bank is the collection of deposits for lending in rural areas. In the United Provinces there is a small joint-stock bank in Meerut, which besides receiving deposits, dealing in *hundis* and generally carrying on the ordinary business of a joint stock bank, specialises in financing agriculturists on the security of mortgage bonds. This bank has advanced no less than Rs. 35,000 in a single village on land mortgages, though for certain reasons connected with recent tenancy legislation, the profit on such loans has, we are told, been so much reduced that the bank has suspended or greatly reduced this part of its business. In the Central Provinces, the Berar Bank Ltd, with a paid up capital of Rs 68,200, is said to be doing money-lending business direct with agriculturists. It advances loans on promissory notes on the security offered. About 20 per cent of the bank's clients are said to be agriculturists, and the maximum period of loans to agriculturists is said to be

three years. Its sphere of operation is, however, limited by its very limited resources. In Bengal the chief business of joint-stock banks at present is discounting of *hundis*, opening of cash credits and granting of loans against various kinds of securities mostly stock exchange shares and, very rarely, stocks of agricultural produce. In Bihar and Orissa, the smaller joint-stock banks are really loan offices, advancing money to the professional and agricultural classes at high rates of interest from 12 to 18 per cent or even 22 per cent. The bigger banks perform the usual functions of commercial banks, financing trade and to a smaller extent industry. In Madras some of the joint-stock banks give advances on gold, on produce and immovable property and *hundis* and also on promotes with or without joint security. The rate of interest on advances against jewellery by one bank is said to be 9 per cent and on joint loans 10 per cent.

252 We have elsewhere recommended that commercial land mortgage banks on a joint-stock basis might be established to advance loans to larger cultivators who can give adequate mortgage security. In regard to the smaller cultivators with small holdings and with unsound ideas of borrowing and use of credit, we do not think that joint-stock banks can play any considerable or useful part. What the Indian ryot wants is controlled credit and this can only be supplied by co-operative societies. In one direction, however, joint-stock banks can do some useful service. If they would liberally extend the system of advances against precious metals including ornaments, the fairly well-to-do among the Indian cultivators would be saved to some extent from the clutches of the money-lender.

253 We may here mention that we have been informed by one of the foreign banking experts that even in western countries, in spite of very developed branch banking, sometimes the commercial banking system becomes slower the nearer it comes to the agriculturist, and it stops entirely at the outskirts of the agricultural line. In Germany, for example, there is practically no branch of the larger banks in any town with less than 10,000 inhabitants, which shows that the business done by the banks with the smaller agriculturist is unimportant, there are a great many large agriculturists, and these get credit from the commercial bank but only to a very small extent and even then only when the credit required is not a permanent one. On the other hand, as pointed out in paragraph 69, in some of the western countries, especially England, a very large volume of rural credit is provided by the commercial banks. But as stated in that paragraph, there are special reasons in India which stand in the way of ordinary commercial banks providing any substantial amount of rural credit. Some of the factors which affect the security that the agriculturist can offer against loans obtained by him have already been

dealt with in chapters IX and X. Certain other factors bearing on the same aspect of the problem are dealt with later on in chapter XIX.

### LOAN OFFICES—BENGAL

254 While in the other provinces joint-stock commercial banks were started in the sixties and the seventies of the last century, the development in Bengal was initially along the line of land mortgage banking. The first loan office was founded in 1865 and on the 31st March 1929 there were 782 loan offices at work, out of which only 26 were in Calcutta and the rest in the mofussil. Their total working capital was about Rs 9 crores. The paid-up capital is generally small. Out of 782 loan offices, only 13 have a paid-up capital of Rs 1,00,000 or more. The percentage of reserve fund to paid-up capital is very low in the case of most of the loan offices of recent origin. No loan office has issued debentures, funds are attracted by deposits only. The rates of interest for deposits vary from 4 per cent for short deposits to 8 per cent for 7 years' deposits. Usually the longest period for which deposits are received is 5 years. The Bengal Committee refer to some undesirable features of new loan companies, such as touting for deposits on which very high interest rates are offered. In some cases deposits have been accepted at 15 per cent. We are told that the authorities of a newly started loan office in Mymensingh were anxious to have a deposit of Rs 10,000 at 24 per cent per annum.

255 The main business of the majority of the loan offices is to lend money not only to *zemindars*, but also to actual cultivators. They rarely finance trade or industry. A few finance tea gardens. Loans are given not only against mortgage and pledge of ornaments but also against personal security. The older companies charge rates of interest varying from 12 to 18 per cent in the case of secured loans, on unsecured loans, the rate is higher. The rates of interest of the newer companies for secured advances vary from 12 to 56½ per cent and for unsecured advances from 12 to 112 per cent. The greater proportion of loans is advanced against personal security. There have been cases in which the same person has borrowed from three neighbouring offices against personal security.

256 There is a wide-spread misgiving as to the likelihood of their failure under present conditions of general trade depression as they have no reserve fund worth the name. 17 mofussil loan offices went into liquidation during the period 1914-1928. There are too many small offices and their rapid growth needs regulation. The Bengal Committee hold that the true remedy in the case of existing institutions is amalgamation, but that it is difficult to suggest any

practical means of compelling the offices to amalgamate. They, however, recommend that—

- (a) For new offices a minimum subscribed capital of Rs 50,000 and a minimum paid-up capital of Rs 25,000 for small banks and loan offices should be prescribed
- (b) For the existing offices having a lower paid-up capital there should be legislation on the lines of section 4 of the Indian Life Assurance Companies Act requiring a deposit of securities with Government of an amount by which their paid-up capital falls short of Rs 25,000
- (c) No bank or loan company should be registered in future with authorised capital exceeding four times its subscribed capital
- (d) No loan office should in future make advances against its own shares, which is now the general practice among loan offices
- (e) At least 25 per cent of the profits should be taken to the reserve fund until it equals the paid up share capital
- (f) For investing their reserve funds, loan offices in the mofussil should be allowed to open post office savings bank accounts and should have the same facilities as regards withdrawals as the co-operative societies. The maximum holding of postal cash certificates in the case of the mofussil loan offices should be raised to Rs 20,000, but no change should be made with regard to the accrual of interest on such certificates
- (g) The existing banks should be required to draw up separate balance sheets and profit and loss accounts for banking and subsidiary businesses. The memoranda of association of new companies should be closely scrutinized and registration refused with a view to preventing the evil of combination of business with banking. On the other hand, all such institutions should be regarded as banks entitling them to all the privileges of banks
- (h) The balance sheet should give more details than at present. Window-dressing should be prevented as much as possible by prescribing a fixed date for the closing of all books
- (i) A special Act embodying the above-mentioned provisions and amending the Registrar of Joint-Stock Companies with wider powers of enforcing the regulations is necessary

257 We agree generally with the above recommendations subject to certain minor modifications. We do not think it is advisable to allow a loan office to have an authorized capital up to four times its subscribed capital. In our opinion, the subscribed capital must amount to at least one half of the authorized capital before the loan office is allowed to commence its business. We consider that the minimum of 25 per cent for allocation to the reserve fund is rather high and would recommend that at least ten per cent of the net profits for the year should be taken to the reserve fund. We also recommend that not more than 10 per cent dividend shall be payable unless 25 per cent of the net profits for the year is carried to the fund. We were inclined to suggest that the recommendations in the two preceding sentences should have effect until a reserve fund is built up equal to the paid-up share capital; but in view of the comparative smallness of the capital of the loan offices and the large amounts they obtain as deposits, we think it salutary to recommend that in the interests of the depositors the compulsory allocation of 10 per cent of the net profits to the reserve fund may well be continued permanently. We consider that any surplus of reserves left after investing in post office savings banks and postal cash certificates should be invested in trustee securities. The difficulties regarding the purchase and sale of such securities which have been referred to in the Bengal Committee's report may be got over by utilization of the Imperial Bank of India which gives free transfer facilities in connection with such purchases and sales.

258 As regards the Bengal Committee's recommendation that a special Act should be passed to regulate the operation of loan offices, we have elsewhere recommended that all joint-stock banks should be governed by a special Bank Act. Such of the loan offices as are well established are really carrying on joint-stock banking and should automatically come under the provisions of that Act. As regards the others, we agree that the necessity for a separate Act has been made out and we recommend the enactment of a measure to be called "the Bengal Loan Offices' Act" on the lines suggested above. A period of five years should be allowed to enable existing institutions to take steps to comply with the provisions of either the special Bank Act or the new Loan Offices Act. In both cases, the institutions should be prohibited from combining trading with their banking business. The loan offices governed by the Loan Offices Act should also be prohibited from dealing in real properties other than those that come into their hands in the course of their business. It should further be clearly provided in that Act that no auditor should be eligible for appointment to audit the accounts of loan offices if he is either directly or indirectly interested in the management of any loan office or is interested in any concern indebted to the loan office.

259 In making these recommendations, we have been guided by the principle that the banking development of the country should

proceed on the basis of existing institutions as much as possible. We are convinced that the loan offices in Bengal are peculiarly adapted to meet the requirements of the small *zemindars* and the land-holding and agricultural classes in that province. To ensure the re-organization and development of these institutions on sound lines, we also think it necessary that a special officer should be appointed by the Bengal Government for the first few years at least of the working of the Loan Offices Act, whose duty should be to supervise and to give sympathetic guidance to them.

260 One of our colleagues, Mr N R Saiker, has submitted a note in connection with the position to be occupied by the loan offices hereafter in the Indian banking sphere, which is printed as an annexe to this chapter. We recommend that the Government of Bengal and the Provincial Legislature should examine Mr Saiker's note fully with a view to devise a scheme to render to the loan offices such assistance as may help them to improve their present position and bring them into line with the other sound and well organized members of the banking system. We are of opinion that any steps that can feasibly be devised to increase the utility of these institutions with a view to extending their operations in the field of commercial banking deserve the fullest support of the provincial Government.

#### NIDHIS AND CHIT FUNDS IN MADRAS

261 There were 228 *Nidhis* in the Madras Presidency on the 31st March 1929, specially in the Southern and West Coast districts, of which 123 were in Coimbatore district alone. The objects of these *Nidhis* are described as the facilitation of savings, the relief of members from old debts, deliverance from usury and accumulation of a fund for special loans and for various other purposes, e.g., ceremonials, maintenance, purchase of jewels, house-building. These loans are given on good security to members but in some cases, if there is a surplus, loans are also given to outsiders. The receipt of deposits is not usually a primary object, the funds being raised chiefly by subscriptions to share capital.

The characteristic of a large number of *Nidhis* is that of a terminating society of members who contribute monthly an amount which is available for loans to members. But this characteristic has now largely disappeared. In some *Nidhis* monthly subscriptions to share capital has been replaced by a recurring deposit and a fixed small share capital which may or may not be withdrawn.

The lending rates of the *Nidhis* are generally low. But they levy high penal rates payable on overdue amounts and much of the profits arise from this source of income. The newer type of

*Nidhis* which are developed specially in the C6mbatore area, charge higher rates on their loans and the rates of 12 to 15 per cent are not unusual among them

The share capital of these *Nidhis* is about Rs 2½ crores. Their deposits and reserve funds amount to another 1½ crores. Thus all the *Nidhis* handle about Rs 4 crores.

All these *Nidhis* are registered under the Indian Companies Act. Some of them are now carrying on the business of banking and are indistinguishable in most respects from an ordinary small joint-stock bank.

The articles of association of these *Nidhis* are in conflict with the provisions of the Indian Companies Act in respect of the withdrawability of the share capital. The Madras High Court have held that the liability of their members continues even after the withdrawal of share capital, because share capital cannot be withdrawn under the Indian Companies Act without the consent of the Court. The Madras Committee say that many of the *Nidhis* are excellently conducted, while some are open to very serious criticism.

There is a great deal of variety in the constitution and working of these *Nidhis*. They partake of the nature of mutual benefit societies and joint-stock banks and sometimes of the Chit funds (*vide* para 263) which are mere loose associations of a small number of people.

262 The main questions that arise for our consideration are —

- (a) Should *Nidhis* be allowed to take withdrawable share capital?
- (b) Should the members of these institutions be permitted to borrow on their share capital?
- (c) If the *Nidhis* are allowed to obtain working capital in the form of share capital paid up in a number of small instalments, should members be compelled to pay a certain percentage on allotment of shares?
- (d) Should the liability of the member be limited to the amount of the share money actually paid or in arrear in respect of the shares, or should his liability cease with the withdrawal of the share capital?
- (e) Should they be allowed to open current accounts and permit their members and non-members to operate upon them?

263 The Chit funds have arisen from two legitimate demands in villages under conditions of defective credit arrangements, namely,

- (1) the necessity for a lump sum to meet "some unusual" expenditure, and
- (2) provision of a form of saving

For the different types of Chit funds we invite a reference to paragraph 482 of the Madras Committee's Report

While there are many properly run funds we are told that the system is open to abuse and is actually abused in a great number of cases. The Madras Committee consider that effective control will probably result in a number of the Chit funds suspending their business. They recommend that the control should take the form of registration which should be optional and that without a certificate of registration no civil court should entertain any suit on behalf of any Chit or a member of it.

264 We have carefully considered the recommendations of the Madras Committee and we have also examined the model rules of the English Building Societies on which the *Nidhis* are largely built. Our recommendations which follow in the main the practice of the English Building Societies are as follows —

- (1) The *Nidhis* and Chit funds in Madras should be controlled by a special Act of the Madras Legislature called the "*Nidhis* and Chit Funds Act",
- (2) Such of the *Nidhis* as have evolved themselves into full fledged banks should come under the general Indian Bank Act if they so desire,
- (3) The idea of the *Nidhis* transforming themselves into co-operative societies and coming under the Co-operative Societies Act is not favoured,
- (4) But if *Nidhis* do not register themselves either under the Bank Act or the Madras *Nidhis* and Chit Funds Act and prefer to register themselves under the Indian Companies Act, they should fully comply with the provisions of that Act in regard to the withdrawability of share capital and other matters in respect of which their present practice is not in strict conformity with the provisions of that Act.

265 As regards the detailed provisions of the proposed Madras Act, we are of opinion that the *Nidhis* may be allowed to retain their characteristic features in the provisions of the legislation recommended above, especially in regard to the following points —

- (i) *Nidhis* should be permitted to take withdrawable share capital and to lend on their share capital as at present. In such cases *Nidhis* should not be allowed to take deposits or loans from outsiders.
- (ii) *Nidhis* should not be permitted to trade.
- (iii) They may be allowed to obtain working capital in the form of share capital paid-up in a number of small instalments and their members need not be compelled to pay a certain percentage on allotment of shares.



- (iv) The liability of the members should be limited to the amount of share money actually paid or in arrear in respect of shares and should cease with the withdrawal of share capital
- (v) *Nidhis* may be allowed to open current accounts for members on condition that they maintain adequate reserves for payments on demand
- (vi) Adequate provision should be made in the Act for the proper audit and publication of balance sheets of *Nidhis*

We also recommend that promoters of Chit funds should be licensed and the provincial Government should consider whether a property qualification should not be prescribed for the grant of such licences. Each Chit fund must be separately registered in accordance with the rules to be made under this new Act.

## ANNEXURE

*Note by Mr N R Sarker on Loan Offices in Bengal*

1 The loan offices, which are small joint-stock companies, are deeply rooted in the economic life of Bengal, and any picture of the present banking organisation of the province would be incomplete, and any scheme for the future development defective, without a proper understanding of the important role which these loan offices play in the economy of Bengal. They have attracted the savings of a large proportion of the middle class population, and such banking facilities as are available in the rural areas are largely due to them.

2 It is my opinion that these loan offices serve a useful purpose even as at present, by catering chiefly to the various needs of the middle class salaried people, and also of the agriculturists, and I think that they could be made still more useful if their operations were to be extended to trade and industry as well. Their methods doubtless require to be overhauled and brought into line with modern banking principles to a greater extent than at present, so that they might adapt themselves to new lines of business arising out of the needs of local trade, industry and agriculture. Their services might also be utilized in fostering banking habits in the people, thereby in turn, facilitating the establishment of various institutions designed to serve the special needs of different sections of the people.

3 The time has come when the loan offices should adjust themselves to the new conditions and growing requirements of the province. They should endeavour, wherever possible, to assume more and more the character of commercial banking institutions and take upon themselves mainly, if not exclusively, the task of financing the movements of internal trade. Some of them might well continue their present activities, such as lending to the agriculturists and the zemindars on the mortgage of land, but they will have to modify many of their methods, such as, for instance, lending for long periods out of short-term deposits. Again, some of them may well be expected to cater still more to the needs of the middle class and salaried people by undertaking functions analogous to those of the Building and Friendly Societies in Europe and America.

4 A study of the various credit needs of the people of the province impresses one with the desirability for development of the loan offices along these lines. The economic activities of the people, whether in the fields of trade, industry, or agriculture, call urgently for the support of adequate financial facilities. They demand special measures for the initiation of separate types of

credit agencies suited to the requirements of each class. There is need for credit institutions to assist the diverse economic developments, there is need for Agricultural and Land Mortgage Banks to help the agricultural class and encourage production from the land, there is need for Industrial Banks to assist in the foundation and growth of small Indian industries and there is need for commercial banks to finance adequately the movement of goods. Further there is need for credit institutions which will cater to the consumptive needs, as opposed to the productive needs, of the people, thereby relieving their dependence on usurious money-lenders. All these requirements may be met effectually by a suitable reorganisation of the loan offices into specialised groups determined by the credit requirements of their clients, the condition of their investments and the extent of business available to them.

5 The immediate problem for solution however is how the present position of the loan offices may be strengthened and improved. For this purpose it is necessary to investigate the reasons underlying their difficulties. As a rule, the loan offices except the very recent ones, conduct their activities with a reasonable degree of caution, maintaining a due proportion of capital and reserve in comparison to their total deposits but, owing to certain local conditions, their loans have to be made mainly to middle class people and agriculturists, all of whom are directly dependent on agricultural prosperity for the liquidation of their indebtedness. Consequently during the general depression of the last two years, the position of the loan offices has become somewhat difficult, since many of them have invested a large proportion of their funds on the security of landed properties, mostly agricultural. Even where good personal security has been available, it has been found difficult to realise loan owing to the economic condition of the borrower being impaired by dependence on agricultural income.

6 The older institutions numbering about 40 which together command a working fund of approximately Rs 7 crores, out of an estimated total of Rs 9 crores for all the loan offices, follow, as a rule, an extremely cautious policy in investment. It is true that investments are not liquid but bad investments have been few. The investments, however, of even these older institutions have now become more or less "frozen" for the reasons stated above, and it is strongly felt that any measure devised to thaw the frozen assets of the loan offices would not only enable the loan offices to meet the demands of depositors but it would also give a great impetus to the development of commercial banking in rural Bengal by giving the loan offices an opportunity of re-organising their working methods on sounder principles.

7 These considerations suggest the need for a financing corporation, as a sort of "apex" institution. It would enable them to

convert then 'frozen' assets into cash for investment gradually in more liquid forms of industrial and commercial securities, and it would greatly facilitate the desired re-organisation of the provincial banking system by inducing the gradual transformation of these loan offices into nuclei of a commercial banking system, of the urgency of which I am convinced. In endeavouring to estimate the total amount of funds that would be required to render this service, we should remember that it is not necessary nor desirable that all the loan offices should give up their land mortgage business in favour of commercial banking, and consequently, in such cases, no assistance would be needed. In other instances, again, the loan offices would themselves be able to realize, in a reasonable time, a fair proportion of their outstanding loans. Therefore, the total relief required from the proposed finance corporation may be estimated at Rs 2 crores, as against the total invested funds of these loan offices estimated at about Rs 7 crores. Even this amount would not be necessary all at once and the programme of relief may be spread over a period of four or five years, at about forty to fifty lakhs per annum.

8 The financing corporation may be floated with an initial paid-up capital of, say, Rs 5 lakhs contributed mainly by the loan offices themselves. In addition, debentures of twenty times the amount of capital may be issued on the security of the loan offices. This initial capital may gradually be augmented by a contribution of 5 per cent of the amount paid to the loan offices from the debenture issues, while again the enhancement of capital by this device may be made the basis of further debenture issues. The share capital and reserve funds of the chief loan offices of Classes I to IV (as described in paragraph 433 of the Report of the Provincial Committee) is just over Rs 1 crore and these can easily subscribe 5 per cent of this amount without much difficulty. The cash in hand and with banks belonging to these classes is also about Rs 1 crore. Even if there be any difficulty in their subscribing the initial capital of the corporation in full, their influence over their clients and the high degree of popular confidence enjoyed by them would enable these loan offices to induce private investors to take up the unsubscribed portion of the shares in a little time.

9 It would be the duty of the corporation to scrutinise carefully the assets of the loan offices applying to it for advances, and of course it should lend only to those whose assets prove entirely to its satisfaction. It may lend to the loan offices on the security of their general assets, or take over specific assets and pay to the loan offices part of the amount lent by the latter against such assets and issue debentures on either of them. In the former case, the activities of the loan offices might be prejudiced by the fact that the would-be depositors may feel reluctant to entrust their money to a bank whose entire assets are under a first charge,

but in any case, there would be good security for those investing in the debentures of the Corporation. To make the debentures attractive, the interest may be as high as 7 or  $7\frac{1}{2}$  per cent. The Insurance companies, the exchange banks and successful Indian joint-stock banks can be made to interest themselves in the issues in the same way as in industrial or agricultural debentures but within reasonable limits, and it should not be difficult to get the debentures taken up.

10 Assuming that the proposed rate of  $7\frac{1}{2}$  per cent interest for the debentures of the corporation is accepted, as the rate of interest generally charged on secured loan made by the loan offices is between 12 and 18 per cent (para 439 of the Provincial Committee's Report), this would give ample margin for working expenses and declaring a suitable dividend to shareholders. It may even contribute towards reduction of interest rates on loans at the time of renewals.

11 Some assistance from the Government will be necessary to ensure the success of the financing corporation. They will have to take the initiative in starting the institution and hold a preliminary enquiry to satisfy themselves that the debentures proposed to be issued by the corporation are adequately secured. The Government may also render direct financial help by themselves purchasing certain blocks of debentures and they may also undertake the supervision of the working of the corporation to keep within sound and safe lines. This would naturally increase the confidence of the general public in the proposed institution.

12 One development that may be expected is that the financial corporation would be in a position to influence loan offices to re-adjust or re-organise their affairs, or effect amalgamations. Thereby, they could be led to develop into commercial banking institutions adhering strictly to canons of sound banking practice. The establishment of warehouses and the adoption of other devices calculated to develop a bill market as recommended by the Committee would help greatly in the process.

13 The loan offices would act as agents of the corporation for collecting interest and instalments of the loans on the security of which the debentures would be issued. They may also be used for popularising industrial and land mortgage debentures; in fact, if our proposals regarding the financing of agriculture and industry work out successfully, the loan offices could be made, so far as Bengal is concerned, to fulfil further a very useful function. The facilities proposed to be provided through the corporation would, with the development of fresh lines of investment, enable a large number of loan offices to find an expanding field for their activities in short term finance.

14 I do not overlook the fact that, in the initial stages at least, the loan offices may have some difficulty in financing trade and industry owing to lack of experience. Such a contingency is inevitable in the initial stages of any enterprise but much of the difficulty may be obviated by the careful study of recognised methods of commercial banking, by the appointment of a special officer to act as advisor, and by consultation and conference among the loan offices themselves. Fresh avenues will have to be explored for the employment of the funds of the loan offices increasingly in the financing of trade, and progress in this direction would be accelerated by the corporation having a special department for the encouragement of such activities.

15 The management of the loan offices lies at present in the hands of directors who are mostly lawyers. However competent the present directors may be in their own profession, they generally lack commercial and banking experience. If, therefore, the loan offices are to develop on commercial lines, it is highly desirable that their management should be associated also with traders, merchants and *araddars* whose interests these banks should more and more tend to serve. This is necessary, also because such businesslike men at the head would be able to inspire confidence among the general public and would also tend to attract investments suitable for commercial banking.

16 It is probable that some of the loan offices would prefer to continue their present system of long-term investments in land. Though we have proposed elsewhere the formation of special land mortgage banks, with initial support from the Government, there can certainly be no objection to private joint-stock banks also undertaking similar activities. But, the experience of the existing loan offices definitely points to the inadvisability of utilising short term deposits for these purposes. It should, therefore, be clearly laid down that those of the loan offices which may decide to adopt a policy of long-term credits should have a corresponding volume of long-term deposits from their clients. If necessary, they should supplement their own funds—paid-up capital and reserves—by the issue of long-term debentures.

17 In this connection, it is also necessary to consider the feasibility of linking these loan offices to the provincial joint-stock land mortgage bank which I have advocated and which the committee has accepted. By this method, such loan offices as may lack sufficient funds, and also have not raised the necessary fund by their own debentures, would be enabled to find the funds for both their old and new requirements. The financing corporation recommended here may be amalgamated with the joint stock land-mortgage bank proposed for the big landowners and others if and when found necessary.

18 We have yet to consider a further category. Some of the smaller loan offices that may not be able as separate units to

conform to the conditions of the proposed Loan Offices Act, may yet be fit to combine into larger units, thenceforward developing on the lines of commercial banks as visualised in the previous paragraphs. But, I am sure that there will still be a demand for facilities for wage earners, salaried men and middle class people, for purposes for which it is not possible for the latter to approach the commercial banks and which make it necessary for them to resort to money-lenders. I suggest that many of these loan offices might develop along new lines, and would do well to follow the lead of the Friendly Societies and Building Societies of England, America and the British Dominions, a short description of which may be useful.

19 The Building Societies in the countries mentioned, perform a very useful social function in that while encouraging the movement for thrift among the middle class population, they help the latter in building, purchasing and redeeming houses. The extent of the benefit which these societies confer on the community can be best realised from their popularity. In 1928, there were in the United States about 13 thousand such societies with a membership of 12 millions and assets of 8,000 million dollars, while in 1929, in England more than one thousand societies with members numbering about a million and a half had about £300 million as assets. The earlier building societies were usually formed on co-operative principles, but later on the ordinary joint stock form of organisation has gained in popularity. The loan offices of Bengal, have so long been carrying on functions somewhat similar to those of the Building Societies of the West, and they will very easily be able to conform to such laws and regulations as may hereafter have to be formed for the purpose.

## · CHAPTER XIII.

### RURAL FINANCE—contd

#### MARKETING AND MOVEMENT OF CROPS.

##### GENERAL CONDITIONS.

266 The fact that India itself is the main market for her agricultural produce makes the marketing problem a very important factor in rural finance. From the Provincial Committees' reports, it may be computed that the value of total agricultural produce of British India amounts roughly to Rs 1,200 or Rs 1,300 crores. The pre-war figure for 1913-14 is given as Rs 1,100 crores roughly by Wadia and Joshi (*vide* Wealth of India, page 98). Out of it the value of the produce exported out of India amounts roughly to Rs 200 crores, if coffee, tea, vegetables and fruits are included in agricultural produce (figures are taken from Trade Review from 1928-29). This proportion, however, between internal consumption and export appears to be lower than that given in the statement submitted by the Indian delegates to the World Economic Conference of 1927. According to this statement, India's "total exports represent only 1/11th of her total production" (*vide* page 63 of the Report of the Conference). Notwithstanding this dependence of the Indian producer almost entirely on the internal market, we find—and our finding has the support of the Provincial Committees and other authorities—that there is no "orderly marketing" in India and that the Indian producer markets his produce under very disadvantageous conditions. The Royal Commission on Agriculture which recently investigated the matter say at pages 388 and 389 of their report —

"From all provinces we received complaints of the disabilities under which the cultivator labours in selling his produce in markets as at present organized. It was stated that scales, weights and measures were manipulated against him, a practice which is often rendered easier by the absence of standardised weights and measures and of any system of regular inspection. Deductions which fall entirely on him but against which he has no effective means of protest are made in most markets for religious and charitable purposes and for other objects. Large "samples" of his produce are taken for which he is not paid even when no sale is effected. Bargains between the agent who acts for him and the one who negotiates for the purchaser are made secretly under a



cloth and he remains in ignorance of what is happening. The broker whom he is compelled to employ in the larger markets is more inclined to favour the purchaser with whom he is brought into daily contact than the seller whom he only sees very occasionally

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The disabilities described in the preceding paragraphs can only be removed by the establishment of properly regulated markets and we hold that the establishment of such markets would confer an immense boon on the cultivating classes of India"

To the above catalogue may be added another disability, *viz*, that even after prices are settled, at the time of weighing the price is still further cut down by refusal to take delivery on the ground that the quality is inferior. The Madras Committee refer to the complaint that the bulk of tobacco grown in certain districts in Madras is bought by one firm for its own use, and that the ryots are said to be suffering from various disabilities such as waiting interminably at the place where the tobacco is inspected and purchased, and being offered in the end prices not always reasonable. Dr. Thomas in a dissenting minute has said that the attempts of the Committee at getting information from the Tobacco Company proved futile.

267 The conditions of external marketing of India's agricultural produce are not less disquieting. Several witnesses have stated before us that the reputation of Indian agricultural produce is very low. Dr. D. Clouston, who was deputed by the Imperial Council of Agricultural Research to the British Industrial Fair, recently reported his impressions to the Council. In his report dated the 25th March, 1930, he states —

"The reputation of Indian agricultural products in the world's markets is low. The price paid by consumers in Europe for these products is based very largely on that reputation and this reacts unfavourably upon the price received by these cultivators who have improved the quality of their produce."

Dr. Clouston proceeds to point out that India's high grade products are not sufficiently advertised and that therefore some of the firms in European markets hold that India cannot produce high grade wheat and other products. He also gives facts and figures to disprove this false notion and pleads for better organisation. The result is that the efforts made in India to improve the quality of agricultural produce by the introduction of improved methods and improved strains of seed bear no fruit, as the producer of pure and better qualities does not get a better price in the

markets The Royal Commission on Agriculture have stated the position in these words at page 398 of their report —

“The incentive to grow the improved varieties introduced by the agricultural departments is *pro tanto* diminished if the cultivator fails to obtain the full premium justified by their superiority over those ordinarily grown. Again, he has little incentive to market his produce in the best possible condition unless that condition is recognised in the price he gets for it.”

268 The foreign banking experts have pointed out\* the intimate relation that exists between the export market and the home market and have suggested that if steps are not taken to organize India's exports in such a way as to meet the modern requirements of world trade, there will be an inevitable reaction on the internal market to the great detriment of the cultivator. We are told that in other countries the banks engaged in the financing of the export trade render invaluable assistance by supplying their customers with information regarding the foreign markets and of the prevailing prices and that the existing institutions which finance the foreign trade of India which are almost entirely non-Indian have not taken any steps in this direction. Further even in articles like tea, coffee, and rice, in which India has a large export trade, we understand that there are no brands by which the Indian articles are known in the foreign markets. The defects due to want of standardization and organization are obvious.

269 These statements about the disabilities of the Indian producer in marketing his produce are more or less borne out by the several Provincial Committees' reports. A few extracts will suffice to illustrate the position.

### *Bengal*

The Bengal Committee have observed as follows in regard to lack of standards of quality —

“By far the greatest difficulty in marketing lies in the absence of definite standards of quality which often disorganises the jute market in Calcutta entailing enormous losses on the Indian merchants who import jute from the mofussil centres. Jute is generally classified into five grades or standards known as Nos 1, 2, 3, 4 and rejections. But the specifications with regard to length, gloss, colour and strength appertaining to each grade are made to vary from year to year and sometimes even in course of one single season.

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\* Appendix I, Enclosure XIV

This variation in the specifications is stated to be brought about in order to depress the prices. Sometimes the prices are brought down by another means without altering the specifications. When the season for jute opens the mills or rather their purchasers start buying operations on certain agreed specifications as to the standards of the different grades, but after the season advances a little, purchases of the top grades are suspended by a concerted action, with the result that later in the season the quality of jute which could have been tendered according to the agreed specification against a higher grade has in fact to be tendered against lower grades, for it could not be sold otherwise. Several witnesses have estimated the loss of the growers resulting from this variation of grade specifications, as amounting to several crores of rupees. The loss which arises from such manipulation of standards falls no doubt on the Indian jute dealers in Calcutta in the first instance, but we think that it is partially shifted over to the cultivators as well."

They therefore proceed to recommend "that the standards should be made definite by some special legislation on the lines of the American Cotton Standard Act, and that any difference arising between the buyers and sellers should be settled by a Statutory Arbitration Board, including representatives of both the parties." The matter is dealt with in paragraph 287 of our Report.

### *Bombay*

The Bombay Committee point out that some of the practices in unorganized markets such as fixing prices secretly and reduction of prices on the ground of alleged inferior quality, act to the detriment of the agriculturist. The Committee also refer to the diversity of measurements which makes it impossible for a cultivator or merchant to know whether he is getting the same price as is paid to cultivators and merchants elsewhere.

### *The Punjab*

The Punjab Committee report that the ordinary market is dominated by the trader, and the cultivator has no voice in the control of market arrangements, no say in the fixing of market dues, no representation on market *panchayats* and little or no means of ascertaining outside prices. In both villages and markets the

cultivator is defrauded by the use of inaccurate weights and scales. As an instance, it is stated that 42½ seers of cotton are taken to be equivalent to a maund. The Provincial Committee also examined 1407 scales and 5907 weights and found that out of these 69 per cent of scales and 29 per cent of weights were incorrect.

### *United Provinces*

The United Provinces Committee enumerate the following defects in marketing: the use of a variety of local weights and measures, false weighing, the levy of a number of incidental charges and imposts, the absence of grading and secret settlement of prices. In paragraph 261 of their report they refer to the practice in a novel form of the well-known evils of cornering and dumping; they say that there is some evidence to show that exporting firms are occasionally guilty of dumping agricultural produce to facilitate purchase at lower prices.

270 More than one Provincial Committee have adverted to the fact that the agricultural produce is forced on the market at certain periods in such a way that the farmers fail to obtain the best price. There seems to be little doubt that financial pressure—the need of ready money to meet rent, revenue and other seasonal charges and pressure from creditors—is one of the chief causes which impel farmers to release their produce in an overfed market for what it will fetch. In this connection it may be noted that the Punjab Committee recommend that the recovery of land revenue should not be effected at one and the same time throughout the province, but should be distributed over different areas in different months. How far this suggestion will help the cultivator has not been the subject of investigation elsewhere. The financial pressure to which the cultivator is subject also exhibits itself in the phenomenon that the cultivator in many cases sells, almost immediately after production, even such produce as is required for his consumption. He either buys it again in a dear market or obtains it by way of loan in kind from the village merchant or trader.

### FINANCE FOR MARKETING AND MOVEMENT OF PRODUCE

271 Some of the Provincial Committees have taken marketing to comprise the process of transporting and selling produce by the farmer and have distinguished it from trading which begins when the produce has been handed over to a merchant. But this distinction has not been observed by all the Committees and considerable overlapping is found between the sections dealing with marketing and internal trade. This is not surprising as strictly speaking marketing covers “all the activities involved from the time the product leaves the producer until it reaches the consumer”.

The essential and ordinary functions of marketing according to

the preliminary report of the International Institute of Agriculture and other writers on Agricultural economics are —

- (a) Collection and assembly
- (b) Transportation
- (c) Wholesale distribution
- (d) Retailing
- (e) Risk-bearing
- (f) Financing in all stages

*\*(a) Collection and assembly* —The cost of this function will be minimized by specialisation of agriculture in a district as opposed to diversification, by standardisation, and grading and uniform packing. The formation of co-operative sale societies by farmers will be useful in securing economy in these operations.

*(b) Transport* —Transport may fall into several stages of which the following may be mentioned —

- (i) from the rural areas to the railway station,
- (ii) from the railway station to the terminal point, and
- (iii) from the terminal point to the urban consignee

Some instances of how farmers economize in the first item are mentioned by the Provincial Committees. A large percentage of the cotton growers of Beiar bring the cotton in their own carts. In Buina, the cultivator often takes part in transportation and is paid for it. The third journey is usually in the hands of the wholesale and retail dealers who can reduce costs by increasing efficiency. The cost of the second journey is beyond the control of farmers, but large-scale collecting agencies, private or co-operative, may be able to secure cheaper rates than small disorganised groups of consignors. Costs can also be reduced by standardisation, grading and uniform packing. We have referred to the useful part that the railways can play in encouraging the movement of agricultural produce by giving concessional freight rates for its movement in Chapter IV.

*(c) Wholesale distribution* —The cost may be reduced by large-scale operations and by organisation of consumers' co-operative societies and by standardisation and grading.

*(d) Risk-bearing* —Fluctuations in prices give rise to important marketing risks and may be controlled by orderly marketing, by proper treatment of surpluses, by collection of agricultural statistics and dissemination of correct information to farmers and by tariffs and subsidies. Co-operative societies of producers may also regulate production.

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\*For the analysis of the various functions we are indebted to 'Agricultural Economics', by G. O'Brien.

Such fluctuations are violent and unnatural when in a market where forward trading is in vogue, large quantities are dealt in on paper without such sales being backed by actual commodities. Organized forward trading centres run on approved lines—with the approval of the governments concerned if necessary—would control such reckless operations. Raids, both bull and bear, in forward markets are undesirable in the interest of orderly marketing.

(e) *Financing* —This is as important as, if not more important than, any of the other marketing functions. The farmers require finance to enable them not to unload their stuff all at the same time and thus depress prices. The wholesale and retail dealers all require finance to carry on their functions.

272 Assuming the existence of a given price, the farmer's profit will be affected by the cost of all the marketing functions including the price paid for finance. We wish to emphasise that every part of the marketing process is a link in a continuous chain and that the strength of the chain depends on the strength of all its parts. The Provincial Committees have rightly dealt with all aspects of marketing so as to give a complete picture. When it comes to making recommendations, we as a Banking Committee are concerned only with one aspect of the subject, *viz*, finance. But we cannot deal with the question in a satisfactory manner without expressing our views on the other factors which promote orderly and profitable marketing of agricultural produce. Without attempting a detailed examination of these factors, we express our concurrence with the following recommendations of the Royal Commission on Agriculture in India, and the various Provincial Banking Enquiry Committees, for improving and organising agricultural marketing —

- (1) Improvement of transport facilities including rural communications. We must not be understood to mean that we recommend an indiscriminate substitution of bullock carts by motor lorries.
- (2) Lowering of railway freight rates and grant of other railway facilities.
- (3) Establishment of regulated markets under provincial legislation on the general lines of the Berar and Hyderabad (Deccan) Market Acts.
- (4) Standardization of weights and measures.
- (5) Adoption of measures to secure improved quality of produce by organization amongst buyers and traders, and to guard against adulteration.
- (6) Fixation of standards and grades of commodities.
- (7) Promotion of co-operative sale societies and other suitable organizations for purposes of sale.

- (8) Holding of auction sales by agricultural departments to ensure increased price to the cultivators who produce improved varieties. We advocate that the Government should not make any profit for themselves from such sales.
- (9) Carrying out of market surveys.
- (10) Appointment of expert marketing officers on the staff of the Agricultural Department who should be able to understand the language of the market and be conversant with the customs connected therewith.

We should, however, like to make a few observations in regard to some of the recommendations mentioned above. As regards railway facilities, we understand that there is no guarantee at present as to when a consignment of agricultural produce is likely to be delivered and that it often happens that by the time the articles are received at the place of destination the prices have gone down considerably. This uncertainty has to be guarded against by the traders and it is therefore not only cheap railway freights but also quick movement of produce that requires consideration at the hands of the railway authorities.

As regards standardization of weights and measures, we would invite the attention of Provincial Governments to Note 'G' in the Report of the Punjab Provincial Banking Enquiry Committee which gives the results of the enquiries made by the Board of Economic Enquiry into the accuracy of weights and scales in certain districts. We think that it is not only necessary for Provincial Governments to undertake legislation for standardizing weights and measures, but it is also incumbent upon them to see that everything is done to ensure that false weights and measures and consequent fraud are rooted out. It has been seriously complained that laxity in this matter has brought about a state of affairs where it is possible for a trader to make irregular profits by manipulating the weights and scales, using one set for buying and another for selling the produce.

Adulteration is undoubtedly an important factor which affects the market for, and the price of, the produce. The demand for Indian agricultural products will receive a serious set-back unless effective action is taken to prevent adulteration by every agency through whose hands they pass. With regard to the adulteration of milk and ghee, to the evils of which the Royal Commission on Agriculture have drawn pointed attention, the existing laws seem to be ineffective in so far as they penalize such adulteration only when the article used is mixed with things which are injurious to health. Adulteration of dairy products will drive away the genuine products out of the market and thus affect the dairy-farming industry.

273 We now proceed to treat in some detail the financial aspect of marketing. The first point which requires notice in this connection is the system of advances on crops which is prevalent in some parts of India and has a very intimate bearing on marketing. The general feature of this system is that in many places not only do the advances carry high rates of interest, but they also put the borrowers under an obligation to sell their produce for less than the anticipated market price. The following are some instances:

(i) In Orissa rice merchants sometimes make advances to the ryots direct. No interest is charged if there is a contract for delivery at a particular price and on a fixed date. But if the contract is for delivery at the market price at the time of delivery, interest at 12 to 18½ per cent is charged, or less if the quantity involved is large.

(ii) It is said to be a common practice in Madras for ryots to take loans on condition of repayment at the harvest. It is usual, where the lender is a shopkeeper or merchant, to have a stipulation that the crop shall be sold at a rate, sometimes pre-arranged, but more frequently at the prevailing market rate or 5 per cent less than the prevailing rate. In the case of the small ryot, this acts to the detriment of his interests as he has practically to agree to the merchant's terms. The more substantial ryot, on the other hand, can decide when to sell his produce, and as he has some knowledge of the market, he is able to secure a fair price for his produce.

(iii) In Bengal, in places where the system of *dadan* prevails, it is said that the cultivators cannot avail themselves of a free market for their produce. Sometimes, the advances carry interest from 24 to 75 per cent and the rate at which the grower binds himself to sell is often lower by 10 to 25 per cent than the anticipated market rate.

(iv) In Burma, it is stated that in one or two districts the lenders compel borrowers to sell the produce to them, but that generally the current market price is paid. The reason for the stipulation is said to be the lender's anxiety to prevent the borrower from spending his money before paying his debts.

(v) In the Bombay Presidency, money is advanced to the sugarcane growers on the security of the crop, with a condition that the *gur* must be sold through the money-lender. But sales are ordinarily effected by public auction and it appears the money-lender can secure by this system only the commission which would otherwise go to some other commission agent.

(vi) In Bihar and Orissa, two kinds of advances are in vogue in respect of sugarcane crops —

(a) Advances of a large amount per acre at a more advanced stage of growing, carrying interest at 12 per cent, and



- (b) Advances of a small amount per acre at an earlier stage of growing, carrying no interest, but counterbalanced by other advantages to the lender

In both cases the crop is to be delivered to the lender and the price is the rate of the season and the cultivator appears to get the fair market price

(vii) In the case of jute in Bihar and Orissa, when the price is low, the ryots take a small sum as earnest-money for which the lender who is the buyer of jute gets merely the first refusal. The producer is free to sell as and when he deems fit and is said to be well informed as to the Calcutta price and its probable trend. It is reported that the system of advances is no longer considered profitable to the lender and that its discontinuance is contemplated.

(viii) A system of advances carrying a liability to sell the produce through the lender is also reported among cotton and sugarcane growers and flower and ghee dealers in the United Provinces, and the producers are said to obtain for their produce less than they would have got if they had been free to market the produce themselves.

(ix) It is reported that in regard to marketing of cocoanuts, in 25 per cent of the sales in Bihar and Orissa, the growers are given advances which carry no obligation at all, but carry interest at 12 to 15 per cent per annum.

(x) Small planters in Coorg who have borrowed from local money-lenders do not get the market price, but only a definite percentage or amount below that price.

274 A second point brought out in the Provincial Reports relates to the effect of the cultivator's indebtedness on the marketing of his produce, even if the cultivator does not borrow specifically for raising the crop. The Bengal Committee report that the cultivator who is indebted is always pressed heavily by the creditor immediately after harvest, for the latter knows that if the debtor does not pay after selling his produce, it will not be possible for him to pay till the next harvest. The effect of this pressure is so great that the borrower is compelled to sell his produce as quickly as he can, and if all sell at the same time, the price naturally comes down by competition. The Punjab Committee think that in ordinary circumstances, the seller should naturally be prejudiced by being in debt to his dealer if only because equality cannot subsist between debtor and creditor, but the evidence before them suggests that the disadvantage to the seller is less than is generally supposed and that it tends to diminish with improved communications, spread of education and knowledge of market rates.

275 We have carefully considered the hardship caused to the cultivator by the practices referred to in paragraphs 273 and 274

above In the case of crops intended for export, adequate remedy for these evils will not be forthcoming until arrangements are made for orderly marketing But the organization of co-operative sale societies which can advance money to the cultivators and enable them to avoid being forced to sell their produce at unfavourable rates will go a great way to help the cultivators in the case of crops intended for internal consumption We therefore recommend that co-operative sale societies should be established wherever there are reasonable chances of their successful working We do not recommend that such societies should purchase their members' produce outright, but we recommend that they should continue the present practice of acting as agents to producers for the sale of their produce It is desirable for the present that these societies should deal only with the produce grown by the members, but if in any particular locality the society is competent to deal with non-members' produce, there cannot be any objection to such a course We shall refer to these sale societies again later on

276 The next point that may be noticed is the practice of the sale of standing crops It is said by the Bombay Committee that a small percentage of agriculturists sell their standing crops of cotton, either for want of money or for speculation The mango crop in Bombay is almost invariably sold when it is on the trees and sometimes even before it is actually seen in blossom The crop is usually purchased by contractors who pay part of the price immediately after the bargain is struck and the rest in instalments when the crop is gathered The same practice is reported in regard to marketing of oranges in Coorg We do not think that any useful action can be taken in this connection

277 We now come to one of the more important aspects of marketing finance, namely, the interest charges paid by the various middlemen for obtaining the necessary finance for moving the crops forward The following summary from the Provincial Committees' reports will be found interesting —

(1) *Assam* —Some *beparis* have their own capital but others are financed by bigger *beparis* and *aratdars* Occasionally cultivators with sound security, who lend to fellow villagers on condition of repayment by handing over of crop, borrow from Marwaris at 18 to 24 per cent to re-lend at higher rates The village *mahajans* who make advances to growers of produce work partly on their own capital, and partly on loans obtained at 9 to 12 per cent from Marwaris and other merchants in towns on the understanding that the former will make over their crop to the latter

(11) *Bombay* —Village or itinerant dealers in cotton, petty traders in tobacco and rice, and contractors for fruits and vegetables, get their finance mostly from town merchants, shroffs and commission agents and pay high rates of interest which compel them to offer

low prices to cultivators. The rate paid by traders in tobacco, for instance, varies from 18 to 24 per cent. Commission agents have to pay from 9 to 12 per cent to local bankers when they themselves have to borrow. A large class of merchants and traders, it is stated, now remain outside the sphere of business of the Imperial Bank of India and joint-stock banks owing to the following causes, *viz*, disinclination to pledge stocks with banks, rigidity of the regulations governing advances by banks against the security of goods in the godowns of banks and publicity given to such advances.

(iii) *Bengal* —The finance is generally supplied by traders who, in addition to providing their own capital, occasionally obtain loans from money-lenders and indigenous bankers on *hundis* in respect of produce which is exported. The mercantile firms of Calcutta finance the movement of produce through their purchasing agencies and branch offices in the mofussil centres. In the case of independent purchasers, the finance is furnished by the money-lenders or by *araddars*. The wholesale dealers of Calcutta obtain accommodation generally by borrowing on personal credit and they also grant credit to their clients in the same way. In rare cases railway receipts and bills of lading are used as security for advances by banking institutions.

(iv) *Burma* —Dealers are financed by Chettiyars. Dawson's Bank and the Imperial Bank of India on the security of agricultural produce. The rate of interest generally charged by Chettiyars is 12 to 24 per cent per annum, the usual rate in the busy season being 21 per cent. But in the case of advances required for the marketing of ground-nuts the interest charged varies from 15 to 30 per cent.

(v) *Bihar and Orissa* —The prevalent system of marketing finance is for the export houses and commission agents to raise money from their own banks or from the Bura Bazar at Calcutta and to finance the up-country traders or *goladars* who have no large capital of their own. The latter in turn finance the small *beparis* and village money-lenders who buy outright from the cultivators for cash or credit already advanced. As an illustration of the interest rates paid, it may be mentioned that in the case of lac, *arhatias* through whom *paikars* sell lac to factories, charge the *paikars* 12 to 24 per cent. The Calcutta *arhatias* to whom the factories sell their product offer the same kind of accommodation to the factories as the local *arhatias* give to *paikars*. The *goladars* and the big grain merchants are also occasionally assisted by the Imperial Bank of India and the joint-stock banks, but it is said that assistance is given on such strict conditions regarding security that it is rarely availed of. In one town the *goladars* were found willing to pay 9 per cent on advances from indigenous bankers rather than pay  $7\frac{1}{2}$  per cent to joint-stock banks.

(vi) *Central Provinces*—The middlemen in the Central Provinces are normally financed by the indigenous bankers and money-lenders, the rates of interest charged being  $37\frac{1}{2}$  per cent per annum. When advances are taken for the whole season, the rate is about 15 per cent. The wholesale merchants generally work with their own capital and if they want credit, they borrow from banks or indigenous bankers on the security of their goods, keeping these in the godowns of the lenders.

(vii) *Central Areas*—Commission agents in the *mandis* charge 6 to  $7\frac{1}{2}$  per cent to the bigger agriculturists and village dealers who store produce with them for short periods.

(viii) *Madras*—The middlemen supplement their resources by borrowing on short-term credit from joint stock banks, which discount *hundis* and bills, and from indigenous bankers and money-lenders, who lend money by discounting *hundis* and also on promotes or personal credit. Loans and cash credits can also be obtained from the Imperial Bank of India but two signatures are required on promotes in such cases by the Bank Act. The Imperial Bank of India also discounts *hundis* and grants loans on produce. A great deal of the produce loans is said to be in the hands of the Imperial Bank and the indigenous bankers do not appear to do much business on this basis. The reason is that the merchant can get loans from the Imperial Bank on this security at rates far below the ordinary lending rates of interest of the money-lenders. The urban co-operative banks also play a minor part and a few of the *mandis* which do ordinary banking business lend for this purpose. The indigenous bankers lend at higher rates of interest on personal credit.

(ix) *Punjab*—The commission agent works mainly with his own capital supplemented by deposits attracted from relatives and neighbours. The smaller agent obtains advances if required, from the bigger agents at 9 to 12 per cent interest. The larger commission agents borrow from the indigenous bankers and commercial banks at 6 to 9 per cent according to the security offered. When the security is grain, the rate is 7 to  $7\frac{1}{2}$  per cent. When it is house property, the rate is 9 per cent. In the slack season rates are lower and are 4 to 6 per cent. Large sums are now advanced by the Imperial Bank of India against produce, possession of which is taken. Before an advance is made, the applicant's financial position is carefully enquired into and also his general trustworthiness, and on the results of the enquiry a maximum credit limit is fixed and an advance is made. Generally, advances are allowed up to 75 per cent of the value in the case of grain and up to 70 per cent in the case of cotton. In the event of a fall in prices, the margins are maintained either by adding to the produce stored or by repaying a part of the loan. Advances against produce are also given by the Allahabad Bank, the Central Bank of India, the Punjab

National Bank and the Peoples Bank of Northern India. The last two find it difficult to compete with the rates charged by the Imperial Bank of India. The Amritsar Sugar and Grain Association also grants advances at rates of interest varying from  $5\frac{1}{2}$  to  $7\frac{1}{2}$  per cent and up to 80 per cent of the value of the produce. In addition, godown rent has to be paid. The Imperial Bank's rates for financing cotton in godowns are said to be higher than those for grain because money is dearer during the cotton season and insurance rates are higher, most of the insurance companies in fact refusing to insure cotton when stored in factory compounds. Consequently the Bank's advances are almost entirely confined to cotton stored outside the factory.

(x) *United Provinces* —The burden of marketing finance falls on the *pucca arhatia* who borrows from his *shroffs* or bank at rates depending on his financial position, the volume of his business, and his relations with the *shroffs* or bank. In the case of goods which he stores, he pledges them with banks or bankers. The methods of the indigenous bankers are found to be more favourable than those of organised banks, as the former are generally satisfied with a smaller margin and even forego it in some cases. They are also content to have merely the key of the godown in which the *arhatia* stores the goods, whereas the commercial banks want to put their own lock and sign-board over the godown.

278 The methods employed for obtaining financial accommodation also deserve mention —

(a) When goods are sent from one middleman to another, funds are generally drawn by means of *darshan hundis* which are either supported by railway receipts or are clean. Banks generally prefer *hundis* supported by receipts since their risk is thereby reduced, but some consignees insist on railway receipts being sent direct to them either as a matter of prestige or to take an advance to pay the *hundi* or to save demurrage. The use of usance bills has become less common in recent years.

(b) Some of the Provincial Committees report that the small *beparis* and village money-lenders who buy agricultural produce from the cultivators make their purchase mostly on a cash basis. If these *beparis* and money-lenders require any addition to their capital for this purpose, they in their turn get actual cash from urban centres from larger traders or urban money-lenders. This arrangement does not admit of a direct contact with the money market. If the use of *hundis* could be encouraged in connection with these transactions, such *hundis* might be discounted in the money market and the rates of interest paid

for accommodation for the movement of crops might thereby be lowered

279 After studying the position as presented in the reports of the various Provincial Banking Enquiry Committees, we have come to the following conclusions —

- (a) The popular belief that the middlemen and the small merchants perform no useful functions is erroneous. Most of the Provincial Committees have found that the charges made by them are not exorbitant.
- (b) We are told that the disinclination on the part of merchants and traders to pledge stocks with banks is gradually disappearing. We think that in their own interest merchants and traders should entirely abandon their present attitude and take all steps that are possible to use the liquid goods in their possession for getting cheaper accommodation from banks. It would be a great help to agriculture if joint-stock banks and the Imperial Bank of India would adopt a still more liberal policy in the matter of granting advances against agricultural produce in godowns.
- (c) Both in connection with advances by banks on the security of agricultural produce, and the promotion of the use of bills with a view to securing to the middlemen engaged in the trade financial accommodation at cheaper rates of interest, it is necessary to provide for facilities for storage accommodation in various parts of the country. If storage accommodation is provided in independent warehouses, receipts given by these warehouses may be used as credit instruments on which accommodation may be obtained. The provision of storage facilities would also give the cultivator and seller of produce more freedom to hold it up if the price were unsatisfactory or if any circumstances arose which made such a course desirable.

#### GODOWNS AND WAREHOUSES

280 We recommend that Provincial Governments should consider the desirability of advancing long-term loans at concessional rates of interest to co-operative societies to build godowns in centres which provide good markets. We are aware that in Madras the Provincial Government already grant loans for this purpose up to a limit of half the amount spent by the societies, not exceeding Rs 2,500 in each case. We are informed that only a few godowns have been constructed in this manner and that the slow progress is due to the fact that the rate of interest charged on loans by the Government is heavy and the charges for storage accommodation are high owing to the expensiveness of construction and its utilization for only a few months in the year. We suggest that the type

of godowns constructed in future may be on a less expensive scale consistent with safety and that where the godowns cannot be used for the whole year, the possibility of hiring a godown may be tried

281 We fully realize that the main difficulties in connection with storage and warehousing would be grading and mixing of stocks of different parties, though it is possible that this difficulty would not arise in the case of warehouses made use of by the larger merchants. We find it stated in the Report of the Punjab Provincial Banking Enquiry Committee that the cultivator has a rooted objection to pooling and that this objection alone is a serious obstacle to the scheme of warehouses. We feel, however, that experiments should be made at selected centres, and that the benefits of standardization, grading and pooling should be brought home to the agriculturist by this means and by propaganda and education, as the warehouse receipts would be welcomed in the money market and would be a very effective means for cheapening the rate for marketing finance. We should like to note that similar difficulties existed in Canada as late as 1907, but have been overcome by educative propaganda and experience of the services of warehouses. We, therefore, recommend that the question of providing warehouses by private agencies and licensing them, and the provision of capital for their construction, be taken up by Provincial Governments. The Imperial Council of Agricultural Research might also co-ordinate the efforts of the Provincial Governments in this matter which is materially connected with marketing, a subject coming within the purview of the work of the Council under its constitution. We reproduce in an annexure to this chapter a copy of the draft Bill of (the late) Mr B F Madon for the establishment of such warehouses. We commend the provisions of the draft Bill for the consideration of the Provincial Governments. We agree with the United Provinces Provincial Banking Enquiry Committee that provision should be made in any future legislation regarding warehouses to the effect that the warehouseman should not be permitted to deal in, or lend money, on goods of any kind which he receives in his warehouse, either in his own account, or that of others, to buy or sell others' goods on credit, or to act as a guarantor of such business. The object of this provision is to remove any temptation in the way of the warehouseman to tamper with the goods in his custody or to exercise undue influence on the depositor to sell his goods to him. We also suggest that in connection with any scheme for the establishment of warehouses, Provincial Governments should give careful attention to the following details —

(1) Any person who is licensed as a warehouseman should be of recognized integrity and should have business ability to run a warehouse. There should be a licensing board in each province for the grant of licences, which would consist of one Government

officer and a number of representatives of local business interests, including agriculture especially for up-country areas. Small local licensing boards may have to be appointed for some divisions of the provinces, e.g., Gujerat, Deccan, etc.

(n) The warehouseman should have a reasonably substantial capital. If on the other hand he hires the warehouse, he should deposit with Government a substantial amount, in cash or securities. The security deposit should, however, not be so exorbitant as to drive out private enterprise.

(m) In areas where grading of produce is done, it is necessary that there should be representatives of the growers on the licensing board. In such cases, Government should ensure the availability of trained and certified graders and the warehouseman will be required to employ only such graders.

(iv) All produce stored in the warehouse should be insured against fire and other accidents.

(v) The licensing authority should be empowered to decide among other things the following matters —

- (a) Classification of commodities into perishable and non-perishable articles, articles deteriorating with lapse of time and non-deteriorating articles, and the apportionment of the risk of damage between the warehouseman and the owner of the produce in regard to the class of articles.
- (b) The apportionment of risk between the warehouseman and the owner of produce of any damage arising from riots and civil commotion.

282 As some Provincial Banking Enquiry Committees have suggested that Government should examine the possibilities of starting railway warehouses in the chief centres of trade, we brought the suggestion to the notice of the Railway Board and also discussed the matter with their representatives. The Railway Board were also kind enough to furnish us with an estimate of the cost of provision and working of warehouses at certain selected railway centres. These will be found in Appendix III in the volume of Written Evidence. While the Railway Board state that they are anxious to do all in their power to help the trade of the country, they consider that the proposal for the establishment of railway warehouses would necessitate a detailed investigation so that the full implications might be made clear. In view of the importance of the subject from every point of view we should urge upon the Government that a detailed investigation of the problem in all its aspects should be undertaken by the Railway Board and that the railways should be asked to start experiments at selected centres, as we believe that such experiments will be of considerable benefit to the country.



We also discussed with the representatives of the Railway Board the question of the railways allowing private enterprise to provide and work warehouses in the vicinity of railway stations and we have been kindly furnished by the Railway Board with a copy of the terms of the lease that would be acceptable to the railways. The Railway Board's letter furnishing these details is also included in the Appendix referred to above. There are two items in those terms which, from the point of view of promoting private enterprise in the direction desired by us, seem to call for some remarks. It is stated that on the termination of the lease any buildings, works, etc., upon the land leased may be purchased by the Railway administration, and if not so purchased, should be pulled down and the material removed from the land by the lessee at his own expense within two months. We consider this most unsuitable for promoting private enterprise and that, at a minimum, the terms should be altered somewhat on the following lines —

If the lease is terminated by notice given by the Railway administration, any building on the land constructed by the lessee shall be purchased by the Railway administration at the current market price of the building, to be valued by an impartial party in case of difference between the Railway administration and the lessee. On the other hand, if the notice is given by the lessee himself, and the Railway administration are not willing to purchase the building themselves as above, the lessee would be at liberty to sell the building to any other person subject to the approval of the Railway Board which approval shall not be withheld unreasonably.

Where railway land is not available and a warehouse is provided on privately owned land at some distance from the railway goods-shed, it is stated that a railway siding, if practicable, will be provided on the usual "assisted siding" terms. In view of the importance to the agriculturist and the trader of the provision of accommodation for the storage of their produce, we trust that the terms for the provision of the railway siding will be more favourable than the usual "assisted siding" terms.

283 The subject of railway warehouses leads us naturally to a consideration of the question of railway receipts, *i.e.*, receipts granted by the railways for the transport of goods from one place to another. In connection with the marketing of produce, we have referred to the use to which these railway receipts are put. They are either attached to the *hundis* or drafts on the purchaser of the goods, or are sent to the consignee to enable him to raise an advance on the security of the receipts with which to pay the *hundis* or drafts when they arrive. At present these receipts are not negotiable or transferable. They do not give either a

full or a correct description of the goods. They are not also in the same position as bills of lading as, with the passing of the Indian Contract Act, the provision of the Factors Act making pledge of documents of title to goods equivalent to the pledge of goods has been abrogated. The decision\* of Justice Waller of the Madras High Court clearly enunciates that banks do not get safe security in the shape of a railway receipt which is endorsed to them. Without going into all the legal complications involved in the interpretation of the sections of the Indian Contract Act and the new Sale of Goods Act, we recommend that a railway receipt should be placed by the legislature on the same footing as a bill of lading. This will dispense with various devices that have been suggested to make the railway receipt a valid security, such as the pledgor addressing a letter to the railway company advising the company that he has transferred his interest in the goods to a bank, the bank in forwarding the pledgor's letter instructing the railway company to hold the goods to its order and the railway company being prepared to accept such instructions. We also recommend that railway receipts be made negotiable and that the railway authorities should issue instructions that the receipt should give as full a description as possible of the goods covered by it.

#### MARKETING BOARDS

284 We are indebted to Mr A. P. McDougall, one of the foreign banking experts, for an interesting memorandum on 'Marketing'. Two suggestions in that memorandum have impressed us considerably. They are the establishment of a marketing board and of a jute control corporation. Mr McDougall recommends a central marketing board with provincial branches. We regret we cannot accept this suggestion in the precise form in which it has been put by Mr McDougall, as such an arrangement would not fit in with the constitution. The marketing boards should, in our opinion, be on a provincial basis and proposals for their establishment should be examined by Provincial Governments in connection with the creation of regulated markets by provincial legislation as recommended by the Royal Commission on Agriculture.

The marketing board will have many important duties to perform. It would be one of its functions to bring about the co-operation of the various interests in the building of godowns and warehouses throughout the province. In consultation with the co-operative authorities, the board would assist and support the promotion of co-operative marketing. The board might also help in the marketing of products of cottage industries. It will be one of the main duties of the board to make a survey of the conditions which govern the marketing of the various products from the ryot to the final market. In fact by

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\* Judgment delivered on the 7th January 1930 in *Official Assignee of Madras versus Mercantile Bank of India*.

standardising and organising the country's supplies of agricultural produce, the marketing board would help the agriculturist to get a full and adequate return for his production. The marketing surveys that we have recommended will be made under its supervision, and the marketing officer, we have proposed, will be closely associated with this board.

285 We realize the necessity for some agency to co-ordinate the activities of the provincial marketing boards particularly in the case of agricultural produce which is intended for export from the country, but, as stated above, we do not consider it desirable, to set up any Central Marketing Board with administrative control over the provincial boards. Such assistance as may be given by way of advice and research may usefully be furnished by the Imperial Council of Agricultural Research and we understand that the Council intend to have a separate section to deal with these problems. If it is found later that the work of this separate section has grown and a separate department is necessary, we have no doubt that that department will come as a matter of course.

#### JUTE CONTROL CORPORATION

286 Mr McDougall has also recommended the establishment of a jute control corporation. He considers that jute is the only crop of any magnitude which under the existing conditions lends itself to such a form of control as would ensure a stabilized price to the grower. The corporation would have "powers to fix prices for the raw material, to eliminate unnecessary costs of distribution to control output, and if necessary to undertake distribution and effect all payments". It should have a capital provided by the Provincial Governments in the jute-growing areas and its management should be in the hands of a directorate constituted on certain prescribed lines so as to include representatives of all the interests concerned. For further details of the working of the scheme, we would refer to Mr McDougall's memorandum. We have given considerable time and thought to the consideration of this proposal for the stabilization of price and the regulation of production of jute. We admit that there are several good points in the scheme but without consulting all the interests involved in a proposal of this kind it is not possible for us to support the particular scheme or to put forward an alternative one. We recommend that the Governments concerned should examine the matter in the light of Mr McDougall's proposals and introduce an arrangement which may be suitable for all interests affected. We also consider that in any scheme which may be evolved in the future, the following points may be considered —

- (1) The share capital of the corporation should not be wholly subscribed by Government but should come from the producers, the business interests and the State, the share of the State being gradually diminished as the other interests can replace it.

- (2) The settlement of a fair price for the produce cannot be left to the management of the corporation but there should be an independent and impartial body to undertake this task
- (3) The producers must under any circumstances have adequate representation on the management of the corporation so that their interests in it may properly be safeguarded
- (4) We do not approve of the scheme of representation suggested by Mr McDougall in the constitution of the board, and we particularly hold that there is no need for representation for overseas interests. The details of the composition of the board will have to be worked out in connection with the scheme as a whole and steps will have to be taken to ensure that no particular interests preponderate on the board and to provide for the representation of the State, if necessary
- (5) For the successful working of the corporation, it is necessary that both its constitution and its functions should be provided for by statute
- (6) It is essential to have a preliminary survey of jute production in the three provinces of Bengal, Bihar and Orissa and Assam
- (7) The question whether in case of restriction of jute any lands which are released from jute can be used for growing other crops is a matter which will require the attention of the local Governments which will, if necessary, consult the Imperial Council of Agricultural Research
- (8) The Jute Committee recommended by the Royal Commission on Agriculture, which we have reason to believe will be appointed in the immediate future, will no doubt deal with these and other matters

287 In paragraph 269 we have quoted from the report of the Bengal Provincial Banking Enquiry Committee their opinion that the absence of fixed standards results in considerable loss to growers of jute. We consider it important that early steps should be taken to remove this disability, and we should like to observe that it is one of the principal reasons why we advocate the establishment of a jute corporation on sound lines as early as possible. We recognize, however, that even if prompt action is taken by the Governments concerned in the matter, it will take some time before the scheme materialises. In view, however, of the great importance to the producer that the standards should be fixed as early as possible, we further recommend that the local Governments concerned should take prompt steps for the fixation of pro-

per standards of jute These standards may be revised later on when a corporation, on the management of which both the buyers and producers will be represented, comes into existence

288 The Bengal Committee have pointed out that the East India Jute Association has been established with a view to impart a steady tone to the movements of the price of jute but that its present constitution and working have not achieved the purpose The Committee have, therefore, recommended that a properly organised futures market should be established by legislation We think, however, that if action in the direction contemplated in the preceding paragraphs is taken, there will be no necessity for considering the recommendation of the Provincial Committee

#### CHAMBERS OF AGRICULTURE

289 We have, in the previous chapters referred at many places to the unorganized state of agricultural finance, production, and marketing We are strongly of opinion that the producer should have a *forum* in which agricultural opinion on all these matters is focussed and crystallised into well-thought out programmes for the advancement of the industry In many countries, e.g., Germany, the agriculturists meet in Chambers of Agriculture for discussion of questions of common concern We are impressed with the need for the establishment of such Chambers and the usefulness of their activity We consider that such Chambers of Agriculture might, with considerable advantage, be established on a provincial or regional basis

#### CO-OPERATIVE SALE SOCIETIES

290 The following statement gives some statistics regarding membership and capital of the co-operative sale societies as on the 30th June 1930 \*

	Number of Socie- ties	Member- ship	In thousands			
			Share Capital and Reserve	Depo- sits	Loans	Total Working Capital
			Rs	Rs	Rs	Rs
Ajmer Merwara .	2	140	10	1	27	38
Assam	2	131	2		8	10
Bengal	108	31,606	8,18	68	39,40	48,26
Bihar and Orissa	2	50	3	..	3	6
Bombay	81	15,142	6,14	2,91	6,03	15,08
Burma	31	2,141	2,51	30	1,20	4,01
Central Provinces	7	775	19	52	12	83
Delhi	Not furnished separately					
Madras	73	5,261	120	9	3,61	4,90
North-West Frontier Province	Not furnished separately					
Punjab	26	4,765	401	1,39	1,84	724
United Provinces	42	2,436	20	10	24	54

\* The dates vary with reference to the Co operative year in each province ; the latest figures available are given

291 According to the reports of Provincial Committees the position in regard to the growth and success of these societies is as follows

(i) *Assam* —In order to create a favourable market for the grower of jute, the Nowgong Co-operative Sale Society was started in 1927. The business was not a financial success owing to insufficient capital, lack of business experience on the part of the management, inability to grant advances to cultivators to extricate themselves from the grip of the Marwaris, and, finally, disloyalty on the part of the members.

(ii) *Bombay* —On the 31st March 1929 there were 28 cotton sale societies and 31 other sale societies and the total value of produce sold through them was over Rs 730 lakhs for the year 1928-29. We are told that the societies have been successful. The cotton societies supply seed to members, arrange for ginning and grading with the assistance of the Agricultural Department and for sale by auction or by private treaty. As a further step in marketing, ginning factories have been started and their work has been co-ordinated with the sale societies. It is said that no difficulty has been felt in regard to the supply of finance. Some societies levy a fine for disloyalty on the part of members.

(iii) *Bengal* —Co-operative sale societies have been established in many centres in Bengal, dealing in commodities like paddy and jute but, with rare exceptions, they have not yielded the expected results. The jute sale societies have resulted in failure.

(iv) *Bihar and Orissa* —Two experiments were made in co-operative marketing in Bihar and Orissa and both of them resulted in disastrous failures.

(v) *Central Provinces* —Experiments made in co-operative sale societies or *adat* shops have not met with much success. Their number on 30th June 1929 was 5 and the total membership 296 and the value of business about Rs 15,000. The Registrar's report for the latest year available shows that there is a clear indication that these institutions stand a better chance of success if the grading of cotton is regularly introduced as is the case in similar societies in Bombay. More intensive propaganda is also said to be necessary for popularising the co-operative sale societies.

(vi) *Madras* —Many attempts were made, some were successful and some proved failures. Four co-operative sale societies have been started for cotton. They are in their infancy. The total paid-up share capital of these societies amounts only to less than Rs 30,000. They are said to be a success in the limited scale in which they are carried on. The ryots are allowed to put their cotton in the godown, take advances on them and have them graded and sold. In the case of planting produce, it is said that "there is too much disparity between the big and the little to enable them to combine readily."

(vii) *Punjab* —In the Punjab, the number of societies at the time of the Committee's report was 25 and the value of produce sold through them Rs 58 lakhs in 1928-29. It is said that 37 per cent of the produce sold was on account of non-members. It is also urged that these societies make little appeal to the small holder, and most members are lukewarm in their support and many do not use them at all for the sale of their produce. Reliable and suitable managers are not easy to secure and embezzlements are not infrequent. The financial position of the societies in the canal colonies is said to be sound, and very little advantage is reported to be taken of the storage facilities offered by commission shops though they are mostly prepared to advance up to 75 per cent of the value at  $9\frac{3}{4}$  per cent.

(viii) *United Provinces* —There has been no progress in the direction of introducing co-operative sale societies.

292 We have already pointed out the directions in which co-operative sale societies can introduce economies in marketing costs. We agree with the Provincial Committees that the success of such societies depends upon four factors —

(i) There should be a margin between the lowest and the highest price during the period for which the product can be stored, sufficient to cover wastage, interest and management charges and still leave an appreciable economy.

(ii) The management of the societies should be entrusted to managers with local knowledge and commercial experience.

(iii) There should be loyalty among the producers strong enough to keep them from the temptation of seizing opportunities of larger profits by selling elsewhere, or from deserting the society on the first appearance of loss.

(iv) The society should get a fair share of the turnover in the area in which it operates.

293, On the whole, we think that there is much scope for improving and extending the existing machinery and that with a clear line of advance and with sound and competent guidance, co-operative marketing is full of possibilities for the future. We may observe in this connection that the Economic Depression Enquiry Committee in Madras has recommended the organisation of more co-operative sale societies for all kinds of agricultural produce, especially commercial crops, and has urged that Government should give liberal grants to such societies for the construction of godowns. We also consider that Provincial Governments should not hesitate to make advances to co-operative banks at concessional rates of interest for the development of co-operative sale societies.

## POSSIBILITY OF POOLS

294 The Bihar and Orissa Committee point out that the pool involves an agreement among individual producers not to sell except at prices agreed on by the whole body of producers acting through an association, but it does not necessarily imply the physical collection of the products in one or more storage centres. They say that this form of organization is already working successfully among the indigo growers in North Bihar and the success of the organisation is due to the fact that the number of growers does not exceed 200 in all and that they are well educated men with long experience of their business. The Committee add that there is no agricultural product in that province which at present holds out much hope of similar organisation and that no one has come forward to advocate the idea of stimulating the formation of pools. Other Committees are of opinion that pools are not a practical proposition in India at present. One Committee doubt if the agriculturist will gain anything in the long run by forming a pool, and are of opinion that pools will lead to clash of interests and unhappy disputes.

295 We have already referred to the possibility of establishing a jute control corporation to control the production and stabilize the prices of jute. We do not think it is possible to take similar action in regard to any other produce at present.

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## ANNEXURE

*Draft Bill by the late Mr B F Madon, for the Encouragement of the Establishment of Independent Warehouses*

The establishment of independent warehouses for the principal staple products of India is a necessary corollary to the establishment of the Reserve Bank of India. There is a wide-spread feeling that adequate financial facilities are not available for Indian products whether raw products or manufactures, and there is an impression that this is due to present banking resources of India being under the control of foreign exchange and other banks, and that these banks are partial to foreign products or to Indian products destined for foreign countries, and devote their resources to such products only. This impression has led to great hopes being built on the future Reserve Bank for satisfactory facilities for the finance of Indian products in view of its great resources, but it is not appreciated that the real difficulty is not the partiality or otherwise of the exchange or other banks, but the want of some system by which goods and merchandise can be taken in pledge by banks on satisfactory lines. It will be readily understood that goods in the possession of the borrower himself cannot form a satisfactory security for advances on such goods, and that what is wanted is goods stored in warehouses under independent ownership, as warehouse receipts issued by such independent owners for goods lodged with them will give the necessary security to bankers, without requiring them to enter into physical possession of the same. It is Bills made against such goods that form the kind of Bills that a Reserve Bank can safely discount, and, as will be seen from the provisions of the Reserve Bank Bill, it is only through rediscount of such Bills that the vast resources of the Reserve Bank can be placed at the service of Indian produce and Indian manufactures. Such independent warehouses are practically non-existent in India and for the satisfactory working of our financial machinery it is essential that such warehouses should be brought into existence. To provide such independent warehouses, sufficiently large to meet the requirements of trade in such big centres as Bombay and Calcutta, and equipped on the most up-to-date lines for the handling of merchandise efficiently and economically, will call for a great outlay of capital, and it may fail to give an adequate return for some years in view of the present practice of merchants of storing their goods in their own godowns. It is confidently anticipated, however, that the advantages offered by such warehouses to both borrowers and bankers will come to be rapidly appreciated, and not many years will pass before every inch of space in such warehouses will be called for. It is feared, however, that until a few such warehouses prove a success and give an adequate return to

the investor, capital in this country, usually so shy, will not be forthcoming for the building of such warehouses. It is accordingly proposed that a guarantee of a moderate dividend be given by Government in order to bring into existence this very essential link in the fabric of India's financial organization. It is further proposed to create some machinery for inspection and supervision of warehouses that may wish to be licensed under the terms of this Act. Such machinery is necessary because the warehouse receipts are to form the basis for advances of large sums of money by bankers, and they would like to feel secure about such advances. Any attempt at supervision by them, however, is likely to be resented as due to suspicion of the honesty or the solvency of the warehouseman or the borrowing customer, while supervision by an impartial authority created for that purpose by Government is not likely to raise any such suspicions and may even be welcomed as inspiring greater confidence in warehouses subject to such supervision.

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*Draft of a Bill to encourage the establishment of independent Warehouses in India and provide for their proper supervision and control*

Whereas it is expedient to encourage the establishment of independent Warehouses in India, and arrange for their proper supervision and control, it is hereby enacted as follows —

- 1 (1) This Act may be called the Indian Licensed Warehouses Act
- (2) It shall extend to the whole of British India and shall come into force from —
- 2 In this Act, unless there is anything repugnant to the subject or the context
  - (a) "warehouse" will mean every building, structure or other protected enclosure in which any raw produce or manufactures are stored,
  - (b) "person" will include two or more persons acting in partnership or a Company registered under the Indian Companies Act, 1913,
  - (c) "warehouseman" means a person lawfully engaged in the business of storing goods and merchandise including agricultural produce,
  - (d) "receipt" means receipt issued by the proprietor of a warehouse for goods entrusted to him for storage
- 3 The Governor General in Council may on application to him issue to any warehouseman a Licence for the conduct of a warehouse or warehouses in accordance with this Act and such rules and regulations as may

be made hereunder, provided that such warehouse is found suitable for the storage of the goods or merchandise named in the Application for Licence and the warehouseman agrees to comply with and abide by all the terms of this Act and the rules and regulations made in pursuance of the same,

Provided further that each such Licence shall be on such terms and for such period as the Governor General in Council may deem fit and such Licence may be renewed extended or modified from time to time at the discretion of the Governor General in Council

- 4 The Governor General in Council is hereby authorised—
  - (a) upon application of any person for a Licence to inspect or cause to be inspected the warehouse or warehouses contemplated in such application,
  - (b) at any time and from time to time to order inspection of any warehouse or warehouses licensed under this Act,
  - (c) to determine whether warehouses already licensed or for which licences may have been applied for are suitable for the proper storage of the particular class of goods or merchandise contemplated in the Licence or Application for Licence,
  - (d) to classify warehouses licensed under this Act according to ownership, location, construction, surroundings, capacity and other qualities,
  - (e) to prescribe within the limitations of this Act the duties of the warehouseman conducting warehouses licensed under this Act,
  - (f) to suspend and if necessary to revoke any licence granted under this Act for any breach of the provisions of this Act or of the rules and regulations made hereunder
- 5 The Governor General in Council shall be entitled to collect a reasonable fee for examination, or inspection, of any warehouse that is the subject of an application for a Licence under this Act and shall also be entitled to collect a fee of not exceeding Rs per annum for each licence or renewal thereof under this Act
- 6 The Governor General in Council may upon presentation of satisfactory proof of competency issue to any person a Licence to inspect sample and/or classify any agricultural product or products stored or to be stored in a warehouse licensed under this Act according to

condition, grade or otherwise and to weigh the same and to certify the weight thereof upon condition that such person agrees to comply with and abide by the terms of this Act and the rules and regulations prescribed hereunder so far as the same may relate to him

- 7 The Licence of any such person licensed under clause 6 may be suspended or revoked by the Governor General in Council if he is satisfied that such Licensee has failed correctly to inspect, sample, classify or weigh any agricultural product or products or has violated any of the provisions of this Act or of the rules and regulations made hereunder or has used his Licence or allowed it to be used for any improper purpose whatsoever
- 8 Every warehouseman conducting a warehouse licensed under this Act shall receive for storage therein so far as its capacity permits any goods or merchandise of the kind customarily stored therein by him which may be tendered to him in a suitable condition for warehousing in the usual manner in the ordinary course of business without making any discrimination between persons desiring to avail themselves of warehouse facilities
- 9 Every person who deposits goods or merchandise including raw agricultural products in a warehouse licensed under this Act shall be deemed to have deposited the same subject to the terms of this Act and the rules and regulations prescribed hereunder
- 10 For all goods and merchandise including agricultural products stored in a warehouse licensed under this Act original receipts shall be issued by the warehouseman conducting the same but no receipt shall be issued for any such goods and merchandise or agricultural products unless the same are actually stored in the warehouse at the time of issuance thereof
- 11 Every such receipt shall embody the following particulars namely—
  - (a) location of the warehouse,
  - (b) date of issue of receipt,
  - (c) consecutive serial number of receipt,
  - (d) statement whether the subject-matter of the receipt is deliverable to bearer or to a specified person or to his order,
  - (e) rate of storage charges,

- (f) marks, number and weight of packages received provided however that where it is some agricultural product in bulk the description and quantity thereof shall suffice,
  - (g) the class and grade of any agricultural product received for storage where the depositor wishes it to be shown on such receipt in which case it shall be as certified by a person licensed under clause 6 of this Act,
  - (h) a statement that the receipt is issued subject to this Act and the rules and regulations made hereunder,
  - (i) if the warehouseman is owner or joint owner of any goods, the subject matter of such receipt a statement to that effect,
  - (j) a statement of the amount of advance made to the depositor or any other liability by the depositor due to the warehouseman for which he claims a lien provided however that where the precise amount cannot be ascertained at date of issue of such receipt a statement that lien is claimed will suffice,
  - (k) such other terms and conditions as may be laid down by the Governor General in Council in this behalf,
  - (l) signature of the warehouseman or of some person duly authorised by him and the number of his Licence.
- 12 So long as an original receipt issued under this Act is outstanding and uncanceled by the warehouseman himself no other or further receipt shall be issued in respect of the same goods, merchandise or produce, provided however that in case a receipt is lost or destroyed a fresh receipt may be issued in identical terms and bearing the same date and number as the original on satisfactory security being given by the person asking for such duplicate on lines laid down in the rules and regulations made in pursuance of this Act
- 13 Upon demand made by the holder of any such receipt and offer to surrender such receipt with such endorsement if negotiable as may be necessary and upon readiness to satisfy the warehousemen's lien and/or charges, and give proper acknowledgment or discharge, the warehouseman shall forthwith deliver the goods that may be the subject matter of such receipt provided however that all such receipts that come back into his hands duly discharged shall be forthwith cancelled by the warehouseman and preserved on his

record for at least three calendar years from date of such discharge

- 14 Every warehouseman licensed under this Act shall keep in a place of safety complete and correct records of all agricultural products stored therein and withdrawn therefrom and of all receipts issued by him and of receipts returned and cancelled and shall conduct the warehouse in all respects in compliance with this Act and the rules and regulations made thereunder
- 15 Every licensed warehouseman shall report to the Governor General in Council the condition of his warehouse or warehouses, and the contents, operation and business thereof in such form and at such times as the Governor General in Council may require
- 16 The Governor General in Council may cause an inspection or examination to be made of any warehouse licensed hereunder and of the goods stored therein and of the books and records thereof at any time by person or persons appointed by him in that behalf
- 17 Whenever as a result of such examination it is found that a warehouseman is not conducting his warehouse in accordance with this Act or the rules and regulations made hereunder or that he is charging unreasonable and exorbitant rates the Governor General in Council may order his Licence to be suspended and if satisfactory explanation of the breach of this Act or of the rules and regulations made hereunder is not forthcoming may order such Licence to be revoked
- 18 The Governor General in Council may order to be published in the *Gazette of India* the result of any investigations under Clause 3 or under Clauses 16 and 17 There shall also be published in the *Gazette of India* the names and locations of warehouses licensed hereunder with the names and addresses of the Licensees as also a list of all licences revoked or terminated under this Act and the reasons therefor
- 19 The Governor General in Council shall from time to time make such rules and regulations as may appear to him advisable for the proper carrying out of the provisions of this Act
- 20 Every person who shall forge, alter, counterfeit, simulate or falsely represent or otherwise unlawfully use any Licence issued by the Governor General in Council under this Act or shall issue or utter a false or fraudulent receipt or certificate and every person who shall without lawful authority convert to his own use or use for the purposes of securing a loan or remove

from a Licensed Warehouse contrary to this Act or the rules and regulations made hereunder any goods or merchandise stored or to be stored in such warehouse and for which Licensed Receipts have been or are to be issued shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanour and shall upon conviction be liable to a fine not exceeding ten thousand rupees or double the value of the goods or merchandise involved whichever is the greater or imprisonment for a period not exceeding twelve months or both at the discretion of the Court and the owner of the goods or merchandise so converted used or removed may in the discretion of the Governor General in Council be reimbursed out of the fines so collected to the extent that he may not otherwise have been reimbursed

- 21 Any person who shall with intent to deceive draw a false sample or shall wilfully mutilate or falsely represent a sample drawn under this Act or shall classify grade or weigh fraudulently any agricultural products stored or to be stored under the provisions of this Act shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanour and upon conviction be liable to a fine of rupees five hundred or imprisonment for three months or both, in the discretion of the Court
- 22 It shall be open to the Governor General in Council to offer an inducement to the establishment of Licensed Warehouses as contemplated in this Act by way of grant of land free or at a nominal rental or by a subsidy towards the cost of construction or by guarantee of reasonable return on the total capital invested or in any other way that may appear most suitable to the Governor General in Council in such place or places and on such terms and conditions as may appear desirable to the Governor General in Council provided however that where the inducement to be offered is a guarantee of a reasonable return on capital it shall not exceed a return of more than five per cent per annum and provided further that where any payment by the Governor General in Council becomes necessary under any such guarantee a separate account shall be kept of the same and Government shall be entitled to one-half of all earnings of any warehouse so guaranteed in excess of a return of six per cent on the capital invested until the amount paid to such warehouse in order to implement the guarantee given to it and standing at the debit of such separate account shall have been entirely wiped off

## CHAPTER XIV.

### RURAL FINANCE-- *contd.*

#### RURAL AND COTTAGE INDUSTRIES

29, It will be convenient to confine ourselves in this chapter to the problem of financing of cottage and rural industries which more appropriately come under the head of "village and domestic industries" providing subsidiary occupations to the agriculturists. The other types of rural industries of the ordinary factory type located in rural areas and which are more or less organized industries are more conveniently dealt with in the chapter dealing with industrial finance, along with major industries. The Provincial Committees have mentioned among cottage and rural industries of the "village and domestic type" handloom weaving, silk, gold and silver thread, brass-ware, bell-metal, bidī and cheroot-making, mat-making, gur-making hand hulling, extraction of oil in the village oil press, dairy farming and the work of the village artisans generally.

297 The first question that presents itself in this connection is whether the agriculturist has the requisite leisure profitably to pursue one or other of these small industries with a view substantially to add to his income from agriculture. On this question the Royal Commission on Agriculture have expressed themselves in these words: "A prominent feature of Indian agriculture is the amount of spare time which it leaves to the cultivator. This varies very greatly according to the local agricultural conditions, but it may be assumed as a broad generalisation that by far the greater number of cultivators have at least from two to four months of absolute leisure in the year. The methods of bringing within the cultivator's reach industrial opportunities to fill up his spare time must vary with local circumstances. As agriculture in the greater part of India cannot offer employment for the whole of the year, the problem is to suggest lines of work which can suitably be undertaken by the cultivator or his family in their spare time and without detriment to the cultivation of their land." We agree with the Royal Commission and with most of the Provincial Banking Committees, and hold that by far the greater number of agriculturists in India have the time at their disposal to pursue profitably one or other of the small village and domestic industries with a view to add to the income from agriculture. The Royal Commission proceed to discuss (1) the industries pursued by village artisan, (2) the handloom, pottery and rope-making industries, (3) sericulture, (4) poultry rearing, and (5) lac industry. Apart from



the provision of finance the factors that tend to encourage the development of these industries are, in the opinion of the Commission (1) development of new ideas such as the supply of attractive patterns, (2) careful and thorough instruction in modern processes, and (3) finding of markets in and outside the locality. The Commission have said that these forms of assistance would best be given by Co-operative and Industries Departments to artisans organized on the co-operative basis. We are informed that steady and strenuous diffusion through specially created services of advice, information and education has achieved much in the development of rural industries in Germany and certain other countries. The following quotation from the United Provinces Committee's Report is relevant in this connection: "Much can be achieved by State aid and supervision as German experience proves. In that country, thanks to the State's economic policy, small scale industries employ about two-fifths of the population and more than 90 per cent of the industrial establishment \* \* \* \* \*

Many industries, however, were "created" by State-aided action, for example, watch-making in Saxony and the making of pencils in Bavaria. Thus, new industries have been introduced on a large scale in those districts where such introduction was most advantageous. A system of farming combined with industry, which gives regular employment throughout the year, enables the agricultural countries of Europe to maintain a density of 200 to 300 persons to the square mile. In our province where the density is from 500 to 900 in the river valleys, and where agriculture cannot normally employ the population for more than 7 months in the year, the need for rural industries as subsidiary occupation to agriculture is far greater. For a stay-at-home population like ours, enforced idleness during a year of scarcity is a paradox, which indicates the lack of balance of occupations in the Indian village which Famine Commissions have repeatedly sought to remedy."

298 The next question that confronts those engaged in the promotion of village and domestic industries is what the chances are of success of the rural industries and whether they can really stand competition with the organized factory industries. In recent years the Provincial Governments have set up special departmental agencies to make a careful survey of the various cottage industries which are still extant in their provinces, and to examine the prospects of their future stability or expansion. A special committee was appointed by the Madras Government to report on the prospects of the handloom industry, and the report recently published gives some interesting figures which show that in some varieties of textiles, the cost of production on handlooms is less than that on power looms. A bulletin\* recently issued by the Department of Industries, Madras, shows that while the imports of foreign cloth have fallen after the War by 1,064 million yards per annum, the

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\* Bulletin No 12, Handloom Weaving in the Madras Presidency, 1930

handloom products have increased by 199 million yards per annum. We should also like to refer here to the following passage at page 57 of Clow's "The State and Industry",

"While acknowledgment must be made of the stimulus given to the industry by the political movement in favour of hand-woven cloth, it appears to be the case that, at present at any rate, the hand-loom weaver can more than hold his own against the mills in simple economic competition."

The Royal Commission on Agriculture have, however, uttered a general note of warning in these words "Even with the aid of new ideas and assistance in training and marketing, the contributions which several rural industries can make in reducing the heavy pressure on the land is infinitesimal and in the nature of things they cannot, as a rule, hope for ever to survive the increasing competition of organized industry." The Bihar and Orissa Committee strike a similar note, but they give particulars of some flourishing cottage industries in their report.

In spite of their decline, cottage industries in different provinces still employ a large population. In Bihar and Orissa, we are told that no less than 2½ million people are supported by these industries. In Bombay 300,000 people are employed in the hand-loom industry, and 13,000 people are employed in the gold thread industry in Surat. The hand-loom industry in the Punjab supports 192,000 weavers.

#### EXISTING POSITION IN THE PROVINCES

299 We give below a brief description of some of the rural industries dealt with by the Provincial Committees.

(1) *Hand-loom weaving—Bombay*—The weavers are of three kinds (1) independent weavers who work at home, (2) *karkhandars* who have weavers working under their supervision, and (3) dependent weavers perpetually in debt either to a dealer in yarn or a *karkhandar* and relying on him for supplies. The independent weavers and *karkhandars* receive yarn at a high price on credit on condition that the manufactured goods are sold through the lender. *Karkhandars* and the independent weavers who work with their own capital either sell through the local *dalal* or an *adatyā* to the merchant and, if they sell direct, they often find that purchasers insist on credit for a month or two during which they have to find accommodation from the *soucar* at heavy rates of interest. In addition to these difficulties, the products of the industry have to compete with machine-made goods. Co-operative industrial societies have been formed to enable the weavers to overcome these difficulties, but compared to the magnitude of the industry, the number of persons helped by the movement is exceedingly small. One notable feature of these societies is that they have comparatively small arrears.

*Hand-loom weaving—Madras*—There are four classes of weavers

- (1) Those that weave cloth for ryots who give the yarn and pay for the labour. This system is no longer common.
- (2) Those who buy yarn, make cloth, sell it in the local *shandy* or hawk it round the villages, and carry on with the sale proceeds.
- (3) Those who buy yarn from the local dealer on credit, selling back the cloth to him.
- (4) Those who are supplied with yarn and finance and return the cloth to the *soucar* or master-dealer.

The fourth class is generally seriously in debt while those in the third class are slightly better off. The former are not at liberty to sell when they like, and are bound to sell their goods at an agreed price to the master-weaver or the merchant to whom they are indebted. Those in class (2) are in a somewhat higher stage economically. The difficulty of marketing is great on account of the fact that the mill-made cloth governs the price of all. The Industries Department has done much to improve the industry, but with existing difficulties efforts can only have very slow results. The Co-operative Department has organized societies of various kinds, to provide raw material and to grant loans and to facilitate marketing. There were 45 purchase and sale societies exclusively for weavers on the 30th June 1929, which sold to the members raw material worth about Rs 1 lakh.

*Hand-loom weaving—Central Provinces*—There has been a considerable decline in the number of people engaged in this industry due to the competition of mill-made cloth and to the financial and marketing difficulties of the weavers. The Weaving Department has been studying the apparatus of weaving and has introduced a number of improved fly-shuttle looms in 1,750 centres capable of increasing the output by 75 per cent. No attention has, however, been paid to proper marketing facilities for the increased output, with the result that in one centre the depression in prices due to overproduction made the weavers discard the improved fly-shuttle. The average small weaver purchases raw material on credit and pays heavy interest charges concealed in high prices. After manufacture, he has to sell the finished product for whatever price he can get.

*Hand-loom weaving—Punjab*—About 200 co-operative societies have been formed to finance weavers. These have brought down the cost of raw material to the weavers by 15 to 20 per cent. They have not however been able yet to tackle successfully the problem of marketing, and the result has been that the weaver gets less favourable terms now from the middleman than before when the weaver was dealing with the middleman throughout. A sales-

depôt has been started in Lahore under a manager specially selected for his business capacity. The Committee refer to the results of certain special enquiries made by co-operative industrial inspectors in five selected villages in five districts. Owing to competition with foreign imports and want of organization the weaving industry was found to be declining.

(ii) *Khadi production—Bihar and Orissa*—The business is run by the Bihar branch of the all-India Spinners' Association which sells raw materials and buys the finished product. It also supplies the capital, managing ability and marketing organization which the spinners and weavers need. Most of the materials are supplied at cost, or at the lowest possible price, and the services of many able workers are rendered free. The Association suggests improved methods and appliances with a view to increase technical efficiency. The entire capital of about Rs. 2 lakhs engaged in *khadi* production in Bihar, with the exception of Rs. 4,000 deposits from weavers, has been supplied by the central fund of the Association. It is not known whether any interest is paid for this advance or for the advances in kind to the spinners and weavers. Under this system, *khadi* worth Rs. 2½ lakhs was produced in about 40 centres, *khadi* worth Rs. 3,17,000 was sold in the year 1928-29 and about Rs. 50,000 was paid in wages to weavers. There were inevitable losses on pioneering work in the first year, but last year, the third year of operation, showed a small profit. The principal activity in this business is the production of yarn, by the use of the *charka*, in the hands of persons who have had no previous experience in spinning. The weaving part of the business is carried on by the ordinary rural weavers. The organization has not been working long enough to judge whether it is likely to be a permanent financial success. Some of the pioneer centres have been taken over by independent business organizations but it is too early to say whether profits will accrue. In the slack season, when production is at a maximum and sales at their lowest level, the Association is compelled to take advances from banks on overdraft account against the security of its stocks.

(iii) *The gold and silver thread industry—Bombay*—The organization is similar to other cottage industries. The market for the finished product is spread all over India and the period of sale operations is prolonged. The bigger *karkhandars* are sometimes able to obtain deposits from the public. The smaller merchants rely on indigenous bankers or bigger merchants. The indebtedness of dependent workers leads to sweated labour.

(iv) *The Bhagalpur silk industry—Bihar and Orissa*—This is now partly an organized and partly a cottage industry, 1,600 hand-looms being owned by weavers and 250 by the factories. But the factories also finance and market the goods of the weavers who are

in chronic debt to them and other merchants. The weavers working in factories are equally indebted. No weaver would work on hire for a master unless he is paid Rs 150 to Rs 200 in advance. No interest is charged for this advance, but if the weaver changes his master it must be repaid by the new master. The independent weavers borrow against jewellery or against personal security. Only 30 per cent are free from debt. The rest are practically tied to their *mahajans* who have a sort of trade combination to protect their unsecured debts. No weaver can go to another *mahajan* without a certificate of discharge from his old *mahajan*. A weavers' co-operative society was organized to help them, but the improvidence, dishonesty and lack of security of the weavers proved such stumbling blocks in the way of success that a sum of Rs 80,000 was lost in the venture. Advances in the shape of raw materials instead of cash were tried by the Bhagalpur Central Co-operative Bank, but they were converted into cash by the thriftless weavers by selling them at less than market prices. Government have started a Silk Institute at Bhagalpur to teach the weavers the use of improved methods and appliances with the object of helping them to hold their own, but the independent weaver suffers in competition with the factory owners, and the industry is thus slowly progressing towards its inevitable end, the factory stage.

(v) *Silk-worm rearing and silk weaving—Assam*—The rearing of the various kinds of silk worms, *endi*, *muga* and *pat*, and silk weaving are important cottage industries in the Assam and Surma valleys. Most of the weaving is for use in the household, but there are professional weavers also who depend on the industry for their livelihood. The Superintendent of sericulture is devoting much attention to the rearing of the *pat* worm which yields fine silk, and progress has been made through the aid of six demonstrators. There is a good market outside Assam for *endi* and *muga* cloths, the price of which has greatly increased in the last ten years. Witnesses before the Provincial Committee have taken an optimistic view of the market. The Government emporium at Gauhati buys cloth from the middleman and from the actual weaver and sells it, the weaver receiving the sale proceeds less a deduction of half or one anna in the rupee. The Committee doubt whether much financial assistance is required by the rearer of silk worms. If, however, some help is required, they think that a small grant from the Department of Industries might be made. The Gauhati emporium supplies good yarn at a reasonable rate to the silk weavers and finds a market for the finished goods. For further progress in this direction, more capital is said to be needed and the Committee have recommended that Government should increase the working capital of the emporium.

(vi) *Brassware industry—Madras*—This industry thrives in Kumbakonam where there are about 100 smithies run by workmen and their families and 125 run by master-workmen employing other workers under them. The owners take brass-sheets from the traders, receive wages in advance either in lump or instalments at stipulated rates, manufacture the articles required by the traders according to their specification and deliver the goods within a month, failing which they pay interest at 12 per cent beyond that period. The master-workman gives advances to the workmen under him out of the advance received from the traders and pays them wages at a rate lower than that paid to him by the traders. Some master-workmen buy brass-sheets on their own account either on credit from traders or from their own capital if they have any. In these cases they sell their finished articles to dealers in town for ready cash as they cannot afford to sell on credit to retail dealers outside the towns, but the traders appropriate the profit for themselves whether they give brass-sheets to the workmen or the latter buy them on their own account. Workmen have generally money dealings only with traders, who give them not only their wages in advance, but also lend additional sums if required. The owned capital of traders is about Rs 10 lakhs with a borrowed capital of an equal amount. Bigger traders who have their own capital do not borrow, but the smaller traders borrow from banks and occasionally from indigenous bankers. Landholders and others who have surplus cash to invest sometimes deposit their money with some of these traders. The traders give their brass-sheets to workmen and pay them wages in advance. The finished articles are sold mostly on credit to dealers in various parts of the Presidency and in Ceylon. Articles are also sent for ready cash or against D/P drafts to the Telugu districts. A small percentage of the articles is also sold for cash to local consumers. The industry is practically run by capitalist traders, the workers getting only their wages.

(vii) *Brass industry—Central Provinces*—The artisan is either paid wages or remunerated for his manufacturing charges. Some artisans borrow money from money-lenders for the purchase of brass-sheets for their business.

(viii) *Bell-metal industry—Central Provinces*—This is a flourishing industry and the bulk of the wares is disposed of locally. The big producers sell to itinerant traders on credit, and the latter sell to villagers on credit for four to six months, *i.e.*, till harvest. The itinerant trader has to pay a higher price for credit purchases and in addition interest at 1 per cent per month. Some of the difficulties to be contended with are—

(1) Competition of articles from Bankura (Bengal) due to the inferiority of the metal and lower cost of manufacture brought about by labour-saving machinery. There is also the competition of aluminium and German-silver ware.

(2) One big firm has obtained an advance from the local branch of the Allahabad Bank, but the terms are not long enough to suit the system of deferred sales. Some Poona and Calcutta firms from which raw material is imported grant credits for a month at a time.

(ix) *Bidi-making—Central Provinces*—This is one of the most promising forms of subsidiary industry that can be developed in the immediate future. The actual manufacturing of *bidis* is a simple process and is easily learnt. Provision for the supply of suitable Bombay tobacco can be made at reasonable terms and the only other important raw material, *viz*, *tendu* leaves, can be had in abundance in the province. The ordinary *bidi*-maker is paid 7 annas a day for 1,000 *bidis* and many of them can earn about 12 annas a day, if not more. The *bidi* establishments are largely managed by Gujaratis and Marwaris, who have plenty of capital of their own. The Committee's enquiries showed that the existing factories do not stand in need of financial assistance.

(x) *Cheroot industry—Burma*—The principal employs local girls to make the cheroots by hand at his house, and he buys the tobacco and other materials with money borrowed from the local Chettiyars or other lenders commonly without security.

(xi) *Bamboo mat industry—Assam*—Advances are given by middlemen in the shape of raw materials at high prices, the finished product is sold to them at low prices, and there is consequent unremunerative business. The only way to improve the situation is by organizing co-operative societies.

(xii) *Carpet-weaving, toy-making, etc—United Provinces*—Many small industries are followed in the province of a type suitable to provide the cultivator with occupation for his spare time. Carpet-weaving is an important rural industry. The dealers usually supply yarn and dyes to the weaver, who advances to the journeyman workers. In certain villages of the Ganges valley the cultivator follows the profitable industry of turkey-breeding. Flower gardening and scent-making are also carried on in various parts of the province, and oils and scents command a large sale in the towns of Bengal and Bihar. In the sandy *khadir* along the Ganges and the other rivers the making of ropes and baskets from grass or reeds is an important subsidiary industry. Blanket weaving is a famous industry in the sub-montane tracts and in some districts of the north-west the women spinning wool and then husbands spinning during spare hours in many districts.

(xiii) *Poultry-farming—United Provinces*—Much has been done to improve the poultry of the province during the last eight or ten years. Government have given assistance to the United Provinces Poultry Association and the Itah Mission Farm, both of which have done much to improve the breed of the country fowls.

(xiv) *Dairy-farming—Assam*—Four milk supply societies financed by the Sylhet central bank have been formed and the members who are also cultivators are financed to enable them to buy good cows and to supply pure milk at a moderate price. The sale of milk in Sylhet is arranged by the central bank on behalf of the societies. The loan is repaid by the members in easy terms by the daily supply of milk. It is proposed to have in due course a milk union to supervise the working of the societies. Government have recently granted a loan of Rs 5,000 free of interest for five years and also lent the services of the Manager of the Upper Shillong Farm for organizing and supervising the societies. In certain other parts of Assam large-scale dairy-farming is carried on, financed by Maiwaris. There is a ready market for the products, and especially for pure milk.

#### WORK DONE BY INDUSTRIES AND CO-OPERATIVE DEPARTMENTS IN THE PROVINCES.

300 The Department of Industries in Assam is introducing improved looms on the hire purchase system through co-operative societies and granting industrial loans at 6 per cent interest. The Government emporium at Gauhati is providing a market for silk cloths, buying both from the middlemen and the actual weavers. There is a weaving institution at Gauhati and a new weaving branch attached to the Sylhet Training School. There are also touring weaving parties.

The Government of Burma have for about ten years employed an officer as superintendent of cottage industries for the purpose of promoting cottage industries and improving their materials, appliances and technique, and in particular to assist them in obtaining the credit they need. The officer works in close co-operation with the Co-operative Department. Besides special co-operative societies formed for particular industries, urban co-operative banks also supply credit to artisans and small industrialists. The rate of interest on loans from co-operative societies is  $1\frac{1}{4}$  per cent per mensem.

Though the Industries Department, which was established in Bihar and Orissa in 1920, has some duties to perform for organized industries, its main function has hitherto been to assist the cottage workers. In this task it works in close touch with the Co-operative Department. Between them the two departments endeavour to provide the cottage workers with (1) technical assistance, (2) marketing facilities, and (3) finance. They have, to some extent, been successful in giving technical assistance especially to weavers by introducing more efficient hand-looms and supplying new ideas for patterns. Technical assistance has been supplied both by central institutes at which workers can be trained and by peripatetic instructors. The Cottage Industries



Institute has done something in the sphere of marketing, and central banks have also attempted to market the products of the members of special societies such as weavers and bell-metal workers. Through these societies too finance has been supplied. Under the Bihar and Orissa State Aid to Industries Act, provision is made for the grant of assistance by Government in the form of propaganda, demonstration and technical assistance. But the Provincial Committee reports that the possibilities of developing cottage industries in rural areas have not been as well examined as one should desire.

The Co-operative Department in Madras along with the Industries Department has done a great deal of work in improving cottage industries, and in organizing societies of various kinds to provide raw materials, to grant loans and to facilitate marketing. Under the Madras State Aid to Industries Act, Government assistance is available for cottage industries.

The United Provinces Committee report that the Industries Department has attempted with success to improve technical and industrial training. The Provincial School of Arts and Crafts devotes itself to artistic education, though of late the school is reported to be more concerned with profit than art.

301 There is little doubt that one of the main reasons for the decline of some of the cottage industries is the lack of interest taken by Government in the past, at any rate up to 1921, in the fostering and development of these industries. The circumstances which led to this situation are detailed more fully in Chapter XVI; and we should here like to observe that the policy therein outlined in regard to the attitude of Government towards industries in general before 1921 applies also to cottage industries. After 1921 some progress has been made in several of the provinces in the direction of the development of these industries, but it will take some time to make up the lee-way arising out of the policy of inaction in previous years. In view of the fact that some of these industries provide subsidiary occupations for the large mass of the agricultural population, while some others are likely to provide alternative occupation for people now engaged in agriculture, we consider that provincial Governments should devote their earnest attention to the development of these industries.

302 From a study of the Provincial Committees' Reports we have come to the conclusion that by the introduction of new and the expansion of the existing industries much can be done to provide the cultivator with a suitable subsidiary occupation for his spare time. Despite a complete lack of organization there are many thriving industries with established markets both in India and overseas. All the industries stand in need of organization and guidance in the selection of designs and processes, assistance in obtaining suitable tools in marketing, in the diffusion

of market intelligence and in the advertising of their wares. The cheap supply of power for agricultural purposes is likely to stimulate some of the existing industries and also to enable new industries being started. There is a good deal of useful work that can be done by both the Co-operative and Industries Departments in the introduction of new and the development of existing cottage industries which will ultimately result in relieving the poverty of the small cultivator and raising his standard of living.

303 A common feature about these industries is that the people engaged in them do not, as a rule, make for stock but only make to order, having received the necessary raw material or an advance in money. This is said to be due to a variety of reasons, *viz*

- (1) lack of capital,
- (2) uncertainty about marketing products due to importation of cheaper and more convenient substitutes,
- (3) unwillingness to take up contracts for continued regular supply due to inability to organize the business so as to obtain uniformity of quality in the raw material and in the workmanship,
- (4) need for co-ordinating specialized functions in such industries,
- (5) the lengthy technical processes involved in some industries such as calico-printing and the inability of a small artisan to lock up his capital for long, and
- (6) the seasonal nature of the industry and the facilities afforded by the middleman to keep the artisan going during the slack season.

304 The result of working on raw materials supplied by dealers on credit and selling the finished products to the dealers is said to be generally to the detriment of the artisan, as he has to pay a higher price for the raw materials supplied on credit in addition to interest on their value, and is allowed lower prices on the manufactured goods. In our opinion, the remedy for this state of affairs lies in the formation of co-operative societies for helping the artisans, though the general experience of the working of co-operative artisan societies has not been satisfactory so far in most of the provinces. Some industrial co-operative societies are, however, working successfully. For instance, the Basin Weaver Society is reported by the Central Provinces Committee to be working very successfully. Other instances are also found in other Provincial Committees' Reports. The chief difficulties to be surmounted are generally —

- (i) indebtedness of the artisans,
- (ii) lack of organization among them, and
- (iii) marketing difficulties.

## PRESENT FINANCIAL FACILITIES.

305 The financial needs of the rural and cottage industries may be summed up under three heads

- (i) purchase of raw materials,
- (ii) working expenses during the period of production, and
- (iii) financial accommodation between the period of production and the final disposal by sale in the up-country markets

306 The financial agencies are

- (i) the urban and rural money-lender,
- (ii) the merchant or dealer in raw materials or produce of an industry
- (iii) the co-operative banks and producers' societies,
- (iv) the Imperial Bank of India and the joint-stock banks, and
- (v) Government through the Department of Industries and the Co-operative Department

Several Provincial Committees report that the Imperial Bank of India and the joint-stock banks provide practically no finance at all to these rural industries. The enterpriseness, under the existing organization of small industries, the dominating figure. His methods and the money-lender's methods are reported to be far from satisfactory. The rates of interest charged by them, in most cases, are exorbitant. Some independent artisans work on their own. If they are part time agriculturists owning land, it is easy to raise money on its security at the usual rate, but where this credit resource is lacking, they have to borrow from the money-lenders who buy their finished product and who sell the raw materials. As examples of the interest rates paid by traders and artisans, the following may be quoted from the Provincial Reports. The weaver in the Punjab pays interest varying from 12½ to 37½ per cent. The master workmen in the brass industry in Madras buy their sheets on credit from traders paying 12 per cent interest. Artisans in this industry in the Central Provinces have to pay money-lenders interest at 9 to 15 per cent per annum. In the case of the bell-metal industry the firms who supply raw materials charge interest at 7½ to 12 per cent per annum. Weavers in the silk industry in Bhagalpur pay 12½ per cent on loans against ornaments and higher rates on loans on personal security. The Chettiyar's rate of interest to people engaged in the cheeroot industry in Burma are 1½ to 2 per cent per mensem. In Bombay bigger *harkhandars* pay 3 to 4½ per cent on deposits from the public, smaller merchants pay 6 to 9 per cent on loans from indigenous bankers and bigger merchants

## WHAT CREDIT AGENCIES CAN DO.

307 A proper agency for financing the rural industrialist on cheap terms and for rescuing him from the clutches of the money-lender and the middleman, where these drive unfair bargains with him regarding supply of raw material and sale of finished product, appears to be very essential. In spite of the not very hopeful experience in the past, we think that co-operative industrial banks or well organised co-operative urban banks are the best agencies to meet the requirements of these industries satisfactorily. We recommend that co-operative institutions should be established to finance the rural industries on a larger scale than at present. German experience in the field of co-operative organization for small industries and small traders and retailers is worth studying, and this might be done by deputing men to go and study the problem on the spot, as it is not possible to lay down general principles in the case of small industries as can be done in the case of large industries. Such institutions should be able to tackle the problem of indebtedness of the artisans, and by propaganda and education remove the existing defects in their character and efficiency. We recommend that Government should give assistance in connection with propaganda and education and should also be prepared to provide funds for the movement if it grows on a large scale and is in need of such funds.

## TECHNICAL ADVISER TO INDUSTRIAL SOCIETIES.

308 It is not necessary for the co-operative societies dealing with such industries to have industrial or technical advisers on their permanent staff. A manager with ordinary commonsense should be able to carry on, and there should be no difficulty in securing valuable advice and guidance from the people in charge of large-scale industries without any cost.

## WAREHOUSES AND CO-OPERATIVE SALE SOCIETIES AND DEPOTS

309 The Provincial Committees have also recommended the establishment of licensed warehouses and co-operative wholesale depots for storing and sale of products of cottage industries. We are in agreement with this recommendation and we hope that with the help of these warehouses and wholesale depots, and under the competent guidance of the provincial marketing boards which we have recommended elsewhere, most of the marketing difficulties will be reduced, if not altogether removed. Co-operative sale societies could also be of much help in opening markets for products of rural industries in commercial centres.

310 We may refer in this connection to the useful work done by the Arts and Crafts Emporium, Lucknow, which is reported to have established a contact between the products of the cottage and village industries in the province with internal and external markets. We support the recommendation of the United Provinces Committee that its activities should be extended in various directions such as imparting commercial and technical education to the industry and trade, assisting in the production of approved designs prepared by the School of Arts and Crafts, advertising the artistic products of the industries and acting as the headquarters of a system of sale depots not only in the province but also in the major towns of other provinces.

#### STATE AID TO INDUSTRIES ACT.

311 The Central Provinces and Bengal Committees have recommended the enactment of State Aid to Industries Acts in their provinces on lines similar to those in Madras and Bihar and Orissa. We commend these proposals to the Provincial Governments for their consideration and we are glad to note that such a Bill has been brought before the Bengal Legislative Council, though we have no information regarding its progress. We refer again to these Acts later on in paragraphs 414 to 418 in connection with organized industries. The provincial industrial corporations which we have recommended elsewhere may also help rural and cottage industries.

## CHAPTER XV.

### FINANCIAL REQUIREMENTS OF OTHER CLASSES OF POPULATION

312 We have dealt in the preceding chapters with the financial requirements of the agriculturist and the people engaged in small rural and cottage industries. We shall deal in later chapters with the financial facilities required by the classes of population engaged in small, middle-sized and large industries, and in foreign trade. In this chapter we shall devote some attention to the needs of the intermediate classes of the population, namely, the middle class people, small traders and shopkeepers, salaried classes, contractors and labourers.

#### MIDDLE CLASS POPULATION

313 In order to illustrate the problems of the middle class population we summarize below the position of this class from the Reports of some of the Provincial Committees.

*Bengal* —Credit is required for financing individuals to take up definite occupations. There is no association or institution for this purpose which could give credit on the personal security of the borrower or on the guarantee of a third party, but the need for such institutions is great owing to the growing unemployment among the middle class population. Financial accommodation is also required by this class for the acquisition of houses and other tangible assets, loans for which can be repaid in instalments.

*Bihar and Orissa* —Loans required by professional men and others engaged in miscellaneous occupations are mostly on the security of house property, jewellery, fixed deposits, insurance policies and stock exchange securities. Very few banks lend against personal security alone, the money-lender charging high rates of interest being the usual resort in such cases. The insurance companies and the Imperial Bank of India advance only against first class security such as Government securities and insurance policies, but such advances are not large. Joint-stock banks in the province take a much larger share than might be expected in financing this class of population and it is said that the high rates of interest so obtained have the unfortunate tendency of diverting their resources from productive credit to consumers' credit.

*The Central Areas.*—The Central Areas Committee have also urged the need for financial accommodation for the urban community and have referred specially to the facilities for acquiring houses.

*Burma* —The Burma Committee refer to the example set in New York by the Personal Loan Department of the National City Bank of New York which grants loans of Rs 150 to Rs 3,000 to any person who earns a regular income or has his own business, on personal security, on the security of guarantors, or on suitable collateral security. Facilities are given for repayment by monthly instalments and arrangements are made for the insurance of the life of the borrower. Loans are also required to pay medical and educational expenses, taxes or insurance premia and for other objects such as the purchase of household equipment.

### SALARIED CLASSES

314 The Bihar and Orissa Committee report that a large majority of the salaried classes borrow from money-lenders at ruinous rates of interest. The Central Areas Committee also refer to the need of the clerks in Government and Municipal services for finance for purchase of houses, marriages in the family and education of children and add that some of them are actually paying high rates of interest varying from 37½ to 300 per cent.

### CONTRACTORS

315 Contractors form a large class of urban borrowers in all provinces and have often to borrow for carrying out their contracts. Like agriculturists and traders they are at present compelled to pay high rates of interest and their loans are from joint-stock banks and urban money-lenders on the security of house property, jewellery and cash certificates. In many cases, no security is ordinarily available and consequently they have to subject themselves to paying the heavy charges of money-lenders.

### SMALL TRADERS AND SHOP-KEEPERS

316 Small traders and shop-keepers also find difficulty in securing credit on reasonable terms and have to depend upon money-lenders for finance. These traders and shop-keepers have themselves to give credit to most of the salaried and professional classes in the cities.

### CO-OPERATIVE URBAN BANKS

317 Most of the Provincial Committee agree that co-operative credit societies of the Schultze-Dehitzsch type are the most suitable banking agencies for all middle class and working people other than agriculturists. We agree with the Provincial Committees and recommend that limited liability co-operative societies, generally known as urban banks, should be established, wherever necessary.

facilities and conditions exist, for the benefit of these classes of the population. We have suggested in connection with the agricultural primary societies that their membership must not be confined to a special creed, caste or calling or to a special class of agriculturists. In the case of these urban banks, we do not see any objection to special societies for salary-earners if these societies are looked upon as thrift societies for collecting and investing the savings of their members. The duty of these urban banks should be to try to do for the small trader, the small merchant and the middle class population what the commercial banks are doing for the big trader and the big merchant.

318 The following statement giving the number of members and capital of the urban banks working in the various provinces on the 30th June 1930\* shows the progress of this class of co-operative society in India and the vast scope that still exists for their further expansion in the future —

*Urban Banks*

	Number of Socie- ties	Member ship	In thousands			
			Share Capital and Reserve	Depo- sits	Loans	Total Working Capital
			Rs	Rs	Rs	Rs
Ajmer Merwara	47	1,800	90	3,26	28	4,44
Assam	48	8,644	3,51	10,71	26	14,48
Bengal	Not furnished					
Bihar and Orissa	79	16,214	10,95	12,93	1,60	25,48
Bombay	76	120,058	65,80	2,10,59	6,08	2,82,47
Burma	91	10,584	17,95	10,14	89	28,98
Central Provinces	Not furnished					
Delhi	Not furnished					
Madras	946	203,714	84,64	64,47	1,06,24	2,55,35
North-West Frontier Province	Not furnished					
Punjab	505	29,877	Figures not available			
United Provinces	71	20,568	9,67	8,85	43	18,95

\* The dates vary with reference to the co operative year in each province; the latest figures available are given



319 In view of the importance of the expansion of urban banks, we have discussed this subject in some detail with the foreign banking experts and we make the following recommendations —

(i) *Area of operation* —The development of large urban banks should be encouraged though restrictions on the area of operation may be considered with reference to the extent and population of the towns served by these banks so that the operations of the bank may not become unwieldy

(ii) *Share Capital* —In view of the fact that urban banks are on the limited liability basis, unlike agricultural credit societies where the liability is unlimited, we see no objection to members of the urban banks being asked ordinarily to take up reserve liability not exceeding twice the subscribed share capital. Where the share capital is fixed at a relatively small figure, the reserve liability may, however, be correspondingly high in order to create a sound business basis. We consider this kind of additional liability a good safeguard for creditors in case of bankruptcy, and it is calculated to enhance the confidence of the investing public

(iii) *Management* —It is necessary to have as manager a qualified person trained in banking. This necessity arises from the fact that there is not the same mutual interest in such institutions as is expected to exist in agricultural credit societies. As in the case of the latter societies, we do not see the necessity for creating in these urban societies supervising boards apart from the managing committees

(iv) *Business* —There is no objection to these institutions doing all kinds of banking business to meet the requirements of their members, but they should be debarred from entering into forward delivery contracts in any market either on their own account or on account of the members. As money circulates more rapidly in urban centres than in villages, these urban banks, on account of this special feature, do modern advanced banking business and deal with their members on current account. The granting of cash credits, dealing in cheques, collecting and discounting inland bills, clearing and remittance business have all been permitted nearly everywhere for urban co-operative credit societies and should be encouraged in India also

(v) *Advances* —Advances should ordinarily not be for long term, but if the banks have adequate resources, they can grant intermediate credits up to 50 per cent of their share capital and reserves and 75 per cent of the long-term deposits, in conformity, in the latter case, with the periods of maturity

We agree with the Bombay Committee that urban banks should not be allowed to finance joint-stock concerns as they are

not intended for such concerns. Urban primary non-credit societies may be financed by urban banks according to special local conditions.

We recommend that urban banks may be permitted to advance money on the security of gold and silver ornaments, on the former up to 75 per cent and on the latter up to 50 per cent of the value. Such loans need not necessarily be limited to the individual borrowing power of the members as fixed by the managing committee. Greatest care is, however, required in valuing and holding in custody gold and silver pledged with the bank. Advances to traders may also be given on sound and authorized warehouse receipts. We also recommend that so far as possible these urban banks may adopt the Morris plan of advancing and recouping loans, particularly to the salaried classes, whose character and income, as well as sureties, are sound. The principal features of the plan are usually as follows —

The Morris plan bank is organized to meet the credit needs of the salaried men who cannot approach the regular banks. In the case of the salaried man the following procedure is adopted. Loans are made on the applicant furnishing references as to his character and income and two good sureties. If he borrows \$50 00, interest is deducted at 6 per cent for the year and he is paid \$47 00 on his agreeing to become a subscriber to the C class certificate on the basis of fifty weekly instalments of \$1 00 each. There is a penalty of five cents in the case of default of any instalment. As soon as the fifty payments are made he becomes the holder of a paid-up certificate, but his loan is due only after two more weeks when he can use the certificate either to cancel the loan or to obtain a B Class certificate with interest at 5 per cent and make new arrangements for the repayment of the old loan. He has thus come to borrow but remains to lend as, once the habit of saving the weekly dollar is created, it goes on. He could use the B Class certificates as collateral for new loans but he need not provide sureties in this case. He can cash these certificates on a month's notice. Thus the man who would have been at the mercy of a loan shark is converted into a valuable co-operator.

(vi) *Financing agency and balancing centre* — As far as possible the co-operative central banks should act as financing agencies and balancing centres for non-agricultural urban banks recommended above. Where urban banks are stronger than central co-operative banks or where the latter do not meet the special requirements of urban banks, urban banks should be allowed to deal directly with the provincial co-operative bank. Sufficient cash balances should be kept by urban banks with the central or the provincial bank from which they receive discount or rediscount facilities. It might

be necessary, if there is a considerable development of urban banks that the latter should have their own central banks different from the central banks of agricultural credit societies. But it will be undesirable to have a separate apex bank. There should be only one provincial bank apart from the provincial land mortgage corporation.

(vii) *Relations with commercial banks* — With the approval of the Registrar, large urban banks may be allowed to keep accounts with commercial banks, especially for the purpose of discounting, clearing and remittance business.

(viii) *Auditing* — Our proposals regarding provincial and district audit unions in Chapter IX apply to the audit of urban banks also.

### CO-OPERATIVE SOCIETIES FOR LABOURERS

320 The Bihar and Orissa Committee have given some attention to the requirements of labouring classes for credit and have pointed out that co-operative societies organized for them have not been particularly successful owing to the lack of trust and education on the part of the members. As pointed out by the Townsend Committee on Co-operation in Madras, labouring classes are extremely poor and co-operative societies for these classes offer special problems of organization, supervision and finance. We share the hope of the Bihar and Orissa Committee that education and better organization may enable the landless labouring classes to form and work successfully co-operative societies of their own and thereby escape the evil effects of resort to money-lenders. We also support the recommendation of the Committee that employers should in their own interest give greater attention to the provision of credit facilities for their employees and should also take more part in the supervision of co-operative societies started for their benefit. We suggest that employers may assist the co-operative organizations by effecting recoveries of loans by deductions from wages, an arrangement which may form part of the contract for advancing the loan by the societies.

### OTHER AGENCIES

321 We do not think that co-operative urban banks alone can solve the problem of the classes of population we have mentioned above. Private enterprise on a commercial scale should also go hand in hand with the development of co-operative organizations. In Germany, for example, there is a great number of public banking institutions which go by the name of City Mortgage Institutions, which are the result of extension to cities of the principle of *Landschaften* in agricultural areas. They are engaged in the business of granting amortization loans to owners of improved real

estate or of land in process of being developed. In their organization and their regulations they resemble the *Landschaften*. The establishment of similar institutions in India is a matter of urgent necessity. Such institutions may be useful in relieving some of the sound loan offices in Bengal and some urban co-operative banks elsewhere of part of their land and house mortgage business which is not their normal function. These latter institutions can then render greater help to the middle classes by furnishing short-term credit, keeping their assets more liquid and increasing the velocity of the circulation of capital.

322 The Bihar and Orissa Committee have referred to the difficulty placed in the way of contractors getting finance at reasonable rates by the existing rules of business and methods of accounts of the Public Works Department and public bodies, which does not allow of all payments being made to the contractors through their financing banks or bankers. They have accordingly recommended that contractors should be encouraged to arrange finance through approved banks or bankers and that the acceptance of tenders should be communicated to the contractor as well as to the bank, which should further be assured that all monies due to the contractor will be paid to it. On the basis of this arrangement banks would be prepared to finance contractors up to approved limits at lower rates of interest than are charged at present. We support the recommendation of the Provincial Committee that any technical difficulties in the way of implementing such arrangement should be removed.

## CHAPTER XVI.

### FINANCIAL REQUIREMENTS OF INDUSTRIES

#### THE POSITION OF INDUSTRIES IN THE ECONOMIC LIFE OF THE COUNTRY.

323 India is predominantly an agricultural country. According to the census tables of 1921, only about ten per cent of the population was employed in industrial occupations as compared with about 73 per cent on agriculture. At the same time, the need for industrialization in India is great from a purely economic point of view as well as in the interests of the agricultural population of India.

324 The policy followed by the British Administration in India in regard to the development of industries up to the time of the Great War is explained in the following passage taken from paragraph 105 of the Report of the Indian Industrial Commission (1916-18) —

“The commercial instincts of the East India Company had from its earliest days in this country led it to make various attempts to improve those Indian industries from which its export trade was largely drawn, as, for example, by organizing and financing the manufacture of cotton and silk piece-goods and silk yarn, although this policy met with opposition from vested interests in England, which were at one time sufficiently powerful to insist that it should be suspended and that the Company should instead concentrate on the export from India of the raw material necessary for manufactures in England. The effects of this traditional policy\* continued for some time after the Company had ceased to be a trading body, and even after it had been replaced by the direct rule of the Crown, and doubtless moulded such subsequent efforts as were made in the same direction by Government. But as *laissez faire* views gradually gained increasing acceptance both in England and in India, these spasmodic efforts became less frequent, and the first attempt at a general policy of industrial development took only two forms—a very imperfect provision of technical and industrial education, and the collection and dissemination of commercial and industrial information.”

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\* For instances of this policy see pages 297 to 300 of the Report of the Indian Industrial Commission

325 This policy of non-intervention in the development of Indian industries was generally pursued up to 1914. Sporadic efforts for giving active assistance to industries were, however, made by some of the local Governments, and these led in Madras to the development of the aluminium hollow-ware and chrome-tanning enterprises. Provincial departments of industries were also set up before 1914 in many of the provinces, though in most cases they existed only in a state of embryo. This policy of non-intervention of Government and their attitude towards the industrial development of the country combined with instances of anomalies in the fiscal, railway and stores purchase policies till recently followed in the country has exposed the Government to the charge of open hostility towards the interests of Indian industries prompted by the over-riding consideration of advancing British interests. We would like in this connection to refer to the speech of the President of the third session of the Indian Industrial and Commercial Congress, 1926.\*

326 In spite of the lack of any support from the Government and the prevalence of deterrent factors which the Government did not attempt to remove, it is indisputable that there has been considerable progress in the last three or four decades in the matter of industrial development in India. The number of joint stock companies at work registered in India with rupee capital has increased from 1,309 with a paid-up capital of Rs 29 crores in 1895-96, to 5,189 with a paid-up capital of Rs 231 crores in 1921-22, and to 6,330 with a paid-up capital of Rs 279 crores in 1928-29, this being the last year for which statistics are available. Some further idea of this development can be obtained by examining the position in regard to five principal industries, namely, jute, cotton, iron and steel, coal, and tea. The numbers of looms and spindles employed in the jute mills have increased from about 10,000 and 215,000 respectively in 1895-96 to 50,000 and 1,068,000 in 1924-25. The total Indian production of cotton mills has increased from 423 million pounds in case of yarn and 83 million pounds in case of woven goods in 1896-97 to 719 million and 459 million pounds respectively in 1924-25. The production of pig iron has advanced from 35,000 tons in 1901 to 884,000 tons in 1924-25. The production of coal has expanded from 3½ million tons in 1895 to 21 million tons in 1925. The total export of tea has increased from 139 million pounds in 1895-96 to 348 million pounds in 1924-25.†

327 At the same time, there is a general feeling in India that the progress made by India in her industrial development during

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\* Report of the third session of the Indian Industrial and Commercial Congress, 1926, pages 19 and 20.

† The figures after 1924-25 have not been given, as in some cases the production in recent years has been helped by the imposition of protective duties on imports.

the last fifty years is very meagre compared with her vast resources and the needs of her large population. This is fully borne out by the extent of her dependence on the imports of foreign manufactures. In 1928-29, for instance, the total value of the imported articles, mainly or wholly manufactured, amounted to about Rs. 180 crores out of the total imports of Rs. 253 crores, while the total value of exported articles, mainly or wholly manufactured, amounted to Rs. 90 crores out of the total exports of Rs. 330 crores. As against these figures, the value of raw materials and produce and articles mainly unmanufactured exported from the country amounted to as much as Rs. 170 crores, while the value of such articles imported from other countries during the same year amounted to about Rs. 23 crores. As the Industrial Commission observed: "India produces nearly all the raw materials necessary for the requirements of a modern community but is unable to manufacture many of the articles and materials essential alike in times of peace and war." India is still almost wholly dependent on foreign countries for the plant and machinery and chemicals which she requires and the production of which may be regarded as the index of the industrial progress of any country. The need for a rapid industrialization of the country can hardly be exaggerated from a purely economic point of view, as it will tend to absorb that portion of the population which cannot be supported by agriculture, will provide a remedy for the gradually increasing unemployment among the middle class people, and will result in an improvement in the standard of living generally. As early as 1880 it was observed by the Indian Famine Commission that "at the root of much of the poverty of the people of India and the risks to which they are exposed in seasons of scarcity lies the unfortunate circumstance that agriculture forms almost the sole occupation of the mass of the population."

328 It is no wonder that for some years before the Great War Indian economists and Indian politicians had expressed their discontentment with the economic dependence of India on foreign money and foreign manufactures. According to them, the domination which the capital, enterprise and skill of England exercised over the trade and manufactures of India had "an insidious influence which paralysed the springs of all the various activities which together make up the life of a nation"†. The discontentment was voiced in the Indian Industrial Conference which began in 1905. The Government of India, however, did not accept responsibility for giving active assistance to industries until after the outbreak of the Great War, when the contraction of commerce in the West served to bring home in a striking manner the extent of India's economic dependence on Europe.

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\* Official summary of report

† Ranade—*Essays on Indian Economics*, 3rd Edition, page 92

329 In 1916 Government appointed the Indian Industrial Commission. That body reported in 1918, and as they observed in the summary of their report, the constructive proposals made by them depended on the acceptance of two principles —

- (1) that in future Government must play an active part in the industrial development of the country, with the aim of making India more self-contained in respect of men and material, and
- (2) that it is impossible for Government to undertake that part, unless provided with adequate administrative equipment and forearmed with reliable scientific and technical advice

The problem, as it presented itself to the Commission was largely one of organization, and the machinery which they proposed to set up included central and provincial departments of industries manned largely by all-India scientific and technical services. According to their recommendations, the main activities of Government in respect of industries were to include, (1) research, (2) industrial and technical education, (3) commercial and industrial intelligence, (4) direct assistance, technical and financial, and (5) the purchase of stores. The Montagu-Chelmsford Report on Constitutional Reforms, 1917, also recognized that "the Government must admit and shoulder its responsibility for furthering the industrial development of the country." Later, the appointment of the Tariff Board, on the recommendations of the Fiscal Commission, contributed its share to the progress of industrialization in India, the industries which have benefited most as a result of the action taken on the recommendations of the Board being cotton textiles, iron and steel, and match.

330 Under the changes made in the Indian constitution in 1921, the main responsibility for the development of industries by the State passed to the Ministers in the provinces. This change made it impossible for the Governments concerned to give effect in full to the organization recommended by the Industrial Commission. Nevertheless, the various recommendations of the Commission furnished the Ministers with valuable material indicating the lines on which they might proceed in the discharge of their responsibilities in the matter. Some amount of progress on the lines advocated by the Commission has taken place in almost every province, though the financial difficulties of recent years and the limitations imposed on the spending powers of Ministers by the diarchical form of constitution have operated as impediments. An account of the action taken in various directions like organization, technical education, development of cottage industries, research and investigations, financial assistance, etc., will be found in Clow's "The State and Industry", published in 1928, which also gives the action taken



by the Central Government in matters with which the latter are concerned, including "protection"

331 There is, however, still a considerable amount of feeling among the intelligentsia of India that the State, and particularly the Central Government, is not taking as much interest as it ought to in the development of India's industries. They contend that the recommendations of the Tariff Board have in many cases not been given effect to promptly or fully, that indeed the Board's report on chemical industries, though made in 1929, has not yet been published, that generally speaking no revision of railway rates has been made on the lines suggested in chapter XIX of the Report of the Industrial Commission, and that for ten years no action has been taken by the Central Government on the recommendation in para 292 of the Commission's Report asking for the appointment *at the earliest possible date* of an expert committee to examine the possibilities of establishment of industrial banks in India. In a later paragraph we shall deal with the effect of this feeling on the investment of capital by Indians in Indian industries.

332 Since the outbreak of the Great War there has been a marked increase in the amount of Indian capital invested in Indian industries, though the flow has received a check in recent years owing to the depressed state of business generally. Nevertheless, a not inconsiderable amount of capital\* invested in Indian industries is still non-Indian. The result is that the control and management in the case of some of the important industries are even now in the hands of non-Indian firms. The predominance of non-Indian management in some of the important industries has detracted from the value of Indian participation in industrial enterprises. Generally speaking, the managing agents have not given any scope to Indians to hold such positions in the companies they manage as might have given these Indians an opportunity to have a comprehensive idea both in regard to the technique of production and management of the business.

333 A strong feeling has, however, grown among the Indian intelligentsia that the control and management of Indian industries should pass to an increasing degree to the hands of Indians, and this feeling has also been voiced in the past by some of the English administrators of the country. For example, speaking on the 21st March 1916 in the Imperial Legislative Council on the resolution which led to the appointment of the Industrial Commission, Sir William Clark, then Member of Commerce, said that "the building up of industries where the capital, control and management should be in the hands of Indians" was "the special object which we all have in view", and he deprecated the taking of any steps "which might merely mean that the manufacturer

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\* We have been unable to ascertain the figures with any degree of accuracy

who now competes with you from a distance would transfer his activities to India and compete with you within your own boundaries" It is possible that more progressive assistance by the State towards the development of Indian industries will make adequate capital available in India for investment in safe and sound industrial concerns This was the anticipation expressed by the minority of the Indian Fiscal Commission in paragraph 50 of their note of dissent In marked contrast to the attitude of the State towards industries in India stands the action taken by Governments in certain other countries like the United States of America and Japan —

*The United States of America* —In the United States a national industrial policy has deliberately been adopted This conscious effort made by the Government of the country to advance its industrial interests is fully illustrated by the development of the iron industry, which is referred to in the following words by Professor Taussig —

"Rich natural resources, business skill, improvements in transportation, widespread training in applied science, abundant and manageable labour supply—these, perhaps, suffice to account for the phenomenon But would these forces have turned in this direction so strongly and unerringly but for the shelter from foreign competition?"

The development of the American industry thus appears to have been expedited by timely intervention of the Government

*Japan* —The Government of Japan has also actively associated itself with the process of industrialization of that country At the time of the Restoration in 1868, the economic condition of Japan was much worse than that of India in 1757, but during the course of little over half a century, she has become one of the most fascinating countries of the world, in so far as industrial and commercial phenomena are concerned \* Japan had been secluded from the world for about three centuries and while she had no powerful and wealthy mercantile class comparable to that which existed in England in the eighteenth century, the only industry in which she could take pride was the production on a small scale by craftsmen of special articles of luxury and military equipment for the knights and nobles This, together with the extremely unsatisfactory conditions regarding other aspects of economic and political condition of the country, led the Japanese to consider seriously the urgency of rapid westernization of Japan, and while the European military equipment and methods were adopted wholesale, the need for speedy industrialization was no less recognized There were, however, very severe obstacles to be overcome There

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\* "Modern Japan and its problems" by Allen

were, on the one hand, tradition and social customs preventing any sort of individual initiative, while the lack of capital necessary for financing large-scale manufacturing industries accentuated these difficulties still more. The seriousness of the situation was promptly realized by the Government which was thus compelled to step in from the very first and embark on an active national policy. Besides sending numerous students abroad in order to study the industrial and commercial technique of the West, engaging foreign experts in order to train those at home and providing other machinery for industrial training, it also pioneered many new industries, such as textile, iron and steel and ship-building industries. It has supplied the capital wherever possible, while in other cases, it has rendered substantial help by granting subsidies or giving protection. The assistance which the Government rendered to the industries was by no means confined to the above commercial museums established by the Government in almost all the cities hold periodical exhibitions thereby facilitating sale of goods abroad and also supply useful information to the traders, while the various guilds numbering over a thousand, have been established under Government auspices, with the object of regulating the quality of the product. The establishment of the Yokohama Specie Bank in 1880 and of the Industrial Bank of Japan in 1902 have also given much impetus to the progress of Japan's industrial development. The amazing progress which Japan has made in the matter of her industrial development during the last sixty years as a result of this active policy of the Government will be realized from the fact that the contribution of manufactured goods to her total export trade rose from 1.14 per cent in 1868 to 42.52 per cent in 1928, the figures for the import trade being reduced from 60.57 per cent in 1868 to 15.16 per cent in 1928. This extraordinary growth of industrial activity is also reflected in the figures for the exports and imports of raw materials, while the country at the beginning of her industrial career exported as much as 26.27 per cent and imported not more than 4.98 per cent of raw materials the progress of industrialization has resulted in changing these figures to 4.17 per cent and 53.12 per cent in 1928\*.

Even in England wherefrom has emanated the doctrine of *laissez faire* imposed on the governmental policy in this country, the need for active participation by the Government in the promotion of industrial interests has come to be effectively recognized in recent years. A reference to this change in the policy of the Government is made in the report of the Liberal Industrial Enquiry, which shows how between 1921 and March 1927 an aggregate loan of more than £74 million was raised under the Trade Facilities Acts for approved purposes on behalf of private

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\* The Asahi English Supplement, Present Day Japan 1930, pages 114 and 136.

concerns with the guarantee of the Government. The Government guarantee of the loans was given free of any charge.

#### CLASSIFICATION OF INDUSTRIES INTO MAJOR AND MINOR INDUSTRIES

334 Before we proceed to deal with the capital requirements of industries, we may refer to a fact which we have already mentioned, namely, that at the outset of our enquiry we divided our task between the Provincial Committees and ourselves. The former were requested to deal with the requirements of small and middle-sized industries, including cottage industries, while we reserved to ourselves the examination of the position of the major industries such as cotton, jute, iron and steel and coal. Although some of the witnesses who appeared before us dealt in their written and oral evidence with a few industries which were the subject of investigation by Provincial Committees, notably the tea industry which being largely an agricultural industry came within the purview of the Provincial Committees, our examination of these witnesses was mainly devoted to the financial requirements of the major industries mentioned above. Most of the Provincial Committees toured about their provinces. As the small and middle-sized industries are scattered, such tours were necessary. We in the Central Committee, however, did not tour for our purpose. The major industries are all concentrated at the larger centres and are well represented in the various Chambers of Commerce and other Trades Associations. Most of the important Chambers and Associations helped us with their valuable written memoranda and oral evidence. We deal in paragraphs 339 to 353 with the position regarding major industries as placed before us by witnesses and in the succeeding paragraphs we summarize the case for the smaller and middle-sized industries as presented by the Provincial Committees.

#### CAPITAL REQUIREMENTS OF INDUSTRIES

335 Industries require capital for two purposes (1) capital for block, that is, to finance fixed assets, and (2) working capital, that is, to finance floating assets. Block capital is required by newly started industries for fixed assets, such as land, buildings, machinery and other appliances of a durable and permanent character. It is also required in the case of established industries for purposes of extensions and replacements. The capital that is invested in these fixed assets is more or less of the nature of permanent investment.

336 Working capital is required for the purchase and working up of raw materials into finished products, for stores, for expenses incidental to the marketing of products, for financing outstandings in respect of goods supplied, and for providing the necessary funds for meeting day to day requirements. The capital that is invested in this way should be of the nature partly of permanent or

long-term capital and partly of short-term finance. A recent writer\* states that the stock of raw materials and manufactured or semi-manufactured commodities never falls below a certain minimum and the capital required for holding these is of the nature of permanent capital. Any working capital over this minimum falls under the category of short-term finance.

337 The relative proportion between block and working capital required in an industry varies with the nature of the industry. In cottage industries, for example, in which processes are not 'roundabout', and the implements are comparatively inexpensive and few, fixed capital is very small compared with working capital, while on the other hand, in modern industries such as jute and cotton, the proportion of fixed to working capital is much larger. Again, as the processes of production become more and more 'roundabout', the proportion of fixed to working capital increases correspondingly. Taking the case of the hydro-electric industry, the distinctive feature of its finance is its large requirements of fixed capital.

338 The period between the starting of an industry and the time when production commences varies from industry to industry. In the case of a tea garden, for instance, the initial outlay on which for a garden of the minimum size is estimated at Rs. 7½ lakhs, production does not commence till after the expiry of at least four years from the laying out of the garden. Again the number of years that a cotton mill takes to become a paying concern is different from that taken by an iron and steel concern.

## MAJOR INDUSTRIES

### *Existing facilities*

339 The conservative school of witnesses such as the European Chambers of Commerce, the Exchange Banks Association and the Imperial Bank of India have all stated in evidence that in India no industries floated on sound lines and showing a reasonable promise of success have been unable to obtain the financial assistance necessary. According to them, capital required for financing fixed assets should in all cases be supplied by public or private subscription of shares or debentures of the undertaking. When an industry has established itself in this way and is capable of presenting a balance-sheet showing its soundness, the commercial banks should supply the capital required to finance the floating assets on the security of stock and other liquid assets built up by the industry. It has been suggested that promoters are often anxious to obtain Government patronage which would make it easier for them to obtain outside financial support, and that it is difficult to sympathise with this

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\*Karin Kock, "A study of interest rates", page 9.

attitude on the part of promoters According to one of these witnesses, in most countries all large industrial concerns have been developed by private enterprise from very small beginnings and if the same principles of non-reliance on Government help be followed in India, no sound scheme of industrial development would find any difficulty in obtaining finance either for block, or working capital from the existing sources of supply

340 Indian witnesses in general differ from the conservative school referred to in the preceding paragraph and they are extremely dissatisfied with the existing state of affairs We mention below the various handicaps to Indian industries brought to the notice of the Committee by these witnesses through their written and oral evidence —

(i) Banks in India do not provide finance for block capital for industries, though there is no reason why such finance should not be provided by them out of their paid-up capital and reserves, if adequate security is offered It is true that these resources are relatively small, but by utilizing these capital resources for the purchase of debentures of industrial concerns with a view to passing them on to the public, banks could render great assistance to new industries This process could be repeated continuously with very little risk to the banks and with great advantage to new industries It is complained that conservatism and lack of initiative make the banks very timid and prevent them from embarking on under-writing of industrial capital or even lending money on the security of industrial shares to any great extent The Imperial Bank of India which is the biggest Indian joint-stock bank that might be of some assistance in this direction is debarred by statute from giving loans to industrial companies for capital expenditure, by the limitation of six months on the period of loans that may be granted by it, and by a prohibition against lending money on the security of industrial shares or immovable property Even as regards floating capital secured by liquid assets, the Bank insists on a margin of something like 30 per cent, with the result that industries have to provide not only the whole of the capital required for financing the fixed assets but also 30 per cent of the capital required for financing the floating assets This attitude of the banks in India, added to the shyness of Indian capital, acts as a damper on the industrial development of India

(ii) Banks further usually insist on a full backing of tangible and easily realizable security for their loans and take no account of the personal credit and integrity of the borrowers This is in striking contrast to the position in England as illustrated by the following quotation\* from

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\*This quotation refers specifically to farmers' accounts but it will be seen from pages 170 to 171 of Walter Leaf's book that the same practice is followed in other directions

Walter Lear's book on 'Banking' — "We (i.e., the Westminster Bank) have had some figures taken out, and I confess they were something of a surprise to me. They refer, of course, to the loans we make for current business purposes. They show that of the total number of borrowers no less than 28 per cent had their loans wholly unsecured, and a further 13 per cent only gave partial security." It has been suggested that a number of failures of industrial concerns, due to bad management, has shaken the confidence of the public as well as the banks, in India, in industrial concerns generally and the banks are, as a result, over-cautious in their advances to industries and insist on tangible and easily realizable security as cover in all cases. It is agreed, however, that it is the business of banks, if they have the national welfare at heart, to distinguish between good and bad concerns and to help those concerns, about which they are satisfied that the business integrity of the management and the financial position are sound.

(iii) Notwithstanding the view of the conservative school it is said to be a great hardship to industries, that banks should insist on maintaining a margin of about 30 per cent in regard to advances against stocks and even a higher margin in regard to stocks in process of manufacture, especially when prices have touched bottom in many cases. The hardship is said to be further increased by banks not giving any consideration to the existence of valuable block capital as general security for loans.

(iv) The Cotton Textile Industry is the biggest national industry of India. The industry has for the last few years been passing through a period of general depression and has also been subject to local vicissitudes. A number of mills in Bombay are not making a profit at present and from year to year have sustained losses which have led to a reduction of capital. On account of this reduction in capital and the recurring losses, the banks are reluctant to make advances. The Managing Agents who finance the industry to a considerable extent in normal times are unable to cope with the requirements in such periods of adversity. It is stated that in other countries of the world such national industries would in times of depression be nursed by a bold and sympathetic policy on the part of banks.

(v) It has been suggested that banks in India are not equipped with the technical knowledge necessary for valuing the assets of an industrial concern and for judging whether the concern is profitable and solvent. Asked whether this lack of technical knowledge interfered with the liberal grant of facilities by banks, one prominent Indian banker said that such difficulties do not exist in the case of large industries where sufficient data are available through balance-sheets and reports, from which the bankers can form a correct opinion about the financial position of the concerns. He added that the smaller

industries, however, which were generally proprietary concerns did not prepare and make available balance-sheets regarding their financial position and that banks were handicapped by the consequent lack of knowledge in granting advances to them. Even if technical men for the valuation of the assets of the company and for giving expert opinion as to the solvency of the concern were required, it was stated that banks could easily employ such men for the purpose and that this would not be very costly. From their personal experience on the boards of industrial concerns, the representatives of an important Chamber of Commerce said that they had no difficulty, practical or otherwise, in getting advances from banks for want of technical knowledge on the part of the bank management.

The Bengal Banking Enquiry Committee have referred to the fact that joint-stock banks do not employ experts to make valuation of the goods against which advances are asked for and have suggested that the task of valuation might be undertaken by some reliable agency. The Bombay Committee have also referred to the lack of technical knowledge on the part of the bank staff for examining propositions for financing industries.

(vi) Banks finance industries at present out of short-term deposits by granting advances for working capital for short periods. Though they are always willing to renew these loans from time to time provided that the industrial concern is running satisfactorily and the security is good, from the point of view of the industrial concern, this position is considered to be precarious in view of the fact that the concern can never be certain of getting a renewal of the advances.

(vii) As stated later in paragraph 343, a great deal of the capital required by the cotton mills in the Bombay Presidency is obtained direct by means of deposits from the public. This system of finance has been compared to a fair-weather friend. When times are bad, these deposits are liable to be withdrawn from good as well as bad concerns, thereby aggravating the position at a time when all resources are required to carry over what may be only a temporary period of depression.

(viii) Some complaints have been made about racial discrimination on the part of the officers of the Imperial Bank of India when considering applications for credit. It has been suggested that the European managers of the Bank on account of their methods of living and social habits have greater opportunities of coming in closer personal contact with European clients than with Indians and that this personal information and contact result in more favourable treatment being accorded to European concerns than to Indian concerns. It is further generally believed that the Bank lends to European concerns more freely than to Indian



concerns and that several Indian concerns which took the Bank's assistance have had bitter experience. It has been suggested that while non-Indian concerns get fuller assistance from the Bank, the assistance rendered to Indian concerns is very small and falls much short of the actual requirements of the concern. We have been furnished, through the courtesy of the Imperial Bank of India, with the figures of advances to Indian and non-Indian concerns, but in the absence of fuller information regarding individual concerns, we are unable to examine this complaint. We were referred in this connection by one of the witnesses to the system followed by the Bank of India at Ahmedabad. Instead of depending on his shroff for information regarding the status and position of his clients, the Manager is assisted by a local board of directors who take the fullest responsibility for the recommendations they make. The particular witness stated that he had known cases where owing to the absence of such local boards for branches of the Imperial Bank of India a party worth Rs 3 or 4 lakhs had been reported as worth Rs 10,000 only while a party worth a few thousands had been represented to be worth some lakhs. The Managing Governor of the Imperial Bank, when asked to explain to the Committee the means employed by the Bank to ascertain the standing and repute of traders, stated —

‘Banks have their own intelligence departments which, by watching markets and the operations of dealers in those markets, by the receipt of information from many sources open to them, confidential and otherwise, by the observation of individuals by trained observers, by the examination of books and balance sheets and the summing up of the information so received by the officers of the bank, arrive at their estimate of the credit that should legitimately be granted.’

We might also observe in this connection that the Imperial Bank of India has more than 160 branches while the branches of 133 other joint-stock banks taken together totalled 421 in 1928.

Similar complaints against banks generally have also been received from representatives of collieries and tea gardens. It is said that collieries and gardens under European management do not suffer on account of want of finance, but that others controlled by Indians do suffer from this cause.

(ix) The rates of interest charged to industries for loans and advances are said to be generally much higher than the industries can bear. For example, the usual rate of interest on bank loans and advances is generally the Imperial Bank's rate, and in some cases one or two per cent higher. As the Imperial Bank rate advances with reference to seasonal market conditions, industries

are penalised by high interest charges based on seasonal stringency though the rates are not justified by the inherent conditions of the industries. Smaller joint-stock banks make advances to industries both on mortgage and personal sureties at much higher rates. Similarly in the case of finance supplied by Indian Princes and indigenous bankers and merchants a very high rate of commission has often to be paid to the intermediary party which arranges the loan and such finance is in consequence more costly than the finance obtained from banks. The difficulty of obtaining capital by issue of debentures has already been referred to and here the cost of raising capital in this manner may be mentioned. It is pointed out by one witness who deals in such debenture issues that debenture loans generally cost about 7 per cent per annum besides the additional cost involved in commissions, stamps, etc., and that the underwriting commission or brokerage alone varies from 2 to 5 per cent.

341 At the same time many witnesses have stated that in India capital for industrial development is not easily forthcoming from the public, and further that the financing of fixed capital expenditure by means of debentures is not as popular as elsewhere. This state of affairs has been attributed to various causes —

- (1) There is no recognized method in India by which the general public can obtain advice and assistance as regards investments in India. No doubt banks' clients can obtain some sort of advice from their bankers, but there are many urban centres which do not still possess any banks and the assistance where it is available is not of the active, directing kind which banks in Germany supply to their customers, for the advancement of industries. The Stock Exchanges function only in the large seaports and an upcountry investor has little chance of getting in touch with any reliable or recognized member of these Exchanges.
- (2) The failure or lack of success of many of the smaller industries started in India is also reported to have shaken the confidence of the public in industrial investments to a certain extent. The conservative investor in the mofussil therefore prefers to invest his money in post office savings banks, cash certificates and other Government securities with the knowledge that the credit of the Government is behind these investments and that his money is, therefore, perfectly secure.
- (3) We have been told that there is a class of Indian investor which looks for capital appreciation in its investments and that debenture loans with a fixed yield

of interest and with no prospect of capital appreciation have, therefore, no attraction for this class. On the other hand, we have been informed by the Calcutta Stock Exchange Association, whose opinion in this matter is entitled to great weight, that there is at all times a large class of investors which prefers the security offered by sound debentures to the possibility of capital appreciation

- (4) In other countries insurance companies invest a large portion of their surplus funds in debentures of first class concerns. In India no insurance company has yet taken to this kind of investment. This is attributed by some witnesses to the insecurity engendered by the fiscal policy of Government and by others to the absence of debentures of really first-class industrial concerns
- (5) The heavy stamp duty on debentures and on transfers of debentures is also considered by some witnesses to be one of the impediments in the way of industrial debentures becoming popular. For example, in Bombay the stamp duty on a debenture transferable by endorsement, or by a separate instrument of transfer, is Rs 7/8 per thousand. On each transfer there is an additional duty of a similar amount. In the case of bearer debentures, there is an initial duty of Rs 15 per thousand at the time of issue, but there is no additional duty on each transfer. In order to encourage this useful form of investment among the public, the Punjab Banking Enquiry Committee have recommended considerable reduction in the duties. There are, however, other witnesses who think the stamp duty has nothing to do with the popularity of the debentures, as the cost of the initial duty falls on the company and not on the holder of the debentures, except in the case of 'registered' debentures of which there are not more than half a dozen issues in all and where the stamp duty is the same as for share transfers
- (6) Our attention has also been drawn to a practice whereby the whole of a debenture loan has been taken up by limited groups of financiers working for wealthy clients such as Indian potentates and merchant princes, who do not try to place the debentures on the market and thus create a market for them. In a few cases, certain banks have, we are told, tried to introduce debentures among their clients by even devising instalment schemes of payment, but that small odd lots

put on the market by companies of unknown antecedents and uncertain future do not attract the investing public, and moreover such issues cannot readily be negotiated in the Stock Exchanges. Opinions as expressed by several important bodies vary considerably. One such body affirms that original debentures are quite popular forms of security and are saleable in the market and that in general debentures of mills, tea gardens, and other sound concerns, are sought after in Calcutta, though such debentures are bought more by investors than speculators and therefore do not pass from hand to hand in the same easy manner as shares. The Calcutta Stock Exchange Association have brought to our notice the success of the debentures of two important Indian jute mills in Calcutta. In their opinion, the success depends on the nature of the security offered, and where this is satisfactory, and the yield is attractive, the public readily subscribe. The standing and repute of the Managing Agents is also a matter of importance, a slight preference being shown, they say, for European Managing Agents.

- (7) Most of the Indian witnesses have added another reason for the shyness of Indian capital, namely, the fiscal policy of Government. When once an industry is started, the industrialist has no guarantee that he will be protected, if any such necessity arises, against unfair foreign competition. We have heard the complaint that though machinery has been set up by Government to consider the claims made by various industries for protection, namely, the Tariff Board, the recommendations of this Board are not always carried out by the Government. It is therefore argued that the investor in an Indian industrial undertaking has no assurance that the industry in which he invests will reach the profit-earning stage or that the profits, when once they accrue, will be maintained by inauguration of proper protective measures on the part of the Government of the country.

#### THE MANAGING AGENCY SYSTEM

342 We have referred more than once to the Managing Agency system. The important place which it occupies in the organization of industries in India justifies a somewhat fuller treatment in our Report.

##### (1) Bombay

343 In Bombay, when an industrial concern is started, particularly a cotton mill, the Managing Agents attract capital from their friends and others who are aware of their standing.

The working capital is found from private deposits and from loans and cash credits from banks, and in both directions the Managing Agents on account of their financial standing have rendered yeomen service to the industries. The deposits are in most cases for six and twelve months and the rates paid on such deposits vary from about  $4\frac{1}{2}$  to  $6\frac{1}{2}$  per cent, being to a great extent regulated by the standing of the individual mills and the position of their Managing Agents. As regards loans from banks, they are obtained on the guarantee of the Managing Agents and are now generally secured collaterally by a hypothecation of the liquid assets of the mill company. Advances to mill companies are not usually made against a pledge of stocks, as the mills do not find it convenient to place their stocks in the possession of banks. The procedure followed by the Imperial Bank of India is that in cases where a pledge on stocks is given, it is not usual to require the guarantees of third parties, and advances in such cases are made on the security of stocks. But sometimes only a 'charge' is given which is a very wide and elastic term embracing hypothecation or lien, and a guarantor is required only when the so-called charge is not a sufficient security in itself. In such cases advances are granted on promissory notes and as under the Imperial Bank of India Act, such advances must be on the security of paper bearing two names, the personal guarantee of the Managing Agents is also taken. This personal guarantee of the Managing Agents is not however required in respect of advances against Government and other trustee securities. In some cases it is stated that the Managing Agents provide finance on consideration of being appointed agents for buying raw material and selling or distributing the products of the industry concerned.

#### (ii) Calcutta.

344 In Calcutta the main industries in which the Managing Agency system prevails are jute, coal, cotton and tea. The duties of Managing Agents are said to be very wide. The Managing Agents (unless the agency has changed hands) are the founders of the concerns, and manage them in every way. They arrange for the finance, both block and working, either by raising share capital or arranging with banks, or other financiers or supplying it themselves. They purchase the raw materials, supervise the manufacture, sell the products and control the management in all spheres. When banks require guarantees, the Managing Agents give the same. We understand that these Managing Agents do not in many cases give their personal guarantee in the case of bank loans and overdrafts as in Bombay but merely give a guarantee that the overdrafts granted are always covered by stocks.

#### (iii) Ahmedabad.

345 The Committee have been furnished with a full description of the working of the Managing Agency system in Ahmedabad where it is admitted on all hands to be an unqualified success.

Generally speaking, the total block capital required for starting a cotton mill in Ahmedabad is about Rs 20 lakhs and of this Rs 5 lakhs is initially found by share capital. As regards the balance, in the case of the old mills, 65 to 75 per cent of the capital outlay has been financed by deposits and by funds supplied by the Managing Agents. These deposits used to be generally for one year. In the case of new mills, out of Rs 20 lakhs required to finance the block capital, Rs 5 lakhs is raised by share capital and the balance is found in the form of seven-year deposits for Rs 5 lakhs and one-year deposits on the Managing Agents' own capital for the remaining Rs 10 lakhs. These seven-year deposits are encouraged by the grant to the depositor of a share in the agency commission. The managing agency is made into a limited concern with a nominal capital of Rs 1,000, there being 1,000 shares of Re 1 each, and any one who comes forward with Rs 5,000, *i.e.*, Rs 3,000 in the shape of ordinary share capital and Rs. 2,000 in the shape of deposits for a fixed period of 7 years is given one share of the managing agency or one thousandth share of the agency commission. This one rupee share has considerably more value than its nominal value and in some cases it is worth Rs 700 to Rs 800. As far as the Ahmedabad industry is concerned, the system is reported to have succeeded beyond ordinary expectations and it is even doubted if the industry would have progressed as well as it has done in recent years, had it not been for the system of giving out shares from the managing agency commission. Formerly, the Managing Agents used to take in persons who would bring in a certain amount of capital, thereby earning a certain portion of the Commission Agent's share, but now the agencies have been made into limited concerns and shares issued, a proportion of which the holders may sell off at their sweet will.

346 The deposits received by mills come mostly from individuals and vary from Rs 5,000 to Rs 10,000 on the average. Before the war, it is said, almost all the deposits used to come from the public in Ahmedabad and adjoining rural areas. But after the war, some of the industrial concerns in Ahmedabad have flourished and accumulated reserves and these reserves are now inter-deposited. These deposits by mill companies have taken the place of the deposits from rural areas which have considerably fallen off, due partly to decline in their prosperity and partly to the competition of Government. It is said that the Ahmedabad public consider that it is safer to deposit with a mill than with a bank and this state of affairs is attributed to the business integrity of the people in charge of the management of the mills who look to the interests of the depositors as if they were their own. On the whole, there has been no reduction or falling off in the total of the deposits received by the mills, which have continued steady during a long period of 25 years.

347 Mills in Ahmedabad obtain very little or no assistance from banks. So far as block capital is concerned, the banks are naturally unwilling to invest their funds raised in the form of short-term deposits in long-term investments in fixed assets of the concerns. Even as regards working capital, the mills are unwilling to pledge or hypothecate their stock with banks as Bombay mills do. It is said that if the mills were to hypothecate their stock, the whole fabric of credit including their deposit system would be ruined.

348 In Ahmedabad it is not the practice for the Managing Agents to charge any commission for buying raw material, it is for selling the finished product that they get a commission.

349 The rates of interest on deposits offered by a mill under a particular management in Ahmedabad during a series of years were as follows —

	Per cent
1923	6
May 1926	5½
January 1927	5
October 1929	5½

The rate which the Managing Agents charge to the mills for the money which they advance is said to be never more than 6 per cent and compares favourably with the rate of interest on deposits, inasmuch as the agents have to advance any amount of deficiency in the total finance required by the mills including losses from time to time.

350 The following statement shows the various sources from which mills in Bombay and Ahmedabad obtain the required finance —

(In lakhs of rupees)

	Bombay (Figures for 64 Mills)		Ahmedabad (Figures for 56 Mills)	
	Percentage of total finance		Percentage of total finance	
	Rs		Rs	
1 Amount loaned by the Managing Agents	5,32	21	2,64	24
2 Amount loaned by Banks	2,26	9	42	4
3 Amount of public deposits	2,73	11	4,26	39
4 Amount of Share Capital	12,14	49	3,40	32
5 Amount of Debentures issued	2,38 (a)	10	8	1

(a) Made up of — 46 from Managing Agents  
53 from Banks  
1,39 from the public

## (iv) Bihar and Orissa.

351 The following extract from the Bihar and Orissa Report shows the position of the Managing Agents in that province — “They are most active in the coal mining and iron and steel industries. Of the lesser industries they support most of the electrical enterprises, the lime factories and the larger mica mines as well as a good part of the sugar industry. They have not much concern with the other industries. Though without their help Bihar and Orissa would have been even less fully developed than it is, from a purely provincial point of view their activity has some serious disadvantages. They have concentrated mainly on industries dependent on the exhaustible resources of the province, and have not, save in the matter of sugar, developed other industries not so dependent. Though they are closely linked to the general money market and can have first class business ability, their outlook is too wide, their centre of operations too far removed, and their financial scale too large, to secure an examination of the possibilities of developing minor industries, which might be of great service to the masses of the provincial population. In fact they have, from our point of view, too many lions in the vast and uproarious fire of their activities. Nor can they be expected to feel, in addition to the stimulus of profit, the spur of provincial patriotism to make them take a lively and well-informed interest in such development.”

## GENERAL REMARKS ON THE WORKING OF THE SYSTEM

352 Although the Managing Agency system is reported to have done a great deal for the industrial development of Bombay, it is admitted that it is not by any means a perfect arrangement but has many serious drawbacks. There have been cases where the Managing Agents have, besides managing their own mills, traded and speculated and the resulting weakness in their position has reacted on the financial position of the mills themselves and led to the banks withdrawing cash credits even when the mills were intrinsically sound, merely because the Managing Agents had become weak. Further, although it is true that in times of crisis such as Bombay has been going through, Managing Agents have incurred extensive losses as a direct result of financing the mills under their control, there have been a few cases in which these Agents have turned their loans to the mills into debentures, with the result that the concerns have passed into their hands and the shareholders have lost all their capital invested in the undertaking. It has also been pointed out that this Managing Agency system works well when everything goes on smoothly and when the industries are prosperous. During these periods of prosperity if more money is required by the industrial concerns, the Managing Agents may very often continue supplying the money themselves.



to a considerable degree. Later on, however, when conditions alter and the industry or the particular concern comes up against bad times and the Managing Agents find themselves compelled to find more money to support the industry, it is found that they are not able in all cases to cope with the requirements.

353 We suggest, therefore, that attempts should be made to make industrial enterprises in India less dependent on this system for future development. The establishment of direct friendly relations between industrial companies and commercial banks is desirable especially in view of the capital demands that are likely to arise in connection with mergers and reconstructions which may follow the present economic depression.

#### RESULT OF PROVINCIAL ENQUIRIES INTO SMALL AND MEDIUM SIZED INDUSTRIES

354 We have referred in the preceding paragraphs to the evidence we received in regard mostly to major industries, such as cotton, jute, iron and steel and coal. As already stated, the financial requirements of small and middle-sized industries were investigated by the Provincial Banking Enquiry Committees. The various industries examined by them were rice, flour and oil milling, lac manufacture, mica mining, sugar refining, cigarette and silk manufacture, cotton ginning and cleaning, the tea industry, and glass manufacture. The position of these industries in regard to the supply of their financial requirements is summarised below.

##### (1) Assam.

355 The Assam Committee have investigated the case of the tea industry, and while they acknowledge the difficulties of some of the smaller gardens they attribute this to some extent to the under-capitalization of the gardens in the initial stage. They state that the firmly established European and Indian gardens which have provided themselves initially with sufficient capital and have built up adequate reserves are able to tide over periods of slump.

##### (11)

356 The Bengal Committee in the case of tea refer also to the difficulties caused by under-capitalization in the first place, and the consequent necessity to borrow from loan offices, moneylenders and *marwan* bankers on personal security or on mortgage of the gardens. Nevertheless they have come to the conclusion that the existing financial facilities enjoyed by the gardens appear to be sufficient, and that the companies should follow the sound policy

of building up reserves from their huge dividends instead of distributing the whole of them as at present. Some of our members think that this conclusion is not justified considering the high rates of interest which some of the gardens have to pay for finance, and we think that it might be advisable for the Industrial Corporation which we recommend elsewhere to look further into the case of this industry if and when it is established.

357 As regards the middle-sized industries in Bengal such as rice-mills, mills for pressing oils, hosieries, match factories, printing presses, chemical works and tanneries, the Committee are satisfied that on account of the absence of suitable agencies, such concerns are not flourishing and that some method should be devised to ensure their stability and development.

### (iii) Bihar and Orissa.

358 The Bihar and Orissa Committee deal with the following industries, lac, mica, leather, oil and rice mills and other minor industries. With the exception of sugar mills and a tobacco factory which raise their money through managing agents in Calcutta, all the concerns appear to have difficulty in obtaining the necessary finance and have to pay exorbitantly high prices for it.

### (iv) Bombay

359 The Bombay Committee call attention to the brass and copper vessel industry as being an instance of an organized industry which is badly in need of financial assistance in all stages of its production. They also refer to other small and middle-sized industries which have difficulty in obtaining necessary funds at reasonable rates of interest.

### (v) Burma.

360 In Burma the following industries were reviewed: rice-milling, petroleum, silver and lead, tin and wolfram, electric supply, cotton ginning, rubber, leather, chemical, engineering and building. The large rice mills are financed by the larger banks, while the smaller ones are financed by Chettyars and some advances are also made by private individuals, by Chinese banks, and by Dawson's Bank. The industry is not profitable at present, and there has been an appreciable contraction in the credit given by Chettyars. The other industries deal with the Imperial and the Exchange Banks and some have access to the London money market. The Committee have no proposals to make regarding the financing of these various industries.

**(vi) Central Provinces.**

361 The Central Provinces Committee have dealt with shellac, oil mills, glass factories, rice-hulling mills and flour mills. In the case of glass factories and flour mills there are difficulties in obtaining financial accommodation, but no specific complaints or recommendations have been made.

**(vii) Madras.**

362 The Madras Committee considered the case of the leather industry, and also of a few co-operative enterprises connected with sugarcane crushing, manufacture of jaggery, oil-crushing, rice-hulling, groundnut decortication, cotton ginning and the grinding of bones. Conditions, though perhaps not so bad as in some of the other provinces, indicate that the industries are handicapped for want of adequate financial facilities.

363 Tanning is a very important industry in Madras. It is carried on mostly with owned capital and with funds borrowed from the exporters and the *mandi* merchants. Exporting firms give standing advances in most cases at a rate of interest of about 9 per cent per annum and on the security of the stock in trade and frequently on the additional security of immovable properties. This standing advance is said to make the tanners dependent upon the exporting firms, thus forcing them to sell their goods only through those particular firms. The Southern India Skin and Hide Merchants Association suggest the desirability of such standing advances being made by some banking institutions. The tanners also receive advances from the *mandi* merchants and exporting firms on the despatch of their goods to the extent of 50 to 80 per cent of the probable value. Some of the exporting firms appear to charge interest at 9 to 12 per cent on these advances until the time when they reimburse themselves with the drafts drawn on the shipment of goods. Some of the tanners have dealings with the indigenous bankers for the purpose of obtaining finance for the purchase of raw stocks and the interest on such credits is generally 9 to 12 per cent, though in certain cases it is as much as 24 to 30 per cent per annum.

**(viii) The Punjab**

364 The Punjab Committee found themselves unable to spare much time for the consideration of industrial finance. They, however, had certain special enquiries made with the help of the Director of Industries and the Registrar of Co-operative Societies into certain small industries like cotton ginning, oil-milling,

ice-making, flour-milling, iron foundries, collieries, tanning, hardware and sports-gear industries. They found that organized industries financed themselves without serious difficulty at 9 to 12 per cent per annum. The sports-gear industry of Sialkot complained of lack of sufficient capital and also of lack of facilities for foreign trade. The Punjab National Bank which is the only Indian bank in Northern India with foreign connections is said to charge very high rates as compared with exchange banks in Bombay.

365 Tanning is one of the most important industries of the province and the volume of business was estimated at about Rs 2½ crores in 1922. Generally this industry is in the hands of very poor Chamars. On account of their poverty, their prejudice against the adoption of new and improved methods, the competition of imported goods and the lack of organization, the industry is said to be definitely on the decline. The tanners generally borrow from three sources, the middleman, the professional moneylender and the co-operative societies. The loans are generally taken either by pledging their ornaments or without any security at all if the tanners have credit. The rate of interest against ornaments is 12 per cent and against personal security 18 to 36 per cent. Co-operative societies charge 12½ per cent. The middleman also makes a profit by charging a higher price for the raw material supplied and by charging a commission.

### (ix) United Provinces

366 There are various kinds of urban industries, viz., blanket-weaving, embroidery (*chikan*) industry, making of carpets and stoneware, calico-printing, silk weaving, gold and silver thread weaving, brass and copper work, etc. The people who finance these industries are the itinerant dealer, the *karikhandā*, and the large dealer or *mahajan*, all of whom supply the raw material and sometimes are agents of larger dealers and depend upon them or the *mahajans* for financial assistance. In those industries where the processes of manufacture are so specialized that they cannot be undertaken by the same set of artisans, the large dealer co-ordinates the different branches of production. To some extent the artisans engaged in these industries are said to be in a state of economic bondage to the middlemen who exploit the ignorance of the artisans and take full advantage of it. The Provincial Committees have not gone into the question of organized industries like cotton ginning, sugar, and oil mills.

### PROPOSALS FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF AN INDUSTRIAL BANK.

367 The written memoranda submitted to us, as well as the reports of the Provincial Committees, indicate a general consensus

of opinion that efforts should be made to start an industrial bank or banks to supplement the existing facilities for the financing of industries. The Bombay, Bihar and Orissa and the Central Provinces Committees have recommended the establishment of Provincial Industrial Banks. The Bengal Committee have suggested the organization of a special type of bank to help the middle-sized as well as the large industries. One member of the Madras Committee and three members of the Bihar and Orissa Committee have suggested industrial banks for their respective provinces. The United Provinces Committee have left it to the Central Committee to decide whether there should be one Industrial Bank with provincial branches or separate provincial banks.

368 The general trend of evidence before us was also in favour of establishing a special type of industrial bank or banks to finance industrial concerns. Even the conservative school which emphasized the importance of private effort in the matter of securing the initial block capital thought that in view of the shyness of Indian capital an industrial bank might be of some advantage in mobilizing capital and turning it into channels of productive investment. There was only one doubt *viz*, whether in the present state of world wide depression in almost all trades, it would not be inopportune to start this new class of bank to help industries and whether it would not be advisable to await the return of more favourable conditions. On the other hand, the present depression and the difficult conditions through which industries are passing were considered by some witnesses to be the governing consideration favouring the proposals for the immediate creation of the proposed new institution.

369 Opinion is divided on the question whether the institution should be an all-India one with provincial branches, where necessary, or should be started as a solely provincial institution in each province where it is required.

370 The arguments adduced in support of a central institution are —

- (1) The financial position of the Provincial Governments at the present moment is not propitious for starting provincial industrial banks. Under existing conditions it will be more practicable for the Central Government to find the money required either for subscribing to the capital of the bank or for guaranteeing the return on the capital than for each Provincial Government to do so.

- (2) It will be easier for an all-India bank to raise the capital required in the shape of shares and debentures than for a provincial bank. The Directorate which will be drawn from the best men in all the provinces will be able to command more confidence and this coupled with their wider knowledge and outlook will make it possible to raise funds more economically and cheaply. The instance of the Madras central land mortgage bank was quoted in this connection, where the central institution was started in order to issue centralized debentures in place of a number of issues by small independent primary banks which were neither popular nor cheap.
- (3) An all-India bank with greater resources and with its funds laid out in a variety of industrial concerns will be better able to tide over periods of loss due to general depression and other causes than a number of independent provincial banks. Some witnesses have, on the other hand, stated that if owing to the preponderant voice of the larger industries, the funds of the central institution came to be invested in those industries, the alleged advantages from distribution of risks would be almost non-existent.
- (4) An all-India bank would be of immense benefit to the country in guiding its industrial development on sound lines. It will be able, by its experience and knowledge gathered from all parts of India and tabulated by a well-equipped intelligence department attached to the bank, to act as a guide and friend to all industrial concerns in India, young and old. It will prevent uneconomical and wasteful efforts to start industries in places where there are no possibilities and it will itself be in a position to formulate schemes for industrial development besides analyzing and criticising propositions placed before it for financial assistance and support. We have also heard the opposite view from some witnesses that it is not the function of an all-India industrial bank to participate actively in directing the industrial development of the country. In the opinion of these witnesses the industrial survey of the country with a view to exploring the possibilities of development is a matter for private enterprise as well as for the Government concerned, and it would be dangerous for a bank to advise on industrial possibilities, as it will increase the bank's own responsibility in the event of any financial loss.

- (5) It will be more economical for a central institution to engage technical experts to advise on industrial propositions throughout the country than for each provincial bank to requisition the services of independent experts and pay for them. Moreover an expert who has acquired experience with a central institution of conditions in all parts of India will be able to give more valuable advice to the bank and industries than one with limited experience in a single province.

371. The arguments advanced by witnesses in support of provincial industrial banks are —

- (1) In regard to the grant of financial assistance by Government, it will be easier for each Provincial Government to find its small share than for the Central Government to meet the requirements, large in the total, of all the provinces.
- (2) 'Industries' is at present a transferred Provincial subject and if it continues to be so in any scheme of future political reform in India, it is but proper that any expenditure in connection with financial assistance to industries and industrial banks should be left to be scrutinized and shouldered by the Provincial Government instead of by the Central Government. For this purpose it is necessary that the proposed industrial bank should be organized on a provincial rather than on an all-India basis.
- (3) The advantages of a centralized issue of share and debenture capital are real within certain limits. But at the same time the urge of provincial patriotism and the competition of the Government of India for capital in the all-India markets are factors which have also to be reckoned with.
- (4) Provincial banks would be able to look after the requirements of the industries in the respective provinces better than an all-India bank, even though the latter might have provincial branches. The proposed industrial banks should also provide the financial requirements of cottage industries and a central all-India institution would not be able satisfactorily to discharge its functions in this regard. The United Provinces Committee have pointed out that though a single central bank would make both for efficient management and economy there is a danger of the interests of the smaller industries being sacrificed to

the needs of the larger. The Bihar and Orissa Committee's observations regarding the working of the Managing Agency system in that province from Calcutta and Bombay emphasize the drawbacks of management from a distant centre from the point of view of provincial interests. An important Indian Chamber of Commerce in their evidence have shown their anxiety that even within the province, the interests of one division which is industrially backward should not be over-ridden by those of another division which is industrially more forward and important. It is argued that all this points to the desirability of starting the proposed new institution on a provincial basis.

- (5) The economy arising out of the engagement of technical experts at the centre is, it is stated, unimportant, as occasions for the use of their services will be few and far between, and it will be more convenient to engage and pay for the services of the best available expert for the occasion than to engage a whole-time officer for the purpose.

372 One Indian commercial body which has supported an industrial bank for each province has suggested that all the provincial banks may be federated to an all-India institution, with the following functions —

- (i) propaganda and advertisement with a view to mobilizing capital for investment in the shares of provincial banks,
- (ii) raising of funds by debentures or loans from the Government of India and distributing them as additional capital to provincial banks in accordance with the requirements of each province,
- (iii) controlling the provincial banks with a view to co-ordination and to avoid overproduction in the various industries, and
- (iv) laying down general principles for the guidance of provincial banks and examining larger propositions for financial assistance to industries.

373 The foreign banking experts in their first memorandum on the subject were definitely in favour of an all-India institution, but after discussing the constitutional difficulty they modified their views though they still considered that there should be an inter-provincial organization to secure co-ordination. After fully considering the matter in all its aspects, we think that the



balance of advantage lies in the creation of provincial institutions, our detailed proposals in regard to which will be found in a later paragraph. It will be observed that we do not at the same time rule out the formation of an all-India institution should its need at any time be established to the satisfaction of the Central Legislature.

374 We shall next turn to the examination of the details of the various schemes placed before us.

#### (1) *Capital—Shares and debentures*

375 It is proposed that the capital of the industrial bank should be obtained partly from shares and partly from issue of debentures. Some witnesses are for placing a limit on the total amount of debentures to be issued in relation to the paid-up share capital, e.g., a limit of fifteen times and five times the paid-up capital has been suggested. Some others prefer not to have any limit and think that the amount of debentures to be issued should only be limited by the industrial possibilities in the country and that debentures might be issued gradually to any extent required.

376 As regards the initial share capital required for an all-India industrial bank different estimates have been given, some of these are furnished below —

- (1) Rs 50 lakhs to start with, which may be increased gradually as required. The object is that no more funds should be raised than can be employed immediately.
- (2) Rs 3 crores, on the basis of Rs 30 lakhs for each province. In view of the potential field for industrial development, this is not considered adequate but it is suggested that it can be supplemented later.
- (3) Rs 10 crores authorized of which Rs 2 crores may be paid up initially. If the bank issues debentures the large share capital will be a security against the debenture issue.

377 In the case of a provincial industrial bank, one estimate of the share capital required is Rs 5 crores authorized and Rs 1 crore paid up. These figures are for the bank in Bombay and are based on the industrial possibilities of that province. It is reported that recently two mills raised debentures to the extent of Rs 90 lakhs and that another is trying to raise money up to Rs 25 lakhs and that the provincial bank should at least have a paid up capital of Rs 1 crore so that with that initial capital and with the additional funds raised by means of debentures, the Bank may be able to meet fully the requirements of the industries in the province.

(11) *Receipt of deposits*

578 Opinion among witnesses is divided on the question of the receipt of deposits. One prominent Indian joint-stock banker is of opinion that the industrial bank should not receive deposits for a shorter term than 3 years, and that it should raise the funds required by means of debentures. The period of 3 years has been suggested for the reason that if the proposed industrial bank received yearly deposits, it would necessarily compete with the other indigenous banks. Another witness has suggested that industrial banks should receive current and short-term deposits and do the ordinary commercial banking business, during the early years of their existence. He has added that the suggestion to restrict the receipt of deposits to those for not less than 3 years is not practicable, as in his opinion people would not be prepared to place with a bank deposits for such a long period as 3 years. At the same time, these short-term deposits should in his opinion, be judiciously laid out, and the fatal error of making long-term investments from short-term deposits should be avoided. Another witness again has suggested that industrial banks should obtain funds by long-term deposits, say for 5 years, and has pointed out that if the bank's stability is guaranteed by the State such long-term deposits will be forthcoming. The Managing Governor of the Imperial Bank of India has stated that though it is possible for an industrial bank to finance both fixed and working capital by means of combined long-term share capital and debentures and short-term deposits the two functions should preferably be kept entirely separate in different institutions which specialize in these particular forms of finance. The recommendations of the Industrial Commission which are relevant in this connection are quoted below —

“It appears to follow that an industrial bank with a sufficiently large capital to ensure its safe working must, at any rate for some time, combine ordinary banking business with its industrial activities to enable it to obtain a return on its capital. But it cannot be too strongly emphasized that, in such case the clearest possible distinction must be drawn between industrial finance and ordinary banking business. Share and debenture capital and long-term deposits may legitimately be used for the former purpose, but short-term deposits never, and any attempts to employ them should be most strictly prohibited, if necessary by law.”

The Bengal National Chamber of Commerce, however, takes exception to this point of view and considers that the main function of the bank should be to provide initial capital

(iii) *Nature of Government assistance*

379 In order to mobilize capital for the industrial banks, various measures of Government assistance have been suggested —

- (i) Guarantee of interest on share capital
- (ii) Guarantee of share capital
- (iii) Guarantee of interest on debentures
- (iv) Guarantee of principal of debentures
- (v) Inclusion of debentures in the list of trustee securities

The first measure has been suggested in view of the past experience of the public. If such guarantee is given, it is hoped that the required initial share capital will be forthcoming. Some have suggested that the guarantee should be limited, as in the case of railways, for a period, say, of 5 or 10 years. Others consider that the guarantee should be permanent, but that the rate of interest guaranteed should be subject to revision every five years, though they agree that a fixed rate would be more acceptable to the public. It is said that if Government give a guarantee of interest, it would obviate the necessity of Government having to find the necessary capital themselves.

The second measure has been recommended by one of the leading Indian Chambers of Commerce on the ground that without it the bank would not be able to attract sufficient capital. When the possible reaction of this suggestion on the management of the bank was pointed out, it was stated that a few Government directors on the board would be able to guard against the danger, though they might have no power of veto.

The third measure has been favoured generally by most of the witnesses. Some of the witnesses who have suggested guarantee of interest on share capital do not think that Government guarantee in respect of debentures is necessary, as the debentures will be issued on adequate securities, though others want to have a double guarantee in respect of interest on both share capital and debentures. As regards the question of limiting the liability of Government in this matter, it has, on the one hand, been proposed that Government should guarantee the interest on debentures issued during the first five or ten years. On the other hand, an important Indian Chamber of Commerce thinks that no limit should be placed on the guarantee in view of certain practical difficulties in the matter. For example, supposing the industrial bank finances several industries like the iron and steel industry, the cotton industry and so on, the guarantee will have to last till the business becomes a paying concern, and the period required to reach the profit-earning stage varies from industry to industry. It believes that the failure of a properly managed bank worked on sound lines

will only be a remote contingency, and as an extreme case, a provision might be made for Government winding up the business of the bank after a reasonable trial. It therefore favours the principle of indefinite guarantee with certain reservations.

The fourth measure is recommended in case it is considered necessary. The Industrial Commission reported that "a powerful and well-directed stimulus is needed to start the economic development of India along the path of progress. Such a stimulus can only be supplied by an organized system of technical, financial and administrative assistance." It has therefore been suggested that Government should follow an active and energetic policy of encouragement and support, and should undertake the responsibility of lending financial assistance of industrial banks, either in the shape of direct subscription of capital, or in the form of guaranteeing repayment of capital and interest in respect of debentures issued by them. The interest of Government could be safeguarded by the nomination of a Government director on the board of the bank in addition to a director to watch the interests of debenture holders.

The last measure has the general support of witnesses, though a prominent Indian banker thinks that at the present stage the debentures should not be treated as trustee securities and that the results of the working of the proposed new institution will have to be watched before such a step is taken.

380 It may be added that a few witnesses including one of the European Chambers of Commerce are not in favour of any guarantees by Government. They observe that the business of any bank, the interest on the share capital of which is guaranteed by Government, would of necessity be very limited and inelastic, as it would not be prepared to take even the ordinary risks which every bank runs in making an advance to a customer.

#### (11) *Nature of Government control*

391 In view of the various suggestions made for financial assistance by Government, some kind of control by Government over the management and the activities of the bank is generally admitted to be necessary. It has been suggested in the first place that the following restrictions on the activities of the banks may well be placed —

- (1) The bank should not lend more than 10 per cent of its capital to a particular industry or to a particular group of industries. Some witnesses would go so far as to raise the limit to 25 per cent and to include the reserves of the bank with the paid-up capital for purposes of this rule, while others would reduce the limit to 5 per cent.

- (ii) Advances should be made only after the prospects of the industrial concern have been declared to be favourable by the Government or the bank's technical expert. An Indian Chamber of Commerce has suggested that Government may employ a competent expert to advise and report to them about the nature of the bank's commitments and its financial position from time to time.
- (iii) Applications for loans should be entertained only after 50 per cent of the required capital of the company has been subscribed and paid up. This would mean that the industrial bank would not take the whole risk and that the promoters and the public would also take a substantial risk. Some witnesses who accept the principle of this restriction have stated, however, that they are not wedded to the figure of 50 per cent.
- (iv) The bank should satisfy itself that the management of the industrial concern is in the hands of competent people having enough experience in the particular line. One of the Indian Chambers of Commerce has suggested that following the model of German banks, the proposed industrial bank should retain some control over the industrial concerns which it helps or promotes. One witness has gone so far as to say that the industrial bank could claim all the rights of a partner in the industrial concern without the liabilities.

382 In the second place, it has been proposed that Government should have an active voice in the management of the bank by the appointment of one or two representatives of Government as directors of the bank, with or without the power to vote or to veto. One important Indian Chamber would prefer the appointment of these directors by the Legislative Assembly, though it is not particular that the selection should be made from among the members of that body. Witnesses are not generally agreeable to concede the right of veto to the Government nominees, as they consider such rigid Government control neither necessary nor desirable. If Government only guarantee the interest on the share capital or on debentures or on both, the directors of the bank who will be all keen and practical businessmen may, in their opinion, be expected to conduct the affairs on sound lines in the interests of the shareholders, and the interests of Government can not be more important than those of the shareholders so as to render the grant of powers of veto to the Government director necessary. The opposition of some of the witnesses to the grant of the right of voting to the Government director is probably based on the precedent of the

position of the Government representative on the Central Board of the Imperial Bank of India, but it is apparently overlooked that in addition to the non-voting Government official on the Board of that Bank, there are four directors nominated by Government who have the right to vote

38) In view of the burden placed on the Indian taxpayer by the various proposals for Government assistance, it has been suggested that a limit should be placed on the extent of non-national participation in the share capital of the industries which the bank is called upon to finance and also in the share capital of the industrial bank itself

### (v) *Nature and scope of advances*

38) Most of the witnesses who have advocated the scheme of an industrial bank have done so with a view to provide finance for a part of the initial block capital of industries and for the capital required for any future extensions, such finance being provided either in the form of a direct loan to the industrial concern or by under-writing the capital issue of the concern. They think that the bank would be of great use in regard to new and young industries, though they have no objection to old and well-established industries, such as cotton and jute mills, being also financed by the bank. They contemplate that existing commercial banks will continue to provide working capital to industrial concerns from their short-term deposits on the security of the liquid assets of those concerns. But in cases where such accommodation is not easily forthcoming from commercial banks, the proposed industrial bank will provide also the working capital. Moreover it is possible that in order to keep its funds fully employed and to meet the convenience of industries, the industrial bank may find it necessary to engage in the financing of both the short-term and long-term needs of industries, though a few witnesses consider that it would be more advantageous that the industrial bank should specialize in the grant of long-term loans for financing block capital. It has also been suggested that it will take some time for the industrial possibilities of the country to be investigated and for new organized industries to be started, and meanwhile it is proposed that the industrial bank should develop the cottage industries whose importance from the point of view of the well-being of the rural populations cannot be underrated.

### THE GERMAN SYSTEM OF PROVIDING FINANCE FOR INDUSTRIES

385 We are aware that in the various proposals put forward by Provincial Committees and by witnesses before us they have been influenced by what they conceive to be the relation between banks and industry in Germany. We have had the benefit of studying a recent book on "Joint Stock Banking in Germany" by P. Barnett

Whale, which has been considered by the German expert on Industrial Banking appointed to advise us as the only comprehensive and neutral study of the subject giving the facts with careful comments and cautious conclusions. We propose to give here a brief description of the relations between banks and industrial firms in Germany as gathered by us from a study of this book and our discussions with the experts.

386 An industrial firm in Germany has what is called a current account connection with its bank, which is distinct from the current account as used in relation to banks and their clients in England or in India. In the ordinary current account connection, the customer is sometimes in debt to the bank and sometimes has a balance to his credit. Many claims thus arise on both sides which are not settled individually but are settled periodically, usually every six months. The extent of the customer's indebtedness, the maximum period for which it may be outstanding, and the security to be given, are fixed by agreement from time to time after consideration of all the circumstances of the case. The current account advances are used by the average German firm not only for the purpose of providing itself with working capital but also for supplying stock for extensions in anticipation of recourse to the investment market.

387 Industries in Germany provide themselves with initial capital in two ways. Either the promoters invite the public to subscribe the capital and to help to bring the company into existence, or the promoters themselves take over the entire capital in the first instance with the intention of placing the shares among the public subsequently. Although promotion of industrial companies by subscription was the general practice at an early period of German industrial development, the second method is said to have completely supplanted the first in later years. In connection with the second method of promotion, because the investing public either require a lead or feel a reluctance to decide on participation in an undertaking before it is fully launched, banks in Germany have played an important part in providing the greater part of the initial capital, which is subsequently placed among the investing public either by offering them for public subscription or by direct sale to customers or to banking firms in relation with the banks. In order to reduce the risk borne by a single bank, and to ensure the success of the issue, it is very common for several banks (or bankers) to join together in what is called a *konsortium* and pledge themselves to accept a certain portion of the issue. It is important to notice that the investment of German banks in shares of industrial companies is not a long-term investment and is resorted to merely as a safe and liquid investment for part of the bank's resources in first class securities. It is not inconceivable that circumstances may arise when on account of the issue

proving unsuccessful, the banks may be compelled to hold the securities almost indefinitely. But such a situation is regarded as involuntary and incidental. From the bank's point of view, its participation in the promotion of new industrial companies is considered useful for acquiring business connections or extending the bank's influence.

383 It will thus be seen that when industrial companies wish to procure new capital, whether from existing shareholders or by issue of new shares or debentures in the general capital market, the German company arranges the transaction with the bank with which it is in permanent banking relations. The ordinary banking business in which deposits from the general public are employed is decidedly the most important business of German banks. In addition, there is a department for industrial and similar finance, with a limited share of the bank's own resources, for carrying on financial transactions arising from time to time in the relations of the bank with ~~the~~ industrial and similar joint-stock companies. These financial transactions require a certain amount of capital investment which is kept in conservative relation to the share capital and reserves of the bank. While it remains more or less stable in the aggregate, its composition is changing as quickly as market conditions will allow. If the public is not responsive to the offer of securities resulting from such industrial financing it follows that the banks cannot continue their assistance to industries until the public is again prepared to put up the new capital required.

## OUR PROPOSALS

### *Some General Principles*

385 In the preceding paragraphs we have given an account of the financial requirements of industries in India as placed before us by witnesses and by the Provincial Banking Committees and we have described the various proposals which have been placed before us for improving the present position. We shall now proceed to record our conclusions and to make our recommendations.

390 We must admit that some misapprehension exists in the minds of some of the people who have favoured us with their views about the proper function of banks in the matter of providing industrial capital. Generally speaking, initial block capital for industrial enterprises should be put up by private or public subscription. Such block capital for subsequent improvements and extensions as is not provided out of undivided profits should be supplied by increase of share capital or by issue of debentures. but pending a favourable opportunity for such further issues of share or debenture capital, commercial banks might be expected



to supply finance for these purposes in the form of temporary advances provided that adequate security is forthcoming. Further the ideal arrangement is that industrial enterprises should also provide out of their initial capital the minimum necessary working capital, the amount of which will depend on the particular facts connected with each industrial enterprise. Any extra requirements of working capital over and above this minimum might be met by short-term advances by commercial banks which will be entitled to require that the industrial enterprise maintains a safe and proper relation between owned and borrowed capital.

### *What commercial banks in India can do*

391 We consider that in India, in connection with the issue of shares and debentures by industrial companies, such of the existing commercial banks as are well established and carry on their ordinary banking business, on the safest and soundest lines, might with advantage to the industries follow, as far as possible, the German system. We do not, however, think that it is to the advantage either of the commercial banking system or Indian industries that any of the weaker banks should participate in such industrial financing. This new class of business requires much experience and an established policy of sound banking. It also demands considerable capital and a firm resistance to the speculative temptation which easily arises in a line of business where securities are created and sold. The bulk of the joint-stock banks in India are at present not ready for this activity and even the larger ones can cultivate it only slowly, with great caution and preferably under competent guidance as participants in strong syndicates. It is, however, possible that the Imperial Bank of India may as soon as a Reserve Bank comes into being, make a start in the above direction and give a lead. In fact some witnesses have proposed that when the Reserve Bank is established, the Imperial Bank of India should be converted into an industrial bank and the enormous experience and training of its officers should be directed to this branch of banking to the great benefit of the country. It must be recognized that this is a matter which entirely depends on the wishes of the shareholders of the Bank. We desire, therefore, to state that our recommendation is in the nature of a suggestion to the shareholders of the Imperial Bank of India and we are sure that if our suggestion is carried out, it would not only promote the general industrial development of the country but would also be equally profitable to the Bank itself.

392 The total capital and reserve of the Imperial Bank of India amount to Rs 11 crores. Similar figures for the nine big Indian joint-stock banks are Rs 7.5 crores. If 10 per cent of the total capital and reserves of these ten institutions are utilized in the manner suggested by us in the preceding paragraph, we hope that

with the co-operation of the public, which will, on account of the increasing association of banks with industrial shares and debentures, have greater confidence in these securities, it will be possible for the commercial banks in India to render to industries in India financial assistance of no mean magnitude

393 We have referred in a previous paragraph to the practice in the cotton mill industry in certain centres of India of depending on deposits from the public for financing block capital. We agree with the criticism that has been made that dependence on such deposits has its dangers, especially at a time of depression. We are of the opinion that capital which is required either permanently or for long periods should be raised by means of shares and debentures and not by means of deposits. It is therefore desirable that with the co-operation of banks these deposits should be replaced by share or debenture capital as soon as possible. We contemplate that these conversion operations should be slow and gradually undertaken by banks as part of the new line of business which we have recommended above.

394 We have heard it in evidence that it is necessary for a commercial bank to have technical experts on its staff to facilitate its operations with industrial concerns. We do not agree with this view, as it is not possible to cover the technique of all the industries by such an arrangement. We consider it useful that a commercial bank which has business relations with industrial firms should have somebody on the management, say an Assistant Manager, who is fully conversant with the financial side of industries in general. We understand the Imperial Bank of India have special departments in the local head offices for this purpose.

395 Witnesses have referred to the need for a sympathetic attitude on the part of banks towards industries. We realize that that is the secret of the German banking policy in respect of industries. German banks delegate a member of their management to act on the Board of Supervisors of companies with which they have business relation in order to maintain a close connection with those companies. The presence of these bank delegates is of considerable use to the industrial undertakings in view of their general experience in finance. It is also of advantage to the banks themselves as a measure of protection against losses. In fact the system of close intercourse between banks and industries thus brought about creates an atmosphere of mutual confidence with resultant benefit to both parties. It is, however, essential that the banks must not allow themselves to be drawn into liabilities and investments which are not compatible with sound banking. We consider that this successful German model may be copied by banks in India which may establish useful liaison between themselves and industries by appointing one of their Managing Directors or Managers as one of the directors of the industrial

concerns financed by them. Besides the furnishing of periodical balance sheets, and the representation of a member of the bank's management on the boards of companies, it is necessary, for the establishment of an effective liaison, that the entire banking business of an industrial concern requiring accommodation from a bank should be concentrated in the hands of one bank and not split up among several banks.

396 With the same end in view, viz., the creation of a sympathetic attitude on the part of banks towards industrial concerns, we recommend the appointment of local Advisory Committees in banks. We have already referred to the establishment of local boards by the Bank of India, which have replaced the Bank's staff in the matter of providing the Manager with reliable information regarding the status and financial position of the Bank's clients. We agree that such local boards are very useful and desirable not only to help the bank in assessing the financial position of its clients but also in removing from the minds of its clients the suspicion of unfair or unsympathetic treatment. In order not to weaken the responsibility of the management it is however necessary that these local boards should be invested with functions of a purely advisory character, and should be appointed by the Board of Directors of the bank. The Board of Directors will no doubt choose for the advisory boards leading men in local business and industry who, in their opinion, will command the confidence of the public and especially of the bank's clients.

397 We have referred to the complaint that banks in India insist on the full backing of liquid assets for their loans and take no account of valuable block capital. We have ascertained that banks in Germany make their advances on the security of block, the liquid assets of the industrial enterprises being left unencumbered as security for suppliers of raw materials to the industries. In Canada, banks are prohibited by law from advancing against immovable property and advances are secured by liquid assets, but banks are allowed to take real estate as additional cover to existing debt. The practice thus varies from one country to another, and no hard and fast rule can be laid down regarding the form of security for advances. Even in India the practice is not uniform in all parts. Joint-stock banks in the Punjab make advances on the security of block to the extent of 20 to 30 per cent of its estimated value, the limit having been 50 per cent before 1926. While we recognize that the question of deciding about the nature and adequacy of securities offered for loans should be left to the final decision of the banks themselves we sympathise with the witnesses who plead for a more liberal policy on the part of banks in the matter of advances. In particular, we consider that industrial concerns in India may reasonably expect to have the whole of their working capital supplied by commercial banks if adequate security to the

satisfaction of the banks is offered and if it is recognized by the industrial concern that the banks can demand repayment of the whole or part of the amount lent if they find it necessary to adopt such a course

398 It is further commonly complained that banks in India lend much less on personal security than in other countries, and that this practice is specially inconvenient to the cotton mills in Ahmedabad which take deposits from the public, as the grant of security by the mills in the form of hypothecation of stock would affect most prejudicially the whole fabric of the mills' credit. We have dealt at some length in another chapter of our report with the causes that have led banks in India to demand tangible security as cover for their advances. We wish to state here that according to our information the grant of advances on personal credit in western countries is limited to big firms of undisputed standing. We cannot therefore recommend an indiscriminate extension of the system of granting clean credits by banks in India, but we hope that with the increase in the number of similar large firms in India the reluctance of banks to lend without security will gradually diminish. We have had no evidence regarding the policy followed by the Imperial Bank of India and other joint-stock banks in the matter of advances to existing firms of standing and repute. If, however, these banks make no difference between borrowers of different standing and follow the same policy in either case, we must then plead for a change of policy on their part both in the interests of the industry and the interests of the good name of the banks, as otherwise the banks' methods might be stigmatized as primitive and undeveloped.

#### *Provision of long-term capital and the fiscal policy of Government*

399 In making our recommendations in the previous paragraphs as to the various directions in which existing banks in India can make themselves more serviceable to industries, we have more or less accepted the position that the industries in India generally need financial assistance for block and working capital over and above what is available to them at present. After studying the evidence placed before us and before the Provincial Committees, we have further come to the conclusion that as regards initial capital for promotion of industries the existing facilities are so inadequate that the proposals we have made in the previous paragraphs will not fully meet the situation. The public in India prefer to invest their savings in Government securities and in Municipal and Port Trust loans to investing in industrial securities. This state of affairs may be partly due to the principle of 'safety first' followed by Indian investors, but we attach great importance to the opinion of several witnesses which has been confirmed by those of our colleagues in the Committee who are bankers, that

confidence on the part of the investor in securities of the latter kind would have been greater, and consequently his willingness to invest in them, if the investor had the knowledge that decisions relating to industrial and fiscal matters rested solely and finally with the government of the country responsible to its legislature. We also consider that the high rates of interest paid on Government borrowings in recent years have been partly responsible for the relative popularity of Government securities as compared with industrial shares and debentures. It may be asked how a change in the present position regarding fiscal policy would help to direct capital to industries, if Government securities continued to carry high rates of interest as at present. We think that a nationalization of the country's fiscal policy would with similar reforms in other spheres of national life, enable industrial investments to become equally attractive with Government securities.

400 We give below figures showing the net capital invested annually in joint-stock companies from the year 1910-11. These have been taken from the statistics of paid-up capital of companies given in the publication of the Director General of Commercial Intelligence, Calcutta —

	Rs (Crores)
1910-11	2 6
1911-12 . . . . .	5 3
1912-13 . . . . .	2 7
1913-14 . . . . .	4 5
1914-15 . . . . .	1 2
1915-16 . . . . .	4 3
1916-17 . . . . .	5 0
1917-18 . . . . .	8 2
1918-19 . . . . .	7 5
1919-20 . . . . .	16 6
1920-21 . . . . .	41 2
1921-22 . . . . .	66 1
1922-23 . . . . .	29 2
1923-24 . . . . .	5 5
1924-25 . . . . .	10 2
1925-26 . . . . .	1 4
1926-27 . . . . .	— 05
1927-28 . . . . .	— 5
1928-29 . . . . .	2 9

It will be seen from the above figures that except in a few years of abnormal activity the funds available for promotion of companies have always been small and that the complaint that private subscription to the share capital of industrial undertakings is not adequate is fully justified. As stated in the earlier paragraphs of this chapter, the need of encouraging industrial development

has long been felt in India. In view of the unfavourable world outlook for agricultural produce, industrialization has been pressed in other countries in order "to strengthen the home market, improve trade balances and reinforce the very basis of the public revenue." These reasons, coupled with the necessity of making India more self-sufficient and less dependent on agriculture, make it imperative that some steps should be taken to mobilize her resources for the promotion of new industrial undertakings and for the expansion of existing ones.

### *Provincial Industrial Corporation*

401 We assume that the development of industries within their territories will be one of the functions which would vest in the provincial Governments under the constitution. We therefore recommend that, as an exception to what is stated in paragraph 390 above, if a provincial Government in the discharge of its responsibility for the development of industries within its territories finds it necessary to ensure the supply of financial facilities to industrial concerns, a Provincial Industrial Corporation, with branches, if necessary, and working with capital initially or permanently supplied by the provincial Government should be established. This recommendation is based on the assumption that the impending changes in the constitution of India will obviate any undue interference on the part of the central authority with the borrowing powers of the provincial Governments as may have taken place in the past. We note that five of the Provincial Banking Enquiry Committees have recommended the establishment of such institutions and have referred to particular types of industries which need financial assistance. Our proposals cover the case of such industries, but they are not necessarily restricted to them. We have carefully considered the question whether we should define in any way the classes or the character of industries which might expect to be financed by the proposed corporation, but we have come to the conclusion that such definition is not called for. Circumstances vary from province to province and we think it undesirable to fetter in any way the discretion of provincial Governments in a matter which is of fundamental importance from the point of view of provincial development by suggesting hard and fast criteria for the grant of assistance by the proposed corporation. At the same time, following the Indian Industrial Commission, we hold that the advisability of giving assistance in any particular case should depend on the extent to which the enterprise will be of benefit to the public, and will add to the productive power of the province and provide employment for its people, and not merely on its probable advantage to the promoters of the industry.

402 It is not possible for us to estimate what should be the initial share capital of the proposed corporation. The amount

would naturally depend on the conditions of each province. We should prefer that the Corporation obtains its share capital as far as possible from the public, but in view of the obvious limitations in the present circumstances of India, it is necessary that Government should take such portion of the share capital of the Corporation as cannot be raised by public subscription. We do not approve of the suggestion that Government should guarantee the share capital of the Corporation or the dividend on such capital, as in our opinion provision of share capital by the Government would give greater confidence to the public than either of the other two measures. Moreover, the shareholders in an ordinary Corporation should be prepared to go without dividends for a certain initial period and we do not think it is reasonable to expect Government to guarantee dividends on shares in regard to the Industrial Corporation. It might further be cheaper from the point of view of the Corporation that Government should borrow and supply any deficiency in share capital than that the Corporation should raise the whole of the share capital even with Government guarantee of dividend.

403 The share capital should be supplemented by debenture capital not exceeding at the outset twice the amount of the share capital. There should be no difficulty in raising this proportion of debenture capital if the investments of the Corporation are sound. If in order to attract investment in such debentures it is found necessary that Government should offer a guarantee of interest on them, Government may give a limited guarantee, *e.g.*, limited to the first issue of debenture or limited to a certain period of currency of the debenture issue.

404 We are aware that in connection with the issue of debentures by co-operative banks provincial Governments have undertaken to subscribe to the issue. We recommend, that they might follow a similar arrangement in the case of debenture issues of the Provincial Industrial Corporation and that they might, if necessary, purchase a portion of these issues until a regular market has been created for them.

405 We have already referred to the suggestion by some witnesses that the debentures of the Industrial Corporation should be classed among trustee securities. We do not support the proposal until the results of the working of the Corporation are known for a certain period, say five or ten years. The question should then be examined by Government in due course.

406 The Industrial Corporation we have proposed may secure additional resources by taking long-term deposits from the public, but an immediate beginning with deposits for less than two years is undesirable, as it is our intention that the proposed Corporation should specialize in the provision of long-term capital to industries which should continue to obtain their working

capital from existing institutions. When long-term deposits are taken, the money thus acquired should not be lent out for longer periods than the currency of the deposits. We do not think that these restrictions would in any way hamper industries for whose benefit the Corporation is being established. On the other hand, we attach great importance to the fact that an institution working with special patronage from Government should not compete with private joint-stock banks to whose development in the future we are looking forward.

407 In order to safeguard the interests of Government, we recommend that in cases where Government subscribes to the share capital or debenture capital of the Corporation, or guarantees the interest on its debentures, it should be entitled to be represented on the Board of Directors of the Corporation during the continuance of such interest in, and liability for, the concern. We have carefully considered the question whether the Government representative in such cases should be invested with the power of veto in the deliberations of the Board. We do not approve of such a provision. We think, however, that should a provincial Government so desire, the Government Director may be entitled to ask for a reference to the Government if he does not agree with the views of the majority of the Board in regard to important matters like increase or reduction of capital, granting of loans in any particular cases and appointment of chief officials of the Corporation.

408 In our opinion, it is not advisable to fetter the discretion of the management of the new Industrial Corporation in regard to the grant of advances in the manner suggested by several witnesses before us. But we recommend that by-laws should be framed by the Corporation defining the conditions under which financial facilities may be granted by it to industrial concerns in order to ensure that the business of the Corporation is done in a fair and impartial manner, and that so long as Government has an interest in the Corporation, either on account of its holding a portion of the share or debenture capital or its guaranteeing interest on the debentures, such by-laws should require the sanction of the Government.

### *An all-India Industrial Corporation*

409 There are and will be certain industries mostly of a national or important character the development of which will fall within the functions of the Federal or the Central Government and not of the provincial Governments. Further, provincial Governments may themselves seek in certain other cases the formation of an All-India Corporation to secure proper liaison in the matter of finance, and a direct connection with the large spending depart-



ments of the Central Government, as well as direct correlation for the industries as a whole with railway rates, customs, stores purchase and other policies of the Central Government. There must therefore be cases in which the vehicle of giving financial aid to industries should preferably be an All-India Industrial Corporation. As the Central Government will practically have no territory of its own and as the collective benefit from the All-India Corporation will flow back to the provinces, the general economic considerations leading to the establishment of such an All-India institution may find strength from the support of the Provincial Governments. We should like it to be clearly understood that our recommendations do not rule out the formation of such an institution when its need is established to the satisfaction of the Federal or the Central Legislature. Pending the formation of such an institution, we contemplate that the provincial Corporations should for matters of common interest combine into a Central Association like the Central Association for banks which we have recommended elsewhere.

#### POINTS OF DIFFERENCE WITH FOREIGN BANKING EXPERTS

410 It remains for us to comment on a few points in the separate report of the foreign banking experts which relate to certain conclusions of ours in this chapter.

411 The experts do not subscribe to the statement in paragraph 397 that industrial concerns in India may reasonably expect to have the whole of their working capital supplied by commercial banks if adequate security to the satisfaction of the banks is offered. They also consider the use of the expressions 'ideal arrangement' and 'minimum working capital' used in paragraph 390 as too weak. After our discussion with them we feel that there is no difference between their views and ours on any question of principle. As regards the use of the expression 'minimum working capital' we find that on page 9 of Karin Kock's "Study of Interest Rates" (Stockholm Economic Studies, No. 1), reference is made to the demand for working capital over and above the *minimum* required for financing the minimum amount of stocks or raw material held in the ordinary course of business, which demand is usually covered by short-term borrowing. We do not therefore see anything "weak" in our use of the expression. In the course of discussion it also seemed clear that after a concern had been working for some time it might have considerable reserves in the nature of investments against which it might quite legitimately obtain the whole of its working capital from banks, and none of our banker colleagues considers that there is anything objectionable in such a course.

412 The foreign banking experts consider our proposed scheme of Provincial Industrial Corporations as unsound and suggest that the work of the Corporations should be restricted to pioneer enterprises of a non-competitive character, the opening up of mineral resources and large public utilities, principally electrical power schemes. In their opinion small industries should be removed from the scope of the financial assistance to be given by the Corporation, and financial assistance by Government to the Corporation should be confined to the taking up of the share capital. As regards the scope of the proposed Corporations, we would observe in the first place that the experts have not given due consideration to the unanimous opinion of the Provincial Committees, and the need brought out in their reports, for financial assistance to existing small and middle-sized industries. In the second place, the experts seem to have overlooked the fact, or what is more probable they were unaware of it, that the Industrial Commission of 1916—18, after a careful study of the need for industrial development in India, recommended in paragraphs 293 to 301 of their report that Government loans to industries, which would according to them be replaced eventually by loans from industrial banks, should be given to small and cottage industries, to middle-class industries, as well as to large industrial undertakings. In the case of the last named categories, they observed —

“The advisability of giving such aid depends on the extent to which the starting of the enterprise in question will be of benefit to the public, and not merely on its probable advantage to the promoters of the industry. Thus, the starting of a new or the improvement of an existing industry, when such a measure is required to supply an existing deficiency in the interests of national safety, is clearly a case for direct aid. There may also be a few cases where a new industry or process will have such an important bearing on the economic development of the country as to deserve Government help. Finally, it may even be found that the extension of an existing industry to a new locality will benefit local consumers or producers so markedly as to merit Government assistance.”

We prefer to be guided in the matter by the conclusions of the Indian Industrial Commission. In the course of discussions with us, it appeared that some at any rate of the experts had no objection in principle to the industrial bank extending its operations over a wider range of industries, but they were apprehensive that this would result in risks which it would be unwise for an industrial corporation to undertake at the earlier stages of its existence. In their separate report, the experts base their objection to our

proposals on the ground that these would involve the taxpayers in serious losses. We consider that the interests of the taxpayers would be more effectively safeguarded by the provincial Governments responsible, as they will be in the near future, to the elected representatives of these taxpayers than by the imposition of arbitrary limitations on the operations of the industrial corporations, which may have the effect of defeating the object for which we want to see them established. We have already recommended that by-laws should be framed by the corporations to define the conditions under which financial facilities may be granted by them to industrial concerns, and that such by-laws should require the sanction of Government so long as Government has an interest in the corporation. We have no doubt that in framing the by-laws some general provisions will be incorporated on the lines indicated at the end of paragraph 408 above, and that all proposals for financial assistance from industrial concerns would be carefully and fully scrutinized from every point of view by the Corporations and that they would also take the customary precautions against loss which any sound banking concern would naturally take.

413 As regards the actual forms of financial assistance that Government should give to the Industrial Corporation we have proposed that subscription to the share capital should be limited to that portion which cannot be raised from the public, and that Government may, in order to attract investment in debentures issued by the Corporation offer a limited guarantee of interest on such debentures and also take up a portion of the debentures until a regular market for them has been created. The suggestion of the experts that Government should not give any assistance in respect of debenture capital does not take into account the special Indian conditions. It has been our experience in connection with co-operative banks that the two forms of Government assistance proposed by us in connection with debenture capital are valuable in creating confidence in the minds of the investing public. Here too, therefore, we are unable to modify our conclusions.

#### GOVERNMENT AND INDUSTRIES

414 Before we conclude this chapter, it is necessary to describe the part played by Government in the provision of finance for industrial concerns.

In three provinces, there are statutory provisions for the grant of assistance by Government to industries, namely, the State Aid to Industries Act in Madras and Bihar and Orissa and the Industrial Loans Act in the Punjab. All these Acts were passed in 1923. Under the Madras Act, Government can aid new and nascent industries or industries newly introduced into an area or cottage industries, provided that the concerns are registered in

India as rupee companies and comply with the Government rules regarding the constitution of the Board of Directors. The assistance consists of loans, guarantee of cash credits with banks, taking up shares or debentures, guaranteeing interest on capital, grant on favourable terms of land or raw material and grant of subsidies for research. The Bihar and Orissa Act is modelled on the lines of the Madras Act and its object, apart from propaganda, demonstration and technical assistance, is to give long-term finance to suitable industrial enterprises, in the shape of direct advances at low rates of interest, subscription to debentures, guarantee of cash credits with banks, supply of machinery on hire purchase basis and granting of land and other Government property on favourable terms. Applications for assistance for Rs 10,000 in any of these forms have to be advertised and objections invited in three successive issues of the local official Gazette and the loan has to be formally sanctioned by a majority of the members of the Board of Industries. This publicity and formality, considered necessary in the interests of the tax-payer, is stated to affect the credit of the applicant which is further damaged if the application is refused. Owing to lack of technical and engineering qualifications on the part of the Director of Industries and his staff, and the incompleteness of the enquiries conducted by the Board of Industries whose members are all busy men, it is stated that serious losses have been incurred. The rate of interest on advances is  $6\frac{1}{2}$  per cent. per annum, and loans cannot be given to the old established industries unless they have been started in a new area. In the Punjab, loans under the Industrial Loans Act are generally limited to Rs 10,000, and only twice has this limit been exceeded. The minimum loan is Rs 500 the rate of interest 6 per cent per annum, and the maximum period of loan 10 years, though the period actually allowed is only 5 years on the average.

415 The total loans granted or guarantees made by the Madras Government amount to Rs 8 lakhs, of which about a sum of Rs 4 lakhs of loans including interest given to one paper mill has had to be written off. It is reported that prospects of recoveries in certain other cases are also doubtful. The Madras Committee add that Government's attempts to assist industries have met with little response and less success. The total amount actually paid or guaranteed up to date in Bihar and Orissa is also about Rs 8 lakhs of which a sum of Rs 3 lakhs has proved to be irrecoverable. The Committee add that the Director of Industries in the province expressed a desire before them to be relieved of the heavy banking responsibility placed on him in the matter of the working of the Act. In the Punjab, the total amount of loans outstanding at the end of 1929-30 is reported to be Rs 2.53 lakhs. The Committee find it difficult to say if the working of the Act is likely to involve the Government in financial loss.

416 Although there is no Act in Bombay corresponding to those in Madras, Bihar and Orissa and the Punjab, the Government of Bombay finance industries through co-operative societies by means of loans or supplies of implements on the hire-purchase system. The Bombay Committee report that during the last seven years loans were given to two concerns, namely, Rs 6 lakhs to a sugar factory and Rs 5 lakhs to a weaving factory. The Committee recommend that there should be an Act for State aid to industries so that the policy of assisting industries which hold out a reasonable prospect of success and which are likely to assist in the economic development of the country may be pursued systematically, for this purpose the Department of Industries should be endowed with sufficient resources, charged with definite functions, and invested with authority to carry out the industrial policy of the Government. They also suggest that there should be close co-operation in regard to the development of industries between the Department of Industries, the Department of Agriculture and the Co-operative Department. Facilities at State expense for research into processes of production and methods of organization are also recommended.

417 The Bengal Committee also propose that a State Aid to Industries Act for the province should be passed without further delay on the lines of the Acts in Madras and Bihar and Orissa but with modifications on more liberal terms. A Bill with this object in view is at present before the local Legislative Council. The Central Provinces Committee too have supported the passing of a State Aid to Industries Act on the lines of the Bill that recently failed to materialize into law, which would give wide powers for granting credit facilities to deserving medium-sized as well as big industries. The Central Areas Committee also have suggested that the local Governments should extend to these areas the benefits of the Madras State Aid to Industries Act with the addition of a provision for granting, free of charge, or on favourable terms, the services of Government officials and experts for starting, and offering advice in connection with, the industries. They have added that the possibilities of developing small industries should be explored by the Board of Economic Development which they have proposed. In view of the evidence of the Director of Industries, the Bihar and Orissa Committee have recommended that the Industries Department might share with banks and approved *shroffs* the task of examining proposals for the provision of credit to industries, as well as the risk of loss after credit has been provided, and that the banks and *shroffs* might receive a commission for this assistance including the sharing of risks.

418 The State Aid to Industries Act deals with two forms of assistance to industries, *viz*, provision of banking and credit facilities and grant of other forms of State aid such as subsidies, grants

of land, etc. We, as a Banking Committee, are concerned only with the provision of the first form of assistance and from this point of view, we approve of the recommendations of the Provincial Committees referred to above for the enactment of provincial legislation on the lines of the Madras State Aid to Industries Act to provide credit facilities to new and nascent industries or industries newly introduced into an area or cottage industries. We further recommend that any Government assistance in regard to provision of capital under such legislation should be given through the Industrial Corporation, if and when one is established in any province on the lines suggested by us. We have been influenced in the latter recommendation by the evidence of the Director of Industries in Bihar and Orissa, referred to above.

#### DIFFERENCE OF OPINION WITHIN THE COMMITTEE

419 In his dissenting minute our colleague, Mr N R Sarker, has disagreed with some of our recommendations on the subject of the financing of industries. We find that the main points of difference between him and ourselves are as follows —

- (1) Mr Sarker wants that we should *unconditionally* recommend the establishment of Provincial Industrial Corporations, at any rate in certain provinces, instead of making our recommendation in this respect dependent on the circumstances mentioned by us in paragraph 401, namely, if a provincial Government in the discharge of its responsibilities for the development of industries within its territories finds it necessary to ensure the supply of financial facilities to industrial concerns.
- (2) While we should like to leave the details of the scheme of Provincial Corporations to be worked out by the provincial ministers, in consultation with the provincial legislatures concerned, Mr Sarker would like us to lay down some broad rules for the guidance of these authorities, both in regard to the functions and business of the Corporation.
- (3) Mr Sarker does not agree with us in regard to the recommendation in paragraph 403 of our report in regard to the proportion of debenture capital to share capital.

We have given careful consideration to Mr Sarker's arguments, but see no reason for modifying our conclusions.

## CHAPTER XVII.

### FINANCING OF FOREIGN TRADE

#### GENERAL

420 The total volume of the import and export trade of India has amounted in recent years to a large sum in the neighbourhood of Rs 600 crores a year. The countries which participated in this trade to the extent of Rs 10 crores or over in 1928-29 were —

	Crores of rupees
United Kingdom . . . . .	183
United States of America . . . . .	56
Japan . . . . .	51
Germany . . . . .	47
Netherlands and Dutch East Indies . . . . .	30
France . . . . .	22
Italy . . . . .	22
Belgium . . . . .	20
Ceylon . . . . .	16
Straits Settlements . . . . .	13
Australia . . . . .	15

421 The financing of this foreign trade generally consists of two operations, *viz* —

- (1) the financing from the Indian port to the foreign port or *vice versa*, and
- (2) the financing from, or to, the Indian port to, or from, the up-country distributing or collecting centre

422 With regard to item (1) in the previous paragraph the actual forms in which financial accommodation is given are described in paragraphs 427 and 429. The bulk of this business, which consists mainly of dealing in foreign bills of exchange or foreign remittances, is in the hands of non-Indian banks, popularly known as exchange banks. As stated in paragraph 42, the number of these banks is eighteen. Two of these, *viz*, Messrs Thomas Cook and Son (Bankers) and the American Express Company Incorporated, do not play an important part in connection with the financing of foreign trade as they deal mostly with tourist traffic. Of the rest, five have a considerable portion of their business in India, *viz*, the Chartered Bank of India, Australia and China, the National Bank of India, the Mercantile Bank of India, the P and O Banking Corporation and the Eastern Bank.

The remaining eleven are branches or agencies of large banking corporations doing a major portion of their business abroad. Eight banks have their head offices in England, three in Japan, two in Holland, two in the United States of America, one in France; one in Portugal, and one in Hongkong. The various classes of business undertaken by these banks generally are given in paragraph 42.

423 There is no provision, statutory or otherwise, which lays an obligation on these exchange banks to furnish to any authority in India any figures relating to their business in India. For purposes of the Statistical Tables relating to Banks in India, a publication issued by the Director General of Commercial Intelligence, figures of Indian deposits and Indian cash balances are furnished by the exchange banks confidentially to the India Office, which consolidates these figures and supplies the consolidated figures for all banks to that officer. The following statement gives the figures so made available for a series of years ---

	Number of banks	Capital Reserve and Rest	Deposits in India	Cash balance in India
		£ (1,000)	£ (1,000)	£ (1,000)
1913 (Pre war year)	12	37,825	23,276	4,411
1919	11	53,070	55,769	22,487
1920	15	90,217	56,105	18,881
1921	17	111,632	56,397	17,675
1922	18	112,221	55,038	12,132
1923	18	140,103	51,332	10,859
1924	18	130,464	52,976	12,275
1925	18	138,311	52,909	7,062
1926	18	148,003	53,658	8,046
1927	18	180,919	51,647	6,098
1928	18	187,923	53,354	6,042

N B — Deposits and Cash balances in India have been converted into sterling at the rate of 1s 6d a rupee.

424 There is no legal bar to an Indian joint-stock bank undertaking the first of the operations mentioned in paragraph 421. In the days of the East India Company this business was mostly in the hands of Agency houses referred to in paragraph 24 and of the



banks started in India under their aegis. One of the existing exchange banks, the National Bank of India, was actually established in India with a rupee capital, though soon after its establishment it converted its capital into sterling and transferred its headquarters to London so as to be at the centre of international finance, following in this respect the footsteps of some of the great merchant banking houses of the Continent in the eighteenth century. We also understand that some of the now defunct Indian joint-stock banks have at different times engaged largely in the business of foreign exchange. For example, the Alliance Bank of Simla, Limited, was known to have developed a large foreign exchange business before its collapse in 1923, operating in London firstly through correspondents like Parr's Bank and Boulton Brothers, and later on through a branch of its own. During its six years of independent existence, the Tata Industrial Bank, Limited, also engaged freely in foreign exchange. At the present moment, however, only two or three Indian joint-stock banks take an insignificant part in this business. We have made enquiries, and discussed with many of our witnesses, the reasons why the business has now become practically a monopoly of non-Indian banks. The four main reasons given are

- (a) the competition of well established non-Indian exchange banks with large capital and reserves,
- (b) the absence of branches of Indian banks at London and other important foreign centres which precludes them from taking part in arbitrage and direct exchange transactions,
- (c) the small profits now realized from the business and
- (d) the full employment of the resources of Indian banks in internal business of a more profitable character

We may quote in this connection at length the views of a prominent Indian joint-stock banker —

“The chief difficulties in the way of an Indian bank opening a branch in London for exchange business are as follows :—

- (1) The bank must have a large capital, say over Rs. 2 crores, in order to command credit in the London discount market as well as with the exchange banks doing business in India
- (2) To open a branch in London and maintain it on sound and proper lines, the institution should be in a position to bear a loss of Rs. 5,000 or more every month for a period of at least three years on

account of working expenses and other unforeseen losses which might naturally result for want of practical experience. To expect the branch to be self-supporting within three years of its existence would be too optimistic a view to adopt considering the strong position of the exchange banks and the very narrow margin on which the branch must work to attract business.

- (3) The branch must have a trained and reliable staff with some knowledge of international exchange.
- (4) The floating resources of the bank should be large enough to permit a big turn-over.
- (5) The political movement in India would affect the banking and trading facilities which an Indian bank could expect from British and foreign banks in London and at other places.
- (6) The bank should have its head office in London rather than in India as its chances of securing import and export bills as well as bills for collection would then be greater and, being on the spot, the bank would be more conversant with the international monetary situation.
- (7) The bank could hardly expect to receive in London local deposits or other business from the British public or merchants and manufacturers. Even banks like Chartered, National and Mercantile are not much patronised by the public in London, and are chiefly known to business firms trading with the East.

Some of the above difficulties are by nature such that they cannot be removed by Government interference or legislation. They could only be solved by mutual trust and good-will. But, besides the above difficulties, exchange banks in India, British and foreign, have been so well established and so well provided with funds through their Indian branches and the London discount market at relatively cheap rates that it would be extremely difficult for an institution outside their circle to compete with any measure of success, at least for a time after the starting of the exchange business. Government, however, could encourage approved Indian banks to establish branches in London by giving them a part of their exchange business, and by lending part of their surplus funds at cheap rates."

425 The Imperial Bank of India is prohibited by its charter from dealing in bills of exchange payable outside India, and is permitted to make remittances only for the *bona fide* personal requirements of its constituents

426 The exchange banks have branches at several up-country places, details of which are given in paragraph 455. In the case of trade between these places and foreign countries, it is possible for a merchant to obtain financial facilities from an exchange bank to cover the second part of the operation mentioned in paragraph 421, as well as the first part by a single transaction. For example, in the case of goods imported to Delhi, the inward bill drawn by the foreign exporter is sent to the branch of the exchange bank in Delhi, and is collected in due course from the importer there and the proceeds remitted abroad. Similarly in the case of exports from, say, Amritsar, the Indian exporter can draw a bill on the foreign buyer under a credit opened by the buyer, and sell it direct to the branch of the exchange bank at Amritsar. We understand that Indian importers and exporters prefer the financing to be arranged by a single agency as this arrangement is found cheaper by them, and we would in this connection invite a reference to para 106 of the report of the Punjab Banking Committee. In up-country places, however, where there are no branches of exchange banks the importers or exporters must make separate arrangements for the finance of the movement of their goods from or to the Indian ports through joint-stock banks or other agencies. The financing of the business in such cases falls definitely into the two operations mentioned in paragraph 421. In regard to the second of these operations, in the case of exports, the Imperial Bank of India, the Indian joint-stock banks and the indigenous bankers take part in the financing of the movement of the produce from the collecting centres to the ports, and the financial facilities given consist of purchasing demand drafts drawn by the exporter's agents on their principal's firm at the port. As regards imports, the movement of imported goods from the importing point to the distributing centres in India is generally financed by commission agents, *shroffs* and Indian joint-stock banks.

## MECHANISM OF FINANCE

### *Exports*

427 When an exporter sells to a foreign buyer, say in the United Kingdom, credits are usually opened with the London banks and finance houses and advised to India through the medium of the exchange banks. The bills against such credits are drawn principally at 3 months' sight, though longer usance paper is sometimes negotiated, and they are chiefly documentary. The bills

may be D A or D P, the general practice being to draw D A bills. The rate for a 3 months' bill is higher than that for a demand bill to allow for interest during the usance of the bill, this rate being regulated by the rate of interest ruling at the centre on which the bill is drawn. These bills, whatever their usance, are sent to London and presented for acceptance, and after endorsement by the exchange banks in London are usually discounted in the open market. For purposes of rediscount of paper with the Bank of England, two British signatures on such paper are necessary. In this way the exchange banks receive back in sterling the equivalent of their rupee payments in India. At times it may suit the exchange banks to hold the purchased bills until maturity, *e.g.*, if the banks are well supplied with funds and there is no immediate prospect of the money being profitably employed, the bills will be held in portfolio until due date, but if trade is brisk or money is tight, the bills may be discounted, even at some sacrifice in the rate. Should the bills be sent for collection through exchange banks, the Indian exporter has to wait for the maturity of the bill before he gets the value in rupees. This practice is not common.

428 The bulk of the bills between India and Europe, America and the Colonies is in sterling. The drafts from and to Japan are in terms of yen while with China, they are in terms of rupees.

### *Imports*

429 As regards the import trade, the bulk of it from Western countries is financed as follows —

(a) by 60 days sight D P drafts drawn on the Indian importer,

(b) by London Banks' acceptance of "house" paper. By this expression is meant a documentary bill drawn by, say, a London exporting house on the London office of a foreign bank which accepts the bill and returns it to the drawer who in turn discounts it in the London Money Market. The accepting bank forwards the relative documents to its branch abroad for collection of the proceeds of the goods from the exporting firms' foreign office and a remittance is sent to London at or before the maturity of the bill.

Both instruments are generally drawn in sterling. In the former case interest is payable, usually at 6 per cent, from the date of the bill to the approximate date of arrival of the proceeds of the bill in London. In the latter, the paper is discounted in the London Market at the prevailing discount rate, which is invariably lower than the rate of interest charged on 60 days sight D P drafts, and importers who have London houses of the standing to arrange for acceptance of their paper benefit

thereby As, however, 60 days' sight D P sterling drafts are generally used in connection with imports by Indians, it will be seen that in both exports and imports by Indians the adjustment of interest between producer and consumer is effected in India and interest has to be taken into consideration at this end in fixing prices in both cases Imports of sugar from eastern countries are financed by bills in sterling, but a fair amount of business is done with Java in guilders

### *Rupee import bills*

430 It will be noticed that the bulk of both exports and imports is financed by means of sterling bills In the case of exports, it is fairly clear that so long as credits can be opened in London, it must be to the advantage of the Indian trader to be able to draw bills on London, and have access thereby to the discount facilities of the biggest international market in the world In the case of imports, however, a comparatively small amount of the trade is financed by bills which get the benefit of the London discount market The question, therefore, arises whether from India's point of view, it would not be advantageous to introduce rupee bills in connection with the import trade of India The representatives of the exchange banks did not see any material difference between the sterling and rupee bills from their own point of view, though from the point of view of promoting a bill-market in India, they agreed that rupee bills might be useful, their adoption being a matter between buyer and seller In fact in the import trade rupee bills are already in existence in some cases They pointed out that the bulk of the import bills coming out are for relatively small amounts and that so far as those bills at any rate are concerned, the chances of creating a discount market are not very great If the Indian importer insisted that the foreign exporter should draw on him in rupees the exchange banks, they said, would certainly have no objection It was pointed out by some witnesses that manufacturers were now very keen on disposing of their products and that it should be a good opportunity for Indian importers to take advantage of the present keen competition among sellers to get them to accept the proposed change in the system in so far as imports are concerned

In their memorandum on the Money Market, the foreign experts have stated as follows in regard to this question —

“At the present stage we consider the improvement of the inland bill and money market as the fundamental and primary problem This problem must be solved before progress to an appreciable extent can be

expected in the use of rupee bills for settling foreign transactions. The question as to what currency the bill will be drawn in, forms part of the conditions which have to be agreed upon by buyers and sellers. It needs no comment that they will try to find the cheapest solution. Under normal circumstances the currency of that country will be preferred where the lowest rate of interest prevails and the money and bill market is so well developed that no doubt can exist about discount facilities being available at any time during the currency of the bill. These conditions are lacking in India. As long as this is the case, trade and industry will be hampered and the cost of imported goods raised by enforcing sellers of foreign goods to draw rupee bills."

This opinion assumes that the import trade of India is financed in the cheapest way with the help of the London money and bill market. The assumption is open to criticism. As pointed out in a previous paragraph, the bulk of the Indian import trade is financed by 60 days' sight D/P drafts drawn on the Indian importer, and the latter has to pay interest, usually at 6 per cent from the date of the bill to the approximate date of the arrival of the proceeds of the bill in London. This rate is raised when the Bank of England rate goes above 5 per cent and for the greater part of the year 1929 was 7 per cent, having been as high as  $7\frac{1}{2}$  per cent from the middle of October till the end of November, during which period the Bank of England Rate was  $6\frac{1}{2}$  per cent. The rate of interest payable by the Indian importer in respect of the import bills which are now being drawn in sterling currency is thus not based on the open market rate of discount in London. So long as this state of things continues, we think that for the import business of India, which on private account amounts approximately to Rs. 230 crores a year, the natural bill market is in India and not outside India. We agree with the suggestion of the foreign experts that the exchange banks should consider the possibility of changing their present custom to the extent that they should be prepared to accept the bills, instead of purchasing them, in the same way as house paper of a London export house is now accepted by them and the bills could then be discounted in the London market as described in paragraph 429 (b). If this suggestion could be followed, and the benefit of the cheap funds in the London discount market is passed on to the Indian importer, then we agree that any artificial measures for the introduction of rupee bills would be of doubtful advantage to India. We commend this suggestion to the exchange banks for their careful consideration, and we hope that it will be possible for them to get over the difficulty that the majority of Indian import bills

are for small amounts. We also hope that when the Reserve Bank is established and the average interest rate in India is brought down by effective measures on the part of the banks to deal with the seasonal stringency in the money market, the Indian money and discount market will compare favourably with that at centres outside India, and that trade will have recourse to both kinds of bills, rupee bills and bills in foreign currencies, according to its convenience. If in the meantime importers in India find it convenient to have the foreign exporter draw on them in rupee bills, we trust that, in view of the fact that the representatives of the exchange banks have already stated that the banks would have no objection to the introduction of rupee bills for import business, the exchange banks would also co-operate and encourage any efforts in this direction, with a view to developing a bill-market in India.

### *Acceptance credit*

431 In America, the arrangement for financing the export trade used to be somewhat similar to that obtaining in India, but after the establishment of the Federal Reserve Banks the use of the dollar acceptance is said to have been developed and the simplicity of the system to have promoted the foreign export trade of America. Sir Basil Blackett, in his memorandum submitted to the Committee, has explained how in the face of world competition India cannot afford to overlook any improved method of handling her annual production of agriculture and other commodities, and has suggested in this connection the development of the practice of drawing rupee bills both in regard to exports and imports and the use of the rupee acceptance credit in connection therewith. The question of creating rupee bills in regard to imports has been dealt with in the previous paragraph. As regards exports, Sir Basil Blackett is of opinion that the system of bank acceptance credit can be made to serve in providing the finance of India's export commodities which require extensive accommodation during the entire season, pending such actual time as shipments are made and sterling or other foreign currency sold to the exchange banks. At present, the finance obtained by the merchant is by means of a cash credit at a high average rate of interest with the added condition in some cases that interest will be charged on at least half the maximum amount of the loan whether fully availed of or not. Sir Basil Blackett has pointed out that the inelasticity of this system must be felt as a hardship by the exporting community and that it would be to the advantage of that community if in place of this cash credit system the system of acceptance credit were introduced, under which the exporter could arrange with a bank in India for an acceptance credit to be established in his favour. This would enable the exporter to draw on the bank for the amount of the

acceptance and would make it possible for him during the life of these drafts to send the goods forward, drawing an export draft on his customer and offer it for sale to his banker in liquidation of the obligation at the maturity of the rupee draft to which the banker has given his acceptance under the credit. As a result of this arrangement, Sir Basil expects that the financial burden placed at present on the exporter during the period his merchandise is stored and is awaiting an opportunity for shipment abroad, would be considerably lightened and that the present restrictions on the volume of his business would be reduced. We are told that in inland banking in India the acceptance credit is in use only to a limited extent and the reasons for this are stated to be the following —

- (a) the practical non-existence of documents of title such as warehouse warrants and railway receipts in suitable form,
- (b) the efficiency of the cash credit system which is much greater than would appear from Sir Basil Blckett's memorandum,
- (c) the high stamp duty on bills, and
- (d) the difficulty of introducing a form of bill which would be accepted throughout India

If the difficulties in (a), (c) and (d) could be overcome and a true banker's bank was brought into existence along with an organization of merchant bankers and acceptance houses, we think that it would be possible to establish a wider use of the system of acceptance credit.

432 In paragraph 421 we have mentioned that the financing of the import and export trade might be considered under two main operations. In paragraph 426 we have briefly indicated the part played by the exchange banks in regard to the second of these operations, and we have dealt at some length with the mechanism of the first operation in paragraphs 427 and 429. As a good deal of discussion has centred round the former operation, it may be convenient to deal with it further in somewhat greater detail.

433 As regards the export trade, the movement of the produce from the village to the *mandi*, as already described in chapter XIII, is financed by *zemindars*, moneylenders, indigenous banks and bankers and co-operative societies. The Imperial Bank of India and the Indian joint-stock banks also help in financing in villages as they lend money in *mandis* against pledge of stocks in the godowns of commission agents and exporting houses, the commission agents and exporting houses in turn lending to village producers against the latter's contracts to deliver produce at subsequent dates. The exchange banks have no direct part in the movement of produce at this stage, but when



the produce is moved from the *mandi* to the exporting ports, the exchange banks along with the Imperial Bank of India and the Indian joint-stock banks take a part in the financing of the movement. The indigenous banks and some of the exchange banks make advances against produce in godowns, but the exchange banks usually limit their accommodation to such firms as do export business. In *mandis* the exporters usually take delivery of the produce through a *shroff* (guarantee broker) who finances the payments and receives a commission of  $\frac{1}{4}$  to  $\frac{1}{2}$  per cent for the transaction. The *shroff* is paid for the price of the commodity by means of demand drafts drawn on the exporter's firm at the port and signed by the firm's representative at the larger centres. These drafts as already stated are purchased by the Imperial Bank of India, the indigenous banks and the exchange banks, and the *shroff* thus receives funds to finance further transactions.

44 Turning to the import trade, we have mentioned that the movement of imported goods from the importing centres to the distributing centres in India is generally financed by commission agents, *shroffs* and Indian joint-stock banks. At inland importing centres like Amritsar, Cawnpore and Delhi the import bills are mostly D/P and are paid on or before due date by the importers, who in case of need may obtain facilities for payment of the bills by means of loans granted by the exchange or joint-stock banks. The loans are given against a margin of 20 per cent of the value of the goods *plus* all import charges, and usually carry interest at about the Imperial Bank rate.

After taking delivery of the goods, the importers sell them to dealers either for cash or on credit from 2 to 4 months with interest at 6 per cent or more per annum. The wholesale dealers in the larger distributing centres similarly deal with the retail dealers in the villages by selling to them either for cash or on credit. In the latter transactions, commission agents play an important part, they buy for the larger village dealers who in turn sell to the smaller village dealers who sell to the ryots against their promise to pay when the crops are sold. The rates charged by the commission agents for this finance vary from 6 to 9 per cent.

45 We have stated in paragraph 42 that the exchange banks also finance imports of bullion, both gold and silver. It may not be out of place here to describe the method of financing followed by these banks. Most of the bullion is imported into Bombay by the dealers, the majority of whom are members of the Bombay Bullion Exchange, Limited. These dealers send orders for their requirements either direct or through exchange banks or brokers. The orders are placed generally in London, although, in the case of silver, orders are

sent to New York direct to a certain extent. As soon as an advice is received from London or New York of the purchase of bullion, a remittance is arranged through an exchange bank and a contract for the purchase of bullion is made and both the exchange bank and the dealer abide by its terms. The contract is made with the exchange bank by the dealer through certified brokers. The bank in Bombay is given written instructions by the dealer whom and when to pay in London or New York, as the case may be, against complete shipping documents, and it instructs its office or agents to make the necessary payment. On arrival of the bullion in Bombay, the bank clears the consignment and stores it in its strong rooms and the dealer has to arrange to take delivery within seven days. Interest at the Bank of England rate, subject to a minimum of 4 per cent per annum, has to be paid by the dealer to the bank from the date of payment in London or New York to the date of payment in Bombay. Loans against bullion are given both by the joint-stock banks and exchange banks. The rates charged approximate to the ruling rates for call funds in the market. The banks require a margin of 5 per cent in the case of gold and about Rs 5 per 100 tolas in the case of silver, though the margin in the case of silver varies according to the market conditions and movement in prices.

#### EXISTING FACILITIES

436 We have been informed by the representatives of the Exchange Banks' Association that merchants are at present able to obtain from the exchange banks all the assistance they require to finance their import and export trade, provided they are of good reputation and possess means in reasonable proportion to the trade that they do. They have added that it is only in cases where banks are unable to ascertain even approximately the financial status of a merchant that the latter finds difficulty in securing the accommodation he may need for his business. In their view, no solvent business-man should experience any difficulty, provided he furnished the necessary information in the form of a balance-sheet. They have therefore suggested that all merchants in their own interests should adopt the business-like practice of having their books regularly audited by a recognized accountant and a balance sheet in correct form drawn up from time to time. According to them, the European firms invariably have their balance-sheets audited by a Chartered Accountant, but it is exceptional among Indians to have their balance-sheets similarly prepared and audited. This opinion is generally endorsed by the European Chambers of Commerce.

437 The Indian Chambers of Commerce and several Indian witnesses consider that the financing of the foreign trade of India

is from the Indian point of view in a most unsatisfactory condition. The main reasons for this contrary view held by the Indian witnesses have been stated to be as follows —

- (a) The share of Indians in the foreign trade of India is, according to the Indian Chamber of Commerce, Calcutta,\* less than 15 per cent of the total. This, they allege, involves the loss to India of a large amount in the shape of commission, brokerage, and insurance, paid to non-Indians. It is believed that this preponderance of the non-Indian element in the foreign trade of India is due to the large facilities given by the non-Indian exchange banks to their nationals operating in India.
- (b) At present in financing the external trade of India, the exchange banks have almost a monopoly. There are only two or three Indian joint-stock banks who do a little of this business but almost the whole of it is really in the hands of non-Indian banks. The Imperial Bank of India is prevented from engaging in this business by the provisions of the Act governing its operations. The resources of the other Indian joint-stock banks (with the exception of a few) are not sufficient to enable them to engage in the business. Even with sufficient resources, it has been found difficult to compete with the well established non-Indian banks.

The Exchange Banks' Association have furnished a statement\* regarding the participation of Indians and non-Indians in the country's foreign trade which shows that the Indians have a larger share than 15 per cent, and that the share of Indians in this trade has been gradually increasing. This statement, however, has been criticised on the grounds that (i) it does not give the actual figures for India but only percentages for the individual centres, and (ii) it ignores that portion of the import trade which is handled by the non-Indian who arranges for the documents to be made out in the name of the final buyers who are Indians. Further it is stated that if we take into account the figures of foreign trade handled without bank intervention and which is almost wholly in the hands of non-Indians, it will be found that the total participation of Indians is much lower than shown by the figures given in the statement. It has not been possible for us to verify the figures given by the Indian Chamber of Commerce or by the Exchange Banks' Association.

438 In addition to these two general complaints, which are not strictly relevant to the problem of banking facilities, various

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\* Appendix III of the Volume of Written Evidence.

other difficulties which arise from the existing arrangements have been brought to the notice of the Committee by Indian witnesses. These are mentioned in the succeeding paragraphs, together with the observations made by the representatives of the exchange banks in regard to them.

439 One difficulty is that Indian merchants who import from abroad cannot do so on D A terms and can do business only on D P terms. It is said that in order to encourage the import of Manchester piece-goods, facilities have recently been offered to merchants engaged in that trade, but in the case of other commodities such facilities are not freely available. The representatives of the exchange banks have referred in the first place to the practice followed by the exchange banks of releasing imported goods on trust receipts, which in their opinion, more or less, takes the place of the system of drawing bills on D A terms. Secondly, they have pointed out that D A terms are mostly arranged between the exporter abroad and the importer in this country, and the reason for the present practice of drawing invariably on D P terms is probably that importers are mostly people with limited means. It has been contended by the exchange banks that they have no power to grant D A terms without instructions from the exporter abroad. The lack of such D A facilities has in some cases been attributed to the bank references given by the exchange banks, but the representatives of the latter have pointed out that bank references are not the sole basis of guidance to the exporter abroad who also tries to get into touch with the importer in India through a travelling agent, and unless he is thoroughly satisfied, he does not allow D A terms. The representatives have repudiated the suggestion that the exchange banks have been discouraging D A facilities with a view to encouraging loan business on trust receipts in order to earn a higher rate of interest, and they have also denied the other suggestion that the present position is due to the fact that the exchange banks are all non-Indian and that if there were Indian exchange banks, the import bills would all be drawn D A instead of D P.

440 Another grievance brought to our notice by some of the Indian witnesses is that in order to get a confirmed letter of credit opened, even first class Indian importing firms are required to make a deposit of 10 to 15 per cent of the value of goods with the exchange banks, while European houses in Calcutta are not required to make such deposits. The representatives of the exchange banks have pointed out that at least 9/10ths of the import business is done without credits at all and that the question of deposits in other cases really depends upon the standing and the position of the merchant and also to some extent on the nature of the commodity imported. They have added that it is not a universal custom to call for deposits and that in the case of well-established

firms deposits should not be called for. They have stated that there is absolutely no discrimination between Europeans and Indians and the same rules and same standards are applied to both classes of customers.

441 There have also been complaints in regard to the bank references given by the exchange banks. It has been pointed out by one Indian Chamber of Commerce that in the case of some Indian firms satisfactory references were not supplied by the exchange banks to overseas merchants, though in the case of foreign merchants whose resources were considerably lower than those of some of the Indian firms, the banks of foreign countries supplied very good bank references. The exchange banks' representatives have said that banks always give the best report they can, based upon their knowledge of the resources of the clients. They have observed that in the case of European clients the managers of banks have more intimate knowledge of their integrity and resources, but in the case of Indian clients through their *shroffs* and other members of the staff, they make an honest endeavour to get at a correct idea of their financial standing.

442 Another complaint made by some of the Indian witnesses is that the Indian merchants have no opportunity of knowing under what rules the members of the Exchange Banks' Association work and the alterations made therein from time to time. The action of the exchange banks in discontinuing the system of partial deliveries has been mentioned and it has been complained that the decision of the exchange banks was arrived at without any previous notice of the change to the merchants. The representatives of the exchange banks have assured us that the Association had no idea of keeping their rules of business secret and that, in fact, in Calcutta, in view of certain requests that had been made for a copy of the rules of business, the rules were actually published in 1926. Alterations in these rules are not made frequently and though the Association did not send the alterations to the customers direct, they had been made available to them through the exchange brokers. The representatives were quite willing to make arrangements for the supply of copies of the rules to merchants and we have since been informed that copies of the rules are now freely available to constituents on application. As regards the case of partial deliveries, we have been told that the system was a purely temporary phase rendered necessary during the period of slump in 1921, and that as soon as the stocks had been cleared, the system was automatically discontinued. We have suggested to the representatives that before making any alterations in the rules of procedure, it might be useful to Indian as well as European merchants if the Association consulted the Chambers of Commerce and other representatives of merchants. We have been informed that if the changes are such that Chambers of Commerce and merchants

would be seriously interested in them, the Association would be happy to consult them before amending the rules. We can conceive of changes in the rules which the Association may consider unimportant, but which may not be regarded in the same light by the merchants and we would therefore impress on the Association the advisability of consulting commercial bodies in all cases.

443 At present the exchange banks charge a penalty for the late completion of exchange contracts. It has been represented to us that this penalty is rather high and is capable of reduction. The representatives have explained that a bank has always to act up to its contract and that this penalty is intended only to make the merchant also act up to his part of the contract. Under the present system, the merchant has a whole month before him to decide whether he can fulfil the contract or not, and the present penalty, if it should be a deterrent, cannot be much reduced. They have, however, agreed that there is no reason for a difference in the penalty rates charged in Calcutta and Bombay, which are  $1/32d$  per week (equal roughly to 9 per cent interest per annum) and 1 per cent over Bank rate respectively. They have also admitted that it is a matter for consideration whether the rates cannot be levelled down. We understand that the penalty in Calcutta has since been changed to the same basis as in Bombay.

444 When a foreign exporter draws a draft on an Indian importer and the draft is held by an exchange bank in India for collection, the Indian importer has to pay the bank in rupees at the bank's selling rate for demand drafts and he is not allowed to pay it either by the demand drafts of another exchange bank, which may be had at more favourable rates except on payment of a commission of  $\frac{1}{4}$  per cent or by his own cheque on his London agent. So far as Calcutta was concerned, an importer could pay for the draft by the T T of another exchange bank (being a member of the Exchange Banks' Association) without any charge and the representatives of the exchange banks have agreed that an exchange bank is not justified in refusing the importer's own cheque on his agent in London where funds are known to be available. They have expressed the view that if the question is put before the Exchange Banks' Association, it would be considered. As regards the method of payment by demand drafts of other banks, we understand that it is not the practice of exchange banks to accept them, as by this method of payment the bank which gets the bill for collection would not receive anything for all the trouble in the business undertaken by it. We do not see any reason why the practice in Calcutta regarding payment by T T should not be followed at other centres or why an importer with available funds in London should be forced unnecessarily to incur the double expense of transferring them to India and back. Although we understand that cases of this sort are of rare occurrence, we trust the Association will take steps to remove this grievance at an early date.

445 Another complaint prominently put forward by the representatives of the Indian Merchants Chamber, Bombay, relates to the attitude of the exchange banks in regard to Indian insurance companies. It has been stated that these banks are literally forcing Indian exporters to insure their goods with foreign insurance companies. A concrete case was quoted where one of the leading firms in Bombay which used to insure its exports with an Indian insurance company was told by one exchange bank that a limit of Rs 4 lakhs would be placed as a maximum amount which could be insured with that company. It was added that there were several such instances where Indian firms were not permitted to insure their goods with Indian companies. As a result of this attitude on the part of the exchange banks, it is alleged that every year India is making payments abroad in the form of insurance premia to the extent of nearly Rs 2 to Rs 3 crores, which should properly go into the pockets of Indian insurance companies.

A similar prejudice against Indian insurance companies formerly existed on the part of the Imperial Bank of India, but they now accept without limit policies of certain Indian insurance companies which have agreed to allow the bank to have access to their books at any time in order to satisfy the bank that the company is reinsuring part of its risks, and to supply all other information required.

The representatives of the Exchange Banks' Association have explained that the question of insurance has always been a very difficult one with the banks, that there is no prejudice whatever against Indian insurance companies as such and that it is really a question of the standing of the insurance companies. As an illustration of their sympathetic attitude, they quoted one instance where in the terms of an old letter of credit it had been stated that insurance with a particular non-Indian company should be made, and where the exchange bank which was dealing with this letter of credit had the terms modified so that the insurance could be made with an Indian company about whose standing the bank was quite satisfied.

It was suggested to the representatives that the Exchange Banks' Association should lay down standards to which the insurance companies should conform for obtaining the confidence of the exchange banks and that the Exchange Banks' Association should thereafter publish a list of Indian and non-Indian insurance companies which conformed to those standards and whose policies should be accepted by all the exchange banks without limit. The representatives were not in a position to say whether this could be done, because the question was in their opinion really one for each bank to decide for itself, but they said that if the suggestion was put before the exchange banks, it would receive every consideration. We have been informed, since this question was first raised, that

with the approval of the London Exchange Banks' Association every support is now being given to Indian insurance companies. In view of the rapid growth of Indian insurance companies during the past ten years, and the fact that no bank has ever incurred a loss on an Indian Insurance policy, we trust that the establishment of more cordial relations between the exchange banks and Indian insurance companies may be speedily effected. With this end in view we suggest that some understanding might be arrived at by the exchange banks in consultation with representatives of the Indian Insurance Companies similar to that between the Imperial Bank of India and these institutions.

446 At present when a draft on an Indian importer comes through an exchange bank, he merely gets an informal note advising him that the draft has come and he has himself to go to the bank and examine the documents. The custom in England and other western countries is to send such documents to the drawee at his office for acceptance. We have been told by the representatives of the exchange banks that it is impracticable to send out drafts for acceptance as in England owing to the difference in ruling conditions. In England, people are quite alive to such things and every firm has got a responsible clerk who attends to them readily. In India when bills are sent round with documents attached for acceptance, it is often found that the party is available only after five or six visits. This may be true in regard to petty Indian merchants and dealers. We doubt, however, whether it applies to big Indian merchants, for example, those in Clive Street, Calcutta, or in the Fort, Bombay. The representatives have agreed that there would be no objection to send out the bills to such people at their respective business places. As regards the allegation that some European firms had this facility while no Indian firm had it, it has been explained to us that this might be due to the European firms having asked for the privilege and the others not having asked for it. The Exchange Banks' representatives have assured the Committee that here too there is no question of discrimination. We are sure that the Association fully realizes the fact that anything which disturbs the smooth working of the banking mechanism injures both the mechanism and those who deal with it and we sincerely trust that no effort will be wanting on their part to remove all causes of misunderstanding and dissatisfaction in the minds of the Indian mercantile community.

#### SUGGESTIONS MADE BY WITNESSES FOR THE REGULATION OF THE OPERATIONS OF EXCHANGE BANKS.

##### (i) *Licensing of Foreign Banks*

447 It has been suggested that foreign banks operating in India, that is those which are not registered under the Indian law,



should be required to take out licences for carrying on their business in India. At present they are not subject to any legal restrictions in India. They are exempt from all the statutory obligations to which Indian joint-stock banks are subject. They do not even publish their balance-sheets giving the information about their Indian business separately from their other business. They draw a large part of their working capital from Indian deposits, nevertheless the depositors are not protected by any regulations governing the operations of such banks in India. Some control over the foreign banks is also recommended on broad national grounds. For example, it is argued that it may be necessary to restrict the operations of any bank which worked against Indian interests by, say, refusing to accept policies of Indian insurance companies, even though they were sound, deliberately placing difficulties in the way of Indian traders, which were not justified, and by imposing unjustifiable handicaps against their Indian customers. One British Chamber of Commerce has suggested that India is now over-banked, so far as facilities for financing of foreign trade at the ports are concerned, and that power should be given to some authority in India to stop the opening of further exchange banks.

449 Various authorities have been named for issuing, renewing, or cancelling licences, namely —

- (1) The Finance Department of the Government of India,
- (2) The Standing Finance Committee,
- (3) The Reserve Bank Board, and
- (4) The Bankers' Association in India

440 The representatives of the Exchange Banks' Association feel that the British banks which have had a long history of service to India should not be penalized in the same way as other foreign banks, but they have no objection on principle to a system of licence if it is required from every bank in the country, whether Indian or foreign. They have, however, added that licences should be freely granted to all the existing banks and should also be similarly renewed provided they complied with any provisions of the Indian law relating to such banks. They contemplate that one of the conditions of the licence would be the submission of periodical statements relating to the Indian affairs of these banks, and that they might be required under any future Reserve Bank Act to place certain percentages of their time and demand liabilities to the public in India as interest-free balances with the Reserve Bank. If as a result of our recommendations it is proposed to have an independent audit of all banks operating in India, the representatives of the exchange banks have stated that these banks would have no objection to such audit. Similarly, they have agreed to abide by whatever might be prescribed for banks as a whole in India.

450 Other conditions in the licence suggested by witnesses are —

- (a) No foreign bank having a capital and reserve of less than £1 million should be given a licence
- (b) Foreign banks should not borrow in India more than 25 per cent of their paid-up capital and reserve, and in no case should the borrowing by a foreign bank exceed its total advances in India
- (c) Foreign banks should accept policies of approved Indian insurance companies
- (d) In the event of liquidation or failure, the assets of the Indian offices of the foreign bank should be earmarked for the satisfaction of Indian creditors and this prior charge of the assets of the Indian branches should not be deemed to prejudice the claim of Indian creditors on the general assets of the bank in case Indian assets were insufficient to meet the claims in full
- (e) Foreign banks should give an undertaking to train and employ a definite percentage of Indians in their higher grades

451 From a study of the literature relating to the treatment of non-national banks in other countries as far as available, we find that provision exists in the laws of various countries for regulating foreign banks by means of licences granted by some prescribed authority in the country. To quote only one instance, foreign banks in Japan established in accordance with foreign laws have to apply to the Finance Minister for permission to carry on banking business within Japan and the Minister is authorized to impose specific restrictions on the issue of licences. This latter provision has the purpose of giving to the applying foreign institution treatment equal to that which a Japanese institution enjoys in the country of the foreign bank. The introduction of a similar system is, in our opinion, necessary in India partly in the interests of depositors, partly for ensuring the grant of reciprocal treatment in foreign countries to Indian banks and partly for giving the Reserve Bank some control over the banks operating in the country. We cannot think of a better authority than the Reserve Bank for undertaking this task of scrutinizing applications from non-Indian banks to do banking business in India, and for granting licences in approved cases. We, therefore, recommend that all non-Indian banks wishing to do banking business in India should be required to take out a licence from the Reserve Bank when it is established. We further recommend that in fairness to the banks already established in this country, licences should be freely granted to them. Every licence should be in force for a stated period and should be automatically renewed if the licencing authority is satisfied that the

provisions of Indian law applicable to the bank and other conditions specified in the licence, are complied with. These conditions should be the following —

(i) In addition to periodic statements provided for in the Reserve Bank Bill of 1928, the non-Indian banks should furnish to the Reserve Bank annual statements showing their assets and liabilities relating to their Indian business as prescribed by the Reserve Bank from time to time

(ii) For a few years to come, at any rate, the banks should submit to some prescribed authority in India, preferably the Reserve Bank, periodic reports of Indian and non-Indian business handled by them

(iii) Other conditions might be imposed on the basis of reciprocity. For example, even the Bank of England has laid down that no financial accommodation would be granted by that Bank on the security of bills unless the bills bore two English names of which one should be the acceptor. There are various restrictions imposed by the laws of foreign countries on non-national banks working there. The power to impose similar conditions in the licences that would be granted by the Reserve Bank would enable the Government of India to accord reciprocal treatment to non-Indian banks.

We do not approve of any other conditions in the licences as suggested by witnesses and referred to in paragraph 450. The suggestions contained in conditions (b) to (e) of that paragraph require special treatment and have been dealt with by us separately. As regards condition (a), we prefer not to fetter the discretion of the Reserve Bank by any hard and fast rule regarding the capital and the reserve which a non-Indian bank should have before it commences operation in India.

#### *(ii) Restrictions on Receipt of Deposits*

452 As regards restrictions on the power to receive deposits in India, various suggestions have been made. No case of a non-Indian bank going into liquidation with resultant loss to the Indian depositors has been brought to our notice, but the necessity for some protection against a future contingency has been emphasized. Some have suggested that foreign banks should bring 50 per cent of their working capital from abroad. Others think that such restrictions are too drastic, and that foreign banks should be allowed to receive deposits to the extent of the trade in Indian hands which they finance. Others again do not want to prevent the foreign banks receiving deposits, but at the same time have recommended that as these banks are able to secure deposits in India at cheaper rates than Indian banks, they should be required to pay a special tax of  $\frac{1}{2}$  per cent on all fixed deposits received in

India It has also been suggested by some witnesses that foreign banks should be allowed to receive Indian deposits only if they subjected themselves to the control arising out of registration under the Indian law with rupee capital and Indian directorates. On the other hand, there were some witnesses who were against placing any restrictions, as they were of opinion that individual liberty should be conceded to depositors to place their money in any bank, foreign or indigenous.

453 It was stated by Mr. R. W. Beaumont-Pease, Chairman of Lloyds Bank, in his speech at a recent annual general meeting that "the total of deposits received in India (by that bank) largely exceeds the amount of the bank's advances and no portion of the bank's deposits at home is used for the purpose of making loans in India." This statement has led to an enquiry in Indian circles whether the banking resources of India are being administered to the best advantage of her own nationals and for the furtherance of Indian trade, commerce and industry. One prominent Indian banker in his evidence before us said that the exchange banks do not at present employ in India all the money they receive on deposit in India, and a portion of this surplus money taken from the public in India is invested in business outside India. He therefore suggested that restrictions should be placed on the receipt of deposits by the exchange banks in India in order to prevent such export of funds from India. On the other hand, it has been pointed out that there are seasons in the year in India when the exchange banks are borrowing money from other countries, in order to finance the foreign trade of India, and that during the slack season this money that is brought out from abroad is remitted back.

454 The Managing Governor of the Imperial Bank of India was definitely asked the question whether he would favour the employment of Indian deposits with exchange banks in investments, say, in the Federated Malay States or in Japan. He replied that he was strongly against any interference with the free flow in bankers' funds between different countries. He thought interference with economic forces must in this, as in other instances, react in ways which largely defeat the purpose aimed at and cause hardship to third parties. In his view, the interests of depositors as well as those of borrowers must be considered. If banks could not find sufficient investments of a suitable character in India for the potential deposit money, they must reduce deposit rates or invest money elsewhere. In his opinion India had probably benefited more than most countries by the use of foreign capital and, if freedom in the movement of capital was interfered with, foreign capital would not be so readily available.

455 It has been suggested by some of our Indian witnesses that the exchange banks with cheaper money received from Indians

themselves offer unfair competition to Indian joint-stock banks. At present the Indian joint-stock banks have to pay higher rates of interest than the exchange banks for deposits taken from the public, and the complaint is that the exchange banks through the facilities of cheaper money available to them quote lower competitive lending rates to the detriment of the Indian joint-stock banks. It is observed that the lowering of the lending rate by exchange banks though it is immediately beneficial to the public at large and to the trade of the country, is at the cost of the indigenous banks, and that as the interests of the general public in the long run coincide with the interests of the Indian joint-stock banks, the exchange banks should be denied all avenues of cheap money in India. The point in this suggestion relates more to the competition of exchange banks in the field of financing internal trade than foreign trade. As regards internal trade, the exchange banks contend that there is not much competition between them and Indian joint-stock banks. It is true that a few of them have branches at some of the larger inland centres, but it is stated that these branches concentrate chiefly on import bills though advances are also granted against goods intended for export. They do not operate in the districts or smaller centres, nor do they compete in storage business in respect of agricultural produce in the mofussil. The number of such up-country branches of exchange banks is also not large as shown by the statement below —

*Statement showing the location of branches of exchange banks  
and the dates of their opening*

Cawnpore	Chartered .	opened 1926
	National	" 1889
Delhi . . . .	Chartered	" 1912
	National . . .	" 1895
	Mercantile .	" 1912
	Lloyds .	" 1912 *
Amritsar	Chartered .	" 1910
	National	" 1900
	Lloyds	" 1930
Lahore .	National .	" 1900
	Lloyds .	" 1928
Simla .	Mercantile .	" 1923
	Lloyds	" 1910 *
Rawalpindi	Lloyds	" 1906
Peshawar	Chartered	" 1926 (Closed 1930)
Srinagar	Lloyds . . . .	" 1918†
Murree	Lloyds .	" 1907 *
Gulmarg	Lloyds . . .	" 1909
New Delhi	Lloyds	" 1927

456 Although the number of up-country branches of exchange banks is not large, it has been brought to our notice that in recent years there has been a movement among the exchange banks to get a footing in the interior of India through the acquisition of shares in other banks. For example, the P & O Banking Corporation, soon after its flotation in 1920, purchased the Allahabad

\* King King and Co amalgamated with Lloyds Bank, February 1923

† Cox and Co

Ditto

Bank, which is an Indian joint-stock bank with about forty branches and sub-agencies in the interior of India. Lord Inchcape commenting upon this acquisition said that "Our purchase of the Allahabad Bank gives us a footing in the interior of India which it would have taken years to work up". The controlling interest in the P & O Banking Corporation itself was acquired in 1927 by the Chartered Bank of India, Australia and China, which purchased 196,059 out of 259,416 shares. Regarding this development, Mr. Baster in his book "The Imperial Banks" says — "It means that one of the greatest exchange banks is directly interested in developing banking facilities in the interior of India, which, to all exchange banks is, in the main, unknown territory. Although English banks can never hope to serve the whole of India, a development of this kind cannot fail to have beneficial effects of vital importance in Indian economic development, if the other banks follow suit".

It has been suggested to us that the Chartered Bank should be made to divest itself of its interest in the Allahabad Bank through the P & O Banking Corporation by the latter selling its shares in the Allahabad Bank to the public, or by some other means, and that if the Chartered Bank is not willing to do so by persuasion, it should be compelled by legislation. We deal in Chapter XXV with the general question of regulating the acquisition of such controlling interests, but here we need only remind the advocates of the proposal that we are not writing on a clean slate, and we cannot conceive of any measure calculated to carry out the proposal which will not in essence be an act of expropriation. Moreover, we have grave doubts whether any such measure can be recommended in the interest of development of banking facilities in India.

457 A complaint has been made in this connection that the exchange banks at these inland centres encourage foreign traders to compete with Indian merchants in regard to the movement of the produce to the ports or of the imported goods from the ports to the interior. The European exporters and importers already have a large share of India's foreign trade and it has been pressed on us that the grant of this opportunity to them of further increasing their inland business must strongly be deprecated. As stated already, the representatives of the Exchange Banks' Association have observed that this complaint is not justified and that Indians are securing an increasing share in the direct import and export business. We understand that many of the inland branches of the exchange banks were definitely opened at the request of the Indian traders, who wanted to have a direct connection from the interior with the foreign importer and exporter.

458 The proposal to place restrictions on the receipt of deposits by the exchange banks has also been recommended from another

point of view. A large portion of the foreign trade of India is in the hands of non-Indians, and it is strongly felt that it is not in the interests of India that the savings of Indians should be utilized to help non-Indians to make a profit. It has, therefore, been suggested that exchange banks should be allowed to receive deposits in India only to the extent of the requirements for financing the foreign trade which is in the hands of Indians.

459 It is, of course, a fact that exchange banks do not compete with the Indian joint-stock banks in the matter of attracting deposits by offering better terms. But it has been contended that the Indian banks, being late-comers in the field, have found themselves arrayed against a number of foreign institutions, which had already gathered enormous influence and created valuable good-will, and which by virtue of these advantages and the greater reserves and resources acquired by them in the process of years, irresistibly draw business to a much greater extent than the former. It has further been argued that as the exchange banks are now in a monopolistic position in regard to the supply of financial facilities for foreign trade, people who are engaged in that business have to open accounts with them, in order to show their stability and to get good facilities from those banks. Some portion of the deposits thus received by the exchange banks consists of current deposits which come to them on account of the monopolistic nature of their business, and the restrictions proposed on their power to receive deposits are intended to counteract this unfair advantage. One of the witnesses who referred to this maintenance of current accounts by people engaged in foreign trade for the sake of establishing their credit with these banks himself admitted that his firm, which had been dealing with the exchange banks for years, was not required to deposit a single pie with them for this purpose. As suggested by the exchange banks' representatives, the real position perhaps is that new customers of exchange banks who wish to open credits in connection with foreign trade are naturally required to make certain deposits with them and such initial deposits are only temporary until the banks get some knowledge of the working of these customers and come to have greater confidence in them based on this knowledge.

460 On the general question of placing restrictions on the receipt of deposits by the exchange banks, the views of the Managing Governor of the Imperial Bank of India are as follows —

“The result of placing restrictions would be that the exchange banks would have to transfer funds borrowed in other countries and/or borrow from the Imperial Bank of India to replace the Indian deposits which they now have to the extent required for their exchange business. Exchange operations would be

hampered considerably, and the higher cost of funds would possibly necessitate increased exchange margins. Inasmuch as foreign funds were brought in, the interest on them would leave the country. Then finance of internal trade would be allowed to decrease as they would not bring in foreign funds or borrow to any great extent for this purpose. The *shroffs*, merchants, etc., who are now financed by the exchange banks would have to go elsewhere for the major portion of their finance and the deposits formerly taken by the exchange banks would also be diverted to other banks. Owing to their very high financial standing and their very strong balance-sheets, the exchange banks are able to borrow their funds in India at low rates of interest and correspondingly low rates are charged to the *shroffs* and the merchants. The Indian depositors place their funds with the exchange banks and accept the relatively low rates offered as they are satisfied that their deposits are quite safe, and they would be unwilling to place them with banks on which they do not place so much reliance except at higher rates and not at all to a large extent. Probably the only non-exchange bank which could attract the bulk of their deposits is the Imperial Bank of India and the prohibition would give that bank a semi-monopoly. Inasmuch as funds were deposited with other banks at higher rates, the cost of finance to the *shroffs* and merchants would increase correspondingly and trade would suffer."

461 According to the same authority, the result of placing restrictions on the exchange banks receiving deposits in India would be that exchange banks would have to realize their considerable investments in India Government securities for the purpose of repaying their Indian deposits, thereby depressing the prices of the latter to the further detriment of the large holdings of the Indian joint-stock banks in these securities.

462 Further, although exchange banks have large deposits, the amount of free or cheap deposits is limited. During the busy season they have to compete for available deposits, and they are frequently able to offer rates which induce Indian banks to lend to them. This bears out the fact mentioned by one Indian banker that the deposits of the Indian banks are not affected by those of the exchange banks. The compulsory diversion of deposits, even partially, may therefore result in those same deposits coming back to the exchange banks through the Indian banks at an increased cost for use in foreign exchange operations, and the addi-



tional cost would be passed on to the Indian trader and ultimately to the Indian producer, so long as margins are kept at the narrowest limit by competition as at present. It has also to be remembered in this connection that deposits are a form of borrowing in India and that the Indian Government itself is continuously borrowing in the London Money Market large amounts for capital and general purposes.

463 We do not think that it is a correct interpretation of the speech of Mr Beaumont-Pease that the Indian branches of exchange banks are not drawing on their Head Offices outside India but have more than enough funds from India itself. We are fairly sure that it is not true that the exchange banks on balance take money out of India for use elsewhere or that deposits received from Indians are utilised for financing non-Indians engaged in the foreign trade. We give below certain figures which we obtained from the exchange banks —

*Statement showing deposits, advances and investments at 31st December 1929 of the exchange banks in India*

All figures are in crores of rupees

Deposits in India.

	Current accounts and money payable at call	Fixed and short deposits	Total
Non-Indian . . . . .	15	12	27
Indian . . . . .	19	20	39
Total	34	32	66

Outstanding loans and overdrafts outside India 22

\* Advances in India

Loans, cash credits,  
overdrafts and local  
bills discounted  
(excluding bills of  
exchange)

Non-Indian . . . . .	15
Indian . . . . .	31
Total	46

Investments in Government and other Indian Trustee  
Securities and Indian Treasury Bills . 26

Bills of Exchange in transit to London and elsewhere  
overseas . 10

\* Mr Buckley informs us that these advances are in connection with the export and import trade

It will be seen from the above statement that of the total deposits of 66 crores, 27 were from non-Indians and 39 from Indians. These deposits were in part utilized in advances which amounted to 15 crores to non-Indians and 31 crores to Indians. The balance of 20 crores, together with loans and over-drafts from outside India amounting to 22 crores were invested mainly in bills in transit amounting to 10 crores and in Government and other Indian securities, including treasury bills amounting to 26 crores.

464 We doubt whether the prevention of the exchange banks from receiving deposits from the Indian public would actually lead to the growth of indigenous joint-stock banking on sound lines. If the indigenous banks require to be protected against their foreign rivals, it is because at present they lack experience and reserves. Both these take time to acquire and the pace cannot easily or safely be forced. Nor is it at all certain that by blocking the channels which the public at present prefer, we shall be able to force the deposits in the desired direction. The public are now perfectly free to use their own initiative and discretion in choosing repositories for their own money. We are sure that in course of time they can be persuaded, for practical as well as sentimental reasons, to make their deposits with the Indian banks. This will surely be when the Indian banks have gained experience and strengthened their resources, and it seems to us to be putting the cart before the horse to attempt to strengthen the Indian banks by deflecting the deposits of the public. Incidentally, one way of winning greater confidence with their own people would be for the Indian joint-stock banks to accumulate adequate reserves which would make them immune from the effects of a decline in the price of Government securities.

465 We are aware that the proposal to place restrictions on the receipt of deposits by exchange banks in India is sought to be justified by the position which obtains in the State of New York, where foreign banks cannot establish branches or take deposits, but can only open agencies and do restricted business. We may point out that this limitation is imposed by a New York State law and not by a Federal law. We have been unable to ascertain the reasons that led to the enactment of the State law which we understand has been in force for over a century. We also understand that there has been a proposal before the State legislature in recent years for the removal of the restriction, but that no progress has been made so far with the proposed legislation. We are not aware of any other country or State in the world where the receipt of deposits by foreign banks is legally prohibited.

466 We give below a comparative table showing the deposits received by the exchange banks and those received by the Imperial Bank of India and the other Indian joint-stock banks —

Year	Deposits in Lakhs of Rupees				Percentage of total deposits		
	Exchange Banks	Imperial Bank	Joint stock Banks	Total deposits of all banks	Exchange banks	Imperial Bank	Joint stock Banks,
	Rs	Rs	Rs	Rs			
1913 (pre-war year)	31,04	36,49	24,10	91 63	34	40	26
1919	74,36	68,21	61,27	2,03,84	36	33	31
1920 .	74,80	78,02	73,18	2,26,30	33	34	33
1921 .	75,20	65,78	80,16	2,21,14	34	30	36
1922 .	73,38	57,01	65,02	1,95 41	38	29	33
1923 .	68,44	74,20	47,69	1 90,33	36	30	25
1924	70,62	76,71	55,16	2,02,53	35	38	27
1925	70,55	77,83	57,91	2,06,29	34	38	28
1926 .	71,54	73,90	63,15	2,08,59	34	35	31
1927	68,86	72,07	64,30	2,05,23	34	35	31
1928	71,14	71,30	66,35	2,08,79	34	34	32

It will be seen from the above statement that there has practically been no change in the respective proportions of banking deposits of the Imperial Bank of India, the Indian joint-stock banks and the exchange banks during the last ten years and that as compared with the pre-war year 1913, the share of the exchange banks has not shown any increase. If the tendency continues unchanged in future, any limitation on the receipt of deposits by exchange banks seems unnecessary. If, however, it appears at some subsequent date that Indian banking deposits are going into the hands of these banks to a greater extent than at present, the reasons for the changed development will have to be investigated. For the present, the position in regard to the Indian banks seems to be quite satisfactory if it is remembered that during the decade two important Indian banks, namely, the Alliance Bank of Simla and the Bengal National Bank, failed.

467 In our opinion there is one important reason why India should be particularly cautious in taking any action at this stage to restrict the operations of foreign banks within her territories

On grounds of sentiment, as well as of a more rapid economic development, her intelligentsia are anxious that a substantial portion of the business connected with the financing of her foreign trade should pass into the hands of national banks. The successful fulfilment of this natural desire must entail the opening of a network of branches of Indian banks at various important centres of the world. If however, India at this stage wants to introduce measures restricting the operations of foreign banks within her territories, the success of the ideal referred to in the preceding sentence is sure to be largely hampered for other countries are likely to imitate India in the matter of restrictions on the operations of foreign banks. Indeed, the retaliation may be directed immediately against the operations of Indian banks and bankers working in particular localities. It would not be inappropriate in this connection to give the following quotation from paragraph 778 of the report of the Burma Provincial Banking Enquiry Committee —

“In India proposals have been made for the protection of Indian banking, meaning that banks managed by Indians should not be subjected to the competition of foreign banks. In these proposals the term *foreign bank* includes banks incorporated in the United Kingdom and the British Colonies but not European-managed or any other banks incorporated in India. But (as we have pointed out in paragraphs 8, 69 and 424) the term *India* is ordinarily used in Burma so as to exclude Burma, and the term *indigenous* cannot be properly applied to the Chettivar community in Burma. In the event of Burma being politically separated from India banks in Burma which have been incorporated in India will thus be as foreign to Burma as banks incorporated in England or elsewhere. But we are opposed to protection for the present, we think that in Burma at the present time it would be detrimental to the general welfare of the country. The agriculture of Lower Burma and much of its trade and industry are relying at present upon foreign capital.”

468 For the reasons given in the preceding paragraphs we are opposed to the suggestion that exchange banks should be prohibited from taking deposits in India. In our opinion, such a measure is not necessary for the development of banking facilities in India, nor is it desirable at this stage in the wider interests of India's development. Further, for similar reasons, we are not in favour of limiting the operations of the exchange banks to port towns and requiring them to close down the inland branches of existing banks within a specified period. We think that such a restriction

may be detrimental to the interests of the merchants engaged in the foreign trade of India. The facility of direct connection with the foreign exporter and importer is a real advantage to the Indian trader and it is not for us to dictate how the Indian exporters and importers shall do business in future, especially when such a course may involve increased cost to them. We have, however, recommended in Chapter XXV that in order to ensure a well-ordered development and extension of joint-stock banking in India, any bank desiring to open a new branch in India should be required to obtain the approval of some authority in India, preferably the Reserve Bank, before doing so. That regulation will automatically apply to the non-Indian banks also, and to that extent, we have no objection to the existing freedom of exchange banks to open new branches in the interior being curtailed. Should this curtailment involve any hardships to the merchants engaged in the foreign trade of India, the matter will no doubt be represented by them to the Reserve Bank.

469 As an exception to what we have stated in the preceding paragraph, we have no objection to a provision being made in the licences to be issued under the proposal made by us in paragraph 451 to foreign banks with their head offices in the State of New York or other countries which limit the operations of foreign banks within their territories, imposing similar restrictions on the business of such banks. This arrangement would be in accordance with the policy of reciprocal treatment advocated by us in that paragraph.

### (iii) *Registration of Exchange Banks with Rupee Capital*

470 It has been suggested to us that foreign banks should not be allowed to do business in India until they register themselves under the Indian Companies Act with rupee capital and have an Indian directorate. This suggestion has in view, among other objects, the protection of Indian depositors and the guarding against unfair racial discrimination. Some witnesses who made this suggestion did not wish to make it a main point, if the protection to depositors and Indian interests was ensured in other ways. It has been pointed out, on the other hand, that the facilities now offered by exchange banks to Indians and non-Indians engaged in foreign trade are as cheap as can be expected, partly as a result of severe competition and partly on account of the fact that the exchange banks have intimate association with the London Money Market and are able to get funds from that market at relatively cheap rates. This access to the London Money Market is a valuable privilege enjoyed by the non-Indian banks and the history of the National Bank of India affords an apt illustration in this connection. The head office of this bank was first in Calcutta and the Bank had rupee capital. In 1866 its head office was changed to London and its rupee capital of about Rs. 32 lakhs was converted into sterling of about £500,000, requiring representation of non-Indian interests

on a wider scale. At the time this transfer was made, 4 out of the 7 directors of the Bank were Indians. The representatives of the exchange banks drew the inference that the directors realized that it was advisable in the interests of the Bank to transfer its head office to the central market of exchange. If the existing exchange banks in India were converted into rupee companies with Indian directorates, it is stated that the existing advantages from the present association may be discontinued. This would react upon the facilities made available by the banks to their customers. We are not in favour of this proposal which in our opinion would have obvious disadvantages from the point of view of access to the London market. While this reason has perhaps application to the present moment, we are opposed to the proposal on more general grounds. The establishment of a Reserve Bank and the progress of Indian banking should go hand in hand. The time may come when the exchange banks will find that for some of their Indian business recourse to the Reserve Bank is more valuable than recourse to the London market, and they would be required from the commencement of the operations of the Reserve Bank to keep a deposit with that bank equivalent to a prescribed proportion of their liabilities to the public in India. We take it that to all intents and purposes the Indian branches of exchange banks already work on a rupee basis, and we do not personally see any banking advantage in the circumstances in an Indian registration or a rupee capital. On the other hand, there are difficulties in the way of converting the exchange banks into rupee companies under any reasonable scheme. When taking over the assets and liabilities of the existing banks, the rupee company may be expected to pay for the goodwill and the cost of this would have ultimately to be borne by the customers of the new company. Further, the proposal is likely to result in the splitting up of existing institutions into smaller institutions with reduced capital and reserves. The depositors would not in that case have the security of the existing international resources of the exchange banks. This would defeat one of the main objects of the proposal.

The real intention behind the proposal seems to be to provide in the near future that a majority of shares in the new institution should be held by Indians. This is part of a larger question, namely, how far any restrictions can be placed on the lawful trading activities of non-Indians in India and cannot properly be settled by the Banking Enquiry Committee.

471 Some witnesses did not go so far as to suggest that the existing banks should be registered under the Indian law. They would be satisfied with an Advisory Board to be associated with the management of each exchange bank, which would be consulted by the latter in all matters like the granting of advances and cash

credits This, it was thought, would remove the existing prejudices against exchange banks and the complaint that the banks were not treating Indians in the same way as non-Indians One objection against this proposal is that these Advisory bodies, as their name implies, would be merely advisory and that their recommendations would not be binding on the banks Nevertheless, we think that the appointment of local Advisory Boards at each branch would help to establish a sympathetic contact between the existing non-Indian management of banks and the Indian customers, and we support the suggestion

(iv) *Training and Employment of Indians*

472 At present there is no arrangement by which exchange banks take Indians for training and employment The only appointments in these banks, apart from the posts of cashiers, which Indians can aspire to are of a clerical character Increased employment and training of Indians has therefore been advocated by several witnesses for various reasons —

- (a) There is a paucity of Indian exchange banks and if the existing non-Indian exchange banks help Indians to get the necessary training, it will supply India with a number of trained men in the field of exchange banking which will facilitate the opening of exchange banks by Indians
- (b) The exchange banks have been established in India for a long time and have been carrying on their business with the help of Indian deposits, though it is true that the banks themselves have at times imported funds from abroad Considering the fact that they derive a considerable portion of their profits from dealings in trade with Indian merchants and from Indian deposits, expression has been given to a strong feeling by Indian witnesses that these banks should give adequate employment to Indians in the higher appointments under them At present, the banks import their superior officers from overseas who are naturally paid a higher salary than it would be necessary to pay Indians locally recruited for such service It would, therefore, be in the interest of the banks themselves, as well as of the bank's customers, to reduce their overhead charges by replacing highly paid non-Indians by Indians who are not so costly One suggestion made is that the exchange banks might follow the scheme started by the Imperial Bank of India Other suggestions have also been made demanding the fixing of certain percentages for the employment of Indians in higher posts

473 The representatives of the exchange banks have, however, contended that it would be difficult to place any restrictions on their choice of officers. Further, the shareholders of these institutions also naturally have a right to say to whom the working of banks in India should be entrusted. They have pointed out that officers in the higher grades of service are men recruited for service throughout the world and not merely for service in India, and that this circumstance might prove to be a difficulty in the way of Indians being employed in such higher posts.

474 We are impressed by the fact that though the exchange banks have been operating in India for more than half a century they have not employed a single Indian in the superior grades of their service. It can hardly be contended that the banks have been unable during all this time to find even one competent Indian who could be entrusted with a superior officer's position in their organization. Even the foreign banking experts have admitted the force of the Indian point of view that banking in the hands of foreign institutions does not give as much employment to Indians as would be the case with purely Indian banks, and they have suggested that the policy of training and employing Indians should be encouraged by the foreign banks. We recommend for the consideration of the exchange banks that they should have a scheme of probationary assistants on the model of the Imperial Bank of India's scheme and promote to higher posts in due course such of them as they find suitable to hold responsible positions in the management. While international education and experience would be a valuable qualification for all members on the staff of these banks, we do not think the introduction of the scheme we have proposed is incompatible with business principles or efficiency.

#### OPENING OF AN INDIAN EXCHANGE BANK.

475 We have already referred to the fact that the share of Indians in the port-to-port operations connected with the financing of India's foreign trade is very small. Indians attach great value to their participation in this field of business and it has been a sore point with them that the Imperial Bank of India, which is the only Indian bank of standing that can compete with the exchange banks, is debarred by an Act of the Legislature from engaging in exchange business. The main reason advanced for the present restriction is that foreign exchange business is attended with risk and the Imperial Bank of India, so long as it continues to keep the Government balances, should not be allowed to take this risk. The existence of any undue risk in this direction is, however, denied by some witnesses. Another reason which has been suggested is that the Imperial Bank of India is holding the balances



of the exchange banks and it should not therefore be allowed to use these balances to compete with the exchange banks. Although the Managing Governor of the Imperial Bank of India stated before the Committee that he did not think that the Government of India had placed the existing restrictions on that Bank with the object of securing an advantage to the exchange banks, witness after witness suggested that the action of the Government of India in this matter was a surrender to the unjust demands of the foreign institutions to prevent an Indian institution of standing from competing in their preserved field.

476 Several witnesses have suggested to us that the best way to obtain for Indian banks a share in the exchange business is to liberate the Imperial Bank of India from its present restriction on its doing this business. It has, however, been observed that some of the Indian banks that favoured the Imperial Bank's doing exchange business have been actuated by the desire to lessen the competition of that Bank in the financing of internal trade. On the other hand, some witnesses have suggested that exchange banking is a very technical business and that the existing staff of the Imperial Bank of India is not qualified to handle it. The Managing Governor of the Imperial Bank of India admitted that exchange banking was technical, but he thought that given the liberty to do exchange business, the staff of the Bank could soon be trained for the purpose and that the Bank would be able to establish without any difficulty the necessary valuable connection with the London Money Market in order to take its place among the exchange banks.

477 Speaking from the point of view of trade alone, it may be said that the facilities available at present for financing India's foreign trade, both imports and exports, are sufficient. But as already stated the agencies which cater for these needs are all of them of non-Indian origin and the few Indian banks which at one time or other attempted to engage in exchange business have never attained anything like even a partial success. As a result, the Indian importers and exporters have been left with no other alternative than to depend absolutely on the facilities which the foreign banks may offer to them.

478 The extent of a nation's participation in its foreign trade depends considerably on the facilities which the banking system gives to its traders. We have already referred to the various cases of alleged racial discrimination which almost all the Indian witnesses, including responsible Chambers of Commerce, placed before us. The representatives of the Exchange Banks' Association denied the existence of any racial discrimination and asserted that credit was impartially available to all customers, Indian or non-Indian, according to their financial standing irrespective of

nationality They admitted, however, that through social intercourse their higher officials had more opportunities of obtaining intimate knowledge of the integrity and the resources of non-Indian clients than of Indians It is impossible for us to come to any definite conclusion as to how far the allegations made by the Indian witnesses are justified by the actual conditions and practices prevailing, particularly as even Indian clients are reluctant to disclose the full facts connected with their relations with their bankers, but the fact remains that there is a strong feeling among most Indians that foreign banks do discriminate against them It is not unnatural that a foreign bank should endeavour to do as much as possible to promote the interests of the nationals of its own country. It is for this reason that even after the British banks had become well-established, we have had the advent of American, French, Japanese and Dutch banks in India catering chiefly for their own nationals The fact that non-British foreign banks have entered the Indian banking field and have continued working under conditions and at a time when it is complained that exchange business brings little or no profit is conclusive testimony that the importance of the individual nation's interests has outweighed the question of loss, if any, in maintaining the Indian connections

479 We have studied with great interest the measures that Germany took to increase the participation of German banks in the financing of her foreign trade Some of these measures seem to us to be well adapted for India and we shall refer to them in due course We only wish to mention in this connection one of the reasons which induced German banks to undertake those measures and which in our opinion very aptly illustrates the conditions in India The methods followed by English banks in granting credit accommodation for foreign customers, including Germans, were considered very conservative and the tendency of both the British export merchants and the British overseas banks was to keep down the length of credit terms The conservatism also extended to the selection of firms to which credit was given In both these respects, namely, the period of credit and the standing of firms, the German banks that were created were distinctly more accommodating and this assistance enabled German exporting merchants to capture trade The author of the book "Joint Stock Banking in Germany" says that—

"It can hardly be doubted that this credit policy contributed to the growth of the German export trade and, judged on the whole, as a policy applied to the trade of a country which came late into the world's markets, it seems to have justified itself by its results"

480 The history of Japan also furnishes an interesting object lesson In 1880, Japan founded a special bank for foreign trade

finance, the Yokohama Specie Bank, "with the avowed purpose of fostering the overseas trade of Japan"<sup>2</sup> It is now generally admitted that "the marvellous expansion of the foreign trade of Japan in the past half century owes much to the banking facilities afforded by this bank and that as a result of these facilities the participation of the Japanese in that trade has increased substantially It is possible that the venture may have resulted in a considerable amount of financial sacrifice to Japan, but the amount of such sacrifice which a country should submit to in order to secure lasting advantages to its economic life, and the steps which it should take to minimize the sacrifice, are matters for the careful consideration of the Government and the public of the country

481 After a careful review of the position and of the share taken by India, both in carrying on the business of her import and export trade and in the provision of banking facilities for such trade, we have come to the definite conclusion that it is not desirable that India should rely for all time on the facilities afforded by non-Indian institutions for the financing of her foreign trade The financing of foreign trade is, however, essentially international, and in so far as it involves co-operation between two countries, there will always inevitably be a considerable foreign element in it In order that India might obtain her legitimate share, both in the sphere of banking and of trade, we think it is necessary to take action in more than one direction

482 In the first place, we consider that such of the Indian joint-stock banks as are well established should open foreign connections useful to their clients This was one of the methods adopted by German banks in similar conditions and has much to commend itself as it obviates the necessity of opening full-fledged foreign branches at greater cost In our opinion, even this small development should assist the natural growth of the Indian share in India's foreign trade, both directly by the facilities afforded to the customers of these banks and indirectly by providing a further stimulus to the foreign banks under the stress of competition to assist the Indian merchants to a greater degree

483 In the second place, we consider that on the establishment of the Reserve Bank and the simultaneous withdrawal of the restrictions now imposed on the transaction of foreign exchange business by the Imperial Bank of India, the latter should be induced to take an active share in the financing of India's foreign trade The agency business which the Imperial Bank of India at present transacts for some of the exchange banks, the amount of inland

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\* Parker Willis and Beckhart Foreign Banking Systems, p 822

trade finance connected with foreign exports and imports which passes through its hands even at present, and the wide area of its operations are factors which in our opinion should facilitate the successful entry of that bank in the field of foreign trade finance. We accordingly recommend that the Reserve Bank should enter into a definite arrangement with the Imperial Bank of India for a period of five years or such other period as the Reserve Bank may consider desirable, by which the Reserve Bank would utilize the Imperial Bank as agents wherever the former has not got a branch of its own and the latter has one, on terms to be settled between the two banks. When a concession of this kind is given, it would not be unreasonable to insist on a preponderance of the national element in the institution receiving the concession.\* We therefore recommend further that the arrangement between the Reserve Bank and the Imperial Bank of India should definitely provide that during its continuance—

- (1) 75 per cent of the Directors on the Local Board and a majority of those on the Central Board of the Imperial Bank should be Indians, and
- (2) no further recruitment of non-Indians to the staff of the Imperial Bank of India should be made except in special cases and with the approval of the Finance Minister of the Government of India

Provision (1) is easily understandable, but it may be asked why provision (2) is necessary, seeing that the appointment of the staff of banks is a matter for the bank's directorate and the bank's shareholders. Our sole reason for suggesting that provision is the complaint of dissatisfaction we have heard from various quarters regarding the unsympathetic attitude towards Indians of non-Indian officials on the staff of the exchange banks. In fact we have heard this complaint to some extent even in regard to the Imperial Bank of India itself.

484 We shall perhaps be justified in devoting some space in this connection to a discussion of whether the concession that we propose to be given to the Imperial Bank of India in the preceding paragraph is really a concession. It is possible to argue that (1) when the Reserve Bank is established, it will not have branches at more than three or four places and in order to carry out its duties as Government bankers, it will have to use one or other of the commercial banks for doing Government treasury business as its agent at other places, (2) that the Imperial Bank of India is the only institution in India which has got branches at a large number of places where there are Government treasuries, and it

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\* Cf. Recommendation VI in Part III of the Report of the External Capital Committee, 1925

will be in the interests of the Reserve Bank itself to entrust its agency functions solely to that bank and (3) that the arrangement recommended by us in the preceding paragraph does not therefore imply any real concession to the Imperial Bank. While we are prepared to admit the force of the reasoning, we do not think that it is in the interests of other joint-stock banks in India and of their future development that the Imperial Bank of India should have a monopoly of this agency business for all time to come. We think therefore that the Reserve Bank should have power to make its own arrangements for this agency work either through the Imperial Bank of India or any other joint-stock bank which it may select. If the Reserve Bank selects accordingly a number of joint-stock banks for this business, it will entail the loss of the privileged position which the Imperial Bank of India enjoys at present or would enjoy as the sole agents of the Reserve Bank. The Indian joint-stock banks know full well the value of such a privileged position, especially from the point of view of creating confidence in the mind of the public and of attracting large amounts of cheap deposits. We have said enough to show that the arrangement that we have proposed, giving a monopoly of agency business, coupled perhaps with liberal terms for carrying on this business, should be considered a sufficient inducement by the Imperial Bank of India to undertake active financing of India's foreign trade. We would leave it to the Reserve Bank to make the terms of the arrangement sufficiently attractive for the achievement of the purpose for which we are recommending it.

485 If, however, the Reserve Bank finds it impossible to arrive at a satisfactory settlement in the matter with the Imperial Bank of India, or if the former finds that within the stipulated period the Imperial Bank of India is unable to participate actively in the financing of India's foreign trade, we recommend that the Government of the day should take steps to secure the establishment of an Indian Exchange Bank. We have considered it advisable to make the starting of an Indian Exchange Bank conditional on the non-fulfilment by the Imperial Bank of India of Indian aspirations in the field of foreign trade finance, as we are averse to a new venture being undertaken with assistance from the funds of the State until an effort has been made to explore whether the same object cannot be achieved through an existing institution the building up of which has cost India much time, trouble and money.

486 The lines on which we recommend that the new Indian Exchange Bank should be established are as follows —

- (1) The capital of the bank should be three crores of rupees. It may not be possible to raise this amount all at once, but that would not create any insurmountable

difficulty, for as the bank will be able to attract business only by degrees, the acquisition of its capital may be spread over a period of, say, three years. Of the total sum of three crores, it may be found sufficient to call up two crores in the first year and another one crore during the next two years. The capital of the bank may be increased as and when required, particularly when the establishment of foreign branches is taken up. The subscription to share capital of the new bank should, in the first instance, be open to joint-stock banks registered in India. Such participation in the creation of new banks is neither unusual, nor is it a recent development. As instances may be mentioned the Deutsche Asiatische Bank, British Overseas Bank, Lloyds and National Foreign Bank and the recently formed Internationals Boden Credit Bank. If the share capital is not fully subscribed within a prescribed time, the balance which cannot be raised by such subscription should be supplied by Government, which should arrange gradually to dispose of their holding later to the general public.

- (2) So long as Government holds more than 50 per cent of the capital, it should have a predominating voice in the appointment of the directors.
- (3) The question of entrusting the work connected with Government remittances to a department of the new bank working under the control of the Reserve Bank should be considered in consultation with the authorities of the Reserve Bank. There should, however, be a clear stipulation that the new bank will not be allowed to make a profit on any Government remittance purchased by it in the open market in its capacity as agent.
- (4) Further details of the scheme will have to be worked out in consultation with the Reserve Bank and with due regard to the circumstances prevailing at the time of the creation of the new Indian Exchange Bank.

487 Although we have suggested a share capital of Rs 3 crores with Rs 2 crores initially paid up, we think the Bank would require further working capital of a considerable amount. It would not immediately be able to attract deposits from the public which can only come by the confidence created in the minds of the latter by its sound working and management. In the meantime we

think that the Bank will have to depend to a great extent on the facilities afforded by the Reserve Bank for financial accommodation based on its portfolio of export and import bills. We observe that on page 262 of his "Organization of Indian Banking" Thakur recommends a capital of Rs 10 crores for such a bank, of which one-half should be paid up initially. Thakur does not give any detailed calculation in support of his figure, but he states as follows —

"In order that the representative Exchange Bank of the country should command requisite confidence in the outside world, which is so essential for its successful working, we have recommended such a large capital. The bank will need deposits and discounting facilities in foreign countries and they will not be forthcoming to the extent desired and necessary, unless there is sufficiently large capital at its back. If, however, the figure of Rs 10 crores is considered too high it may be reduced to Rs  $7\frac{1}{2}$  or Rs 5 crores."

We also note that the initial capital provided for the Yokohama Specie Bank was 3 million yen at a time when the total foreign trade of Japan was about 82 million yen, and that with a total foreign trade of over 4,000 million yen its present capital stands at 100 million yen while it holds 20 million yen on a *quasi*-permanent loan account from the Bank of Japan at a special low rate of 2 per cent. We recognize that with the establishment of the Reserve Bank the considerations mentioned by Thakur for providing the new Indian bank with a larger capital will lose some force, but we have little doubt that the bank with a share capital of Rs 2 or Rs 3 crores will fail to secure a material share of the foreign exchange business of India unless it received financial accommodation in other directions from the Reserve Bank. We would leave it to the Government of the day, if and when they decide to take action on our recommendations in this particular matter, to settle an adequate amount of capital for the new bank in consultation with the Reserve Bank, and after careful consideration of the financial accommodation which the latter may agree to provide for the former.

488 It has been suggested to us that the existing exchange banks are so well entrenched in their present position that in order to give the new bank some chance of competing with those institutions it is necessary to give it a position and prestige by giving it the sole monopoly of Government remittances. The idea underlying the suggestion is that the new Indian Exchange Bank would be able to sell to Government all the sterling resources in its hands and the other exchange banks which now sell exchange to Government would have to do it to the new Indian Exchange Bank.

We have discussed this question carefully with the foreign banking experts and we agree with them that there are various objections to the proposal as put in this form. *Firstly*, it will be the primary task of the Reserve Bank, when it is established, to maintain the stability of the international value of the rupee. For this purpose, and for the purpose of keeping the Secretary of State in funds, it will be constantly in the market buying sterling exchange. It will, however, have to conduct its operations in such a way as not to upset the market and it is not inconceivable that occasions may arise when instead of going into the market, it will have to depend on its accumulated holdings of foreign exchange to supply the Secretary of State with funds. Partly because it is difficult to distinguish the Reserve Bank's remittance operations on behalf of Government and its operations for currency purposes, and partly because the considerations which would govern the operations of the Indian Exchange Bank in the exchange market would be entirely different from those that would govern the Reserve Bank, we find it difficult to support the proposal to give the new Indian Exchange Bank a monopoly of Government remittance. *Secondly* we do not think that the Indian Exchange Bank would be able to secure the full amount of Government remittance as cheaply as the Reserve Bank. It will have to depend upon its competitors for enabling it to complete a major portion of the remittance programme of Government, and we cannot say whether the existing exchange banks will not force the rates against the Indian Exchange Bank and thereby against the Government and the tax-payer. While the Reserve Bank will be fully aimed to deal with such a situation, should it arise, the Indian Exchange Bank will be powerless to cope with it. Moreover the Indian Exchange Bank itself which will, after all, be a shareholders' bank might legitimately charge the Reserve Bank some commission on its business, even if it did not try to make a profit.

The specific proposal that we have made in this connection meets in our opinion all these difficulties. By making the new Exchange Bank merely an agent of the Reserve Bank and giving the latter full control over the remittance operations and by providing that the new Bank should not make a profit on any remittances which it makes as the agent of the Reserve Bank, we have purged the scheme of its inherent drawbacks and bestowed on the new Bank a unique and privileged position.

We understand that the Yokohama Specie Bank and the Bank of Japan afford an interesting parallel in this connection. The Bank of Japan, we are told, entrusts all its foreign exchange operations to the Yokohama Specie Bank. We have, however, no accurate information about the extent of this foreign exchange business, the precise nature of the arrangements in force, or the



degree of success which has attended this scheme. Of one thing, however, we are clear, namely, that the introduction of a system of dual control over exchange operations is definitely to be avoided when starting a Reserve Bank

489 From what we have stated above, it will be seen that it is our intention that the new Indian Exchange Bank should not be started until after the Reserve Bank has come into existence and until after the scheme of participation of the Imperial Bank of India in the financing of foreign trade has been tried and found wanting. It has been suggested that the Reserve Bank may take a long time to come into being and that any avoidable delay in creating the new Indian Exchange Bank will only strengthen the chain that hold India dependent upon the foreign banks. We are unable to appreciate this suggestion. We can by no means agree that the delay in bringing the new Indian institution into existence caused by the delay in the inauguration of the Reserve Bank can be avoided, for we have shown that, in our opinion, the new Indian Exchange Bank cannot take its proper place among the exchange banks in India without the advice and assistance of the Reserve Bank. On the other hand, we have made it quite clear that what India wants for a sound development of her banking system is the immediate establishment of the Reserve Bank. We cannot obviously subscribe to any suggestion which assumes the contingency that the establishment of the Reserve Bank may be delayed, nor can we agree that any other banking measure is more urgent and imperative than the one to establish a sound and strong central banking institution.

#### CREATION OF "JOINT" BANKS

490 A suggestion was made by some of our colleagues at a late stage of our deliberations that the real and permanent solution of the problem of financing India's foreign trade, both from an economic and from the national standpoint, is the creation of "joint" banks, in which the controlling interest would be a partnership on equal terms between Indians and Europeans, or members of other countries with which we carry on our foreign trade. One of the main objections to the existing exchange banks is that they are foreign, and the proposal to enforce registration as rupee companies is an attempt to Indianize these foreign institutions with a view to removing one of the causes of ill-feeling between the Indian mercantile community and these banks. It was pointed out however that the mere idea of foreign trade implies two parties, one Indian and the other foreign, and it is not to the interest of either that either should have a dominating voice in the financing of the business. In so far as the trade is mutual and involves co-operation, so should the financing of the trade. With this object in view, it was suggested that banks might be

formed by mutual arrangement between India and the principal countries with which she trades in which the rupee capital would be furnished by Indians, and the foreign capital by the partner abroad, the control and establishment being under joint supervision, and the profits realized from the business being shared between the parties

491 The idea of joint banks in the sphere of international trade, which postulates co-operation and good-will among nations trading with each other, is a valuable one. It brings out, in the special field of banking, the basic fact of the economic life of nations, namely, economic solidarity, which is apt to be lost sight of when economic affairs are deliberated upon in an atmosphere of isolation, the fact being that economic welfare is interdependent and should be regarded from that point of view. This fact is strikingly brought out in the distress which has been caused by the world-wide economic blizzard. It may not be possible to make an immediate advance in the direction of joint banks in these times of widespread depression in business, but there is no reason why they should not be a success when prosperity returns. Apart from the service which they may render to trade, they are certain to promote international co-operation and to eliminate many causes giving rise to misunderstandings and friction.

492 A variant of the scheme based on the same principle of co-operation was also suggested, but no clear cut proposals were placed before us and we can only indicate the lines on which beneficial action might be taken, if practical bankers in India and abroad would consider the development of mutual advantage. It has been maintained that owing to the cut-throat competition of recent years both in internal and external trade, there has been an increasing tendency for joint-stock banks and exchange banks to endeavour to poach on each other's preserves in the struggle for fresh business. It is therefore suggested that joint-stock banks and foreign banks should endeavour to find some method of affiliation or amalgamation, which would result in co-operation instead of competition, and would at the same time avoid the undesirable criticism that either party was aiming at confiscation, absorption or domination. Reference has already been made to acquisition of Indian banks by foreign banks and its effect on national sentiment. What, however, is aimed at in the idea under consideration is an affiliation under which each party might hold an equal interest in the other and the two institutions would work together not merely as agents or as formal shareholders in each others' concerns, but as one concern being directed and run for the interest of both, with free interchange of expert staff, full and frank consultations as regards policy, and a generally recognized mutual responsibility for each other's well-being.

In a matter of this nature it is obviously impossible to suggest any form of compulsion or legislation, the matter is primarily one for shareholders and directorates. We feel however that if "joint" banks on the above lines could be evolved out of existing institutions the result would be advantageous not only for the institutions concerned, but also for the country as a whole.

#### POINTS OF DIFFERENCE BETWEEN US AND THE FOREIGN EXPERTS.

493 Before concluding this chapter we should refer to that part of the report of the foreign experts which deals with the financing of foreign trade. The report is based upon the provisional conclusions communicated to them at an early stage of our final deliberations, which differ considerably from the final scheme as developed in the preceding paragraphs. We have taken into account all the considerations urged by the foreign experts and the scheme as finally embodied in this chapter meets, in our opinion, most of the criticism levelled against the original scheme. There, however, still remains one essential point of difference. While the foreign experts say that they cannot concern themselves with the ambitions or desires of a political or nationalistic character, we ourselves feel that we should be failing in our duty if in addition to discussing the problem from the point of view of the present-day requirements of trade only we did not also give due consideration to wider economic issues like those referred to in paragraphs 479 and 480. Our published discussions with the foreign experts and the economic literature of other countries will show that national ambitions and desires have indeed played a very great part in the shaping of policies of these countries in varied spheres of life. This essential difference in our view-points accounts for the experts not advocating any Government assistance to the new Indian Exchange Bank in any circumstances. We on our part are convinced that if the attempts to obtain the whole of the share capital of the new Bank from Indian joint-stock banks do not prove successful, there is nothing inherently wrong in the State providing the balance of the capital with the intention of disposing of it to the public as soon as circumstances permit, if it agrees with us that such assistance will be in the best interest of the economic advancement of the country.

494 In view of the importance of the problems discussed in this chapter we may now briefly summarize our recommendations as follows:

- (1) There are certain directions in which the existing mechanism of foreign trade finance may be improved, such as encouragement of Indian insurance companies, grant of equal facilities to Indian and non-Indian traders and training and employment of Indians by exchange banks. We have made our

recommendations in regard to these matters in paragraphs 445, 471 and 474. In our opinion the best way to implement these recommendations is for the Government of India to arrange for a convention with the exchange banks.

- (ii) Steps should also be taken to secure for Indians a larger share in the financing of the foreign trade of their country. We suggest that the first steps should be in the direction of using existing Indian institutions for this purpose. Our recommendations in regard to the joint-stock banks other than the Imperial Bank of India are contained in paragraph 482. We hope that joint-stock banks may be persuaded to increase their activities in this field by their own self-interest. As regards the Imperial Bank of India, we have suggested certain valuable inducements on certain conditions in paragraph 483.
- (iii) If the attempts to secure for Indians their legitimate share of foreign trade finance by using existing machinery are not crowned with success, we have no hesitation in recommending the establishment of a new Indian Exchange Bank with the facilities and privileges required for guaranteeing the success of the new institution.
- (iv) We have also suggested in paragraphs 490 to 492 that the question of establishment of "joint" banks may usefully be explored fully by the parties concerned.

#### DIFFERENCE OF OPINION WITHIN THE COMMITTEE

495 Those of us who have subscribed to the views and recommendations in this chapter desire to add the following observations on the dissenting minutes signed respectively by six of our colleagues and by Mr. Sarkar so far as they relate to the subject of the financing of foreign trade. Our colleagues differ from us (i) in the analysis of the present position and (ii) in the recommendations made to meet it.

#### I—MINUTE OF SIX DISSENTING MEMBERS

##### (i) *Analysis of the present position*

496 In paragraph 477 of our report we have stated our conclusion that the facilities available at present for financing India's foreign trade are sufficient. By this we meant that the existing banks give merchants all the assistance required to finance this trade provided the merchants are of good reputation and possess means in a reasonable proportion to the trade that they do. The

authors of the dissenting minute justify their dissent from this conclusion on two grounds —

- (1) the direct evidence of Indian commercial bodies, and
- (2) the indirect evidence from a comparison of the share of Indians and non-Indians in the external trade of India

497 As regards (1) they admit that many of the witnesses were not prepared to give details of their grievances for formal submission to the Committee. While we can appreciate the reluctance of witnesses to substantiate the charge publicly before the Committee, we find it hard to accept these charges when the witnesses were unwilling to supply information even confidentially and when it was thus not possible for us to pursue the matter further.\*

498 In contrast to these charges of racial discrimination, we have the authority of certain other witnesses and some Provincial Committees that the facilities are adequate. For example, the Bombay Provincial Banking Enquiry Committee report that in regard to imports "the existence of the Port Trust warehouses, coupled with that of the well-organized system of credit given by exchange banks and importing houses, has resulted in the adequate financing of the trade in imported goods and there does not seem to be any demand for greater facilities." Again, in regard to export bills, even the Indian Chamber of Commerce, Calcutta, on whose evidence the dissenting minute is mainly based, admit that there is a great competition among the exchange banks for securing such bills. The Chamber, however, pointed out a number of directions in which Indian exporters and importers were experiencing difficulties. We have dealt with these complaints fully in paragraphs 439 to 446 of our Report. The representatives of the Exchange Banks' Association, who appeared before us and with whom we had a long and frank discussion *in camera*, observed that some of the complaints were brought to their notice for the first time and could have been easily and quickly remedied if they had been brought to their notice earlier. (Question No 3460 Oral Evidence.) In fact in several instances the Exchange Banks' Association have already taken action, such as the publication of the rules of the Association, the levelling down of the penalty rate in Calcutta for the late fulfilment of contracts, the reduction of the rate of interest on import bills from 6 to 5 per cent and the issue of instructions for giving more liberal support to Indian insurance companies. In these circumstances we cannot but adhere to the conclusion recorded by us as to the adequacy of the existing facilities. We understand that our six colleagues, who

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\* Please see question 1239 *et seq*, Volume of Oral Evidence

have signed the dissenting minute had no information about the reduction in the rate to 5 per cent which was communicated by one of our colleagues to the members of the Committee who have subscribed to the views in this chapter, only at the time when they were considering that dissenting minute

499 As regards the indirect evidence from the share of the Indians in the foreign trade of India, the authors of the dissenting minute refer to the figures furnished to us by the Indian Chamber of Commerce, Calcutta, and the Exchange Banks' Association. It is pointed out in the dissenting minute that the figures furnished by the Indian Chamber are based on official and private publications. The Secretary of the Chamber has added in his letter forwarding the estimate that the figures relating to articles of trade other than jute and cotton have been verified by personal enquiries from the people in the trade. We should like to observe in this connection that in paragraph 5 of his note relating to this chapter, Mr. Sarker states that from the enquiries which he has been able to make, he is inclined to believe that the actual proportion is about 20 per cent. We have also recently been furnished with another estimate based on the customs returns for the Port of Calcutta which shows the share of the foreign trade of Calcutta in the hands of Indians to be 30 per cent. The fact that the proportion is different in the different estimates supports our conclusion that no reliable judgment can be based on those estimates without further investigation. As stated in paragraph 437 of our Report, it has not been possible for us to verify the figures given either by the Indian Chamber of Commerce or by the Exchange Banks' Association, we have ourselves pointed out the obvious drawbacks of the estimate furnished by the Exchange Banks' Association, but we cannot, in fairness to ourselves, accept any estimate as correct "in the absence of a more accurate estimate" (Para 7 of the dissenting minute)

500 In paragraphs 5, 6 and 8 of their dissenting minute our colleagues have made an incursion into the history of commercial intercourse of India with other nations. Neither the author whom they quote in paragraph 5 nor their own observations in paragraph 8 set out the historical facts in their proper perspective. We do not propose to deal with this part of the minute as it is not necessary for our purpose. We only desire to make a passing reference to the inconsistency in the statements made in paragraphs 5 and 8. Our colleagues state that of the two causes of the initial concentration of foreign trade in the hands of non-nationals, the concentration of foreign trade finance in the hands of banks controlled and run by non-nationals has played the more important part. The author whom they quote in paragraph 5 is of the opinion that "almost the entire foreign trade had passed into the hands of Europeans when European banks came to be established." If the

foreign trade of India had already passed over into non-national hands, there was obviously nothing further left for the non-national banks to do to bring about such a transfer. The authority quoted by our colleagues and the statement that they themselves make are in conflict with each other. The reasons why the Indians did not possess any share of the foreign trade with Europe after the Western powers successively the Portuguese, the Dutch and the English, had acquired the mastery of the seas are well-known facts of history and we do not propose to dilate on them.

501 Our colleagues infer that the small percentage of Indians' share in the foreign trade of India is due to the financing of their trade being the monopoly of the non-national banks. We are not prepared fully to subscribe to this view as we have no doubt that there are other factors which play a more important part in the situation. At the same time, we have admitted in paragraph 478 of our report that it is not unnatural, that a foreign bank should endeavour to do as much as possible to promote the interests of the nationals of its own country. It is exactly for this reason that we have come to the conclusion that it is not desirable that India should rely for all times on the facilities afforded by non-Indian banks for the financing of her foreign trade. We have quoted in this connection from Professor Barrett Whale's book "Joint-Stock Banking" and pointed out how national banks can give extra-liberal facilities to merchants and firms of their own nationals, both in the matter of the period of credit and the selection of firms. In fact the author of the book traces the growth of Germany's export trade to the adoption of such a liberal credit policy by the German credit banks.

502 Our colleagues refer to the exchange banks' demand from merchants of audited balance-sheets of the latter's financial position. We do not think that it is correct to say that the exchange banks insist on their clients furnishing balance-sheets audited by auditors approved by the bank. The representatives of the exchange banks have definitely stated that it is only in cases where the banks are unable to ascertain even approximately the financial status of a merchant that the latter finds any difficulty in securing the accommodation that he needs. They have added that merchants and firms who maintain regular accounts and are willing to publish their balance-sheets duly audited find very little difficulty in getting the accommodation which the latter require. They did not lay any emphasis on the balance-sheets being audited by qualified chartered accountants. They only wanted the accounts to be audited by accountants who were on the approved list of Government. In fact this matter was cleared up in the oral examination of witnesses by two of the members who have signed the dissenting minute (Questions 3081 and 3082). We wish further to add that the exchange banks do not insist on balance-sheets in all cases.

503 Our colleagues refer to the invaluable assistance rendered by banks engaged in the financing of export trade in other countries in the matter of supplying their customers with information regarding foreign markets and prevailing prices, and observe that the lack of similar facilities in India is due to the non-Indian character of the banks engaged in the financing of foreign trade. It is true we have referred to this complaint in paragraph 268, but we are not conversant with the practice in other countries nor are we aware whether merchants and firms rely upon this assistance in their foreign trade business without any supplemental assistance from other sources. In any case the lack of such assistance in India is detrimental to those engaged in foreign trade will affect non-nationals much more than nationals, and one would have expected complaints to have been forthcoming from representatives of the former. We have recommended the establishment of marketing boards in various provinces and it will be one of their functions to obtain and publish information regarding foreign markets and foreign prices. We cannot say how far banks can usefully add to the service rendered by marketing boards in this direction.

504 Our colleagues have referred to foreign banks monopolising the best medium for banking investments, namely trade bills, and leaving to Indian joint-stock banks only such investments as those on landed property or on short-period advances against raw material in the mofussil during the period of the marketing of the crops. We are constrained to draw attention to the inconsistency in the argument of our colleagues. When the question of reviving the indigenous banker was considered by us, they agreed that with the revival of the indigenous banker, conditions for the extension of the bill-market will be created and the indigenous banker whose knowledge of local and trade conditions must form the basis of good bills would provide the commercial banks and the Reserve Bank with a gradually increasing number of genuine bills. In fact it has been pointed out by the authors of the dissenting minute that the volume of internal trade is as much as Rs. 9,000 crores, and if a bill-market securely based on this enormous volume of internal trade of the country developed, we think that that would give to the indigenous banker and the commercial banks in the country a safe, adequate and liquid form of investment. We have pointed out in Chapter XIII that the existing methods of marketing finance are undeveloped and that the replacement of cash and open account credit system by bills is a reform which is most urgently called for. We think, therefore, that if instead of directing the attention of the Indian joint-stock banks and the indigenous bankers to the field of foreign trade finance which is already well organized, their efforts were directed to the development and organization of internal trade finance, great and lasting benefit would accrue to the country.



505 Our colleagues have referred to the introduction of rupee import bills. We have already dealt with this subject fully in this chapter of our report. We should add that the rate of interest on import bills has recently been reduced to 5 per cent. We should not pass unnoticed the statement in paragraph 22 of the dissenting minute that "even though bills could be discounted in the Indian money market at under 6 per cent the Indian importer must finance his imports at a rate of interest, the minimum of which is 6 per cent." This is hardly correct. The exchange banks do not insist on retaining the import bills in their portfolio till maturity nor do they force the importers to continue to pay 6 per cent when accommodation is available locally at lower rates. The Indian importer is always at liberty to retire the import bills before due date and if he prefers the 6 per cent rate under the interest clause (now 5 per cent) to repayment by loans raised locally, it is because in the majority of cases even the 6 per cent rate is more advantageous than what he would obtain from the Indian money market.

#### (11) *Recommendations*

506 Our colleagues see no reason to suppose that the attitude of the Imperial Bank of India towards Indians would be more sympathetic than that of the foreign exchange banks and they therefore do not feel it would be a satisfactory solution of the problem to induce the Imperial Bank of India to take to foreign exchange business on the conditions stipulated by us. We do not think it is necessary to repeat the arguments which we have given in paragraphs 483 and 485 as to the desirability of utilizing the existing machinery of the Imperial Bank for achieving the object which both the authors of the dissenting minute and ourselves have in view. One of the conditions which we wish to impose on the Imperial Bank of India under our proposals is that 75 per cent of the directors on the local boards and a majority of the directors on the Central Board should be Indians. This recommendation, which is in accordance with the recommendations of the External Capital Committee, coupled with the increasing Indianization of the staff, is in our opinion, bound to result in provision of larger facilities to Indians engaged in the foreign trade. Moreover, we have no doubt that with the grant to India of a fuller measure of self-government both the Imperial Bank of India and the foreign exchange banks will make themselves more accommodating to the interests of Indians even if Indians may have any legitimate complaints in this respect at present. If for any reason it is found impossible to use the machinery of the Imperial Bank of India to fulfil Indian aspirations in the field of foreign trade finance, we definitely recommend that a new Indian Exchange Bank should be started.

507 Our dissenting colleagues desire that the State should initially subscribe the share capital of the new Indian Exchange Bank. In other parts of our report we have recommended that the State should actively help in the establishment of various institutions which, in our opinion, are more urgently necessary than a new Indian Exchange Bank. We would draw special attention to our assumption regarding the establishment of the Reserve Bank as early as possible with capital provided by the State. That institution is the first pre-requisite for the reorganization and development of Indian banking and is urgently required in order to make increased banking facilities available to agriculture, at present the main industry of India. The imposition of an obligation on the Government immediately to start the State Exchange Bank in advance of the Reserve Bank may weaken the power of Government to provide the capital required for the Reserve Bank. We do not, therefore, think it will be wise to delay action in these other directions by insisting on the provision of State capital for the purpose of the new Exchange Bank. Further, the object of creating a new Exchange Bank is to get for Indians not only a greater share of the foreign trade but also a greater share of the financing of such trade. We have already observed that a few of the existing Indian joint-stock banks are taking a part—though an inconsiderable part—in this finance. For example, the Central Bank of India in 1930 had a turnover of about £1½ million in foreign exchange and it is not unlikely that, left to itself, that bank will be able to develop its business within the next few years to a greater extent.\* We, therefore, think it inadvisable to create a State Exchange Bank which would add to the difficulties of the existing joint-stock banks and thereby lessen their chances of taking their proper place in the financing of India's foreign trade. Our colleagues have themselves admitted that in actual practice very few hard and fast rules can be laid down demarcating the dividing line between the field reserved for internal trade and that for foreign trade. We are quite sure that the new Indian Exchange Bank, if it is to be a success, would find it necessary to give its clients a direct connection from the interior with the foreign importer or exporter. This would involve competition with the existing banks and in order to avoid this competition, our suggestion that the Indian joint-stock banks should first be asked to subscribe to the capital of the new Bank is justified. The new Bank formed according to our plan would be able to use its member banks for financing the portion of the trade from the ports to the interior and even if it had to enter into the field of internal trade financing, the profits from this business would accrue to the Indian joint-stock banks and the entry into that business would not therefore be resented as creating unfair and unhealthy competition.

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\* "The Tata Industrial Bank did as much exchange business as any exchange bank in India during the first few years of its life" Sinha's "Early European Banking in India", page 220

508 Holding as we do, along with the authors of the dissenting minute, that the national aspiration to secure for Indians an increasing share of the financing of India's foreign trade is quite legitimate, we have no hesitation in recommending that if the joint-stock banks are unable to put up the capital required by the new Exchange Bank, and by that time have also been unable to satisfy Indian aspirations in this connection, the State must step in with all its power and influence to make the new Bank a success. We do not, however, anticipate that such a contingency will arise as we are sure that the Indian joint-stock banks will realize their responsibility in this matter.

509 The authors of the dissenting minute justify the creation of a State Exchange Bank on the ground that it will provide a suitable institution to handle the remittance operations of the Government. They add that the large amounts of remittance which Government have annually to make abroad necessitate the starting of an institution for such remittances. We cannot see the force of their argument in this matter. Even if the State Exchange Bank be started, it will not be in a position to provide the sterling resources required by Government for meeting their charges in England. We understand that one difficulty with the Indian joint-stock banks which are now operating in the exchange field is that their share of the import bills is greater than their share of the export bills. Unless the new Bank that our colleagues propose is able to oust all the existing banks from the field of foreign trade finance, we cannot see how the new Bank will be able to supply Government with the amount of remittances required without going to the other banks for a major portion of their sterling funds abroad. The reason why we recommend that the Reserve Bank should consider using the new Indian Exchange Bank as its agent for making remittance operations is that the arrangement will give the new Bank a prestige in the Indian banking system, which, with the other facilities recommended by us, such as the provision of rediscount privileges by the Reserve Bank, will enable the new Bank to compete with the existing exchange banks.

510 We do not understand the reference to the profits of the East India Company arising from the reservation of foreign exchange business to itself and the suggestion that the State should take over that business today. The position of the East India Company was entirely different from that of the present Government. The former was a trading body and as such could use the sterling resources at its disposal arising out of its trade for meeting its sterling requirements to defray the charges of the Government in England. The Government is no longer a trading body and it passes our comprehension how it would be able, through the State Exchange Bank, to find the sterling wherewith to meet its requirements in England.

511 Our colleagues say that we entertain the apprehension that the foreign exchange banks will put up a very severe competition against the Indian Exchange Bank and prevent it from carrying on its normal operations. We cannot trace anything in the report which can have given them this impression. Our object in bestowing on the new Bank certain privileges is to create confidence in the minds of the public and to direct the foreign trade business to the new institution. In this connection we should like to refer to paragraph 45 of Mr. Sarker's dissenting minute on this chapter.

512 Our colleagues have referred to the arguments in paragraph 488 of our Report against giving the new Exchange Bank a monopoly of Government remittance free from any control from the Reserve Bank. This argument had reference to a proposal that had been made at one stage of our deliberations and we do not see any point in the reference of our colleagues to this argument, when by making even the new Exchange Bank an agent of the Reserve Bank in the matter of remittance operations and by providing that the Bank should not do this business for profit they have accepted the conclusion in the paragraph of our report referred to above, in support of which these arguments were adduced by us.

513 Our colleagues state that we admit that the Yokohama Specie Bank furnishes an interesting parallel in connection with the question of the relation between the State Exchange Bank and the Reserve Bank in regard to the remittance operations. We have made no such admission and in fact, from a recent book, which we have had an opportunity to study, we do not think that the Yokohama Specie Bank furnishes any guidance in the matter. The balance of trade in merchandise in Japan has generally been adverse as shown by the following figures\* —

		(In millions of yen)
1919	. . . . .	—74
1920	. . . . .	—388
1921	. . . . .	—361
1922	. . . . .	—253
1923	. . . . .	—534
1924	. . . . .	—646
1925	. . . . .	—267

With the balance of trade unfavourable against Japan, we do not see how the question of either the Yokohama Specie Bank or any other exchange bank in Japan helping the Government of Japan in their remittance programme arises.

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\* "Problems of Japanese Exchange, 1914-26," by Inouye, page 223.

514 Our colleagues desire that the new Exchange Bank should be started immediately without waiting for the establishment of the Reserve Bank. They admit that the new Bank would require further resources besides its share capital and that these resources may be found partly from deposits from the public and partly through advances from the Government. They have agreed with us in connection with the provincial industrial corporations that an institution working with special patronage from Government should not compete with private agencies to whose development in the future all of us are looking forward. We cannot, therefore, appreciate the satisfaction with which they anticipate the attraction of a large amount of deposits from the public by the new State Exchange Bank in competition with existing joint-stock banks. As regards Government, through the Currency Department, providing additional working capital for the new institution by discounting import and export bills, this will surely lead to the addition of one more agency for the supply of currency in this country, when the present dual agency for controlling currency and credit is already a matter for standing criticism. We are, therefore, convinced that the establishment of a Reserve Bank is absolutely essential before any scheme for the creation of an Indian Exchange Bank is contemplated. We further hope, as already pointed out in paragraph 486 of our Report, that the full details of the scheme for a national institution of the kind we have in view would be worked out in consultation with the Reserve Bank, which established on the basis which we contemplate in paragraph 606 will be in the best position to give the most disinterested and valuable advice in the matter to the Government of the day.

515 Our colleagues have referred to the existence of two money markets in India at the present day and suggest the entry of Indians into the field of the financing of foreign trade as a solution for unifying the two money markets. We have referred to this subject in paragraph 578 of our Report wherein we have indicated the proper solution for the unification of the markets. That solution is not for all the existing institutions to compete in order to capture the comparatively small amount of bills that now exist in the foreign trade business but to develop, on a large scale which India's internal trade justifies, an expanded bill business which would make it easy for capital to flow from one market to the other and thereby level down all existing differences and finally lead to the abolition of two separate markets in India.

516 Our colleagues differ materially from us in recommending that the new Exchange Bank should be started immediately irrespective of the establishment of the Reserve Bank. As already pointed out, there are various other recommendations of an urgent character like the development of agricultural bills, with the resultant increase in banking facilities available to agriculture, which

are wholly dependent on the establishment of a Reserve Bank. In paragraph 48 of the note of dissent, our colleagues have said that the reason why they have thought it fit to single out the finance of foreign trade for special treatment involving the adoption of immediate steps without making similar recommendations in regard to rural, industrial and commercial finance is the presence in the field of financing of foreign trade of powerful vested interests which renders delay in taking remedial measures detrimental to national interests. We regret we are unable to agree with our colleagues in this respect, as we consider the other things to be of a *more urgent* character from the point of view of the economic welfare of the country than the needs in the sphere of the finance of foreign trade. Indeed if, in the latter sphere, the establishment of an Indian Exchange Bank by itself is likely to help a section of the community which is comparatively wealthy in securing a larger share of a profitable trade, one may be pardoned for asking the question whether that section of the community itself should not take combined action to secure the necessary remedy even if such action involves a certain amount of extra expenditure to it during the period which must elapse before it can secure the desired goal.

517 As regards the reference of our colleagues to the branch activities of the exchange banks, we note that they propose the closing down of existing branches of the exchange banks on account of the unjustified encroachment in the field of finance for internal trade to the harrassment of Indian joint-stock banks. We might point out that there are no branches of exchange banks in 6 out of the 9 provinces in India, namely Assam, Bengal, Bihar and Orissa, Bombay, Central Provinces and Madras. They cannot, therefore, be said to have encroached on Indian joint-stock banks in any of these provinces in all of which the development of banking facilities is urgently necessary. The branches of the foreign exchange banks, where they exist, serve a definite purpose, and we are not prepared to deprive the public of the facilities which it derives from their existence. We may observe that in almost all of these places certain Indian joint-stock banks have opened branches long after the establishment of branches by the foreign exchange banks. We should like to add that if the Indian public dislikes the operations of these branches of foreign banks, it can take effective action in securing that they are closed down by withdrawing its custom from them. As a contrast to the opinion of our colleagues, we would refer to Mr Pochkhanawala's evidence before us where he has said that if foreign exchange banks prefer to open a branch at a certain place where there are no banking facilities, he would not prevent them from going there (Question 1,000)

## II—DISSENTING MINUTE OF MR N R SARKER

518 In dealing with the dissenting minute of our six colleagues at some length we have answered many of the points raised in Mr Sarker's minute. We deal below only with a few points which have not been covered by our comments in the preceding paragraphs or in the body of the report.

519 Mr Sarker has given a reconstructed table showing the respective shares of the exchange banks, the Imperial Bank of India and the Indian joint-stock banks of banking deposits in India. From that table he comes to the conclusion that there has been a disproportionate growth of the share of deposits with foreign banks. We do not see any justification for his including the figures of the Allahabad Bank in the heading of "foreign banks" as this bank still continues to do only inland trade business and is a bank registered under the Indian Companies Act.

520 As regards the conditions of the licence, the main points of difference between Mr Sarker and ourselves is that we do not agree with the confinement of the business of the exchange banks to port towns and the restriction on the acquisition by exchange banks of shares in other Indian banking concerns. We have given our reasons very fully in the body of the report as to why we have not been able to accept these conditions. Mr Sarker has referred in this connection to the proceedings of the International Conference on the Treatment of Foreigners held in Paris in 1929. We regret that for want of time it has not been possible for us to obtain and study this document. Even assuming, as Mr Sarker says, that it was accepted in the course of discussions at that Conference that the right of international commerce would not apply to the retail trade or hawking or peddling, we wish to point out that the business of exchange banks at their upcountry branches would not seem to go against this principle, as at these places their business is connected mainly with international trade.

521 As regards the rest of the conditions, we have embodied only some of them as conditions in the licence to be granted by the Reserve Bank and have left others for a convention between the Government and the exchange banks. Mr Sarker himself admits that it is possible that such a convention may be established in which case he thinks that the conditions need not be included specifically in the licence. It is only if Government fail to establish such a convention that he suggests that the terms should be enforced in the licence.

522 Mr Sarker has suggested the introduction of an Exports Credits Scheme on the lines of those in force in Great Britain and Germany. This matter was never discussed before the Committee.

and it is not possible for us at this stage to express any opinion on the question

523 As regards Mr Sarker's comments on our recommendation regarding joint banks, we have ourselves admitted in our report that no concrete scheme was placed before us. The idea of joint banks seems to be a valuable one, and has been tried in other countries, but the details must be worked out by practical financiers and only when there is a prospect of trade revival

524 In our scheme of recommendations we have provided for the establishment of an Indian Exchange Bank only after attempts to secure for Indians their legitimate share of foreign trade finance by using the existing machinery are not crowned with success. We have, therefore, not thought it necessary to fill in the details of the new institution and have left them to be worked out in consultation with the Reserve Bank with due regard to the circumstances prevailing at the time of the creation of that Bank. We accordingly think it will serve no useful purpose for us to criticise the details of the Indian Exchange Bank given in Mr Sarker's dissenting minute. We note that Mr Sarker is of the opinion that the new Indian Exchange Bank should be started immediately after the establishment of the Reserve Bank and that the new Bank should not be a purely State Exchange Bank as proposed by our six dissenting colleagues

### III —CONCLUSION

525 Finally, we wish to add that we do not feel that it is necessary to make any modifications in our recommendations in this chapter. We have no doubt that when a constitution of the type envisaged by us comes into force, if the authorities find that a Reserve Bank has not been established by then, or that its early establishment is not a practical proposition, they will take such action as they may find feasible to give effect to the principles underlying our various recommendations with due regard to the degree of importance they may attach to each of these from the point of view of the economic welfare of the country as a whole

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## CHAPTER XVIII.

### THE BANKING SYSTEM AND THE MONEY MARKET.

#### THE IMPERIAL BANK OF INDIA.

526 In Chapter III, we have already described the functions and working of the Imperial Bank of India and in subsequent chapters we have made various recommendations in regard to the directions in which its present useful activities may be extended. We have suggested that —

- (i) it might use the indigenous bankers as agents for collection of cheques and bills in the same manner as it uses joint-stock or co-operative banks (paragraph 142),
- (ii) it might discount the bills of indigenous bankers more freely than at present (paragraph 144),
- (iii) the assistance rendered to co-operative banks in the matter of cash credits and overdrafts against sound security should be continued (paragraph 181),
- (iv) it should grant to the co-operative banks remittance facilities for other than co-operative purposes on the same terms as for joint-stock banks (paragraph 182),
- (v) it should continue to follow a liberal policy in the matter of granting advances against agricultural produce in godowns (paragraph 185),
- (vi) the existing practice of giving loans against gold ornaments should be further developed (paragraph 252),
- (vii) within safe and proper limits it should extend the assistance at present given to industries on the lines followed by joint-stock banks in Germany (paragraph 391),
- (viii) under conditions explained by us it should endeavour to take its proper place among the banks financing the foreign trade of India (paragraph 483)

527 There are a few other miscellaneous matters connected with the Imperial Bank of India which we propose to deal with in this chapter. When the Reserve Bank Bill was introduced in the Assembly, another Bill to amend the Imperial Bank of India Act, 1920, was also simultaneously introduced with the object of freeing the Bank from the restrictions which on account of its hybrid nature were imposed upon it, and of modifying the

control of Government over its operations. In paragraphs 34 and 35 we have referred briefly to the restrictions and to the nature of the control, but it will be convenient to give in some detail the salient features of the amending Bill of 1927 as modified by the Joint Committee of the Central Legislature. They are —

(a) The Imperial Bank should under arrangements with the Reserve Bank of India act as agent of the latter in places where the Reserve Bank has no branches

(b) The provision that gives power to the Governor General to issue instructions to the Bank in respect of certain matters should be repealed

(c) Power should be given to the Bank to establish branches or agencies at such places in India or elsewhere as it deems advantageous

(d) The Central Board should consist of the following Governors, (i) the President and the Vice-President of the Local Boards established by the Act, (ii) a Managing Governor appointed by the Central Board, (iii) a Deputy Managing Governor appointed by the Central Board, (iv) the Secretaries of the Local Boards established by the Act, and (v) such number of persons to represent any Local Boards established hereafter as the Central Board might prescribe. The Deputy Managing Governor should be entitled to vote in the absence of the Managing Governor, but the Governors specified in clause (iv) should not be entitled to vote and they will be given only the power to take part in the deliberations of the Board

(e) The Bank should be authorized to make advances and open cash credits on the security of debentures issued under the authority of a Municipal Board or Committee

(f) The Bank should be empowered, subject to any general or special directions from the Central Board, to make advances and open cash credits on the security of fully paid shares and debentures of companies with limited liability whether registered in India or elsewhere

(g) The Bank should be allowed to advance freely on hypothecations instead of being restricted to making advances only against goods in its possession

(h) The Bank should be allowed to buy and sell foreign bills of exchange

(i) The existing restrictions on the borrowing of money in England by the Bank should be removed

(j) The statement of the balance of the Bank should contain the particulars, and should be in the form, required by section 132 of the Indian Companies Act of 1913 and the provisions of section

136 of the same Act should apply to the Bank in like manner as they apply to a banking company

(k) Various administrative defects in the working of the Bank should also be removed

### WITHDRAWAL OF RESTRICTIONS

528 It will be seen from the above that some of the important restrictions on the operations of the Bank were left untouched. We understand that this was due to the fact that the Managing Governors of the Bank desired their retention in view of the special position which it was then contemplated that the Bank would occupy even after the Reserve Bank had been established. As stated in paragraph 484, we do not desire to fetter the discretion of the Reserve Bank in the matter of its choosing its own agents and we would prefer to give the Reserve Bank full discretion to utilize the Imperial Bank as its agents in the country until the Board of the Reserve Bank are able to make permanent arrangements with the Imperial Bank or any other bank. We have suggested that under certain conditions the Reserve Bank might give the Imperial Bank a monopoly in agency business. If, however, this is not found feasible, the position of the Imperial Bank of India would be on a par with the other joint-stock banks in the country and we would not be opposed to the restrictions imposed by the present Act and proposed to be retained in the amending Bill being withdrawn

### SPECIAL CHARTER

529 The question has been raised whether when the Reserve Bank is created it is necessary for the Imperial Bank of India to have a special charter of its own. This suggestion is mainly based on the suspicion that a special charter would give the Imperial Bank of India a position and prestige which would be detrimental to the interests of the other joint-stock banks in the country. Certain obligations are imposed on the Indian joint-stock companies by the present Indian Companies Act and that the Imperial Bank of India is free from these obligations under its special charter is also another consideration urged in favour of this suggestion. We have already mentioned in paragraph 527 that in the Imperial Bank of India Amending Bill as modified by the Joint Committee provision has been made for the Imperial Bank fulfilling the very important requirements of Sections 132 and 136 of the Indian Companies Act in the same way as other joint-stock banks in the country. Although we propose that the Reserve Bank of India should be given full discretion in the matter

of choosing its agents, we feel that the fact that the Imperial Bank of India has a larger number of branches spread throughout the country than any other joint-stock bank would lead the Reserve Bank of its own accord to have the Imperial Bank of India as its chief, if not its sole, agent. This agency business would include Government Treasury business and we think that it is on the whole desirable to continue the special charter with suitable amendments.

#### OPENING OF BRANCHES

530 In the Reserve Bank Bill of 1927 provision was made for the grant of certain interest-free balances to the Imperial Bank of India with a view to encourage the extension of its branch banking activities in the interior. It was urged at the time that the only possibility for indigenous banks to develop their business was to open branches where the Imperial Bank of India had none, and that this possibility would be shut out if the Government gave any special concession to the Imperial Bank of India which was not given to the other banks. The force of this argument appears to have been appreciated by the Joint Committee which recommended the omission of this provision in the amended Bill. We are in full sympathy with the aspirations of the Indian joint-stock banks and we consider that any facility given by the Government or by the Reserve Bank, when it is established, should be freely available not only to the Imperial Bank of India but to all other joint-stock banks in the country. With this end in view, namely, to encourage the opening of branches of joint-stock banks, we have elsewhere recommended that the Reserve Bank may place for the first five years with every new branch opened by an approved joint-stock bank at a centre, where there are no joint-stock banks, a deposit of such sum on such terms as it may consider necessary.

531 In their separate report the foreign experts have referred to the recommendation in the preceding paragraph, with which they do not agree on the ground that it would be contrary to the principles on which the policy of a Reserve Bank should be based. We have pointed out that the provision for giving assistance to the Imperial Bank of India in order to enable it to open branches in the interior was rejected by the Joint Committee of the Central Legislature not on the ground of any opposition to the principle of such assistance but because they were against giving preferential treatment to the Imperial Bank of India as compared with other banks. Our recommendation simply extends the general principle to all the joint-stock banks in the interests of extension of banking throughout India. As stated in Chapter XXIII in connection with the policy of the Reserve Bank and its relations to other

banks, a great deal must be left, in matters of this kind, to the discretion of the management of the Reserve Bank

### INDIANIZATION OF STAFF

532 The question of Indianization of the staff of the Imperial Bank of India has been pressed before us. The Bank has already inaugurated a scheme of training young Indians which is described in the evidence of the Managing Governor of the Imperial Bank of India. We have been told that staff officers of the Bank are now to an increasing extent being promoted from the Assistants trained in the Bank under the probationers' scheme and the following figures have been supplied showing the direct recruitment in London and from the staff in India during the last six years —

	Recruited from London		Recruited from the staff in India
	European	Indian	Indians
1925	32	1	13
1926	6	1	1
1927	3	1	1
1928	8	1	4
1929	6		7
1930			1

In paragraph 483, we have recommended that if the Imperial Bank of India is given, in connection with its entry into the field of foreign trade finance, the special concession of being appointed the sole agent of the Reserve Bank at certain places in India, no further recruitment of non-Indians to the staff of the Imperial Bank should be made except in special cases with the approval of the Finance Minister of the Government of India. While we consider such a condition justifiable in connection with the grant of any special concession to the Imperial Bank of India, we do not think it necessary to make any recommendation to cover the *interim* period before the establishment of the Reserve Bank. If the privilege of the free use of the Government balances and other concessions now enjoyed by the Imperial Bank of India

is a consideration in favour of the proposal of further Indianization as urged by witnesses, it has also to be remembered that these privileges are not given without a *quid pro quo* and that the Imperial Bank of India has to incur a large expenditure on account of the staff employed for carrying on the Government Treasury business. We should at the same time like to add that the question of Indianization stands on its own merits as a matter of policy in India.

533 Several of our members have urged that the appointment of the staff is a matter which should in all circumstances be left solely to the discretion of the Central Board, and consider that their hands should not be fettered in making appointments to the superior staff. In view of the arguments produced in the Report of the External Capital Committee, however, we consider that the concessions we recommend and which are referred to in the previous paragraph, justify our proposals regarding not only a majority of Indian directors but a definite restriction on the further recruitment of non-Indians to the staff.

## CHAPTER XIX.

### THE BANKING SYSTEM AND THE MONEY MARKET— *contd*

#### COMMERCIAL BANKING

##### GENERAL.

534 In the exact sense of the word, commercial banking in India is undertaken by the Imperial Bank of India, the foreign banks commonly known as exchange banks, the Indian joint-stock banks and many of the indigenous bankers. We have dealt in Chapter XVIII with certain operations of the first of these institutions, and in Chapter VIII we have dealt with the last-named institution. In Chapter XVII we have dealt with the operations of the exchange banks, mainly in connection with the financing of foreign trade. The remarks in this chapter refer chiefly to the operations of Indian joint-stock banks, though they also apply in certain cases to similar operations of the other institutions.

535 In India, as in almost all other principal countries of the world, commercial banks are engaged mostly in the distribution of credit. The right of issuing notes is denied to them, this latter function being the privilege of the State in India and of the Central Banks in the other principal countries excepting Canada, where commercial banks still possess the right of issuing notes, and certain other countries where the power is in the process of transfer to a Central Bank. For the purposes of their lending operations, the banks have to depend almost wholly on the resources which they can secure by attracting deposits from people who have money to spare for the time being, or by obtaining loans against their investments of various categories. Nevertheless, commercial banks render a most valuable service to the economic life of the community by mobilising the banking resources to which we have referred and making them available to the best interest of the community.

536 For reasons which we have stated in Chapter XVII, Indian joint-stock banks practically take no part in the financing of India's foreign trade from the stage at which exports leave her ports, or to the stage at which imports arrive thereat. We have in that chapter made certain suggestions for increasing the participation of Indian joint-stock banks in this business.

537 Following the orthodox practice of English banks, Indian joint-stock banks, generally speaking, give loans for short periods

and against certain forms of security. The result is, as has been brought out in Chapter XVI, that they do not take any material part in the financing of industries, unlike the German or Continental banks in Europe. In that chapter, we have made certain recommendations on the subject.

#### DEVELOPMENT OF DEPOSITS AND OF BANKING

538 From what has been stated in paragraph 535 it will be evident that the development of commercial banking depends mainly on the flow of deposits. On a comparison of the figures of deposits of the banking institutions from the year 1919 to the year 1928, the experts were led to draw the inference that despite the establishment of new banks and branches deposits have not developed and that the country accordingly is not "bounding with untapped banking possibilities". It might appear, at first sight, from the following table of deposits with the various classes of banks for the ten years ending 1928, that there is not much scope for the development of deposits —

Year	Imperial Bank of India (Private deposits)	Exchange banks	Joint Stock banks	Total of all banks
<i>In crores of rupees</i>				
1919	68	74	61	203
1920	78	75	73	226
1921	66	75	80	221
1922	57	73	65	195
1923	74	68	48	190
1924	77	71	55	203
1925	78	71	58	207
1926	74	72	63	209
1927	72	69	64	205
1928	71	71	66	208

It is not, however, correct to infer from these figures that the banking resources of India are limited. The following factors have to be taken into account —

(1) The number of principal towns which possessed a bank or a branch or agency of a bank was only 185 in the year 1919. In



1928 it was 339, showing an increase of eighty-three per cent, but nevertheless a very insignificant increase, considering that the number of towns in India is about 2,300. It is true that the investigations of the Provincial Banking Enquiry Committees indicate that there is little hoarded wealth in the country held in precious metals other than investments in ornaments and jewellery. It is obvious however, that the absence of banking facilities at most of the urban centres must result in the temporary locking up with individual possessors of large sums of money which may be required for expenditure later but which, if commercial banks were in existence at such centres, would be made available for the development of credit facilities, particularly to meet seasonal requirements. We have not overlooked in this connection the existence of indigenous bankers, but it appears from the reports of the Provincial Banking Enquiry Committees that it is not the universal practice of these bankers at all places in India to accept deposits from the public. Considering the fact that the vast bulk of the people live not in towns but in villages the absence of banking facilities to the people at large becomes all the more noticeable.

(2) The deposits with co-operative central banks and banking unions on 30th June 1930 were Rs 18½ crores. Further, in spite of various restrictions on investments in the postal savings banks and post office cash certificates, the figures of these accounts increased from Rs 27 crores in 1921-22 to Rs 72 crores in 1929-30. These facts, together with the increase in Government borrowings by short-term loans and the treasury bills, at any rate, during the last few years, indicate the existence of potential banking resources in India. The Committee recognize at the same time that to the extent that these short-term loans and treasury bills are taken up by banks out of deposits, the increase in Government borrowings by this method would not be a separate factor.

(3) Although no accurate figures of export of capital from India are available, it is generally accepted that resources which would ordinarily have remained in India have had in recent years a tendency to be remitted abroad, and this would partly affect bank deposits.

(4) The duplication of deposits has been very much less during recent years than before, the balances of the exchange banks and of the joint-stock banks with other banks and interlending among banks being very much less than what they were ten years ago. The deposit figures of 1928 would, if these balances were excluded throughout the decennium, show a larger increase during the period than is apparent.

(5) The last years of the decennium were years of trade depression, while the earlier years were of the boom period. A statistical comparison of the mere figures of total deposits, therefore, does not convey a true idea of the position. Owing to acute trade

depression, a shrinkage in the loans advanced by banks is inevitable, and the figures of total deposits must necessarily be affected to the extent of deposits ordinarily created by such loans and reflected in the returns for the years when trade is brisk. Further, it must be remembered that the bank failures during the years 1922 and 1923, particularly the failure of the Alliance Bank of Simla, must necessarily cause a temporary set-back. During these two years as many as 35 banks failed, then total paid-up capital being Rs 469 lakhs, and then subscribed capital Rs 1,020 lakhs. Despite these adverse factors, there has been a steady increase in the volume of deposits of the banks from the year 1900 to the year 1928, as will be seen from the following table —

(Crores of Rs)

Year	Imperial Bank of India	Exchange banks		Joint stock banks		Total of all banks
	Deposits (Private)	Deposits (in India)	Number of reporting banks	Deposits	Number of reporting banks	Deposits.
1900	13	11	(8)	8*	(9)*	32
1905	22	17	(10)	12*	(9)*	51
1910	32	25	(11)	26*	(16)*	83
1915	39	33	(11)	19	(45)	91
1920	78	75	(15)	73	(58)	2,26
1925	78	71	(18)	58	(74)	2,07
1928	71	71	(18)	66	(74)	2,08

\* Does not include figures relating to banks with capital and reserve of Rs one lakh and over but less than Rs 5 lakhs

It may be noted that the deposits received by indigenous bankers have not been included in the foregoing tables owing to want of reliable statistics, nor have we for a similar reason included the deposits received by industrial enterprises like the cotton mills in Ahmedabad and Bombay

539 Having regard to all the factors affecting the volume of deposits, and also to the experience of banks that have opened branches in the mofussil and succeeded in attracting local capital, we are inclined to believe that there is still considerable scope for the development of banking, especially branch banking, in the country and for securing deposits in increasing amounts particularly from places where there are no banks at present. The branches of the Imperial Bank of India, for instance, have been very successful in raising local deposits. In England, partly as a result of the great development of branch banking in recent years, the deposits of the 'big five' in 1928 amounted to £1,666 millions, or about 14 times their capital and reserves which totalled £116 millions. The corresponding figures for the same year of the five biggest joint-stock banks in India excluding the Imperial Bank, are respectively Rs 49 crores and Rs 7 crores.

540 At the same time we recognize that the establishment of a branch bank may not always be a remunerative proposition to the bank from the outset. We accordingly recommend that with a view to encouraging the opening of branches by joint-stock banks, the Reserve Bank may place, for the first five years, with every new branch opened by an approved joint-stock bank at a centre where there is no joint-stock bank, a deposit of such sum on such terms and conditions as it may consider necessary.

541 It will, however, be long before India is provided with a net-work of branches of joint-stock banks. Partly for this reason and partly to utilize the valuable knowledge and resources of the indigenous bankers, it is necessary to link up the latter with the Reserve Bank and thus to strengthen their present position and increase their utility, particularly for the purpose of providing banking facilities in areas where there is no bank at present and to classes of population whose requirements are not generally catered for by joint-stock or co-operative banks. The exact method of linking the indigenous bankers with the Reserve Bank has already been dealt with in paragraphs 139 and 140.

542 A complaint has been made in the reports of some of the Provincial Committees that the deposits collected by the commercial as well as exchange banks at their branches at certain mofussil centres are diverted to their head offices for investment in other centres at rates of interest more favourable than those obtainable at the place where the money is collected. It is also urged that even during the busy season when there is a demand for funds in these mofussil centres, the capital raised locally is not used for financing local requirements. Such a complaint is, however, often made in other countries also in a general way against the joint-stock banking system and the Bombay Committee have referred to a similar complaint made to the Committee on Agricultural Credit appointed in year 1922 to enquire

into the adequacy of credit facilities available for agriculturists in Great Britain \* The Central Areas Committee suggest that branches of all banks should be compelled by law to invest a prescribed minimum percentage of deposits and of the proceeds of bills collected by them within the specified areas in which the branches are located † We are not in favour of imposing any such restrictions, as we consider that they will be unworkable in practice and may operate to the disadvantage of the community as a whole We trust that when the Reserve Bank is established it will make it its policy to see that the requirements of the various parts of the country in regard to banking facilities are duly met

543 It has been urged by some of the witnesses that the competition of the Imperial Bank of India and of the exchange banks in the domain of commercial banking is too powerful to admit of a healthy growth of the Indian joint-stock banks It is suggested that there should be some restrictions on the opening of new branches at places where the Indian joint-stock banks have established themselves The joint-stock banks are not themselves immune from the charge of crushing competition with another banking agency Some of the Provincial Committees report that the position of the indigenous banker is weakening owing to the competition of the branches of joint-stock banks established in the provinces This is, however, a natural process of evolution beneficial to the body politic, although affecting adversely individual interests

544 The position of the Imperial Bank of India as bankers to Government gives it an advantage over the Indian joint-stock banks, but its competition with banks is not at present acute, though according to certain witnesses it is keenly felt There is no competition at present in regard to borrowing rates and that in regard to lending rates is beneficial to the public It has brought down the incidence of interest charges for local trade Similarly, the branches have been instrumental in providing facilities for remittance and assisting in the easy flow of money from one centre to another as the exigencies of trade require

545 In our opinion it is not advisable in the larger interests of the country to place any definite restrictions on the branch activities of the banks in India In order, however, to ensure a well-ordered development and extension of joint-stock banking in the country, we recommend that any bank desiring to open a new branch in India should be required to obtain the approval of the Reserve Bank before doing so Licences should be freely granted to the already established branches and it would be the

\*Bombay, para 164

†Central Areas, para 234

business of the licensing authority to see that the provisions of the law and any other conditions specified in the licenses are complied with

546 If banks do not find it worth while to open regular branches owing to insufficient business possibilities, we recommend for their consideration that they should open, in small centres contiguous to places where there are regular branches of banks, sub-offices or part-time branches which might develop into branches in course of time. We understand that this system has worked satisfactorily in rural areas in England. The Imperial Bank of India has also followed with success this system of serving rural areas. Within the last few years it has opened several pay offices and out-station offices at small centres of trade. Besides three local head offices and 161 branches, there are at present 3 sub-agencies, 26 pay offices and 21 out-station offices of the Bank.

547 Another suggestion worthy of consideration in connection with the question of the paying capacity of branches is economical management. It has been stated by a witness that it is one of the weaknesses of most of the Indian joint-stock banks that their cost of management is disproportionate to their earnings. It is urged that these banks have been content to be mere imitations of expensive European models and that the management is unduly influenced by a false sense of prestige in maintaining larger and more expensive establishments than is justified by the exigencies of business at different branches. It is suggested that these banks should aim at combining the reputed efficiency of the European system of banking with the proverbial economy of indigenous bankers. We have not had any material before us to form an opinion as to whether the Indian joint-stock banks are run on an extravagant scale and whether there is much scope for retrenchment. It is, however, a matter which we commend for consideration to the management of the banks.

548 A suggestion has been made that Postal Savings Banks should permit deposits being withdrawn by cheques. We propose to consider this suggestion separately in Chapter XXIV. But the development of any other banking business by these Savings Banks is not recommended at this stage, as it would make it more difficult and less attractive for joint-stock banks to open branches at suitable places. It would also interfere with the desirable development of the indigenous banker and of co-operative banks. Nor do we believe that the post office could find, on its present scale of salaries, trained men who could be trusted with the work. If higher salaries were paid, the operations of the department would become prohibitively costly.

549 We are of opinion that no obstacles should be put in the way of mergers among smaller joint-stock banks by stamp duties or taxation, and that any existing obstacles in this direction should

be removed. For example, if an amalgamated bank comes under the super-tax law, owing to the fusion of individual banks which were free from such an impost, an exemption from super-tax for a limited period is recommended. The question whether there should be any control over a bank securing a majority ownership of another bank's shares is dealt with in Chapter XXV.

#### DISTRIBUTION OF COMMERCIAL CREDIT LOANS BY BANKS

550 Having surveyed the situation as regards the inflow of banking resources, we may now examine the distribution of commercial credit. The advances given by commercial banks fall under three classes: (1) advances against tangible and marketable security lodged or pledged with the lender, (2) clean advances against personal credit with a second signature to the promissory note, and (3) clean advances against the personal credit of the borrower only. In India advances are mostly of classes (1) and (2), while in western countries, with highly developed banking systems, advances of class (3) occupy an important place.

551 Two-name borrowing is a method of raising funds encouraged by bankers in India. A promissory note endorsed by a *shroff* or *shroffs*, or by a managing agent or a firm of agents, is one of the securities beloved of bankers. In Chapter XVI we have referred to the practice of requiring the signature of managing agents, even in case of advances made on the hypothecation of stocks. The *hund*, which is still largely in vogue among merchants in India, though its use has considerably fallen off, is also in effect a two-name paper. Considering the volume of trade and the financial accommodation required by the merchants, the quantity of two-name paper acceptable to banks is, however, limited, so that the loans made by the banks on the security of such paper forms only a small proportion of the total accommodation allowed by them. The bulk of the credit is based on the tangible security of valuable assets such as bonds, shares and immovable property or on the security of merchandise deposited either in the bank's godowns or in the godowns of the borrower under letters of hypothecation. We have heard in evidence that merchants and *shroffs* who combine trading with banking have a great aversion to the pledge of stocks. It is, however, a hopeful sign for the future that such prejudice is now slowly dying out.

552 The most favourite mode of borrowing is the cash credit account under which an advance is allowed against a promissory note signed by the borrower and secured by hypothecation of stocks. Under the cash credit system interest is paid by the borrower only to the extent to which the credit is availed of from day to day and he can reduce his obligation at any time subject in some cases to a minimum interest clause, by which is meant that the

bank would charge its client interest on a minimum amount which is generally about one-half of the maximum limit of the drawing, power allowed to the borrower by the bank. Similarly, the bank can curtail or withdraw the facilities at any time, should it be necessary to do so. It has thus advantages for the borrower as well as the lender. We are informed, however, that the popularity of the system, stands in the way of development of bills and acceptance credit. We deal with this aspect of the question in Chapter XXI.

553 The principal reason for the difference between the practice of banks in India and in western countries to which we have referred in paragraph 550 is the tradition established by the old Presidency Banks, and later followed by the Imperial Bank of India, based on the restrictions imposed upon them under the Acts governing their operations. This tradition, which has been followed by other joint-stock banks and has been reinforced by the provisions of the Indian Companies Act, requires that for the purposes of the balance-sheet a bank's advances should be classified as secured and unsecured and shown separately in the balance-sheet. The granting of unsecured loans on properly appraised credit, instead of being regarded as ideal banking, is actually regarded by the shareholders as making for lack of safety for the bank and evidence of unsound banking. In the form of balance-sheet which we are recommending in Chapter XXV, it will not be necessary to show separately unsecured loans on personal credit and we hope that this change will help to remove the prejudice against this form of loans.

554 Other reasons for the difference in practice mentioned above are —

- (a) the absence of touch and the lack of knowledge resulting therefrom between borrowers and lenders in the principal money market centres,
- (b) the absence of the policy of 'one man, one bank' which obtains in western countries,
- (c) the practice in India which has been materially assisted by, and has in its turn fostered, the managing agency system, and,
- (d) the absence of institutions like 'Seyds' and 'Duns' for supplying information about the financial standing of borrowers.

#### NEED FOR A MORE PROGRESSIVE POLICY

555 We consider that banks in India generally should adopt, as far as possible and consistently with safety, a more progressive policy in the matter of granting clean advances on the personal

credit of borrowers. In our opinion, the change will be facilitated by the growth of the practice 'one man, one bank'. It is generally assumed that a clean advance on a single-name promissory note, unsecured by collateral, is less secure than two-name or collateral paper. In practice, however, clean loans on personal credit of an individual of undoubted means and character turn out to be just as safe and satisfactory as any other. On the principle that in number there is strength, the banker in India usually likes to have collateral security. In the case of bazar discounts, however, although there may be more signatures than one on the paper discounted by him, he invariably looks for payment only to the regular customer who presents the two-name or collateral paper to the bank, namely, the endorser. The ordinary drawer of the note or bill is often unknown to the bank. Thus in a large number of cases the basis of credit is the banker's confidence in the individual customer, but such confidence in turn has its foundation in a knowledge of the borrower's personal integrity as well as his financial standing and his ability to liquidate the loan at the proper time. It is, therefore, on the accuracy of the banker's knowledge in this respect that the prospects of recovery of loans depend. So long as trade and industry were conducted on a relatively small scale and so long as there was an intimate touch between the banker and the borrower, the banker's personal impression, confirmed by bazar reports, formed a fairly accurate basis of loans. With the growth of large scale enterprises and increase in the number of business concerns, the banker cannot be expected to maintain such close personal touch with the borrower. It is, therefore, incumbent upon him to supplement his general knowledge by reliable information obtained through other sources. Organized agencies for supplying information concerning the financial standing of borrowers have not yet been started in India. In England Seyd's, and in America Dun's and Bradstreet's, are the principal commercial agencies which render such information available to banks. They collect data concerning the standing and credit position of corporations, firms and individuals and supply the information to their members and subscribers. The service primarily consists of reports on parties about whom the subscriber makes an inquiry and ratings of capital and credit of practically every business concern in a particular country. With new concerns springing up from day to day, it is impossible in practice to furnish up-to-date information concerning all establishments, but the information collected by these agencies and revised from time to time forms an important means of verification in most cases, and upon request the agencies also furnish special and up-to-date reports to their customers. We understand that individual banks in India at present maintain special establishments for obtaining information in regard to their customers. We recommend that the problem of pooling this information and organizing



some system of collecting reliable information, a system suited to the needs of Indian customers and conforming, as much as possible, to Indian custom should be studied by the banks and the Bankers' Association proposed by us

556 The most important source of credit information is, however, the balance-sheet or financial statement furnished directly by the borrower. It has been brought to our notice that the borrower in India is reluctant to divulge freely to his banker his financial position. It is not necessary for us to examine the question whether the desire to maintain such secrecy is cherished in India to a greater degree than in western countries. The Managing Governor of the Imperial Bank of India, on being questioned as to the difficulty which, we were told, hampered banks in India in this respect, observed that the information necessary to conduct a satisfactory banking business in India was available in the great majority of cases if the correct method of obtaining it were followed. He added that the success or failure of the efforts to obtain the information must depend on the ability with which the banking business was conducted. We find that the banks that require financial statements before entertaining applications for loans generally have no difficulty in obtaining them from borrowers. We are, therefore, inclined to think that wherever banks in India require information about the financial position of their borrowers, they find no difficulty in obtaining the same if they can maintain the proper touch with their clients.

557 Another method of obtaining credit information is the direct interchange between banks of their personal knowledge and experience relating to common customers. Such an interchange of information is not uncommon among the banks in India, but it appears to us that in this as in other matters more free and full co-operation is necessary. We refer later to the formation of a Bankers' Association to promote such co-operation.

#### OTHER DEFECTS IN EXISTING ARRANGEMENTS

##### (1) *Absence of bills and bank acceptances*

558 One of the most important defects in the present mechanism of commercial banking in India which stands in the way of the development of credit facilities is the scarcity of trade bills and the absence of bank acceptances. We have dealt with the latter in Chapter XVII. We shall deal with the former in Chapter XXI.

559 Owing to the scarcity of bills, commercial banks in India invest a relatively large proportion of their resources in gilt-edged securities as compared with bills. In Chapter XX some statistics have been given relating to the London Clearing Banks for 1928 and in Chapter XXI certain statistics have been given for the six important Indian joint-stock banks for the same year. It will be

seen from these that while the total investments of the Indian banks amounted to Rs 20 crores against total advances aggregating Rs 33 crores, the corresponding figures for the English banks amounted to £259 million and £945 million respectively. It is hoped that the position will improve with the disappearance of the present depression in trade, the establishment of a Reserve Bank and the development of a bill-market in India. The matter is dealt with further in Chapter XXI.

### (11) *Development of cheque habit and use of vernacular scripts*

560 Later on in chapter XXIV we have dealt fully with the question of the development of the cheque habit and the part which banks can play in this matter. One of the factors retarding the progress of banking in this country is the paucity of persons able to read and write English, this being the language in which all organized banks carry on their business. Cheque-books and pass-books are printed in English and only a few commercial banks recognize cheques and signatures inscribed in the vernacular scripts. All the Provincial Committees have recommended that the banks should freely allow the use of the local vernaculars. The main scripts are 13, as noted below, and two to four scripts would have to be recognized in each province.

- (1) Assamese, (2) Bengalee, (3) Burmese, (4) Devnagri,  
(5) Gujarati, (6) Guimukhi, (7) Kanaiese, (8) Malayalam,  
(9) Modi, (10) Sindhi, (11) Tamil,  
(12) Telugu, (13) Urdu

There can be no question that the extension of banking facilities for borrowing and saving will be facilitated by the use of vernacular scripts in the various fields of banking including cheques, pass-books, and paying-in slips. The Bombay Provincial Committee state that banks sometimes require account holders, unable to write English, to sign blank cheques in advance in the vernacular, in the presence of bank officials, it being left to the account holders to fill in blanks as regards date, name and amount as necessity may arise, and that the customer is generally asked to indemnify the bank against the loss that it may be put to owing to any negligence on the part of the customer in regard to the custody of such cheques. The Committee point out that such restrictions on the use of the vernacular script must involve serious inconvenience, risk and hardship to the depositor. We are of opinion that any such restrictions are likely to defeat the object in view in recognizing the use of the vernaculars, namely, an increase in the clientele of the banks. We revert to the question of the extended use of the vernaculars, with a view to popularizing the banking and investment habit, in Chapter XXIV.

(iii) *Legal hindrances*

561 The development of the credit system depends not only upon the growth of business and the business relation of the banker and the businessman, but also on the efficiency of a legal system designed to safeguard the rights of individuals and to enforce a prompt fulfilment of contracts. Credit at reasonable rates would be impossible if the lender has to insure against legal impediments and risks of unfair treatment in law courts. In the following paragraphs we shall deal with certain legal hindrances in the way of development of credit facilities in India to which our attention has been drawn from various quarters.

562 The Provincial Committees have called attention to several legal difficulties experienced by banks. Where property is transferable without any legal or customary impediments, it forms a sound and valid security, but where there are in operation legal enactments placing impediments against such transfers, various complications arise in connection with the banker's advances to his customer. The difficulties as regards land tenures and the provisions of the Land Alienation Acts have been dealt with by us in Chapter X. Here, we should like to refer to certain other difficulties arising in connection with the advances made by commercial banks to their customers on the security of immovable property. Certain Hindu as well as Muhammedan laws and customs relating to succession and transfer of rights put serious obstacles in the way of bankers in this country providing financial accommodation on the security of what is ordinarily considered to be a normal and reliable bank security. For instance, in a joint Hindu family governed by the Mitakshara law all the members acquire a right in the ancestral property by birth and the accrual of that right dates from conception, so that there is always the possibility of having a transaction impugned by a person who at the date of transaction was not born. In order to charge a joint estate, it is necessary that all the members of the family should join in the execution of the deed or should give their consent, or it should be made by the head of the family in his capacity as *karta* or manager. The powers of the *karta* are, however, strictly limited and a charge created by him is binding on the family property only if the loan is taken for a purpose necessary or beneficial to the family or is in discharge of a lawful antecedent debt. If a banker who grants a loan on the security of the joint estate files a suit to enforce the charge, the burden of proof that before he made the loan he satisfied himself that the loan was taken for purposes binding on the family lies on the banker. This and several other difficulties must discourage a banker in accepting property belonging to such families as a bank security.

Similarly, in the case of Muhammedan customers the banker is confronted with doubts and difficulties. A Muhammedan has the customary power of informally binding property by verbal *wakfs* or trusts, and the defence in certain cases in a mortgage suit against a Muhammedan is that the property mortgaged was in fact the subject of religious endowment. Besides, a Muhammedan cannot dispose of by will more than one-third of his property without the concurrence of his heirs, his heirs on his dying intestate, have, therefore, to be traced to the third generation in the ascending and descending lines.

From the purely banking point of view the time has, in our opinion, arrived when the Hindu law and the Muhammedan law should be reviewed in the light of recent experience, and steps should be taken as early as possible to remove the impediments which now stand in the way of immovable property belonging to a Hindu or Muhammedan family being accepted by bankers as a normal security. We recognize, however, that other considerations may be involved, and we must accordingly leave it to the Governments concerned and then legislatures to weigh the various considerations involved and determine what action should be taken in the matter.

553 For temporary loans, mortgages created by a simple deposit of documents, without any mortgage instrument or registration, are a great convenience to the commercial community as well as to banks. Such an arrangement saves considerable amount of time, trouble and expense in registration and it also avoids publicity. Under Section 58 (f) of the Transfer of Property Act, however, equitable mortgages can be effected only in Calcutta, Madras, Bombay, Karachi, Rangoon, Moultan, Bassein and Akyab and in any other town which the Governor General in Council may, by notification in the *Gazette of India*, specify. There is good reason for this restriction, as it would be dangerous to extend such facilities to places where people are illiterate and backward. The Act, however, recognizes that the facilities could be gradually extended to commercial centres where people are more advanced. Accordingly, some of the Provincial Committees have recommended that the provisions of the Act relating to equitable mortgages should be extended to other important centres of trade and commerce (both internal and port towns) throughout India. We concur in this recommendation.

554 In view of a recent ruling by the Bombay High Court in connection with bearer instruments of credit it is now incumbent upon banks and business houses to examine all endorsements on bearer cheques. The practice that was in vogue before was based on the principle "once a bearer always a bearer", but it was held by the High Court that the character of a negotiable instrument

which was drawn payable to bearer in the first instance could be effectively altered by any subsequent endorsement. A Bill was thereupon introduced in the Legislative Assembly on 2nd September 1929 to provide that negotiable instruments, including cheques and bills of exchange which are expressed on the face of them as drawn to bearer, should not in any circumstances lose through endorsement their character of bearer instruments. The Bill was, however, rejected, as, among other reasons, it was considered desirable to await the recommendations of our Committee in the matter.

The question has since been fully considered by the Provincial Committees and some of them have recommended that the Negotiable Instruments Act should be amended so as to provide that cheques originally drawn to bearer would, despite any endorsement, retain their character as bearer instruments. We concur in this recommendation. We also approve of the recommendation made by the Madras Committee that any holder of a cheque should have the right to alter the character of the cheque from "bearer" to "order" on the face of it and that the alteration should be supported by the name of the drawer or holding endorser who makes the alteration. It should not, however, be altered by endorsement on the back of the cheque. We further recommend that *hundis* which are drawn in the form of cheques should be treated similarly. We are not, however, in favour of interfering with the existing practice in regard to other *hundis* and do not recommend that the principle "once a bearer, always a bearer" should be made applicable to such *hundis*.

567 It has been represented to us that banks need protection against frauds in connection with goods which they allow to remain in the custody of borrowers. In such cases a document known as a trust receipt is signed by the borrower who thereby binds himself to hold the goods in trust for the bank. It is an arrangement very convenient to the commercial community and is largely availed of. Owing, however, to a recent decision of the Madras High Court which arose out of a prosecution instituted at the instance of the Central Bank of India against two groundnut exporters in Madras, it is feared in banking circles that there are difficulties in the way of successfully prosecuting the executants of trust receipts without proving actual loss to the bank or likelihood of loss arising from their fraud. We are not in a position to examine the details of the commercial practice and the legal incidence attached to these trust receipts and are unable to pronounce an opinion as to whether any, and if so what, protection in addition to that already given by the existing provisions of the law is necessary and whether any remedy suggested may not lead to other legal difficulties. We, however, suggest that the legal position as regards this matter may be investigated by the legal advisers of Government and such action taken as may be considered necessary.

### REMITTANCE FACILITIES.

566 One of the essential services which commercial banks are expected to render to the public is to transmit money from one centre to another quickly and economically. The rate charged for internal remittance by the Imperial Bank of India is one anna per cent on sums above Rs 10,000. In case of telegraphic transfers the telegram charges are added. The joint-stock banks are allowed a concession rate of half an anna per cent for sums of Rs 10,000 and over for transfers of funds between their branches. The rates charged by the joint-stock banks to their customers vary according to demand and supply. The cost of internal remittance in India is, however, according to the information supplied to us higher than in other countries and we recommend that it should be reduced as far as possible with a view to a better utilization of the resources of the country and a lowering of the rates of interest generally throughout the country. It is understood that in Canada internal remittance is allowed free by banks between places contiguous to one another, say within about 300 or 400 miles and that only a small charge is made if the distance is greater. The charge for remittance in Java is only 1 guilder for remittance of 1,000 guilders or above irrespective of the amount. It may be expected that with the facilities afforded by the Reserve Bank, when it is established, the commercial banks will be in a position to offer still better terms for remittance. If transfers of money for member banks and bankers were made by the Reserve Bank free of cost as a national service, it would, we think, have a good influence on the equalization of interest rates throughout the country. It will perhaps be not possible in the beginning to forego the charge, but it might be possible to do so at a later stage. In this connection we should like to call attention to the following observations made by the Royal Commission on Indian Currency and Finance emphasizing the need for the extension of cheap remittance facilities.

“In any scheme of banking reform that may be planned, we trust that due emphasis will be laid on the provision and extension of cheap facilities to the public, including banks and bankers, for internal remittance.”\*

In the meantime we consider it desirable for the Imperial Bank of India to reduce the remittance cost to the public by extending the half-anna rate for remittance of Rs 10,000 and above to transfers between any two banks.

The co-operative societies are the most suitable agency for the extension of remittance facilities to rural areas. We have already dealt with their difficulties and grievances in this respect and made our recommendations in Chapter IX.

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\* Report of the Royal Commission on Indian Currency and Finance, 1926, paragraph 215.

## WANT OF INTER-BANK CO-OPERATION

567 It may be expected that the establishment of a central banking institution will promote regular business relations between the different types of banks, including indigenous bankers. Something more is, however, essential to bring about closer co-operation among them. They seldom meet to discuss matters of common interest, or to agree upon lines of co-operation which could bring about an improvement of standard, eliminate elements of weakness or foster the combination of smaller banks with larger units. We are therefore, recommending in chapter XXIII the creation of an All-India Bankers' Association, and for further details we invite a reference to that chapter.

## FUTURE OF INDIAN JOINT-STOCK BANKING.

568 The chequered history of joint-stock banks as briefly depicted in Chapter II, together with the difficulties they have experienced and are experiencing as brought to our notice in the evidence of our witnesses, shows that the problem of the development of joint-stock banks is one which deserves the fullest and most sympathetic consideration by Government. On the one hand they are looked upon as dangerous rivals by the indigenous bankers and on the other they frequently find themselves in opposition to the old established exchange banks and the powerful Imperial Bank of India. Placed in this position, therefore, they have been called the Cinderella of the Indian banking system and have only been able to exist amidst bickerings, suspicions and cut-throat competition. Despite all difficulties, Indian joint-stock banks have shown considerable stamina, and while the weaker banks have failed to survive, others have made creditable progress. For example, 93 institutions with 300 branches in 1921 have expanded their sphere of influence and there were 133 banks with 421 branches in 1928. This expansion in face of adverse factors reflects the persistence and enterprise of the founders and management of these institutions, and it is our desire that the efforts which have been made in this sphere of Indian banking should be recognised both by Government and by the Reserve Bank in due course. It may perhaps be stated that our proposals in this chapter are not very constructive and will not be of any great practical benefit to the joint-stock banks, but we must emphasize that the remedies must come largely from within. Joint-stock banks can learn much from their rivals on both sides, they must incorporate the economy and adaptability of the indigenous bankers with the efficiency and modern methods of the western institutions. It is a truism to say that the foundation of successful banking is good bankers, and yet the fact is sometimes overlooked. With good bankers forthcoming

the next step is the elimination of unhealthy competition and the substitution of a spirit of co-operation and joint action where such is in the common interest. We recommend elsewhere the formation of an All-India Bankers' Association which should have as one of its main objects the formulation of conventions and working principles which will prevent overlapping and what we have called unhealthy competition. We have also suggested that the expansion of branch banking should be under the guidance of the Reserve Bank. Other methods by which the development of the joint-stock banks may be assisted may be devised by the Reserve Bank, and we strongly feel that then interests must be steadily borne in mind by the authorities of that Bank when it comes into being. In the meantime we feel that the credit operations of Government should be arranged as far as possible so as to cause the minimum of difficulty to such banks either in the way of putting up the price of credit or of depreciating the value of the reserve assets of such institutions.

563 The removal of hindrances by law can do no more than create a healthy atmosphere for the development of banking. But the attainment of the desirable result, *viz*, an adequate development of banking on the correct lines, depends essentially on the private initiative which the necessary legislative measures are intended to promote. The real problem in relation to commercial banking in this country, which must be regarded as one of paramount importance, is the very scanty development hitherto attained in this line of banking business in India. This development is essentially dependent on the extent of private enterprise that may be directed to banking business. And we cannot too much emphasize the need for a systematic propaganda that should be carried on to infuse the necessary optimism and initiative among the enterprising sections of the public. While the measures proposed by us have a particular bearing on the qualitative aspect of commercial banking, the need for the development of its quantitative aspect is also equally imperative. As has been previously stated, there were in 1928 only 339 towns in the whole of India served by either a bank or branch or an agency of a bank. This number of 339 against the total number of 2,300 towns strongly points to the need of expediting the expansion and progress of commercial banking in this country.

#### POINTS OF DIFFERENCE WITH FOREIGN EXPERTS

570 In their report the foreign experts state that in so far as our conclusions could lead to the view that the commercial banks failed to provide the country with banking facilities which could reasonably be expected, they cannot agree with us. We should



like to point out that there was nothing in our provisional conclusions, which they had before them when they wrote their report, that would justify any such inference. On a study of the figures of deposits received by the banks from the year 1919 to 1928 the experts were led to draw the inference that deposits had not developed and that the country was not "bounding with untapped banking possibilities." We, therefore, considered it necessary to review the situation as regards deposits and to point out that having regard to all the factors influencing the development of deposits, it would not be correct to infer that the banking resources of India were limited and that there was consequently no scope for the development of branch banking.

571 The only other point concerning commercial banking in regard to which the experts have recorded their dissent from our conclusions refers to the absence of touch and the lack of knowledge resulting therefrom between borrowers and lenders. The experts state that although our conclusions did not clearly indicate the defects from which the absence of touch and lack of knowledge originate, they gathered from their discussions with us and from our provisional conclusions that it was the banks in the principal money markets that, in our opinion, were mainly responsible for such defects. We should like to point out that our suggestion that the banks with the assistance of the Bankers' Association proposed by us should co-operate with a view to collecting and pooling reliable information regarding the credit position of their Indian customers and conforming as much as possible to Indian custom was not intended as a criticism of the banks. It is intended merely to stress the desirability of better co-operation between the banker and his customer in this respect and to suggest the means by which their credit operations can be facilitated and developed.

It was not our intention to draw any comparison between the attitude of the Indian bank customers and those in western countries, but the experts have drawn a comparison. They observe that a great difference exists between the attitude of the two classes of customers and that secrecy about business affairs seems to be much more cherished in India than in other countries. Such an inference, we are constrained to observe, cannot be drawn from the material placed before us. Some of the witnesses, no doubt, made such a statement, but the fact is, as stated by the Managing Governor of the Imperial Bank of India, that banks following the correct method of obtaining information find no difficulty in getting it.

572 In their observations concerning Regulation of Banking the experts refer to our provisional conclusion regarding the inadvisability of placing restrictions on branch activities as being inconsistent with the recommendation made by us to make the opening of new branches of banks dependent on the approval of the Reserve Bank. Our position is that while we are not in favour

of the imposition of any specific restrictions on the opening of new branches by banks, we consider it desirable to ensure a systematic expansion of branches under the general supervision and control of the central banking institution of the country. We have expressed the opinion that licences should be freely granted and we take it that normally the Reserve Bank would offer every encouragement for the extension of branches. The experts themselves recognize that if the Reserve Bank were made the licensing authority, it "would handle the system in a sound and impartial way." They, however, record their dissent as regards the reasons given in justification of the recommendation, particularly the reason that such control is partly necessary in the interests of depositors. This particular aspect of the question has been dealt with by us in Chapter XXV.

## CHAPTER XX.

### THE BANKING SYSTEM AND THE MONEY MARKET— (contd.)

#### RELATIONS BETWEEN THE VARIOUS PARTS OF THE INDIAN BANKING SYSTEM

573 Having described the component parts of the banking system in some detail, we now proceed to consider the relations of the several parts to each other and to the money market. The first thing that strikes the observer is the absence of a central co-ordinating agency in the Indian Banking system. In the absence of such an agency, the Imperial Bank of India plays the rôle of a bankers' bank. There is no legal provision compelling the other banks to maintain minimum balances with it, although the exchange banks and important joint-stock banks in practice keep the major part of their cash balances with it. The Imperial Bank of India renders valuable service to the ordinary joint-stock banks by granting loans against the security of Government paper at Bank rate, although the relatively high level of the Bank rate on occasions detracts considerably from this facility. Owing to the special privileges enjoyed by the Imperial Bank of India as the Government banker, the joint-stock banks look upon it more as an unfair rival than as a friendly coadjutor. Some of the joint-stock banks also regard the foreign exchange banks as formidable rivals on account of their large resources and their ability to attract deposits at more favourable rates of interest than the joint-stock banks themselves. The penetration of the foreign exchange banks into inland business both at the ports and in the interior is also naturally looked upon by the Indian banks as an encroachment upon the latter's proper field of activities. As regards the co-operative banks, the primary societies have no contact with credit agencies other than co-operative. The provincial and central co-operative banks, however, keep small current accounts with the Imperial Bank of India and some central banks have similar arrangements with other joint-stock banks. The provincial banks have also cash credit facilities with the Imperial Bank of India and an arrangement for overdrafts, but the latter has recently insisted that in such cases the existing cover for the cash credits in the form of demand promissory notes of primary societies should be replaced by Government securities. There is a growing feeling among the joint-stock banks and the Imperial Bank of India that the co-operative banks are beginning to compete with commercial banks and indigenous bankers in forms of banking which are outside co-operation, e.g., opening current accounts, purchasing drafts and selling remittance, etc. The co-operative banks have no relations with the indigenous bankers and



The chief source of supply of funds to the banks is current and deposit accounts. The banks do not pay interest on large portions of the balances, left with them on current accounts, but they pay interest on time deposits which is generally 2 per cent below the Bank Rate. Besides cash, the main items of liquid assets are bills discounted and money at call and short notice. Of the sum of £145 millions lent at call and short notice, about two-thirds are lent to the discount market against bills accepted by first class banks and finance houses in the City of London. These loans are either made for the night or for a week, and the latter class of loan carries interest at present at 1 per cent below the Bank Rate. The interest charged on over-night loans is comparatively low. The rate for 7 days' loans to bill-brokers is called the market rate for loans in the money market. The funds available with the bill-brokers for discounting bills consist of funds obtained from the London Money Market, *i.e.*, money lent at call or short notice by all the deposit banks and amounting in all to about £150 to 180 million, and of further resources placed at their disposal by other lenders such as the finance houses and merchants. The remainder of the money at call and short notice other than that lent to the discount market, is loaned by them to the stock exchange and for the financing of stock bought by speculators which have to be settled for fortnightly in the stock exchange market. If owing to any reason the banks are unable to lend the discount market all the money needed to finance the bills, the bill-brokers obtain accommodation from the Bank of England either by discounting approved bills at the Bank Rate, which is the official minimum rate, at which the Bank of England will discount bills, or by way of loans from the Bank of England at  $\frac{1}{2}$  per cent above the Bank rate.

576 The following statement gives a clear idea of the relations between the various money rates ruling in the London Money and Discount Markets

---	March 5, 1931	March 12, 1931	March 19, 1931	March 26, 1931
	%	%	%	—
Bank Rate	3	3	3	3
Banks' Deposit Rate	1	1	1	1
Clearing Banks' Rate for Money at Short Notice	2	2	2	2
Market Rate (3 months' bills)	2 $\frac{5}{8}$	2 $\frac{5}{8}$	2 $\frac{9}{16}$	2 $\frac{9}{16}$

577 We may now deal with Indian conditions. There is no fixed relation between the rate paid by banks on deposits and the Imperial Bank rate. As regards the distribution of the total assets of the various banks, the effects of stock exchange operations vary in different centres. Probably in Bombay they assume greater importance than in Calcutta. Normally, however, they do not constitute a factor which is considered of serious importance. The holdings of bills have never been on a large scale, and such bills as have been purchased have been looked upon as a definite investment and there has rarely been any question of rediscounting them. In the case of foreign bills in connection with external trade, those representing exports have at once to be sent out of the country for acceptance and are placed, if necessary, on the London Discount Market, while those representing imports are held by the banks till maturity under an interest clause. This point has been dealt with more fully in Chapter XVII. In the case of inland bills representing movement of goods internally, these do sometimes find their way into the portfolio of the Imperial Bank of India through indigenous bankers or *shroffs*. But in the absence of proper warehouse receipts it is difficult to distinguish inland trade-bills from finance bills and there is no regular organized market on a large scale for dealings in such bills.

### THE BANK RATE AND THE DIFFERENT MONEY MARKETS

578 Now let us see what Bank Rate means in India. The Imperial Bank Rate, though quoted in financial journals along with the bank rates of the Central Banks of other countries, has a different significance from those rates. Whereas the bank rates of Central Banks usually denote the rates at which first class trade bills can be discounted at the Central Bank, the rate published by the Imperial Bank of India denotes the rate at which it is prepared to grant demand loans against Government securities. From the banking point of view it is obvious that this form of security must be at least as acceptable as trade bills and one would therefore expect the official rate of the Imperial Bank of India to be the lowest rate at which credit can be obtained. An examination of the following table will show that though there is an intimate connection between the Imperial Bank Rate and the Imperial Bank Hundi Rate, which is the rate at which it will discount or re-discount first class bills of 61 days' date, the latter has sometimes been higher and sometimes lower than the official bank rate. The table illustrates further the differences between the "Bazar" rates, the inter-bank call money rates and the official rate —

	Bank rate	Call money rate		Imperial Bank Hundi rate	Bazar Bill rate*	
		Calcutta	Bombay		Calcutta	Bombay.
	Per cent	Per cent	Per cent	Per cent	Per cent	Per cent.
<i>1st April 1925 to 1st March 1926</i>						
April	7	5	6½	7	10—11	11½
May . .	7	5½	6½	7	10—11	11½
June	6	5	5½	6½	10—10½	10½
July	5	2	3½—4	5½	10—10½	9½
August	4	2	1¾	4½	10—10½	8½
September	4	1½	1½	4½	10—10½	8½
October	5	1¾	1	5	10½—11	9½
November	5	2½	1½—2	5½	10½—11	10½
December	5	2½	3	5½	10—10½	9½
January	6	3½	3½	6	10—10½	9½
February .	6	4½	4½—5	6	10—10½	9½
March	6	5	5½—6	6	10—10½	10½
<i>1st April 1926 to 1st March 1927.</i>						
April	6	4½	5½	6	10—10½	9½
May .	6	4	4½—5	6	10—10½	9½
June .	5	2	4	4	10—10½	7½
July	4	2½	2½	4	10	7½
August	4	1	1	3	10	6½
September	4	1	1	3	10	6½
October	4	½	½—1	3	10	6½
November	4	¾	½	3	10	6½
December	4	¾	½—¾	3	10	6½
January	5	4	4½	4½	10	8½
February .	6	4½	5—5½	6	11	9½
March .	7	6	6½—6¾	7	11	10½

\* The bazar rates are those at which the bills of small traders are discounted by *shroffs*. The rates for bills of large traders and *shroffs* are not given separately as they follow very closely the Imperial Bank *hundi* rate.

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BETWEEN THE VARIOUS PARTS OF THE INDIAN BANKING SYSTEM.

	Bank rate	Call money rate		Imperial Bank Hundi rate	Bazar bill rate*	
		Calcutta	Bombay		Calcutta	Bombay
	Per cent	Per cent	Per cent	Per cent	Per cent	Per cent
<i>1st April 1927 to 1st March 1928</i>						
April	7	6	6½—6¾	7	10—12	10½
May	7	5	6—5½	7	10—11	10½
June	7	4—4½	6—5½	7	10—11	10½
July	5	1½	3	5	9	7½
August	4	1½—2¼	2—1¾	4	9	6¾
September	4	2	2½—2¾	4	9	6¾
October	5	1½	2	5	9—10	7½
November	5	1½	2	5	8—9	7½
December	5	3	4—4½	5	8—9	8½
January	7	5½—6	5¾—6	7	10—10½	9¾
February	7	6	6¼—6½	7	10—11	10½
March	7	4¾—5	6—6¼	7	10—11	9¾
<i>1st April 1928 to 1st March 1929</i>						
April	7	6½	5½—5¾	7	10—11	9¾
May	7	5½—5¾	5¾—6	7	10—11	9¾
June	7	4	5¾—6	7	10	9
July	6	3	4¼—4½	5½	9	6¾
August	5	2¼	2½—3	5	9	6¾
September	5	3½	3¼—3¾	5	9	6¾
October	5	2¼	2—2½	5	9—10	6¾
November	5	2—1½	3	5	9—10	6¾
December	6	1½	3	6	9—10	7¾
January	7	4—4½	6½	7	10—12	9½
February	7	6	6¼—6½	7½	11—12	10½
March	8	6	7½	8	11—12	10¾

\* Please see footnote on previous page



—	Bank rate	Call money rate		Imperial Bank Hundi rate	Bazar Bill rate*	
		Calcutta	Bombay		Calcutta	Bombay
	Per cent	Per cent	Per cent	Per cent	Per cent	Per cent
<i>1st April 1929 to 1st March 1930</i>						
April . . .	8	5	6½	8	11—12	11
May	7	2½	3½	7	10—11	8½
June . . .	6	1½	3½	6	10—11	6½
July	5	1½	1½	5	10	5½
August	5	Nil	1½	5	10	5½
September	5	1½	1½	5	11	6
October	5	2½	3—3½	5	11	7½
November	7	2	2½	7	11	8½
December .	7	1½	4½	7	11	9½
January	7	3	5	7	11	9½
February .	7	4½—5½	6½	7	11	9½
March . . .	7	5	4½	7	11	9½

579 The problem of the independence of the various money markets in India and how to make them more inter-dependent has occupied much thought, and has been the subject of long discussions with both local witnesses and with the foreign experts. The bazar rates quoted in the table are those of Bombay and Calcutta for small traders' bills, those of other up-country markets not being available. An interesting feature is that this bazar rate of Calcutta changes very rarely outside 10 and 11 per cent whereas that of Bombay seems to have some remote connection with the Imperial Bank rate and the call money rate. The fact that a call rate of ½ per cent, a hundi rate of 3 per cent, a bank rate of 4 per cent, a Bombay bazar rate for bills of small traders of 6½ per cent, and a Calcutta bazar rate for bills of small traders of 10 per cent can exist simultaneously indicates an extraordinary sluggishness in the movement of credit between the various markets. The Bombay Committee have also pointed out that in Bombay City alone there are the Gujarati, the Marwari and the Multani bazars with their different rates. The last mentioned is more closely connected with the Imperial Bank rate owing to the fact that Multanis do a fairly extensive business with the Imperial Bank of

\* Please see footnote on page 398

India The other bazar rates do not necessarily bear any relation to the Imperial Bank rate

580 The independence of the call money market is perhaps the simplest to understand, and may be dealt with first. In most money markets of the world it will be found that the rates for day to day loans are considerably lower than the bank rate. In fact, the rates represent different charges for different articles. The call money rate is the rate for surplus money seeking employment for possibly a minimum period of 24 hours, whereas the bank rate indicates the charge for the use of money for a specified period. Further, call money is repayable at the option of either the lender or the borrower, while advances against securities at bank rate are usually repayable at the option of the borrower only. The latter normally, therefore, should be higher than the call money rate. In other countries the call money rate tends towards a bank's demand deposit or current account rate while the bank rate indicates a lending rate. It is possible that one reason of this is that the supply of currency and credit is properly regulated by the Central Bank taking away surplus funds from, or supplying new money to, the market as may be necessary. But in India we find that call money is sometimes unobtainable in the slack season at almost any rate when treasury bills are not available, while it may not be obtainable even at bank rates in the busy season. While the existence of differences between call rates and bank rates in normal circumstances requires no special action, it should be noted that in conditions of exceptional ease or stringency call money rates may have considerable importance in connection with exchange considerations. Any special action in the matter will be one of the functions of a Central Bank under modern conditions.

581 The explanation of differences between bazar rates for small traders' bills and the Imperial Bank rate is much more elusive. In India there are two money markets, namely, the Indian money market or the bazar, and the market controlled by banking institutions working on western lines. The natural link between the two markets would appear to be a steady supply of trade bills endorsed by reliable firms or discount houses which are in touch with both markets, and are able to meet the needs at one end of the merchant who prefers the elastic methods of bazar finance, and to take advantage at the other end of entry into the central money and discount markets. It has been pointed out that though the Bank of England rate controls money rates in London and large centres, there is often considerable divergence in rates in the provincial towns, and that the levelling down of rates must be a matter of slow growth and development. The ultimate ideal must be the mobilization of the whole of the floating resources of the country into one large pool into which bills can

find their way with as little delay and with the intervention of as few intermediaries as possible. At present the resources more closely resemble a stream which is constantly being blocked by obstacles preventing a free flow of bills.

582. We have referred to the fact that the banks' deposit rates in London follow the Bank of England rate automatically and that in India, although the same causes which result in a change in the Bank Rate would affect the deposit rate also, the mere fact that the Bank Rate has altered does not necessarily change the deposit rate. This uncertainty and this undefined position in India were brought to our notice, and we were told that such a state of affairs could not be remedied until India got a highly organized money market as in London. It was the unanimous opinion of witnesses, and we agree with that opinion, that in order to organize the Indian money market on sound and modern lines it is essential that the Reserve Bank should be started as the centre of the Money Market. In fact this was the view held by the late Mr. Benjamin Strong in his evidence before the Royal Commission on Indian Currency and Finance, 1926. He said that the establishment of a Central Bank was the best means of establishing a properly functioning money market and that the absence of a Central Bank results in developments that are distortions of the money market. He referred to the chaotic position of the New York money market before the Federal Reserve Banks were established and to its better organization after their establishment.

583. A large number of witnesses before us complained of the dual control by the Government of India and the Imperial Bank of India over the Bank Rate and suggested that until a Central Banking Authority can be created the regulation of the Bank Rate should be in the hands of the Imperial Bank of India without interference from Government. The Managing Governor of the Imperial Bank of India pointed out that so long as the control of the currency is in the hands of the Government of India, it is impossible to take from them the powers over the Bank Rate which that control gives them. Those powers confer the right to expand and contract the currency, and the supply of currency is an important factor in determining the Bank Rate. He added that even if it were possible to take away the powers of Government in this matter, it is clearly to the advantage of the country that currency and credit should be managed by the two authorities working in sympathy. Even witnesses, who suggested that the Bank Rate should be entirely dictated by the exigencies of the monetary situation in India and should in no way be subject to control by the Government of India, admitted that such interference by the Government would be inevitable in emergencies arising from international considerations and this has been the experience of England and the United States of America.

### *Seasonal Stringency*

584 We have referred to the powers in the hands of the Government to expand and contract the currency. There is one aspect of the exercise of the powers of expansion which has come in for a good deal of criticism. Under Section 20 of the Indian Paper Currency Act, Act X of 1923, the Governor General in Council is authorized to issue currency notes to an amount not exceeding Rs. 12 crores against bills of exchange maturing within 90 days of the date of such issue and satisfying other conditions as the Governor General in Council may by general or special order prescribe. The memorandum of procedure now in force for the issue of this additional currency is printed in Appendix III in the Volume of Appendices to the Report of the Royal Commission on Indian Currency and Finance, 1926. It is prescribed in that memorandum that this additional issue will take the form of a loan to the Imperial Bank of India against demand promissory notes with a certificate that internal bills or *hundis* which satisfy the provisions of Section 20 of the Act referred to above, and whose discounted value does not fall short of the amount of the additional issue, are held by the Bank on behalf of the Government. No issue can be made until the Bank Rate rises to 6 per cent and the entire amount outstanding at any time bears interest at Bank Rate subject to a minimum limit of 6 per cent for the first Rs. 4 crores and 7 per cent for the subsequent Rs. 8 crores. It is a universal complaint of banks and merchants in India that the fixing of arbitrary rates for the issue of additional currency against trade bills penalizes commerce and industry unnecessarily. It has, therefore, been suggested that the issue of emergency currency, by which name the additional issue is popularly called, should be at the current Bank Rate with no fixed minimum and that this procedure would be analogous to the practice in other countries where rediscount of trade bills by the central banking institution is at the Bank Rate. It is hoped that by adopting this suggestion, in practice, the control of Government over the Bank Rate would be removed and then interference would be confined within its legitimate sphere.

585 So long as the issue of additional currency is within the discretion of the Government—and this is the position under the present Paper Currency Act—we do not see how the suggestion above will have the contemplated effect. The Government might still refuse to issue currency at a particular time if, in their opinion, the Bank Rate is lower than circumstances warrant, and the only effect of such a course would be to compel the Imperial Bank of India to raise its rate.

586 It has also been suggested that the arbitrary limit of Rs. 12 crores for the issue of emergency currency has been detrimental

to trade and commerce and that it should be raised at least to 10 per cent of the total circulation. We cannot sympathize with this suggestion as in practice it has been rarely necessary for the Imperial Bank of India to avail itself of the total of Rs. 12 crores. Further, we do not think that the Government themselves regard this limit as unchangeable for all time, and in fact the original limit which was fixed at Rs. 5 crores in 1923 has been changed to Rs. 12 crores later. The necessity for any alteration in the limit of issue of emergency currency can only arise with the growth of the bill market in India and when this happens we have no doubt that the Government of their own accord will raise the limit to meet the country's demand for additional currency.

587. We must, however, record our opinion that the present conception that the seasonal monetary stringency in India is inevitable, and that this stringency must bring about a wide range of interest rates, is erroneous and can be traced to the existing defective system of control of currency and credit. It will be one of the functions of the Reserve Bank, when it is created, to keep sufficient free reserves\* at the beginning of the busy season to supply the country with the currency needed during the crop-moving season without the necessity of putting up the interest rate solely on this account. The present system of issue of emergency currency under which no issue is possible except at stated rates of interest has contributed to this unsatisfactory state of affairs. With the establishment of the Reserve Bank, the supply of additional currency against proper cover would be automatic, and the question of penal rates of interest would not arise.

#### GOVERNMENT AND THE MONEY MARKET

588. The operations of Government in connection with the money market have been severely criticized by several witnesses. Not only have they exercised considerable control over the Bank Rate of the Imperial Bank of India, to which reference has already been made, but both by their purchases of exchange and by their issues of treasury bills they have been able to influence the money position. The responsibility of Government towards the money market has long been recognized and opinions have been divided as to which is the better line of progress, to remove the responsibility or to improve the machinery through which it is exercised. The Royal Commission on Indian Currency and Finance, 1926, summed up the position as follows — "The Government controls the currency. The credit situation is controlled as far as it is controlled at all by the Imperial Bank. With divided control

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\* By this is meant that during slack season the percentage of gold assets in the Paper Currency Reserve will be higher than the statutory requirement. During the busy season, therefore, the Reserve Bank will be able to issue more currency without violating the statutory requirement of maintaining a certain percentage of the Reserve in gold assets.

there is likelihood of divided counsels and failure to co-operate". Since the above was written there is no doubt that to a much larger extent than previously Government have assumed control of the credit situation through the medium of treasury bills. In so far as such issues have been in pursuance of their exchange policy, the matter is not within the scope of this Committee's investigations, nor are we concerned with such issues as have been for the purpose of supplementing the ways and means programme. As regards the effect on banks, it would appear that in the early stages at any rate these issues of treasury bills had the result of reducing deposits and of competing with banks for available deposits. They also resulted in a temporary contraction of credit. In some cases, the proceeds of the treasury bills were disbursed into the money markets and the contraction was counter-balanced, and the net result of the operations may be said to have caused dearer money without creating a scarcity of money. In some cases, however, where the proceeds of treasury bills were utilized to contract currency by cancelling *ad hoc* securities, there has to this extent been a scarcity of money in the market. At the present moment it is probable that treasury bills are looked upon by banks as a profitable source of investment, free from capital depreciation and readily available for obtaining cash advances from the Imperial Bank of India. The fact that Government still have to pay on an average about one per cent more than banks for deposits for similar periods suggests that these bills have not yet been accepted as an integral part of the money market at their proper value. We are informed by one of the foreign banking experts that in London the rate for such bills is usually about one thirty-second above the rate for fine bills, and the margin in India between the treasury bill rate and the open rates for time deposits, therefore, appears to us excessive. Another criticism that has been levelled against operations in treasury bills is that they have resulted in very serious depreciation in the ordinary Government Security market, not only causing heavy losses to banks and others who hold the long dated loans but at the same time creating a feeling of nervousness and reluctance on the part of investors to take up new rupee loans. It is difficult to make any definite statement as to the effect of treasury bills on investments in industrial concerns, but in so far as the operations have raised the general rate of interest on gilt-edged investment they have inevitably reacted on all investments. Both the Bengal National Chamber of Commerce and the Calcutta Stock Exchange have commented on the effects of treasury bills on existing securities, and the foreign experts also considered that banks' investments in gilt-edged securities in India formed a very high percentage of their investments compared with such percentages in other countries. They

further recommended that such investments should be largely replaced by commercial bills as soon as possible. Speaking from the point of view of banking credit as a whole, it has been stated by witnesses that the effect of recent Government operations has been to raise the price of credit and in that respect to penalize trade and industry. From the figures given in chapter III, it will be seen that the net borrowings of the Government of India since 1925-26 in the form of loans, treasury bills and cash certificates have amounted to about Rs. 140 crores, while from the table in Chapter XIX paragraph 538 it may be observed that the figures of bank deposits have remained stationary during the last ten years. This state of affairs has made the Indian banking and credit problem still more difficult.

It is not part of our function to enquire into this matter and we, therefore, abstain from passing judgment on the Government's borrowing policy, the amount, the time and the terms of their borrowings and their effect on the general level of interest rates and on the development of trade, industry and banking. We, however, hope that when the Reserve Bank is established Government will work in close co-operation with that Bank in the matter of their borrowing operations (including rates for post office savings banks deposits and cash certificates) and that in those circumstances there will be no room for adverse criticism of the kind referred to above.

## CHAPTER XXI.

### THE BANKING SYSTEM AND THE MONEY MARKET— (Contd.)

#### BILL MARKET—GENERAL

589 Although it is generally accepted that from the point of view of a discount market bills in India are scarce, it must not be assumed that this is due to a lack of knowledge on the part of the people of the utility of this form of credit, or to an unwillingness to make use of it. As stated in paragraphs 22 and 23, there is definite evidence of the remittance of money by credit instruments as early as the fifth century, B C, and the use of *hundis* as early as the twelfth century A D. Indeed on pages 70 and 71 of his book on Indigenous Banking in India, J. C Jain refers to legendary stories which carry back the origin of the *hundi* to a very early period of Indian history. The safety of *hundis* for travellers as compared with the risk of carrying cash must in itself have provided a good reason for the development of the *hundi* habit.

590 There is no legal definition of a *hundi*. It is governed by the custom and usages of the various localities, and only where no specific custom exists does it come under the term "bill of exchange" within the meaning of the Negotiable Instruments Act. *Hundis* are of two kinds, *darshan* or demand bills, and *muddat* or usance bills. In this respect they resemble the bill of exchange and they should certainly form a foundation for the development of a bill market on modern lines.

591 In Chapter XX we gave a statement of the joint balance sheet of several clearing banks in England showing the distribution of their assets. The following statement relating to Indian banks affords an interesting comparison. Unfortunately banks in India do not make a universal practice of showing investments in bills separately and in several cases the figure is included in the total figure of advances. The very small figure under the heading of bills must therefore not be taken as strictly correct, though it may be assumed that the reason for not showing it separately in certain cases is that it is too small to be treated as



an independent item The figures are for 1928, the same year as those of the English banks —

	The Imperial Bank of India.	*Six Indian joint stock banks
	Rs in lakhs	Rs in lakhs.
Liabilities—		
Capital and Reserves	10,85	6,66
Current and Deposit Accounts	79,25	52,20
Assets—		
Investments	19,04	20,06
Bills	12,47	1,23
Advances	51,55	33,42
Cash	10,65	6,83

\* Allahabad Bank, Bank of Baroda, Central Bank of India, Bank of India, Peoples Bank of Northern India and Punjab National Bank

The striking feature as mentioned in the previous chapter is the relatively large proportion of assets locked up in investments. This may be due to two causes, firstly the necessity for banks in India to maintain a relatively stronger liquid position than in better developed banking countries, or secondly the attractive yield of Government securities as compared with other forms of investment. The growth of confidence in banking institutions followed by a reduction in the present investments in gilt-edged securities of banks must inevitably be a matter of time while as already pointed out it is hoped that in due course there will be a very definite tendency to equalization of the attractiveness of investment in Government securities and that of commercial business.

#### SCARCITY OF BILLS—OTHER REASONS

592 Various other reasons are suggested why joint-stock banks do not hold more of their assets in commercial bills —

- (1) Banks do not make a practice of discounting their bills with the Imperial Bank of India. A bank which rediscounts with the Imperial Bank of India feels that it runs the danger of having its credit affected in the market, as such rediscounting is considered by the

market to be a sign of weakness. There are, moreover, no facilities for the ready sale of bills in the open market.

- (2) Joint-stock banks, whenever they want funds prefer taking loans from the Imperial Bank of India on Government securities to offering their bills for rediscount with that bank. This is due to the fact that the Imperial Bank is itself a competing commercial bank and no bank would like to give away the secrets of its bill portfolio to a rival bank. Under these circumstances, Government securities are a more popular form of asset than trade bills.
- (3) The Imperial Bank of India is prepared to discount only approved bills, *i.e.*, bills approved by it. It does not lay down any standards for the guidance of other banks as to what constitutes an approved bill in its opinion. The result is that joint-stock banks cannot depend on bills which they discount for their customers being rediscounted by the Imperial Bank of India.
- (4) The system of cash credits in vogue in India with certain advantages to both the lender and the borrower stands in the way of a greater use of bills. In the case of cash credits, interest is generally paid only to the extent that credits are used and the bank can withdraw credits in the event of deterioration in the position of the borrowing party. It has in fact been urged by some of our witnesses that the borrower should get his assistance from banks in the form he desires and that both cash credits and bills should be developed side by side. In view of other advantages in the use of bills, such as liquidity to banks and certainty to borrowers during the period of currency of the bills, it is, however, hoped that the use of bills will become more popular, provided the banks take some initiative in this matter.

593 The following suggestions have been made for developing the bill market —

- (1) A leading Indian banker has suggested that the Indian joint-stock banks do not go to the Imperial Bank of India for rediscount of *hundis* as the latter charge the same rediscount rate to the joint-stock banks as to *shroffs* and merchants, and he has stated that if the Imperial Bank give a cheaper rate to the Indian joint-stock banks, the latter would readily take advantage of the special facility and the question of prestige

which now stands in the way of the development of the rediscounting habit would disappear. So far as the Imperial Bank of India is concerned, the Managing Governor does not think that any reduction in rates would be possible as these are already on the rock-bottom level and any reduction would place the business on a non-paying basis. He further adds that the real reason for the preference of joint-stock banks for borrowings against Government securities to rediscounting bills with the Imperial Bank of India is that the banks desire to benefit by reducing the interest they pay to the Imperial Bank, immediately they have any surplus funds, and that it is more difficult for the banks to do this if they obtain the accommodation by rediscount than by loans against Government securities.

We are not in a position to make any recommendation in regard to this point for the *interim* period before the establishment of the Reserve Bank. When that bank is established, its published rate should be the minimum rate at which it is prepared to buy or rediscount first class trade bills and promissory notes arising out of *bona fide* commercial or trade transactions of member banks and bankers, the Bank having full discretion in regard to the rates for its open market operations. To stimulate the use of bills the Reserve Bank should use its discretion to charge a higher rate for demand loans against authorized securities and it may find it useful to have a larger margin between these rates at the outset than will be necessary after the bill market has developed. Should the Reserve Bank find it necessary to discount the paper of the public without bank endorsement, it should consider whether it should not in the first few years at any rate charge a higher rate of discount to the public than that charged to member banks and bankers.

- (2) The representative of the Ahmedabad Millowners' Association has pointed out that the charges for discounting are rather high at present and that if they could be lowered it would facilitate the use of bills. The following case was quoted to illustrate this point of view. If goods were sent from place A to place B and if the bank in place A did not possess a branch in place B, a higher commission had to be paid to the bank at place A to discount the bill, as that bank not having a branch at place B had to get the business done through another bank to which a commission had to be paid. He has suggested that this difficulty

can be solved if there were some arrangements between the different banks whereby business could be done by charging one commission only by the bank which first negotiated the bill and that the establishment of a clearing house for bills in all provincial capitals would secure this end. We think the simplest solution for reducing the charges in such cases is that the banks should share the single commission equally between themselves instead of charging double commission. We commend this suggestion for acceptance by banks.

(3) It is generally believed that the creation of a Reserve Bank would tend to dispel the present prejudice on the part of joint-stock banks against discounting their bills with the Imperial Bank of India. The Reserve Bank would not be a competing institution and as its normal business would be to act as bankers' bank, the development of the bill habit would be greatly facilitated. We agree that the creation of the Reserve Bank would dispel the present prejudice on the part of banks and lead the way to a greater use of bills.

(4) It has been suggested that the establishment of warehouses\* in various parts of India would encourage the use of bills as it would tend to replace the finance bills now drawn by merchants and shroffs by documentary bills which would be more popular with banks. We have elsewhere advocated the wide establishment of warehouses throughout the country and the promotion of the use of the bills is one of the important considerations which have influenced us in making those proposals.

(5) The present rate of stamp duty on bills is 18 pies per cent. As the bills current in the market are generally payable at 61 days, the duty works out at 9 pies per cent per month or 9 annas per cent per annum. It is admitted on all hands that this high rate of stamp duty militates against a greater use of bills.

In this connection we recall that the Royal Commission on Indian Currency and Finance, 1926, recommended the abolition of the stamp duty on bills of exchange. We repeat that recommendation, with the further suggestion that it should be given effect to within a period of five years so that necessary steps may be taken by the Provincial Governments to make good

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\* Wherever the word "warehouse" is used, it includes "godown".

the revenue deficit consequent on the acceptance of the proposal. As an initial step we recommend that the stamp duty on all bills of less than one year's usance should be reduced to a uniform rate of two annas per one thousand rupees. The argument adduced by the Royal Commission on Currency and Finance that in America the abolition of the stamp duty on bills was one of the first consequences of the institution of the Reserve Bank system should also be borne in mind in this connection.

- (6) Post offices should stock for sale bill forms printed in English and the vernacular in parallel. We think that this suggestion and also suggestions (8) and (9) deserve the careful consideration of the Government and the Indian commercial public. We endorse the suggestion of the Bombay Committee that the Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry should take the question in hand and arrive at a satisfactory solution in consultation with all the bodies interested in the matter. We are sure that the Government will themselves be prepared to do everything in their power to help the Federation to arrive at such solution.
- (7) In places where *hundi* business is important, an expeditious procedure for disposing of suits based on negotiable instruments should be introduced on the lines of Order XXXVII of the Civil Procedure Code. We endorse this suggestion.
- (8) The noting of dishonour and protest by recognized associations of banks, *shroffs* or merchants (so as to save trouble and expense to the owner of the instrument) should be validated.
- (9) Standardization of customs governing the *hundis* with a view to promote their circulation is recommended at least for particular regions, if not possible for the entire province. Some witnesses have also suggested that legislation should be passed standardizing the essential features of the *hundi* and producing a document simple in language and terms capable of circulating under definite and clearly defined conditions.

#### DEVELOPMENT OF THE USE OF BILLS.

594 The question of developing the use of bills has been considered at some length in the memoranda submitted by witnesses and also in the oral evidence tendered by them. The various classes of transactions in which the use of bills is not widely prevalent at present and the manner in which bills might be introduced in connection with such transactions are dealt with below.

(1) *Agriculture*

595 The finance required by the agriculturists may be divided into finance required for growing crops and that required after the crops have been gathered. In regard to crops which have been gathered, it has been recommended by the Madras Provincial Banking Enquiry Committee that agriculturists may become members of co-operative godown societies and obtain finance on agricultural produce from these societies by allowing the latter to draw a four months' bill upon themselves (owners of produce). The godown societies may, if necessary, discount the bill with the central co-operative bank and the latter in turn with other banks. The system of godown societies would greatly assist in protecting the co-operative banks against wrongful disposal of crops.

596 As regards finance required for growing the crops, the Madras Committee have suggested that it will be a long time before a suitable form of agricultural paper is developed, for there is a chance that the borrower may not grow the crop or other accidents like drought or flood may destroy the crops. In these circumstances there is no immediate prospect of rapid advance in the direction of creating agricultural paper in respect of advances granted to ryots for repayment at the harvest.

597 The Managing Governor of the Imperial Bank of India has suggested that the only way in which greater co-operation can be obtained between indigenous bankers and other banks in India is through the use by indigenous bankers of credit documents which are acceptable to the commercial banks. He has, therefore, urged that the usance bill should be encouraged for the finance of village bankers by *shroffs*. He has admitted that in the absence of satisfactory documents of title it would not be possible to identify these bills with any particular goods, but he has added that if such bills were introduced and the parties thereto showed themselves worthy of credit, they would in course of time be discounted by banks. We agree with the principle enunciated and we recommend that banks should take the initiative in the matter by suggesting this method to *shroffs* seeking accommodation from them.

598 As regards the financing of the cultivators by the village bankers, he has expressed the view that even if the difficulties mentioned above were met, bills with fixed dates of maturity would be unsuitable for use in this connection, because in the nature of things the cultivators must depend on sale of their crops in order to pay their bills. The sale of the crops would depend on the season, whereas the bill's maturity is fixed and renewals are both expensive and disliked by discounters. While we appreciate the reasoning, we think that the dates of maturity might be approximately fixed with reference to the probable date on which the crops would be brought to the market for sale and that a safe margin might always be provided.

(2) *Marketing Finance*

599 We have referred to this subject in Chapter XIII. The Bihar and Orissa Provincial Banking Committee have made the following suggestion for the introduction and use of bills in connection with marketing —

“The prevalent system of marketing finance is that the export houses or commission agents of Calcutta raise money from their own banks or the Bura Bazaar and finance those up-country traders, who have no large capital of their own. These, in turn, finance the small *beparis* or village *mahajans* who buy outright from the cultivators for cash or credit already advanced. This system does not admit of a more direct contact with the central money market nor can credit be expanded as occasion requires, since none of the cash credits or book accounts extending from the Calcutta Exchange Bank to the village *bepari* are negotiable or transferable. On the other hand, if the process were reversed and the village *bepari* or the substantial cultivator could, with the help of the licensed warehouses, create a documented agricultural *muddati hundi* of six months' usance, which may be accepted by a registered *mahajan*, the bill so created could be discounted in the central money market. It will be eagerly bought by the Reserve Bank in case of necessity.”

The Managing Governor of the Imperial Bank of India has expressed the view that the main difficulty in the way of the introduction of this system is that connected with licensed warehouses. It would be necessary for stocks to be graded and those of different parties mixed together. This is a practice which Indian cultivators have consistently set their face against and is one of the main reasons of the failure of an experiment of a similar nature at Lyallpur. He has added that the management must also be an expert one which would cost money. He would like to see further experiments made in this direction in select localities as the bills created would be welcome in the money market. We wholeheartedly support this proposal and we sincerely hope that the Provincial Governments will give their earnest consideration to our recommendations regarding the establishment of licensed warehouses.

600 As regards the movement of goods from the port town to the interior, open account credit is given by the commission agents to the merchants in the interior. By co-operation between the banks and the commission agents, the latter can be made to realise that by converting the open account credit into bills they

can get credit from the banks. The commission agents will then in their turn persuade their customers to accept usance bills for the value of goods despatched. This will bring into existence bills of considerable amount both at the port towns and in the interior and a free circulation thereof between the port towns and the internal markets, as also closer connection between the banks and the indigenous bankers. Comparatively little attention has so far been paid to this branch of the trade from the banking point of view. We commend the matter for the consideration of the parties concerned.

### *'31 Export and Import Finance*

601 The suggestions regarding the introduction of rupee bills and promotion of bankers' acceptances in connection with the financing of India's foreign trade have been referred to in chapter XVII.

### *(4) Bank Acceptances*

602 While it is true that the system of cash credits has been working successfully we consider that it will be far better for the banks to invest their funds in discounting bills. Such discounting may be either by buying bills held by customers or discounting bills accepted by other banks for their customers. In regard to the first type, banks can play only a passive part but they can take a very active part in creating acceptances, once the Reserve Bank is started and is ready to stand behind the bank's signatures in the absence of demand for their acceptances. The banks could charge a small commission and could take collateral security for accepting the bills in the same way as they do now for their cash credits.

### DISCOUNT MARKET.

603 The development of the discount market is an essential feature of any scheme of improvement of our monetary system. We have referred in paragraph 146 to the adoption of bill-broking as an integral part of the indigenous banker's business. Some of the indigenous bankers and their wealthy depositors might also form themselves into discounting houses under the aegis of the Reserve Bank. They could supplement their own resources as in other countries by fixed deposits from their associates and friends and credit supplied by banks. The Reserve Bank could also foster the growth of such discount houses by classing them with member banks in the matter of rediscount facilities.

604 There is little doubt that the creation of the Reserve Bank with the resultant co-ordination of the various elements of the money market and a unified control of credit and currency should



do much to develop the use of commercial bills and ultimately create an active and efficient discount market in India. The mere fact that during the busy season the Issue department of the Bank will be enabled to issue currency freely against genuine trade bills without the Bank Rate being raised to artificial levels should have a psychological effect on merchants generally and encourage them to take advantage of a cheap and convenient form of short credit. The prestige and standing offered to indigenous bankers who decide to come within the scope of the rediscount facilities of the Reserve Bank should tend to link up the indigenous money markets with the large centres where surplus funds tend to concentrate. There should no longer be any jealousy or feeling of uncertainty as regards the rediscount of bills by joint-stock banks with the Reserve Bank, and if, as we propose elsewhere, the published rate of the Reserve Bank is its rate for the rediscount of first class trade bills, which will be its lowest operative rate, the money market as a whole should gradually come to take advantage of this rate as a natural practice in lieu of the present crude method of taking advances against securities at a higher rate for shorter periods.

## CHAPTER XXII.

### THE BANKING SYSTEM AND THE MONEY MARKET— (contd )

#### THE RESERVE BANK—ITS NECESSITY

605 We have had frequent occasions in the preceding chapters to stress the necessity for a central banking institution in India for securing the development of the Indian banking and credit system on a sound and proper basis. Some of the Provincial Committees have also recommended the early establishment of the Reserve Bank the inauguration of which was recommended by the Royal Commission on Currency and Finance five years ago. It is the unanimous opinion of all authorities on the subject that the first step to remove many of the defects in the existing system is to bring the Reserve Bank into being. The foreign banking experts went so far as to say that it is one of our principal duties to recommend that the Reserve Bank should be established in India as soon as possible and that this institution should be free from political influence. We agree with the Royal Commission on Indian Currency and Finance, 1926, that the existing system of control of currency and credit in India which is in the hands of Government and the Imperial Bank of India respectively is defective, and we are convinced that no substantial progress is possible unless and until the control of credit and currency in India is placed in the hands of a single authority. We accordingly consider it to be a matter of supreme importance from the point of view of the development of banking facilities in India, and of her economic advancement generally, that a Central or Reserve Bank should be created *at the earliest possible date*. The establishment of such a bank would by mobilization of the banking and currency reserves of India in one hand tend to increase the volume of credit available for trade, industry and agriculture and to mitigate the evils of fluctuating and high charges for the use of such credit caused by seasonal stringency.

#### PROPER TYPE OF RESERVE BANK

606 The question whether the details of the constitution of a Reserve Bank came within the purview of our committee has been open to doubt from the outset of our deliberations, and the Chairman has been asked to give a ruling on the subject on more occasions than one. The object with which our Committee was appointed was stated in a circular letter issued by the Government of India to the Provincial Governments on the 3rd April, 1929, in

the following terms which were taken from a statement made by the Hon'ble the Finance Member in the Legislative Assembly "The formation of a Central or Reserve Bank is desirable in order that India may be equipped with a mechanism for the control of currency and credit on the lines approved by modern experience. At the same time the Government can only proceed subject to their being satisfied as to two conditions—first, that the organization of the Bank is securely settled on sound lines, and secondly, that there is a measure of general support among the representatives of public opinion for the proposals. Full advantage should be taken of any interval which may occur before these conditions are fulfilled and the time is again ripe for reviving the proposals for a Reserve Bank by inaugurating an enquiry into the general banking organization of the country which is intimately connected with the question of a Central Bank. For a Central Bank is essentially the crown of the whole structure of banking in its widest sense, and if it is well designed to meet the practical requirements of the country it must be adapted to the banking organization of the country on which it should rest. Viewed from this angle, a banking enquiry will be of value in throwing light on the actual situation throughout the country and in instructing public opinion as to the main requirements."

On the other hand, the terms of reference to our Committee did not specify its functions in regard to the Reserve Bank. In February last, when the proceedings of the Indian Round Table Conference were published in India, it was found that there had been general agreement at that Conference that "efforts should be made to establish on sure foundations and free from any political influence, as early as may be found possible, a Reserve Bank which will be entrusted with the management of Indian currency and exchange", and that His Majesty's Government had expressed the view that this matter was one of those which "will have to be provided for somehow in the new Constitution". In view of these various considerations, it was ruled by our Chairman that it was for the framers of the Constitution to decide what steps should be taken to ensure the condition envisaged that the Bank should be on a sure foundation and free from any political influence, and he ruled out of discussion by our Committee questions bearing on that point, *e.g.*, (1) whether the Bank should be a State Bank or a Shareholders' Bank, and (2) what should be the composition of its directorate. In order, however, to arrive at a basis on which our recommendations about the working of the Reserve Bank and its relations with the Money Market should be formulated, we unanimously agreed to proceed on the following assumptions—

- (1) The Reserve Bank would be established by an Act of the Indian Legislature

- (2) The capital of the Bank would be provided by the State,
- (3) The Bank would be under Indian control, and
- (4) The Bank would be free from interference from executive or legislature (Indian or British) in its day-to-day administration

It must be clearly understood that all the recommendations in our report which envisage the establishment of a Reserve Bank are based on these assumptions. We may add in this connection that the foreign experts have expressed the opinion that a Reserve Bank can be run on sound lines whether it is formed as a State Bank or as a Shareholders' Bank, provided that the Bank is kept free from interference by Government in its daily administration.

#### SOME PROVISIONS OF THE RESERVE BANK BILL OF 1928 EXAMINED

607 The two principal tasks of the Reserve Bank will be to maintain the international value of the rupee and to control the credit situation in India, which would include the rate of interest at which credit would be available to trade and industry. It has been suggested to us that the provisions of the Bill of 1928 are not quite satisfactory so far as the Reserve Bank's task of regulating internal credit is concerned. This difficulty arises from the fact that the Bill does not take fully into account the absence of a well developed and extensive bill market in India. We have used the word '*fully*' advisedly, for the framers of the Bill have recognized that the financing of industry and the movement of crops in India is at present effected mostly by cash credits and not by bills. They realized that it would be difficult for the Reserve Bank to assist other banks in providing the necessary credit facilities without some temporary provision for permitting it to grant loans and advances on the security of the promissory notes of scheduled banks, supported by documents evidencing title to goods which have been transferred, assigned, hypothecated or pledged to any such bank as security for credit granted for *bona fide* commercial or trade transactions or for purposes of financing seasonal agricultural operations or the marketing of crops. We consider that this provision is only a partial remedy to the existing situation. In the first place, the number of member banks would at the outset be only about 60, of which 18 are exchange banks mostly unconnected with agriculture and inland trade. In the second place it is not inconceivable that owing to the absence of an extensive bill market in India which would ordinarily enable the Reserve Bank to enforce its credit policy by its operations therein, the Reserve Bank may have to

follow instead of controlling the member banks with regard to the interest rates in the country in the busy season. As a result, the position in India after the Reserve Bank is established may differ little from what it is to-day, and the wide range of interest rates caused by the slack and the busy seasons may still continue to the detriment of the economic life of the country. Owing to these considerations, we agree with the foreign banking experts that additional provision should be made in the Reserve Bank Bill enabling the Bank to make loans and advances on the security of movable goods, wares and merchandise, as well as against the warehouse warrants or warehouse receipts representing such goods. This provision may perhaps be criticized as likely to encourage too much competition between the Reserve Bank and the other commercial banks in the country. We agree that the Reserve Bank should not ordinarily compete with commercial banks for profit, but in our opinion it ought to be in a position to operate in the open market and compete with the commercial banks so as to make its policy effective. We contemplate that the Reserve Bank need not necessarily avail itself of this provision to a large extent, but the mere fact of its existence will enhance its influence on the level of interest rates. We might also draw attention to the fact that a number of the recent modifications to the South African Reserve Bank Act have been on the above lines, the object being to render its working more effective.

608 We have mentioned in paragraph 430 that we contemplate the introduction of rupee import bills as a possible and desirable future development of the Indian bill market. When this development takes place, we think it necessary that the Reserve Bank should have powers to purchase, sell and rediscount such bills. The provisions of the Bill of 1928 confined the business of the Reserve Bank to the purchase, sale and rediscount of bills of exchange and promissory notes *drawn and payable in India*. As rupee import bills would be drawn out of India, we suggest that the Bill should be amended so as to omit the condition that the bills should be drawn in India.

609 We have considered the provision in the Bill which restricts the total holding by the Reserve Bank at any time of agricultural bills of a maturity longer than three months to one-fourth of the total face value of all bills including promissory notes, purchased or rediscounted by the Bank up to that time. It has been suggested to us that this limit, coupled with the comparatively small volume of bills in the Indian Money Market in the present circumstances, may operate as an undesirable impediment in the way of the Reserve Bank giving the full financial assistance required by agriculture which is the chief industry in India,

and that it may be useful to have another over-riding maximum so fixed as to take into account not only the need for liquidity of the Reserve Bank's assets but also the essential requirements of agriculture. We have recommended a scheme for bringing a large body of indigenous bankers into the Reserve Bank system. If that scheme were carried out, we believe that a greater proportion of the agricultural population would come within the purview of the Reserve Bank's operations than would be the case if the Reserve Bank dealt only with the joint-stock banks and provincial co-operative banks as contemplated in the Bill. Conditions for extension of the bill market would then be created, and the indigenous bankers whose knowledge of local and trade conditions must form the basis of good bills, would be enabled to provide the commercial banks and the Reserve Bank with a gradually increasing number of genuine trade bills. Partly for this reason and partly because we have suggested the extension of the powers of the Reserve Bank to grant financial facilities not only by purchase and rediscount of bills but also by grant of advances against goods and warehouse receipts we do not think that the limit prescribed in the Bill of 1928 will operate as a handicap to the agricultural industry when the arrangements contemplated by us have fully been developed. To avoid any possible inconvenience to the industry at the early stages of the proposed arrangements, however, we recommend that if the limit prescribed in the Bill of 1928 is at any time less than the share capital of the bank, the total face value of agricultural bills or notes purchased or rediscounted by the Reserve Bank may, at the discretion of that Bank, go up to the amount of the share capital.

610 As India is predominantly an agricultural country it was provided in the Bill that, while commercial bills purchased or rediscounted by the Reserve Bank should be such as mature within 90 days of the date of such purchase or rediscount, the currency of agricultural bills might extend to 6 months. It was expected that this provision would enable the Reserve Bank to give all the facilities required in connection with seasonal agricultural operations or the marketing of crops. We consider the provision adequate so far as the marketing of crops is concerned. But seasonal operations in India extend over a longer period than six months. On the other hand, as ordinarily the Reserve Bank will only purchase or rediscount agricultural bills from member banks, it might be expected that these banks would hold the bills for a certain period of their currency. Taking both these considerations into account, we recommend that the period of six months for agricultural bills in the Bill of 1928 may be extended to nine months as being more suitable to meet the conditions of agriculture in India.

611 There are a few miscellaneous amendments which we have to suggest in the Bill —

(1) The Bill empowers the Reserve Bank to act as agent for the Secretary of State in Council, the Governor General in Council or any local Government in regard to various transactions. We consider that the Bank should also be permitted to act as agent for any Indian State that may desire to utilize the services of the Reserve Bank for that purpose.

We have considered in this connection a suggestion that has been made to us that the Reserve Bank should be permitted to act as agent for member banks in the same way as it is empowered to act as agent for central and provincial Governments, and that, in addition, the Reserve Bank should also undertake to act as agent in any place outside India for member banks and to sell foreign currency or pay out in foreign currency on their behalf, to collect bills in foreign countries and to accept against adequate securities in India bills drawn by or on behalf of member banks. The foreign banking experts have objected to this extension of the task of the Reserve Bank in the following extract from their report —

“We fully agree with the opinion expressed by the Joint Committee of the Legislative Assembly, to which the Reserve Bank Bill was referred. In their report of the 18th August 1927, they wrote on page 3 against sub-clause (13) —

‘We think that the power of the Reserve Bank to open accounts and act as agents of other banks should be restricted to central banks which are the principal currency authorities in their respective countries and among which we include the Federal Reserve Banks in the United States of America.’

We consider this the right conception in accordance with the practice in most other countries. Especially with regard to the foreign exchange business of the Reserve Bank, we see great objections to the Bank acting as agent for member banks, using part of its holdings in foreign currency and doing acceptance business on behalf of these member banks. The activities of the Reserve Bank in the field of foreign exchange must on principle be restricted to what is necessary for performing its principal duty, *i.e.*, to keep the currency of the country at par with gold, in any case at a value between the upper and the lower gold points. It would be dangerous in our

opinion to encroach upon this principle by inducing the Reserve Bank to place part of its foreign assets at the disposal of member banks on behalf of their foreign exchange business ”

We agree with the foreign experts that the proposed extension of the activities of the Reserve Bank is undesirable. We wish to add the additional reason that both the Royal Commission on Indian Currency and Finance, 1926, and the Bill of 1928 contemplated the Reserve Bank operating in the open market only when such a course was necessary for making its currency and credit policy effective, and that to impose an obligation on the Bank to carry out agency functions on behalf of member banks might make it necessary for the Reserve Bank to be in the market even when it was not required for the enforcement of its policy. The fact that the suggested provision will only be permissive does not take away the force of our argument.

(ii) Provision has been made in the Bill enabling the Reserve Bank, subject to certain limitations, to purchase and sell securities of the Government of India or of a local Government or of a local authority in British India. In addition to these securities we recommend that if any securities were issued with the guarantee of Government both for capital and interest, the question of including them in the list of securities eligible for purchase and sale by the Reserve Bank should be considered.

(iii) The powers of the Reserve Bank to borrow money are limited to the amount of the share capital of the Bank. We think the limit should be extended to the share capital and the reserve fund of the Bank.

#### SCHEDULE OF MEMBER BANKS.

612 The Bill of 1928 included a schedule of banks that were entitled to certain rediscounting facilities from the Reserve Bank in return for certain obligations imposed on them. The most important of these obligations is that a scheduled bank should maintain with the Reserve Bank free of interest a certain prescribed balance based upon the demand and the time liabilities of the bank to the public in India. As the necessity of these deposits has been questioned in certain quarters, we give below an extract from Messrs Premchand Roychand and Sons' Annual Market Review for 1927 —

“A great deal of the objection arises out of the fact that the public have not yet clearly apprehended the way in which the holdings of bankers' balances by statutes helps the Central Bank effectively to control credit



Expenses of a joint-stock bank in carrying on its business, apart from salaries paid to its employees, rent of offices, etc., are the loss of interest it suffers in respect of that part of its resources—called cash reserves—which is kept as a non-interest-bearing balance with the Reserve Bank or in the form of cash. The smaller these reserves are, the greater is its profit. The banks therefore aim at limiting their cash reserves to just so much as in their opinion, must be kept in this liquid form to meet their current engagements. Supposing the joint-stock banker is satisfied that a cash reserve of  $17\frac{1}{2}$  per cent of his current liabilities is sufficient to meet his current engagements, and supposing that the Reserve Bank Act compels him to keep  $7\frac{1}{2}$  per cent of his current sight liabilities as a balance with that bank, he would hold in his vaults 10 per cent in cash. Every time the cash in his vaults decreases below this limit, he will be anxious to restore the position and that he can best do by obtaining the necessary cash through re-discounting some of his bill portfolio with the Reserve Bank, or taking some advances from it against approved securities. In no event, however, could the banker allow his cash balance to run down to anywhere near the  $7\frac{1}{2}$  per cent which he is compelled to keep with the Reserve Bank. The smaller therefore, the margin between what he has to keep as a reserve balance with the Reserve Bank and the amount of the total cash reserves on which he is working the greater the likelihood of his having recourse to the Reserve Bank for facilities and the greater therefore, the Reserve Bank's power to enforce its policy."

Mr Osborne Smith, with whom we discussed the matter, considers that it is absolutely essential to the control of credit that the exchange banks and the other member banks should keep an adequate and substantial percentage of their time and demand liabilities with the Reserve Bank and that this is a primary reason why the central banking institution is debarred from doing ordinary banking business. We agree with these views and we do not suggest any change in the provisions of the Reserve Bank Bill of 1928 in this matter.

613 The Bill of 1928 provided for the grant of rediscount facilities to provincial co-operative banks but did not place any obligation on these banks to maintain interest-free balances with the Reserve Bank. In paragraph 140 we have suggested that a number of indigenous bankers who confine their activities to banking proper should be brought within the Reserve Banking

system and that some concession should be given in regard to the maintenance of free balances by such bankers. We suggest that these matters be provided for in the Reserve Bank Bill.

#### RESERVE BANK POLICY AND RELATIONS BETWEEN THE RESERVE BANK AND OTHER BANKS

614 It can hardly be expected that the creation of the Reserve Bank will be universally welcomed by the existing institutions. Its privileges as Government banker, its free funds provided largely by the other banks, its potential competitive capacity, and its control of the note issue, will all tend to engender in the early stages at any rate a feeling of suspicion against it, and to delay that unification of, and co-operation between, the various sections of the money market which is the ultimate object underlying its establishment. It is essential, therefore, that from the time of its inception it should direct its policy towards gaining the confidence and willing support of the existing banks so that if and when control may become desirable or necessary to the temporary disadvantage of any section of the market, such control may be exercised and received without any feeling of antagonism or ill-will. In the initial stages, therefore, practically everything will depend on the management of the Reserve Bank. The transfer of the Government balances from the Imperial Bank of India to the Reserve Bank and the working of the provisions regarding maintenance of free balances by member banks with that Bank, will have to be effected with the greatest possible care in order to avoid any disturbance in the banking machinery of the country. We agree with the oft-expressed opinion of the foreign experts that the satisfactory working of the Bank must depend finally on its having first class men in charge of its affairs. In the course of our conversations with these experts there was at times some difference of opinion as to whether certain regulations should be prescribed by law or should be left to the discretion of the management. The general opinion of those experts who have had working experience of Reserve Banks in other parts of the world was to leave as much as possible to the management, in other words to allow banking practice to develop on convention rather than on legislation. Possibly we ourselves, in our anxiety to complete the detailed plans of the Reserve Bank, have suggested legislation on points which might be considered unnecessary in other countries. Our desire, however, has been to indicate further details of policy for the guidance of the authorities of the Reserve Bank, the carrying out of which will at all times call for tact, sympathy and understanding on the part of the executive. Our object is to make the existing machinery of banking and finance

run more smoothly for the general welfare of the community, from the humblest ryot to the largest industrialist, and this will not be possible if the Reserve Bank is looked upon as an enemy or a parasite which is only to survive at the cost of existing institutions. It may be inevitable at first that the Bank will be looked upon as an engrafted and extraneous body, but if its policy is directed on the right lines, it should not be long before it is regarded as a natural and healthy growth which has evolved from and for the benefit of the banking system of the country as a whole.

## CHAPTER XXIII.

### THE BANKING SYSTEM AND THE MONEY MARKET— (contd.)

#### MISCELLANEOUS

615 We shall deal in this chapter with certain miscellaneous matters relating to the Indian banking system

#### A BANKERS' ASSOCIATION

616 Witnesses have suggested that there is no co-operation between the Imperial Bank of India and the other joint-stock banks in the country, and that it would be to the advantage of the banks if a Bankers' Association were formed by the Imperial Bank on the lines of the Exchange Banks' Association where questions affecting the common interests of banks, including the Imperial Bank of India, could be considered. The Managing Governor of the Imperial Bank of India, on the other hand, has stated that there is co-operation between the Imperial Bank and the other joint-stock banks and that leading officers and directors of most of the joint-stock banks discuss in the most friendly manner matters of common interest with senior executive officers of the Imperial Bank. His own opinion is that this relationship between the Imperial Bank and the other joint-stock banks is preferable to what would exist were a Bankers' Association formed, of which all would be members. He has added that such an Association, when the time is ripe for it, should be confined to banks of more or less equal standing doing similar business and having the same problems to face. If the Imperial Bank of India was a member, that bank would, in his opinion, dominate the deliberations of the Association to an undesirable degree, with the result that the healthy development of the smaller banks by their own efforts would be retarded.

617 The United Provinces Banking Enquiry Committee have strongly urged the formation of provincial bankers' associations with branches in important towns, of which not only the joint-stock banks but the indigenous bankers should be members. The principal object of such an association would be to enable banks and bankers to arrive at a better understanding of their common problems and interests. The association would also take steps to collect information regarding the practices in various markets relating to *hundis* and so far as possible to standardize them.

## EXCHANGE BANKS' ASSOCIATIONS.

618 The Exchange Banks have organized themselves into Associations at all places and such Associations exist in Calcutta, Bombay, Madras, Rangoon and Karachi. Any bank, Indian or foreign, is eligible for membership of the Exchange Banks Association, provided it does exchange business and is willing to subscribe to the rules and regulations of the Association. The object of the Association is to maintain a uniform standard for certain routine operations, to secure harmony in the conduct of business and to safeguard the rights of its members. The Association now comprises not only the British exchange banks but also other foreign banks but no Indian joint-stock bank transacting exchange business is at present a member of the Association.

## INDIGENOUS BANKERS' ASSOCIATION.

619 The Bombay Committee report that there are diverse castes and classes of indigenous bankers and that in certain large centres they have their associations. Within its own sphere, each of these associations conducts its business on well defined lines and is governed by its own regulations. Questions of common interest are considered at meetings of such associations where members' differences, and disputes regarding business matters, are also settled. Members of one association have dealings with those of another, but there is no organization for the interchange of intelligence concerning the credit position of constituents, for the enunciation and adoption of policy and methods of work, or for the regulation and promotion of inter-*shroff* business. It has been suggested to the Bombay Committee by witnesses that a central association of indigenous bankers should be formed at each important centre.

## ALL-INDIA BANKERS' ASSOCIATION

620 We have already referred in Chapter XIX to the creation of an all-India Bankers' Association. Such an Association should be inaugurated as early as possible and should include as members not only the joint-stock banks but also the exchange banks, the Imperial Bank of India and the indigenous bankers. We suggest that there should be two kinds of membership, namely, full membership and associate membership. The former would be open to those banks and bankers enjoying rediscount facilities from the Reserve Bank. The latter would comprise the rest of the banks and bankers and there would be transfers from one class to the other depending upon the member's relations with the Reserve Bank. Such an association should be able to do most valuable work in the direction of improvement of standard, elimination of elements of weakness, and fostering the combination of smaller banks into larger units.

What the constitution of such an association should be may be left to the banks and bankers concerned to settle. We are particularly anxious that the indigenous banker should be brought into line with the other organized banking institutions, and we can see no better method of achieving this purpose than by including them in one single association with other banks.

621 The association which we have recommended must have an all-India centre for its operations. We realize that a central body working at its headquarters which may be removed from some of the provinces may not be able to deal with all the local problems that may arise. For this purpose, the all-India Association will probably require provincial branches to consider problems of local interest, problems of all-India importance being dealt with at headquarters. Both in the all-India Association and in the provincial branches, the system of working by committees may be found most convenient.

#### EXCHANGE BROKERS' ASSOCIATION

622 In Calcutta there are two Exchange Brokers' Associations, one European and the other Indian, and the exchange business of the exchange banks is restricted to members of these two Brokers' Associations. When an Indian exchange broker dies, his place is said to remain vacant, but this practice, we are told, has been adopted at the desire of the Indian brokers that they should limit their numbers. In Bombay, there is only a European Exchange Brokers' Association, and in the case of Indian brokers, though they have been asked by the exchange banks on several occasions to form an Association of their own, there has been no practical result in that direction. The exchange banks, therefore, carry on their business with the European Exchange Brokers' Association and also with such Indian brokers as are on the approved lists of these banks, business being conducted in both cases under the same rules. Both European and Indian brokers are required to make a deposit of Rs. 10,000 either in cash or in Government securities, as a guarantee of ratification of contracts, and the brokers are, therefore, called deposit brokers. The exchange banks also do business with other Indian brokers not on their approved lists but this business is strictly limited to other than exchange business.

623 We consider that the existing arrangements under which there are more associations than one at the same centre are undesirable and that all engaged in exchange-broking should have one association at each centre.

#### CLEARING HOUSES.

624 The part played by the Imperial Bank of India in the conduct of the Clearing Houses has been referred to in a previous

chapter We have received complaints that admission to the Clearing House is closely guarded and that Indian banks find it extremely difficult to gain admission. It is commonly believed that this state of affairs is due to the fact that the majority of the members of the Clearing Houses are non-Indian banks. The Managing Governor of the Imperial Bank of India has, however, assured us that the complaints were not well founded, that membership of the Clearing House involved great obligations, that applications for admission were considered on their merits, and that even in England the number of members is only 10, other banks doing their clearing through these ten banks.

625 The Managing Governor of the Imperial Bank of India has made the following suggestion in order to improve the present position —

“Every Clearing House should be controlled by a body which some usually call the Clearing Bankers’ Association. This body should be incorporated and have its own rules and it should manage the Clearing House in every detail, it should have its own banker as should every member. In India such a body has never been firmly embodied, its functions having been largely performed by the Imperial Bank or its predecessors. There has thus been confusion and, not infrequently, it has appeared that other banks have regarded their accounts with the Imperial Bank of India as being nothing more than a part of the Clearing House and a means of settling their differences in the clearing. They appear to have overlooked that in addition to the balance required to meet their clearing differences their balances should cover the work involved as in the case of an ordinary constituent and also the cash reserve which we must maintain to meet the requirements of all their constituents. In the interests of all concerned, I think the Association of Clearing Banks should be incorporated as soon as possible. Another important reason is that in its present position the Imperial Bank might possibly be held solely liable in cases where the true liability rests upon all the members using the Clearing House.”

626 It may be mentioned in this connection that the Joint Committee on the Reserve Bank Bill considered the desirability of making specific provision in the Bill for empowering the Reserve Bank to supervise Clearing House business and came to the conclusion that it was hardly necessary to make special provision for this purpose as the supervision of Clearing Houses was so clearly a business of the Reserve Bank that it would certainly

undertake the obligation without special provision. We agree with the conclusion of the Joint Committee.

We hope that in the meanwhile admission to the Clearing House will be so regulated as not to give rise to justifiable complaints on the part of Indian banks.

#### STATISTICS.

627 We are greatly struck by the absence of published statistics in regard to the operations of indigenous bankers. We have also had occasion to refer to the position of the exchange banks, which are not required to publish separately any figures relating to their operations in India, though figures of their Indian deposits and cash balances are as a matter of courtesy supplied to the Director General, Commercial Intelligence, Calcutta, through the India Office, in a consolidated form for all banks. The Director-General's publication, "Statistical Tables Relating to Banks in India", does not give all the details that are important from a banking point of view even in regard to joint-stock banks. Nor does it give any figures relating to banks whose capital and reserve is less than Rs 1 lakh. The value of such figures as are published is also greatly discounted by the inordinate delay that the Department takes in bringing out the publication. For example, the Statistical Tables for 1928 were only available a few months ago. We hope that when the Reserve Bank is established, it will be one of the primary functions of that Bank to consider this question and to arrange for the compilation of proper statistics relating to the operations of banks and indigenous bankers and for their timely publication. In the meanwhile, we would suggest for the consideration of Government that efforts should be made to obtain more complete statistics for the various classes of banking institutions on the lines recommended by us in our report and to publish them as early as possible so as to avoid the inordinate delay to which we have referred.



## CHAPTER XXIV.

### SAVING AND INVESTMENT HABIT

#### GENERAL POSITION.

628 The development of banking depends to a very great extent on the growth of the investment habit which in its turn depends on the earning capacity of the people, then will to save, the incentive to save, and the facilities for investment. Some of the Provincial Committees point out that the surplus left with the agriculturists, who constitute the bulk of the population, is very little even in normal years. To the few wealthy agriculturists, who have a surplus during prosperous seasons, land or jewellery has greater attraction as a form of investment than interest-bearing bank accounts, postal cash certificates, Government securities, or industrial stock. Moreover, it appears from the reports of the Provincial Committees that money-lending is fast becoming a particularly attractive form of investment to the agriculturists having surplus funds. The landed aristocracy in several places is reported to be far from solvent. In any case, its wealth, consisting mainly of land, could add little to the capacity of the capital-market of the country. The other well-to-do classes, the commercial community and the salaried and the professional sections of the middle class, have the capacity as well as the will to save and they select such forms of investment for their surplus as have special attractions for them. The salaried class is on the whole content with a low but assured income from investments and prefers to invest in post office savings banks, postal cash certificates, or Government securities. A considerable section of the well-to-do classes also prefers gilt-edged securities. We understand, however, that owing to the fall in the value of such scrip during the last few years this form of investment has become less popular now-a-days. These cautious and conservative classes of investors also deposit their savings with banks.

629 The commercial community generally prefers to invest surplus funds in short-term deposits or treasury bills when those are available. It also subscribes to the share capital and debenture issues of joint stock concerns. It appears, however, that numbers of merchants, and even certain classes of indigenous bankers, invest their funds largely in the purchase and mortgage of land and building. During the war boom period a good deal of money was invested by the commercial community in real estate and although there has since been a slump in the value of property, land investment, which serves as an unfailing source of credit in times of need, is still popular but at the present time funds available for such investment are limited.

630 To the Muhammedan also, investment in land appeals the most. The Koranic injunctions forbid interest. The orthodox section of the community is, therefore, deterred from investing its funds in interest-bearing deposits or scrips. Capital appreciation is not, however, regarded as interest, so that real estate is the only means of investment for that section. We understand that individuals here and there and a small section of the mercantile and professional classes leap over or creep under the ban on the taking of interest.

631 Next to land, jewellery is a form of investment common both to the rich and the poor, the town and the country. Every year large sums are invested in ornaments and jewellery in every province. To hold small savings in jewellery is a practice rooted in ancient custom and usage. Various economic and social causes have influenced its growth. In the earlier days, lack of banking facilities, of suitable means of investment ensuring safety, and of ready realisability of savings, militated against the investment of savings for productive purposes and fostered the predilection for gold and silver ornaments. The Hindu law of inheritance applicable to certain sections of the community which debar women from receiving any share of immovable property has encouraged the practice of giving *stridhan* to women in the shape of gold ornaments at the time of marriage.

632 With the spread of education and the introduction of the banking system, however, there has been a reduction in the expenditure on ornament and jewellery. Almost all the reports of the Provincial Committees bear testimony to this fact. The Punjab Committee state that the reports they received in regard to enquiries made on the subject, show beyond doubt that "the immemorial custom of putting savings, and also a proportion of borrowings, into jewellery is beginning to weaken. For the moment the change appears more marked than it really is, since much of it is due to trade and agricultural depression. But below this strong surface current may be clearly discerned an under-current flowing in the same direction and generated by deeper and more permanent forces. Amongst the latter are education, the rising standard of living with its greater demand for money and wider facilities for investment" \*.

It will be seen from this extract that the predilection for ornaments need not be regarded as inevitable. It has been found to be susceptible to change and it may be expected that with the diffusion of education among the masses, extensive propaganda concerning the economic use of one's resources and the investments of one's savings, and improved banking facilities, the expenditure on jewellery would be still further reduced and a larger

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\* Punjab, para 226

share of the people's surplus rendered available for augmenting the banking resources of the country

### HOARDING

633 One of the important factors having a vital bearing on the development of the banking wealth of a country is the tendency of its people towards hoarding. There appears to be a general impression outside India, and even among certain classes within the country, that from the very commencement of her commercial intercourse with other countries India has imported considerable quantities of gold which have disappeared into hoards. The word "hoarding" has, however, been loosely used by those who refer to the subject. No attempt is made to distinguish between the locking-up of surpluses in gold or silver bullion or coin and the industrial use of precious metals.

634 The present position in regard to hoarding in India has been investigated by the Provincial Committees. But before we refer to their findings it would be desirable to recapitulate the observations made by some of the Currency Committees and Commissions appointed from time to time. The situation as regards the character and extent of India's demand for gold was summed up correctly by the Babington Smith Committee (1919) in its report in the following words —

"It has frequently been alleged that an undue proportion of the world's gold supply is absorbed by India. It must be remembered, however, that the population of India exceeds 315 millions, and that the use of gold (or, alternatively, of silver) plays an important part in social ceremonies sanctioned by religion and tradition. Presents of gold or silver ornaments are obligatory at weddings and on other ceremonial occasions and this custom is supported by the practical consideration that a woman, whether Hindu or Moslem, who possesses gold and silver ornaments, or coins converted into ornaments, is entitled to hold them as her personal property. It has also always been the habit in India to use the precious metals as a store of value, and to hold savings in this form, nor, until banking and investment facilities have been extended, and the habit of using them has been acquired by the people of India, is it easy to see in what other form savings can be accumulated. We do not, therefore, consider

that the quantity of gold taken by India for all purposes in the period before the war was disproportionately large in relation to her economic conditions, and it must be assumed that so long as existing conditions prevail India will continue to require a considerable quantity of gold for the purposes named above "

The following extract from a memorandum submitted to the Committee by Sir Stanley Reed completes the picture —

' India is still an illiterate country whose credit and banking facilities are miserably unorganized and where the practice of holding small savings in gold and silver ornaments is centuries old. Yet its normal demand for the industrial arts and for the satisfaction of the social customs of three hundred and fifteen millions of people, was met before the war by about ten millions of gold annually. The United States of America was reported recently to be absorbing a million sterling in gold per month for industrial purposes. Yet no one says that the United States is a bottomless sink in the matter of her gold absorption. It is stated that in England one of the most flourishing trades during the war was that in cheap jewellery, in which form the working classes invested a substantial proportion of their increased earnings. Every country in the world uses gold and silver for industrial and domestic purposes, and it induces a sense of angry injustice to find that the Indian demand for the precious metals, for precisely the same purposes, is perverted into senseless hoarding, specially when the history and conditions would justify a far larger gold absorption than the western nations with their general literacy and highly organized credit systems can claim "†

635 The External Capital Committee (1924), however, expressed its belief that India possessed a large share of potential capital, much of which was locked up in bullion and jewellery. They considered that the fact that the net imports of gold and silver since the year 1913 amounted to 482 crores was evidence that large resources were still being hoarded ‡. The Royal Commission on Indian Currency and Finance, 1926, also stressed the point that India's demand for gold was not confined to monetary purposes

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\* Report of the Babington Smith Committee, para. 63

† Report of Babington Smith Committee, Vol. III, page 130

‡ Report of the External Capital Committee, para. 8

and that she had always absorbed gold and would probably continue to do so in large amounts for purely social uses. In recommending the introduction of savings certificates payable in gold they stated that the proposal would attract "stores of wealth, great in aggregate, and at present lying wastefully inert, to their right function of meeting the needs of India for productive capital expenditure"\*

636 The question of absorption of gold by India has also recently come under the scrutiny of the Gold Delegation, appointed, in June 1929, by the Financial Committee of the League of Nations "to report upon the causes of fluctuations in the purchasing power of gold and their effect on the economic life of the nations". In its interim report we find the following reference made to the question of acquisition of gold by India —

"From time immemorial, the population of India has purchased very considerable quantities of gold. During the war years India was unable to satisfy her needs and she consequently effected exceptionally heavy purchases about 1924. In the last four or five years, however, her demand has dropped back to between \$80—\$90 million per annum—a rate of consumption rather less than that of the last pre-war quinquennium. We understand that attempts are being made to extend banking and investment habit in India, but we do not think it would be safe to anticipate any material reduction in the Indian demand for many years to come"†

637 It is the opinion of most of the Provincial Committees that the extent of hoarding in the country is greatly exaggerated. Only the United Provinces Committee states that "the average man usually insists on keeping his valuables in some secret hiding place"‡. A few other Committees also refer to the tendency amongst certain classes, such as the aboriginal and nomadic tribes and *zamindars* in rural areas, to hoard, but the evidence recorded by most of them and the information collected in the course of the intensive enquiries made in rural areas in some of the provinces show that the practice of burying precious metals underground or otherwise putting them completely out of use is disappearing and that if there is any hoarding, it is in the sense of investment in

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\* Report of the Royal Commission on Indian Currency and Finance, 1926, paragraphs 64 and 68.

† Interim Report of the Gold Delegation of the Financial Committee of the League of Nations, pages 13—14.

‡ United Provinces, para 483.

ornaments and jewellery, the value of which per head of population is very small. There is no evidence of hoarded gold in bars in private households. Nor has any one of the Banking Enquiry Committees constituted by the Indian States had evidence of hoards of considerable magnitude in any State. Only a few reports make references to the practice of investments of savings in gold and silver, which cannot be called high.

638 Having examined the question in the light of the information available to us, despite the absence of complete and reliable statistical information, we see no justification for the widespread belief that India has absorbed and still absorbs an undue proportion of the world's gold supply and that the accumulated treasure of centuries has been lying in hoards buried deep in the ground or hidden in the houses of the people. In the days when life and property were not safe and when banking facilities were not available, hoarding was inevitable. Social and economic conditions also influenced the predilection of the people for the precious metals. Circumstances have, however, altered materially during recent years and there is little evidence of hoarding of precious metals in these days apart from the use of ornaments.

639 We have also tried to examine whether it is a fact that India does absorb more than her proper share of the world's production of precious metals. Approximate figures of the gold absorbed by India since 1493 were furnished by Mr. Joseph Kitchin to the Hilton Young Commission in a table showing the consumption of the world's gold supply and the world's stock of gold money from 1493 to 1924, based on the returns to the Bureau of the United States Mint, with his own estimates for the gaps. From this table, constructed as it was on the incomplete data available to Mr. Kitchin, it would appear that of the world's estimated total gold output valued at £4,000 millions, India has absorbed approximately £553 millions worth of gold, or 14 per cent. According to another table prepared by Mr. Kitchin and placed before the Commission, India consumed 34 per cent of the world's production of silver of which, it is estimated, nearly two-thirds may have been converted into ornaments or kept as store of wealth. Considering that India's population is roughly one-fifth of the world's population, her consumption of the precious metals can therefore hardly be said to be in excess of that of other countries.

640 The following statement shows the value of imports and exports of gold coin and bullion to and from India for a series of years, as given in the Report of the Controller of the Currency for the year 1929-30 \*

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\* Report of the Controller of the Currency, 1929-30, page 50

*Value of Imports and Exports of gold coin and bullion for each quinquennium (average) from 1900-01 to 1924-25 and for each of the official years from 1925-26 to 1929-30*

(Lakhs of Rs )

	Imports	Exports	Net imports or exports Import— Export +
Average for 1900 01 to 1904 05	15,07	8,84	+6,23
„ 1905-06 to 1909 10	17,50	5,75	+11,75
„ 1910 11 to 1914 15	29,92	4,58	+25,34
„ 1915 16 to 1919 20	19,65	6,23	+13,42
„ 1920-21 to 1924 25	36,45	7,74	+28,71
1925 26	35,23	38	+34,85
1926 27	19,50	10	+19,40
1927 28	18,13	3	+18 10
1928 29	21,22	2	+21,20
1929 30	14,23	1	+14,22

India's imports for the years 1922 to 1925 were abnormal. The figures for these years should, therefore, be read with the figures for the previous years when, owing to the embargo, her imports fell. It will be seen from the table that since the year 1925-26 there has been a decline in the tendency to import gold, and we should like to reproduce in this connection the following extract from the Report of the Controller of the Currency for the year 1929-30

“The net imports (in 1929-30) were 14.22 lakhs, seven crores less than in 1928-29, a drop of practically one-third. Out of this, only some five lakhs were tendered to Government in accordance with the provisions of the Indian Currency Act, as compared with two and a half crores in 1928-29. As the gold tendered on private account to the Bombay Mint for refining (practically all of which is the output of Indian gold mines) amounted to 1,134,087 fine tolas in 1928-29 and 1,211,813 in 1929-30, which may be roughly valued at 245 and 262 lakhs respectively, the net private consumption of gold in India may be considered to have fallen from twenty-one crores in 1928-29 to sixteen and three-quarter crores in the year under report. The low prices realized by India's crops naturally reduced the surplus available for the purchase of the precious metals and later in the year the heavy fall in the price of silver increased to a certain extent the demand for it instead of gold. The low rates of exchange which prevailed throughout the year also made the price slightly dearer. Apart, how-

*ever, from these obvious factors there does appear to be a steady decline in India's tendency to import gold for private use*\*\*\*

641 Mr Kitchin's calculations and the later figures of the Controller of the Currency do not support the view that India has been absorbing more than her share of the world's supply of the precious metals, and from the evidence which has been collected by the Provincial Committees it appears that almost the whole of her consumption is used for ornaments or in the arts. According to Mr Kitchin's calculations referred to above, no less than 30 per cent of the aggregate gold output of the world was consumed by Europe and America for non-monetary purposes. This being so, it is hardly to be wondered that 14 per cent of the world's gold supply taken by India is absorbed for similar purposes. It is necessary to mention in this connection that a portion of the gold is lost by wear and tear of the ornaments, and that the annual wastage on this account must be higher in India than in other countries owing to the peculiar customs connected with the use of the ornaments and their frequent handling, remaking and replacement for various ceremonial

#### EXTENSION OF FACILITIES FOR INVESTMENT

642 Although we doubt the existence of large hoards of wealth in this country, we should like to emphasize what we have already stated in chapter XIX on the subject of the possibilities of developing deposit-banking in this country. The few existing branches of joint-stock banks and co-operative institutions in the cities as well as in the mofussil have been successful in drawing out small savings of small people in urban as well as rural areas. A good deal, however, yet remains to be accomplished. The man in the remote interior has yet to be reached. Slender savings of small men everywhere have yet to be garnered. We have no doubt that if systematic propaganda for stimulating savings and cultivating the investment habit is carried on throughout the country and if the facilities for investment are extended, small men with savings would not be slow to respond. Savings Associations founded on the lines of similar associations in Great Britain will undoubtedly be of great assistance in carrying out systematic propaganda for the development of the investment habit and we have in the concluding paragraph of this chapter suggested the inauguration of such organizations.

643 Various suggestions have been made by the Provincial Committees as to the measures that should be taken for the extension of facilities for the investment of savings in Post Office Savings Banks, Postal Cash Certificates and Government Securities. We shall deal with some of the important proposals in this chapter.

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\* Report of the Controller of the Currency, 1929-30, para 12



## POST OFFICE SAVINGS BANKS

644 The Post Office Savings Bank is the most far-reaching agency created for the promotion of thrift. Its principal object is to inculcate the habit of thrift among the working classes and the middle and lower sections of the community. The majority of the depositors, however, belong to the professional classes and the intelligent middle-class people. The labourer, the peasant and the artisan have yet to be drawn to the portals of the post office savings bank in increasing numbers.

645 The limits of deposits that can be made and the total balance that can be held by a single depositor are now Rs 750 and Rs 5,000, respectively, while the limit of balance in the accounts of minors is Rs 1,000 only. Various suggestions have been put forward for raising these limits. We, however, concur in the recommendation made by the Bombay Committee that while the ordinary limits should remain as at present, the limit in respect of minor accounts may be raised.\*

646 It is suggested that Post Office Savings Banks should open current accounts with or without interest and allow withdrawal of money by cheques. We do not favour this proposal except that we support the suggestion that persons having savings accounts should be allowed to operate on these accounts, and to make deposits by means of cheques, the proceeds of the cheques in the latter case being credited to the depositor's account on collection. The system may be first introduced, as a tentative measure, in selected post offices and gradually extended as experience may justify. Accounts may be allowed to be opened jointly in the names of two persons payable to either or survivor. It would be a great convenience if the depositor were allowed to name a nominee to whom payment of the deposit should be made in the event of his death. The present procedure necessitating an examination of the legal position of heirs entails delays.

## POSTAL CASH CERTIFICATES

647 There has been no marked increase in the issues of Postal Cash Certificates during recent years, as will be seen from the table appended to Chapter II. However, the amounts invested in these certificates show that they have been instrumental in drawing out a considerable amount of savings of small people to whom perhaps no other means of investment would have proved attractive.

It has been suggested that if a holder of these certificates were allowed to nominate a person to whom the amount may be transferred in case of death, their popularity could be increased. We endorse the suggestion.

648 Opinion is divided on the question popularizing these certificates. Some advocate more favourable terms to the investor,

\* Bombay, para 289.

whereas others urge that the yield of investments in these certificates being higher than the rates of deposits ordinarily allowed by commercial banks, these cash certificates enter into competition with banks and hamper the growth of deposit-banking. They, therefore, suggest the abolition of these certificates. We are inclined to hold that between these two extremes lies the golden mean.

#### SAVINGS CERTIFICATES PAYABLE IN GOLD

649 The Royal Commission on Indian Currency and Finance, 1926, has recommended the issue of gold savings certificates which could be sold for legal tender money and be redeemable, after three or five years, either in legal tender money or in gold at the option of the holder. Agreeing with the Commission that such certificates would constitute a powerful incentive to investment, several Provincial Committees have supported this proposal. The Commission have expressed the opinion that it would add to the attractiveness of the certificates if the holder were given facilities to obtain payment on account of such certificates at any time during their currency at a discount reckoned at varying rates according to the date of encashment, but that until the date of maturity it would be paid in legal tender currency and not in gold. We support these proposals in principle, but we doubt whether it would be feasible to give effect to them under present conditions.

650 It is suggested by the Bihar and Orissa Committee that a new type of gold certificate, which for want of a better name they call "stridhan certificate", should be issued to women by the Post Office at the usual price or perhaps a slightly lower price than the postal cash certificate †. It is hoped that the incentive to earn interest may lead to the conversion of their superfluous ornaments into such certificates. We support this recommendation in principle.

#### GOVERNMENT SECURITIES

651 It appears that the facilities afforded by the post office to investors for the purchase as well as the sale of Government securities and for their safe custody are not sufficiently known. Under Section VI of the Post and Telegraph Guide, any person, whether previously a depositor in the Post Office Savings Bank or not, may invest through the Post Office in any loan issued by the Government of India bearing interest at  $3\frac{1}{2}$  per cent or upwards. The total amount, after deducting any sum sold through the Post Office, which may be invested through the Post Office by an individual investor in any one official year from the 1st April to the 31st March inclusive, is Rs 5,000.

Investments in Government securities can be made either from money already deposited in the investor's Savings Bank account,

\* *Vide* Report of the Royal Commission on Indian Currency and Finance, paras 67—68.

† Bihar and Orissa para 186.

or from money specially deposited for the purpose, or partly from the one and partly from the other

The Post Office also sells at the current rate, and free of expenses, the whole or any portion of any Government promissory notes or stock certificates which may have been purchased for him through the Post Office, whether held by himself or held for him by the Deputy Accountant-General, Posts and Telegraphs, provided that the investor is also a Savings Bank depositor at the time of application, and also that, if only a portion is specified for sale, the balance of securities left after the sale is of the nominal value of Rs 100 or a multiple of Rs 100

An investor has the option of taking delivery of the Government promissory notes or stock certificates or of leaving them in the custody of the Deputy Accountant-General, Posts and Telegraphs. Except in the case of investments in connection with public accounts or with regimental, police, or other conjoint accounts, the total amount which may be kept in the custody of the Deputy Accountant-General, Posts and Telegraphs, by an individual investor is limited to Rs 22,500 in case of securities the interest on which is liable to income-tax unless they are retained in the custody of the Post Office. This limit is exclusive of securities issued free of income-tax as one of the conditions of subscription thereto

No fee, commission, or brokerage of any kind is charged for the purchase, sale, safe custody or delivery out of custody, of Government securities bought through the Post Office, or for the realization and remittance of interest on such securities. So long as Government securities purchased through the Post Office remain in the custody of the Deputy Accountant-General, Posts and Telegraphs, the interest thereon is exempt from income-tax

We are of opinion that if wider publicity is given to the facilities thus afforded, it may attract a larger number of small investors

652 It has also been suggested that transactions in Government securities may also be encouraged if the aforesaid facilities are extended to small investors generally and not confined to those who are savings bank depositors. We endorse the suggestion

653 It has further been suggested that banks, too, may help better than they do at present in popularizing investment in gilt-edged securities by reducing their charges for the purchase and sale of scrips, collection of interest, safe custody and other services incidental thereto, and by offering easy terms for the purchase of securities in instalments as the Imperial Bank of India does to promote new flotations. The Bihar and Orissa Committee have stated that the charges levied by the Imperial Bank of India for buying and selling securities are excessive, being 50 per cent higher than those charged in England for similar services\*. We

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\*Bihar and Orissa, para 450

have no information as to the charges levied by banks in England for such services. We have been told by the Managing Governor of the Imperial Bank of India that the charges levied by the Bank for such services are very reasonable for the business done. He has, moreover, urged that it is necessary to take simultaneously into account all the charges made by banks for different services rendered by them for keeping an account and that it would obviously be of little use to compare a single item out of many if one wished to compare the total cost of the services. He has also pointed out that there is nothing like the same free market for securities in India as in England. We, however, support the suggestion in principle and commend it for the consideration of banks.

654 A suggestion has been made that interest coupons should be attached to Government bonds. We understand that the issue of bearer bonds was discontinued by Government, as it was believed that they were not popular. We have, therefore, no comments to make.

#### INVESTMENT IN INDUSTRIAL SECURITIES.

655 Investors for this class of securities are drawn from a very wide circle, including all classes of people from princes and millionaires to clerks and shop-keepers. All over the world there are investors who are not content with a low yield of interest on their investments though steady and assured. They are not afraid of taking the risks ordinarily attendant on the investment of funds in stocks of industrial concerns and subscribe freely to the share capital and debenture issues of concerns which offer the prospect of a higher yield than that of gilt edged securities and also of capital appreciation. In normal times no difficulty is experienced in India in finding capital for joint-stock concerns, provided there is a reasonable guarantee of good prospects and efficient management. The statistics concerning joint-stock companies in India, as given in the Government Publication No 2212 (1930), show that in the year 1928 there were in existence 5,831 joint-stock companies with a paid-up rupee capital of Rs 276 crores. These figures are exclusive of companies with capital in pounds sterling or other currencies. There is, however, no regular investment market in the country. Investment banking institutions with an organization for investigation into the merits of industrial issues, for underwriting such issues and for marketing the securities, are as yet unknown. Such institutions can, if founded, assist materially in the flotation of sound concerns, give a ready marketability to their securities and inspire public confidence in such forms of investment.

There are, however, stock exchanges at Bombay, Calcutta and Madras, which play a useful part in directing the flow of capital to industrial enterprise, by providing a market for the purchase and

sale of recognized scrips. No regular stock exchange exists in provinces other than the three above-mentioned. The want of an exchange must seriously handicap joint-stock enterprises as well as investors, but unless there is sufficient business no exchange can be established. In the absence of local exchanges, however, the existing banks and their branches, including co-operative banks and other financial organizations such as the loan offices, the Chit funds and *Nidhis*, may render useful service by undertaking the work of buying and selling stocks and securities for their customers on a commission basis.

#### DEBENTURES.

656 It has been represented to us by some of the witnesses that for various reasons debenture issues of industrial concerns are not popular in this country. We consider, however, that it would be more correct to say that their popularity is limited to a small class of investors which is not interested in more speculative investments. As a rule debentures charged on good undertakings and yielding a sufficiently attractive return appear to command a good price. The demand for them would naturally vary with the ebb and flow of prosperity in the industries concerned. It would also be influenced by the standing and reputation of the firms of managing agents.

657 We are told that the initial stamp duty on debentures and the duty on transfers, to a certain extent, also militate against the ready negotiability and, therefore, against the popularity of the debentures of industrial concerns. The Calcutta Stock Exchange, however, do not consider that the question of initial stamp duty, which is  $1\frac{1}{2}$  per cent, has any bearing on the popularity or otherwise of debenture issues. The transfer duty now varies in different provinces from annas eight to annas twelve per cent, the same as for share transfers. We recommend that it may be reduced to a uniform duty of annas four per cent. Formerly, bearer debentures did not find favour with the investing public owing to the risk of loss, but we are informed that now they are more in vogue, the fact that their transfer does not entail additional duty being an attraction.

#### INSURANCE COMPANIES

658 Life insurance is an important factor influencing the development of banking. Not only does a life insurance company perform a service similar to that of a savings bank in stimulating savings but it also assists in mobilizing the savings of the people and transferring them from individual savers to borrowers, including Government, public bodies and industrial corporations. Life insurance is thus one of the forms of investment which needs to be encouraged and developed.

659 The benefits of the post office insurance fund are available only to Government servants or servants paid from local funds.

It has been suggested that postal insurance should be extended to the general public. In view of the existence of a large number of local life insurance companies, which are doing useful work in this direction, the proposal does not appear to meet with general approval, and we do not accordingly support it.

660 Owing to the fact that many important insurance companies in India are non-Indian, the question of investment of their funds is one of peculiar interest from the point of view of developing the banking resources of the country. No statistics have been placed before us to show what portion of their funds is invested in India and how much outside, but it is believed that much of their income is invested outside the country to the detriment of the development of the country's resources, and it is therefore urged that these companies should be compelled by legislation to place an initial deposit with Government and to invest a fixed proportion of the premia received by them in the country in approved Indian securities. We consider it essential for the economic development of the country that all insurance companies doing business in it, whether Indian or non-Indian, should by a judicious investment of their funds assist in the promotion of public utility undertakings and the finance of the trade and industry of the country generally. We, therefore, recommend that legislation may be undertaken to render it obligatory on all insurance companies, Indian as well as non-Indian, to lodge an initial deposit with Government and to invest, and keep invested, a fixed proportion of their premia funds in approved Indian securities. What the proportion should be may be determined by Government after investigating the situation in the light of the necessary statistics.

#### PROVIDENT FUNDS.

661 To a limited extent, provident funds started by public bodies and corporations fulfil the same object as insurance schemes in promoting thrift.

The benefits of the provident fund are being gradually extended to the employees of charitable and educational institutions and private commercial and industrial concerns, large as well as small, throughout the country. We understand some of the joint-stock banks quote special rates of interest for the deposit of such funds. The value of all possible encouragement given by banks to institutions having as their object the promotion of the saving habit cannot be overestimated.

#### INVESTMENT TRUSTS

662 In Great Britain and the United States of America, Investment Trusts have been instrumental in fostering the saving and investment habit of the people to a considerable extent.

Several witnesses have recommended that Investment Trusts should be formed in India and have pointed out that there is scope for them and that there are also men of ability available to manage them. One drawback pointed out, however, is the high rates of interest for money ruling in this country as compared with those prevailing in England and America, which would reduce profits. In our opinion the establishment of Investment Trusts is a matter for private enterprise and may be looked upon as a possibility, as the banking and investment habit grows in India. We, therefore, do not make any special recommendations in this connection.

#### GROWTH OF THE CHEQUE HABIT

663 The increasing use of negotiable instruments of credit is a certain indication of the growth of the banking habit. The most important of such instruments is the cheque. Evidence is forthcoming from all directions of a substantial increase in the number of cheques which daily pass through the Clearing Houses. The recent abolition of the stamp duty on cheques appears to have contributed materially to a more extensive use of the cheque not only in the Presidency towns and other big commercial centres, but also in the mofussil. The co-operative banks also recorded a rise in the number of new accounts opened and the cheques issued by them. There is, however, still a large portion of the population to whom the cheque system is a mystery. It has yet to understand and appreciate the facility and the security a cheque currency affords both to the drawer and the payee.

664 One of the most serious obstacles that impede the growth of the cheque habit in this country is the illiteracy of the people. The cheque system presupposes a certain degree of literacy which is lacking in this country. Even amongst the literate classes only a few can correctly draw up a cheque in the English language in which the cheque-books of most of the banks are printed. A single erasure or a mistake vitiates the instrument. There is, therefore, a general demand for the use of the vernacular in this and other departments of banking and we have referred to it in the chapter on Commercial Banking. Among the other suggestions put forward by the Provincial Committees with a view to popularizing the cheque habit, there are a few which call for the assistance of Government and the banks. To these we desire to invite special attention in this chapter.

665 Government can assist materially in spreading the cheque system in rural areas by accepting freely payment of land revenue by cheque. Such payments are now, under certain conditions, accepted at treasuries which are managed by the branches of the Imperial Bank of India. Very few people are, however, in a position to avail themselves of this facility. The number of such branches is limited and they are situated mostly at district headquarters. It is, therefore, suggested that the facilities for pay-

ment of land revenue by cheque may be extended to *taluka* sub-treasuries and district treasuries. We support this suggestion. It is also suggested that all material payments should be made by Government by cheque. The Bengal Committee makes definite proposals on the subject, which we commend for the consideration of Government.

Some of the Provincial Committees have suggested that local bodies should similarly encourage the use of cheques. We recommend that all municipalities and other local bodies should be asked to consider the feasibility of making and accepting payment by cheque on account of salaries to some of their employees and other items of receipts and disbursements.

666 Banks can encourage the cheque habit by providing adequate facilities for prompt encashment of cheques over the counter. Merchants and traders should also be encouraged by banks to use cheques as far as possible instead of currency in the settlement of transactions in up-country markets in connection with the movement of crops. A wide-spread use of cheques in these markets would assist greatly the development of the banking habit with the small traders. We should like to emphasize the fact that the circulation of cheques in the money market and the mobility of the banking resources of the country largely depend on the facilities given by banks for transfer of funds from one centre to another.

#### NEED FOR SAVINGS ASSOCIATIONS

667 We have referred above to the need for concerted and concentrated effort on the work of stimulating thrift and mobilizing small amounts of savings and directing them to channels of production. Some of the Provincial Committees and witnesses have suggested the inauguration of savings associations or thrift committees on the lines of the National Savings Associations in England. These organizations were started during the war in connection with the issue of war loans and were so successful that after the war their activities have been continued. There is now in England a National Savings Committee guiding a large number of National Savings Associations, which are local associations formed to help their members to invest in the National Savings Certificates. We support in principle the formation of such associations in all provinces. The educative effect of such organizations working systematically in different parts of the country, with the zeal and spirit of service essential in a cause of national importance, would be immense. By active propaganda for encouraging small savings, by providing means for the collection of such savings and by pooling them for remunerative investment in approved securities, they would succeed in promoting the saving habit among the young as well as the old, in overcoming the timidity of the small saver and in familiarizing him with practically safe and profitable means of investment.



## CHAPTER XXV.

### REGULATION OF BANKING

#### NEED FOR REGULATION

668 Serving as repositories of the cash resources of all classes of individuals and institutions, the banking institutions of a country exercise a very powerful influence on the economic life of its people. Banking business has, therefore, been regarded as *quasi-public* in its nature, warranting legislation for safeguarding the interests of depositors on whose confidence rests the entire banking structure of a nation and for ensuring and fostering the growth of banking on sound lines. Restrictions are imposed on banking operations in some form or another in different countries according to their requirements. In the United States of America, Canada and other countries there are special banking laws. In England apart from the Companies' Act there is no special enactment for the regulation of the business of banks, but the purpose of legislation in matters not specifically provided for by the Companies' Act is there served by the tradition, convention and case law that have grown up as the result of the experience of generations.

#### EXISTING POSITION IN INDIA—THE INDIAN COMPANIES ACT.

669 Joint stock banks in this country are at present governed by the Indian Companies Act in regard to various matters such as constitution and incorporation, articles of association, share capital, maintenance of registers of members, management and administration, meetings and proceedings, qualification, appointment and liability of directors, restrictions on commencement of business, debentures and floating charges, maintenance of books and accounts and publication of statements and balance sheets, investigation by the Registrar, inspection and audit, service and authentication of documents, arbitration, and compromise, winding up and appointment of liquidators, removal of defunct companies from the register and offences and legal proceedings. There are, however, certain matters in regard to which the Act draws a distinction between banks and other companies and prescribes special provisions applicable to banks. These provisions are set forth in brief below —

(1) *Section 4* —Prohibits partnership exceeding ten in number from carrying on the business of banking unless it is registered as a company, or is formed in pursuance of an Act of Parliament or some other Act of the Governor General in Council, or of Royal Charter or Letters Patent.

(2) *Section 32* —Requires that an annual list of members, etc., should be prepared and filed with the Registrar, and a note appended

to Form E requires that banking companies should add a list of all their places of business to the above-mentioned list

(3) *Section 132* —Requires that the balance-sheet shall be in the form marked F in the Third Schedule, or as near thereto as circumstances admit, and Form F requires that in showing book debts a distinction should be drawn between those considered good and in respect of which the bank is fully secured and those considered good for which the bank holds no security other than the debtors' personal security, and exempts banks from the obligation to show provision made for bad and doubtful debts which has to be shown in the balance sheet in the case of all other companies.

(4) *Section 136* —Requires every company being a limited banking company to make a statement in Form G in the Third Schedule, or as near thereto as possible, before it commences business and thereafter on the first Monday in February and the first Monday in August in every year

(5) *Section 138* —Provides that the local Government may appoint one or more inspectors to investigate the affairs of a banking company on the application of members holding not less than one-fifth of the shares issued, the proportion in the case of any other company having a share capital being one-tenth of the shares issued

(6) *Section 140* —Provides that if a banking company has branch banks beyond the limits of India, it shall be sufficient if the auditor is allowed access to such copies of, and extracts from, the books and accounts of any such branch as have been transmitted to the head office of the company in British India

(7) *Section 259* —Requires a banking company, which was in existence on 1st May, 1882 to give notice to account holders of its intention to register as a limited company at least 30 days before registering

670 It appears to be the general opinion that the Companies Act touches only the fringe of the problem of banking legislation and that there should be some legislative control over the operations of banking institutions which at present stand almost exclusively outside the purview of the Indian Companies Act. In fact, the question of legislation for the regulation of banking has engaged the attention of the Government of India and of the public for several years. In a letter addressed by the Government of India to the provincial Governments in the year 1913, it was stated that it was not the intention of Government to attempt to control all the numerous forms of banking operations known under various names which were carried on in this country in business centres either by foreign or indigenous agency. It

was added that similarly it was not proposed to include in the scope of such legislation the regulation of a form of banking undertaken by industrial companies which received deposits during their busy season in order to finance the business of the firm, but that it was proposed only to examine the desirability of attempting to impose restrictions on the use of the term "bank" or "bankers" or its equivalents such as "Banking Agents", "Banking Societies", etc., by individuals, partnerships or companies who conducted banking business on lines which were unsound and likely to imperil the security of credit. It was pointed out that in the first place it was for consideration whether the term "bank", "bankers", etc., should not be restricted to companies registered under the Indian Companies Act and it was stated that it would appear desirable that, at least for the future, the term "bank", "bankers", etc., should not be allowed to be used except by registered companies and that Government would be prepared to consider the question of permitting the then existing companies to continue their business on their undertaking the regular publication at six-monthly intervals of balance-sheets audited under the provisions of Section 144 of the Indian Companies Act. It was added that it would follow from these suggestions, if they proved capable of adoption, that institutions that would thereafter possess the name and prestige of "banks" should be subject to certain restrictions. The views of local Governments, Chambers of Commerce and other public bodies interested in the question were invited, and the replies received revealed a body of opinion in favour of legislation requiring that institutions styling themselves "banks" should be registered under the Indian Companies Act and should limit their business to what is generally known as banking.

#### NELD FOR A SPECIAL BANK ACT.

671 We are not in favour of elaborate banking regulations and restrictions dealing with matters which had best be left to the discretion and sense of responsibility of the directorate and the management, such restriction is at times likely to do more harm than good and to hamper the activities of Banks. At the same time, we are of opinion that the existing provisions in the Indian Companies Act governing banking companies are inadequate. Several important matters having a vital bearing on questions such as the initial organization of banks, their efficient management and stability, provisions for supervision and examination and publication of accounts, the safety of shareholders and depositors and the development of banking generally on sound lines remain to be provided for. We do not suggest that it is necessary to provide for all these matters by legislation. Some

can be met by suitable provisions in the memorandum and articles of association of the different banking companies according to their respective requirements, subject to the approval of the Registrar of Joint-Stock Companies, some might be left to the control of directors and the supervision of auditors, while some would be within the purview of the Reserve Bank when it is established. Nevertheless there will remain certain matters which, in our opinion, will have to be provided for by legislation.

672 There are two ways in which the existing regulations can be amplified —

- (1) by the promulgation of a special Bank Act comprising the necessary provisions governing all banking institutions, and
- (2) by the amendment and amplification of the Indian Companies Act so as to provide for the additional matters which require to be dealt with by legislation.

673 We prefer the first alternative which will, in our opinion, be more convenient to the public as well as to the banks, and we recommend that a special Bank Act may be passed comprising the existing regulations embodied in the Indian Companies Act with the modifications and additional provisions recommended below. The foreign banks operating in India should be brought within the purview of the Act to the extent indicated in the report and provided for in the Act.

674 Various suggestions have been made to us for legal provisions regulating the organization and functioning of banks. Most of them are apparently made in the light of the experience of various witnesses concerning the failures of banks in the past. We have already pointed out in Chapter II that some of the early banks came to grief owing to combination of trading with banking. Various other reasons have been given by different witnesses for bank failures, but an analysis of their statements shows that the root cause of the disaster can be traced to defective management. For instance, some of the principal causes of failures mentioned by them are

- (a) dishonest management,
- (b) incompetence of directors who have been found to be "too innocent of banking practice or business prudence" to check the manipulations of designing directors or managers,
- (c) bad and speculative investments,
- (d) unrestricted loans given to directors or concerns in which they were interested,
- (e) injudicious advances,

- (f) utilization of short-term deposits for long-term loans,
- (g) insufficient paid-up capital and an unduly large proportion thereof held in immovable property,
- (h) insufficient reserves,
- (i) insufficient liquidity of funds.

Some of the witnesses have rightly pointed out that the failure of some banks could also be ascribed to want of co-operation among banks for joint action in the hour of need, absence of a central banking institution from which timely assistance could be obtained and lack of any organization through which schemes for amalgamation could be put through.

675 We propose to classify our recommendations concerning the additional provisions which should, in our opinion, be incorporated in the proposed Act under the following heads

- (1) Organization,
- (2) Management,
- (3) Audit and Inspection,
- (4) Liquidation and Amalgamation.

#### (1) ORGANIZATION.

676 The incorporation of a banking concern under an Act of the legislature involves an obligation to comply with certain general requirements laid down therein. While such provisions cannot prevent fraud or mismanagement, they ensure a minimum standard of efficiency and integrity in the conduct of business of the institution. The Indian Companies Act requires, under Section 4, that more than ten partners wishing to carry on the business of banking must form themselves into a company and get it registered under the Act. The term 'banking' has not, however, been defined in the Act and the question has often been raised as to whether any and every concern choosing to style itself a bank should be allowed to use the term.

#### *Definition of "Banking"*

677 Nowhere has a definition of "banking" been evolved which has met with general acceptance. None of the banking enactments of different countries that we have seen incorporates a definition of the term "bank" or "banking business". For instance, the framers of the Bank Act of Canada are content with merely interpreting the term "bank" as meaning "any bank to which

this Act applies" In England the Bills of Exchange Act says "banker" includes "a body of persons whether incorporated or not who carry on the business of banking" The Negotiable Instruments Act of 1881 of our country takes us no further Section 3 of the Act simply lays down that the term "bankers" includes "also persons or a corporation or company acting as bankers" In reply to our questionnaire some of the witnesses have expressed the opinion that no attempt should be made to define the term "banking" by legislation, lest it should give rise to technical difficulties Others, however, consider it necessary that there should be a legal definition Several ingenious definitions have been suggested by a few witnesses and some of the Provincial Committees\* Fairly exhaustive and helpful as these suggestions are, we find that the task of defining the term "bank" or "banker", which has been regarded as well nigh impossible in other countries, is much more so in India where a definition cannot be drawn up without excluding many firms of indigenous bankers and individuals who do a considerable portion of the financing of the country

678 It may be mentioned that in his 'Law of Banking' Sir John Paget, after reviewing legal decisions, sums up the position as follows —

No one and no body, corporate or otherwise, can be a 'banker' who does not—

- (1) take deposit accounts,
- (2) take current accounts,
- (3) issue and pay cheques drawn on himself,
- (4) collect cheques, crossed and uncrossed, for his customers

But a person or body corporate may in his opinion do all of these things and yet not be a "banker", for in addition to the above-mentioned requirements,

- (5) banking must be a part of the man's known occupation,
- (6) he must hold himself out as a banker and the public take him as such,
- (7) there must be an intention generally to get a living by so doing, and
- (8) the banking business conducted must not be subsidiary or ancillary to another business or other businesses carried on by the same concern

"The only true road to 'safety'", adds Sir John Paget, "both for the public and the banker, lies in the scheme, propounded by those

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\* *Vide* Bombay para 286, Bengal para 464, Burma para 658

best qualified to judge, of an authoritative and conclusive register of bankers. This, completed after investigation by a legally qualified tribunal and amended by the same as occasion may require, would supply a means of ready reference and prompt decision, open to the bank clerk and public alike."

679 For the purpose of the Enemy Banking Business Rules, 1918, which for a period of at least five years after the war forbade any banking business to be carried on in the United Kingdom by a company which was an enemy-controlled corporation, "banking business" was defined as follows —

"Receiving money on current account or on deposit, accepting bills of exchange making, discounting, buying, selling, collecting or dealing in bills of exchange, promissory notes and drafts whether negotiable or not buying, selling or collecting coupons buying or selling foreign exchange by cable-transfer or otherwise issuing for subscription or purchase or underwriting the issue of loans shares or securities making or negotiating loans for commercial or industrial objects or granting and issuing letters of credit and circular notes except in so far as such operations form part of and are for the purpose of and incidental to the conduct of a business carried on for other purposes by the company firm or individual by whom such operations are transacted"

680 We have referred above to the Government of India's communication regarding the desirability of imposing some restriction by legislation on the indiscriminate use of the term "bank", or "banker", by individuals and firms whose business has no relation to banking properly so-called. We have also referred to the general body of opinion elicited by this communication. The subject was touched upon by the Royal Commission on Indian Currency and Finance, 1926. In paragraph 162 of their report they suggested that "the term 'bank' or 'banker' should be interpreted as meaning every person, firm or company using in its description or title 'bank', or 'banker' or 'banking', and every company accepting deposits of money subject to withdrawal by cheque, draft, or order". They recognized, however, that in view of the special conditions of indigenous banking in India, this matter would require more detailed consideration than they had been able to give to it and they recommended that it should be further examined.

681 Having examined the question further, we find that the difficulty pointed out by the Commission is one which cannot be fully met by any legal definition or any restrictive or regulating provision of the law. What is really needed is a register of

bankers without a hard and fast definition and we are of opinion that the situation in India as regards indigenous bankers will best be met by an arrangement for the enrolment of such bankers as members of a recognized association

682 In Chapter XXIII we have suggested the formation of a Bankers' Association. It has been suggested by the foreign experts that the members of the Association may affix to their names the appellation, "Member of the Bankers' Association", which would carry with it the status of a recognized banker. We approve of this suggestion which, if adopted, would render it unnecessary to restrict by law the use of the terms "bank" and "banker" and their equivalents. The mere term "banker", as used in this country, would be shorn of much of the prestige it now conveys, after the appellation "Member of the Bankers' Association" comes into vogue. As regards companies, using the term "bank" or its "equivalent", and desiring to be incorporated under the Bank Act, we recommend that the Act should lay down that adequate provisions regarding the subjects mentioned in paragraphs 700, 709, 710, 712, 714 to 717, 721 and 731 of this chapter should be incorporated in the Memorandum and Articles of Association of a company which wants to make use of the word "bank" or the words "savings bank", "banking company", "banking house", "banking association" or "banking institution", or any word or words of import equivalent thereto in connection with its operations. We also recommend that an existing company using any such title should arrange to conform to such provisions within five years after the Banking Act is passed, failing which registration in its existing name should be cancelled.

Banks registered under the Indian Co-operative Societies Act or under any special charter or enactment such as the Imperial Bank of India Act, and banks registered under laws of other countries, will be exempt from the operation of this provision. It would also be open to any unregistered firm or individual to use the term "bank" and it appears to us to be difficult to devise any means by which they can be prevented from doing so.

### *Licensing of Banks*

683 It has been suggested to us that all individuals and firms doing banking business, excepting joint-stock banks incorporated under the Indian Companies Act and societies registered under the Co-operative Societies Acts, should be compelled by law to take out licences which would impose certain restrictions on their working. We consider this suggestion impracticable in the existing circumstances. Indigenous bankers who now finance the bulk of the internal trade of the country would not subject themselves to any such restriction and banking in this country has not developed



to such an extent as to admit of the withdrawal of a large number of indigenous bankers and private banking firms from the field of banking

684 We, however, recommend that any bank, Indian or non-Indian, wishing to do banking business in India should be required to take out a licence from the Reserve Bank when it is established. This is partly necessary in the interests of depositors and partly for giving the Reserve Bank some control over the banks operating in the country. Licences should be freely granted to the already established banks and it would be the business of the licensing authority to see that the provisions of the law and any other conditions specified in the licences are complied with. So far as this proposal applies to non-Indian banks we have already dealt with it in paragraph 451 of our Report.

685 We may explain that the object underlying the proposal in the preceding paragraph is to ensure a systematic development and extension of joint-stock banking and not to impede in any way free competition. Having regard to the present stage of literacy of the people, we consider it essential that a bank should be organized on certain recognized principles of banking and that no institution calling itself a bank should start operations without obtaining a licence from the Reserve Bank. Having regard also to the present stage of development of banking in the country, we consider it essential that there should be a policy of encouraging expansion of banking in areas where there is need for it and discouraging the multiplication of banking institutions beyond the needs of business in particular localities. We have no doubt that the Reserve Bank would be willing to encourage the expansion of banking as much as possible and that its policy in granting licences would be influenced solely by the considerations of the economic interests of the country. As pointed out by us in chapter XIX, even the foreign banking experts, who are generally not in favour of the introduction of a licensing system, recognize that the Reserve Bank may be trusted to act in this respect "in a sound and impartial way". They, however, take exception to the reasons given by us in support of the proposal. They consider that the protection of interests of depositors by means of licences will be a dangerous responsibility for the Reserve Bank to undertake. We have not suggested that such responsibility should devolve on the Reserve Bank. What it would do among other things, before issuing a licence, would be to see that the financial position of a new bank and the general standing and reputation of its directorate are such as to admit of its being allowed to deal in credit. Licensing implies preliminary investigation as to the fitness of an institution to commence work and enforcement of the conditions of the licence. But it carries no assurance and no guarantee concerning the efficiency or integrity of its future

management, and is not likely to be construed as conveying such a guarantee any more than registration under the Indian Companies Act at present or under the Banking Act in future will convey a guarantee. We do not, therefore, share the apprehension of the experts that in suggesting that the Reserve Bank should be the authority to issue licences to new banks we are asking it to undertake a dangerous responsibility.

686 The other reason given by us in support of the proposal for licensing banks is that the Reserve Bank may thereby obtain some control over the banks operating in the country. If the Bank had the authority to issue licences, it would be easy for it to get all banks to conform, as a condition governing the grant of licences, to certain general requirements regarding the preparation and publication of statements of their accounts. It would further be able, as pointed out by the Bombay Chamber of Commerce and mentioned by us in paragraph 447, to control the evil of overcrowding of banks at certain places. It is not suggested by us that by merely having the authority to grant licences, the Reserve Bank would be able to obtain full control over the operations of the banks doing business in the country. While, therefore, we agree with the foreign experts that such control should be obtained by the Reserve Bank by means of its discount rate and its open market policy, we see considerable advantage in the Reserve Bank being invested with additional powers to exercise general control over the banking system of the country.

687 We have already recommended in Chapter XIX that the opening of a new branch by an existing bank should be subject to the approval of the Reserve Bank.

688 It has been suggested that there should be a provision in the Act requiring the permission of the Central Banking Authority for opening savings banks. It is urged that small depositors who are attracted by the term "savings bank" need special protection. We are not, however, in favour of this proposal. It has been customary with banks in this country to maintain savings banks departments and by offering special terms in respect of savings deposits they have succeeded in attracting considerable amounts of small savings and thus mobilizing the resources of the comparatively poorer section of the population. Moreover, should the proposal be adopted, a highly anomalous situation would be created. While the banks registered under the proposed Act would be subjected to such a restriction, it would be open to those not so registered and remaining outside its purview to receive savings deposits and run savings banks departments.

689 We recommend that there should be a provision in the Act requiring that every institution doing banking business in British India, other than a foreign bank, should have a majority of natural born or domiciled Indian directors. We are of opinion

that such a provision is essential for the regulation of a service of national importance such as banking. We consider that some safeguards are necessary to prevent the control and management of such a service passing into foreign hands and that unless non-nationals are precluded from having a preponderating voice in the management of banks operating in this country, it would not be possible to give effect to any national policy that might be evolved for the development of banking in the interests of Indians.

690 For the same reasons we recommend that no new bank other than a foreign bank should be allowed to operate in British India unless it has a majority of Indian shareholders and is incorporated under the Indian law.

691 Some of our colleagues\* are unable to subscribe to the views expressed in the preceding two paragraphs. They consider that in the case of banks started by private initiative it is undesirable to lay down any restrictions by legislation on the rights of shareholders to choose their own directors and on the free transferability of shares, and that these matters should be provided for in the Articles of Association as is done in most other countries of the world. They are inclined to think that the acceptance of the proposals in the two preceding paragraphs must convey an implication that promoters of Indian banking companies and the shareholders of these companies are less likely to secure a protection of national interests by their voluntary action than citizens in other countries, and they are unable to subscribe to any proposals which may convey this implication. The Director of the Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce in the United States in a bulletin issued in 1929 has pointed out that the examination of the laws of several European countries shows that nearly all these countries provide equal rights for foreign shareholders, though Spain, Roumania, Sweden and Norway have definite restrictions on foreign capital in the development of their national resources. But even in Spain the restrictions are only applied to banks and companies which have any direct contractual relationship with the Government or which are concessionnaires of public services. The Director has further observed that most countries permit corporations to make their own provisions regarding shareholders' rights and that the absence of definite laws has resulted in many private measures restricting foreign shareholders. Those of our colleagues who differ from us in regard to the recommendations in paragraphs 689 and 690 therefore consider that the practice in other countries and the absolute discretion given in paragraph 699 of our Report to directors of banks to refuse to register transfers of shares without assigning any reason do not justify any restrictive and safeguarding measures except when any bank

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\* Sir Bhupendra Nath Mitra, Sir Hugh Cocke, Mr. F. V. Rushforth, Dr. H. J. Messersmith, W. Lamond and R. W. Buckley, Nawab Sir Sahibzada Abdul Qayyum and Mr. G. K. Devadhar.

obtains some concession from the State. In the latter case, the executive government or the legislature will be fully justified, in their opinion, in stipulating for measures calculated to prevent the control and management passing into foreign hands.

### *Prohibition of activities other than banking*

692 There is a consensus of opinion among witnesses that banking business is not compatible with trading, and we concur in this opinion. There have been instances on record in which banking institutions came to grief because of their trading operations or close contractual relations with trading concerns. Of these the most conspicuous instance is that of the Alliance Bank of Simla whose connection with a trading firm led to a colossal drain on its resources and brought about its ruin. We have already referred in Chapter II to the failure of some of the banks inaugurated during the days of the East Indian Company owing to the combination of banking with other business and speculation. We, therefore, recommend that the Articles of Association of a banking company should prohibit activities other than banking and that the Act should give powers to the Registrar of Joint-Stock Companies to refuse the registration of banks the Articles of Association of which are not in accordance with the provisions of the law in regard to this matter. He should also refuse the registration of banks if the Articles of Association do not make adequate provisions in regard to the other matters referred to below.

### *Managing Agency System*

693 It has been suggested that the managing agency system as applied to joint-stock banks in India is both unnecessary and undesirable and that, before it is too late, there should be a statutory provision prohibiting the advent of managing agents in the field of banking. Whatever justification there may be for the managing agency system in the sphere of industry, banking is not a business in which the need for such an agency ought ever to be felt. We, accordingly, recommend that the Bank Act should prohibit the organization of a bank on the managing agency system and provide further that any arrangement made subsequently for conducting the management of a bank under such a system shall be void. The object we have in view is to prevent long-term agency contracts being given to firms or individuals creating, so to say, a hereditary title to the agency.

### *Capital*

694 One of the advantages of incorporation of banks under an Act of legislature is that it renders it possible for Government to prevent the growth of mushroom banks with insufficient capital,

which in the nature of things would have a less extensive distribution of risks and would be less able to withstand shocks than banks of larger size. There is nothing, however, in the Indian Companies Act to require the provision of a minimum capital or to prevent a new concern of doubtful pretensions from placing its authorized capital at a high figure, out of all proportion to its paid-up capital, with the object of giving an exaggerated idea of its resources and misleading the public. The Statistical Tables relating to Banks in India give glaring instances of so-called banks that had no difficulty in starting business in the absence of any legal obligation to provide a minimum amount of capital. Six out of the sixteen banks that failed, or went into liquidation in 1927 had practically no paid-up capital. The paid-up capital of one was only Rs 800, of another Rs 1,400, and the capital of two more was less than Rs 5,000 each. Similarly, of the thirteen banks that failed in 1928, four had no paid-up capital and not even any subscribed capital. The paid-up capital of one was only Rs 2,780, of another Rs 3,804 and of a third Rs 5,000.

695 Most of the witnesses are of opinion that it is necessary that the legislature should prescribe a minimum amount of capital which a banking company must raise before it commences operations and that it should also prescribe some definite relationship between the authorized and subscribed capital and between the subscribed and paid-up capital. In prescribing a statutory limit, however, care has to be taken to see that it does not preclude the possibility of the opening of small banks in areas which are not served by banks at present. We are of opinion that in the existing stage of development of banking in this country a minimum capital of Rs 50 000 should be sufficient. We, therefore, recommend that the new Act should provide that a bank registered under the Act should not commence business until its paid-up capital is at least Rs 50,000. We are also of opinion that the authorized capital of a bank should not be more than double the subscribed capital and that the paid-up capital should not be less than 50 per cent of the subscribed capital before commencement of business.

696 Our proposals regarding capital requirements have been made in respect of joint-stock banks with limited liability. Under Section 70 of the Indian Companies Act the liability of a director or directors of a limited company may, if so provided by the memorandum of association, be unlimited. It is not intended that the capital requirements suggested by us should be made applicable to such banking companies also.

#### *Maintenance of Registers of Members*

697 The Indian Companies Act provides for the maintenance of a register of members and the preparation of an annual list of members. It is suggested that there should be a separate index

of the names of members of a banking company for ready reference and inspection by shareholders, as is provided for by section 96 of the (English) Companies Act, sub-section (1) of which runs as under —

“Every company having more than fifty members shall, unless the register of members is in such a form as to constitute in itself an index, keep an index of the names of the members of the company and shall, within fourteen days after the date on which any alteration is made in the register of members, make any necessary alteration in the index ”

We approve of this suggestion and recommend that a similar provision may be introduced in the proposed Act

698 It has been suggested that there should be a provision requiring institutions doing banking business in India to keep a separate register of shares owned by non-nationals We support this suggestion

#### *Registration of Transfers of Shares*

699 The Articles of Association of a bank generally empower its directors to refuse to register transfers of shares, whether fully or partly paid, without assigning any reason It has been represented to us that sometimes such authority is wrongly and arbitrarily exercised It is suggested that in the case of fully paid shares no such power should vest in the directors or that the directors should be required to give reasons for refusal so that the aggrieved shareholders might have the opportunity to appeal to law We are not in favour of restricting in any way the discretion of the Board of Directors of a bank to admit or not to admit any person as a member of the company It is, however, a matter which may be met by provisions in the Articles of Association, should it be considered necessary by the promoters or shareholders to restrict the powers of the directors in respect of registration of transfers of shares

700 The Articles of Association of banking companies also contain a clause prohibiting a member from being present at or voting at a meeting unless he has been possessed of shares of the bank for a certain period before the meeting is held It is suggested that the period should not exceed six weeks and that some safeguard be provided against directors unduly putting off registration of transfers with a view to bringing a shareholder within the operation of the clause We are of opinion that it is for the company to provide in the Articles of Association the period during which a member should have held its shares before being entitled to take part in its proceedings In order, however, to prevent unnecessary delay in the registration of transfers, we recommend

that there should be a provision in the Bank Act requiring the directors to decide within two months of the date of presentation of transfer deeds to the bank whether the transfers shall be registered or not

### *Registration of mortgages and charges*

701 It is suggested that particulars of mortgages and charges created by a bank on its own assets, which would under section 109 of the Indian Companies Act be void if not registered with the Registrar, should also be filed with the Registrar of the province where the bank has branches, so that those who are dealing with the branches can have better means of ascertaining the nature of such transactions which vitally affect the credit of the bank. We approve of this suggestion.

702 It is also suggested that in the event of a bank acquiring immovable property which may be already subject to a prior charge of any such kind as would, if it had been created by the company after the acquisition of the property, have been required to be registered under section 109 of the Companies Act, it should get particulars of such prior charge registered. The principle underlying the suggestion is that it makes no difference whether a bank itself creates a charge on its assets or acquires assets subject to a prior charge. This principle is recognized in England where under section 81 of the (English) Companies Act, 1929, the duty of registering such charges is imposed on a company registered in England. We recommend that a similar provision be introduced in the Bank Act.

703 Another suggestion is that satisfaction of a mortgage should be recorded before the Registrar. This is not compulsory under the present law, and it has been represented to us that persons searching the Registrar's record are frequently misled in consequence. We support this suggestion also.

## (2) MANAGEMENT

### *Provision of Reserves*

704 On the soundness of a bank's policy concerning the distribution of profits among the shareholders, and the allocation of a portion thereof to the reserve fund, depends its stability as well as prestige. The laws of several countries require banks to set aside, before declaration of dividend, a prescribed minimum share of their net profits for the building up of a reserve fund which would enable them to meet losses without depleting their capital. Under the National Bank Act of America, every bank is required to allocate 10 per cent of its net profits to reserve until it reaches 20 per cent of the capital. Moreover, the Comptroller has the discretion to decide that dividends shall not be paid at all, if

in his opinion the reserve already built up is not substantial. Under section 59 of the Canada Bank Act, the rate of dividend is limited to eight per cent per annum until the bank has a reserve fund equal to at least 30 per cent of its paid-up capital after all the appropriations necessary for ascertained and estimated losses have been made. In Japan under the new Act (1927) no dividend can be declared until one-tenth of the profits is appropriated to the reserve fund. Various suggestions have, accordingly, been made to secure a sound banking policy in India by strengthening the reserves of a bank. It is suggested that the allocation of profits to dividends should be forbidden until all preliminary and flotation expenses have been paid, and that thereafter the distribution of profits should be restricted so as to provide for adequate sums being set aside for depreciation of dead stock and investment and reserve fund. Some would prohibit the declaration of a dividend, while others would set a limit to the rate of dividend, until the reserve fund amounted to the whole or a prescribed proportion of the paid-up capital. Others, again, would have an equal proportion of the net profits declared as dividend and taken to reserves. In this connexion we cannot too strongly emphasize the fact that the first essential of a banking system is sound management and that if that is wanting, no legislative provision for strengthening its reserves or its financial position generally would be of much avail. In view, however, of the fact that banking in this country is yet in its infancy, we recommend that there should be no distribution of dividend in any year until a bank has set aside, for being taken to the reserve fund, an amount equal to at least 2½ per cent of its paid-up capital and that this restriction should be in operation until the reserve fund equals the paid-up capital.

705 In addition to the reserve fund, a prudent board of directors generally builds up from annual profits a secret reserve which is not disclosed on the balance-sheet. It is on this secret reserve that it mainly relies to meet unforeseen losses, leaving untouched the reserve fund disclosed in the balance-sheet and causing as little uneasiness as possible to depositors and shareholders. The need for such a secret reserve in a well-managed bank is generally recognized, and we call attention to this practice merely to emphasize the fact that the provision we have suggested should be regarded as an absolute minimum and not as a rule of perfection. The minimum prescribed by law often tends to become the maximum and that is one of the reasons why the legislature generally shirks from regularizing by law matters such as these, thereby taking off the shoulders of the management their responsibility in regard thereto. From the point of view of sound management, we consider it important that managers of banks should not be content with the annual accretion to the



reserve fund of the minimum amount suggested by us and that they should review their position from year to year and make such further provisions for reserves as circumstances may require

### *Cash Reserves*

706 Several suggestions have been made for requiring banks to hold minimum reserves of cash. Such a provision is considered necessary to prevent the cash reserves of a bank being depleted to a point which might endanger its solvency. The United States of America is, however, the only important country that has prescribed minimum reserve requirements. In the early days of banking in that country many banking institutions kept practically no reserves with the result that their outstanding notes depreciated in value with disastrous effects on the monetary system. We are not in a position to say whether the banks in India maintain a sufficiently liquid position throughout the year. The figures given for the closing day of the yearly or half-yearly period can scarcely be taken as an index to the actual day to day position of the banks. Nevertheless, we do not consider it desirable that there should be statutory provisions on the subject. While there are many ways of evading the legal requirements in this respect there is also the danger of the statutory minimum being regarded as the maximum in relation to a position which changes from day to day and which in our opinion requires to be regulated with care and foresight rather than by rule of thumb. The question of the inter-relation of loans, deposits and reserves, and of the maintenance from day to day of an adequate ratio of fluid resources to time and demand liabilities is one that in our opinion had best be left to the discretion of the management and the control of the directors. When the Reserve Bank is established, the member banks will be required to keep with that Bank a deposit of a certain percentage of their time and demand liabilities, in addition to their till money. In respect of the other advantages of such a system of mobilization of the reserves of the banking institutions of the country, it would mean a distinct improvement on the existing position regarding the maintenance of cash reserves.

### *Regulation of Loans*

707 Various suggestions have been put forward with a view to regulating advances made by a bank and ensuring a sound loan policy. It is suggested that the total clean advances made by a bank on its advances against immovable property should not exceed the paid-up capital. Another suggestion is to impose this restriction only during the first five years of a bank's existence. It has also been suggested that banks should not be allowed to grant any loan on the security of their own shares. Some witnesses

have also expressed their opinion that advances to an individual without security should be limited, that a limit should be fixed to the total amount which may be advanced to any single individual or to any single concern and that the limit should be absolute and should not exceed a fixed proportion of the bank's capital

708 Underlying these suggestions are sound principles of banking to which a prudent banker would willingly subscribe. The reason for limiting the amount of loans that may be given on the security of immovable property is that they are not liquid. They are ordinarily made for long periods of time and the mortgages given as security are not readily realizable as is the case with stocks and bonds and liquid assets. The object of imposing restrictions on the amount of credit that may be allowed to any single person or corporation is to insure a relatively wide distribution of risks. These are, however, matters in regard to which there can be no hard and fast regulations. We are of opinion that they should be left to the discretion of the management and the control of the Board of Directors.

709 The question of making loans on the security of a bank's own stock, however, stands on a different footing. The objection to such loans is that they lead to abuses that have proved disastrous in the history of the banks of this as well as other countries. We have suggested above that no bank should be allowed to commence business until it has collected a certain amount of capital. Were a bank to make loans on the security of its own stock and were the amounts advanced used as a means of purchasing additional capital stock of the bank, a large amount of the bank's capital would be borrowed from the bank itself and it may not be able to realize the securities against which it has lent money should it be necessary to adjust the account. We are therefore, of opinion that there should be a provision in the Articles of Association of a banking company prohibiting such loans.

710 Similarly, the Articles of Association should provide for limitation of loans to directors and managers and members of the staff.

711 The auditors of a bank, however, stand on a different footing. The duties they are required to perform are such that they should be absolutely independent of the management and should have no business relations with the bank which might compromise their position. We are, therefore, of opinion that as a matter of public policy advances to an auditor or a member of a firm of auditors of a bank, either jointly with other persons or severally, on short or long-term, with or without security, should be prohibited. If any person after being appointed an auditor of a bank becomes indebted to it, his office should thereupon become vacant.

*Restrictions on borrowing powers*

712 A bank's Articles of Association generally give wide powers of borrowing to the directors. It has been represented to us that some statutory limitations are necessary and that the amount borrowed by a bank should have a definite relationship to the paid-up capital. We are inclined to leave this matter also to be met by suitable provisions in the Articles of Association. We are, however, definitely of opinion that the uncalled capital of a bank is its creditors' security and should not be allowed to be mortgaged. We accordingly recommend that there should be a provision in the Bank Act expressly prohibiting banks registered under the Act from creating at any time a mortgage or a charge on their uncalled capital or any part thereof.

*Qualifications, Appointment and Voting power of Directors and Officers*

713 Several suggestions have been made regarding the appointment of directors, their disqualification for and retirement or removal from office, the qualifications of managers and managing directors, their voting power, etc. The Articles of Association usually contain provisions regarding such matters as the appointment and retirement of directors, and we see no necessity for statutory provisions in regard to these matters which it is mainly for the shareholders to regulate.

*Proxies*

714 It is suggested that, as provided in section 31 of the Canada Act, no manager, officer or clerk of a bank shall vote either in person or by proxy, or hold a proxy for the purpose of voting, and that the general form of proxy should be prohibited entirely. We are of opinion that the right to vote in their capacity as shareholders which under the existing practice is conceded to the officers and other employees of a bank should not be taken away from them but that such employees should not be allowed to hold proxies for the purpose of voting on behalf of any other shareholder. We do not, however, suggest any statutory inhibition, but recommend that the Articles of Association should contain a suitable provision regarding the voting power of the officers and employees of the bank and the holding of proxies by them.

715 It has also been suggested that the general form of proxy should be prohibited but that, if allowed, the maximum period of its duration and validity should not exceed three months. This also is a matter which, in our opinion, should be met by a suitable provision in the Articles of Association.

*Voting power of individual shareholders*

716 It is further suggested that the voting power of individual shareholders should be limited with a view to preventing the possibility of control of an institution passing into the hands of a single shareholder or group of shareholders. The existing practice in this country as well as in other countries allows one vote for each share held by a shareholder in a joint-stock concern, and we are not prepared to recommend any change in this practice. It is possible, however, that the promoters of a company may desire to provide safeguards against individuals or groups of individuals acquiring a controlling interest in it. We, therefore, suggest that this matter may also be provided for in the Articles of Association.

*Validity of Votes*

717 Articles of Association of banking companies make the Chairman of a meeting the sole judge of the validity of the votes tendered at the poll. It is urged that it is undesirable to vest such power in the presiding authority. It is generally provided in the Articles that objections to the legality of a vote tendered at a meeting should be raised at the time of the poll. This, it is stated, causes hardship, as it is not possible for a shareholder present to be aware of the validity, or otherwise of votes tendered by other shareholders, and it is urged that the right to object subsequently, to invalid votes should not be taken away from the members of a bank and the jurisdiction of the court thus ousted. We are of opinion that these too are matters which could best be dealt with by a suitable provision in the Articles of Association.

## (3) AUDIT AND INSPECTION.

*Appointment of Auditors*

718 Banks' accounts are now audited by professional auditors. Under section 144 of the Indian Companies Act, no person can be appointed or act as an auditor of any company other than a private company unless he holds a certificate from the local Government entitling him to act as an auditor of companies. This requisition is subject to the proviso that the Governor General in Council may by notification in the *Gazette of India* declare that members of any institution or association specified in such notification shall be entitled to be appointed and to act as auditors of companies throughout British India. The appointment of auditors of a bank vests in the shareholders, but it has been pointed out that the management has considerable influence with regard to their appointment or reappointment. One of the witnesses calls attention to the Canadian practice of appointing auditors only from among the list of auditors selected from the Canadian Bankers' Association. Another witness suggests that

firms of auditors of long standing and experience should be given special licences or certificates to act as auditors to banks. On the other hand, the Council of the Indian Society of Accountants and Auditors are of opinion that all persons whose names are enrolled on the Indian register of accountants under the authority of the Governor General in Council under the Indian Companies (Amendment) Act, 1930, may be appointed as auditors of banks. They strongly oppose the idea of restricting the selection of bank auditors to only a few among the qualified auditors and suggest that there should be a provision in India on lines similar to those prescribed by section 55 of the Dominion of Canada Bank Act of 1923 which imposes a restriction on the period of appointment of the same persons as auditors of banks. It is also suggested that there should be two auditors, one appointed by the directors and the other by the shareholders. It is believed that such an arrangement would minimize the possibilities of the auditors conniving at any irregularity committed by the management or by the directorate. After careful consideration, in consultation with the foreign experts, of all the suggestions made to us in regard to the appointment of auditors, we have come to the conclusion that the existing arrangements need not be disturbed. Under these arrangements shareholders have the right to appoint auditors, and so long as this right remains unfettered, it is open to them to make the best possible selection.

719 It has been suggested to us that it should be illegal for directors of a bank to vote as shareholders or to solicit proxies for the appointment or removal of auditors. We do not agree that the rights of directors as shareholders should in this respect be in any way trenchied upon in the manner suggested.

720 It has been brought to our notice that the affairs of certain banks revealed the fact that their auditors had passed over important matters which should have been brought to the notice of the shareholders. Section 282 of the Indian Companies Act lays down that whoever in any return report, certificate, balance-sheet or other document wilfully makes a statement false in any material particular, knowing it to be false shall be punishable with imprisonment and shall also be liable to fine. It does not, however, provide any penalty for omitting to make a statement. It has also been represented to us that there is an increasing tendency to insert an indemnity clause in the Articles of Association of joint-stock companies in India whereby directors and auditors are relieved from liability for negligence in the discharge of their duties. Section 152 of the (English) Companies Act renders void any such provision, whether contained in the Articles of Association or in any contract with a company or otherwise, for exempting any person (whether an officer of the company or not) employed by the company as auditor from, or indemnifying him

against, any liability which by virtue of any rule of law would otherwise attach to him in respect of any negligence, default, breach of duty or breach of trust of which he may be guilty in relation to the company. On the analogy of this section it is suggested that the indemnity clauses in the Articles of Association should be declared void. We do not support this suggestion. We recommend, however, that there should be a specific provision of the law rendering officers or auditors of a bank liable for omission to state material facts in their reports and in the presentation of the accounts of a bank.

### *Remuneration of Auditors*

721 We understand that under the Indian Companies Act the remuneration of auditors is fixed at general meetings of shareholders but that auditors are frequently paid by the management additional remuneration for doing accountancy work or for rendering special professional services and that such remuneration is not brought to the notice of the shareholders. We are of opinion that any payment to any auditor on any account in addition to the amount of remuneration fixed at a general meeting of shareholders shall be invalid unless fixed or confirmed by the shareholders.

### *Audit of Branch Accounts*

722 Auditors appointed by shareholders of banks do not always audit the accounts of a bank's up country branches. Sub-section (3) of section 145 of the Indian Companies Act does not lay any obligation on them to conduct such audit. It provides that in the case of a banking company, if the company has branch banks beyond the limits of India, it shall be sufficient if the auditor is allowed access to such copies of and extracts from the books and accounts of any such branch as have been transmitted to the head office of the company in British India. The auditors, therefore, rely on certified returns furnished by branches. It has been suggested to us that such returns should be certified by qualified local auditors at the places where such branches may have been situated. The foreign experts are, however, of opinion that the proposal is not practicable and would be too costly. We agree.

### *Additional Outside Audit*

723 Several witnesses have expressed the opinion that audit by special examiners, in addition to that carried on at present by professional auditors appointed by shareholders, will have a very salutary effect. It has been suggested that the duties of examiners appointed for such outside scrutiny should be not merely to examine the accounts of a bank, but also to appraise its financial position and to suggest ways to improve the latter. On the other hand, the proposal is opposed by some witnesses on the ground that such a

system of audit would tend to throw on the outside examiners the responsibility which should be borne by the management and the directorate. Any form of control or inspection which should in any way detract from the responsibility of the management is in their opinion obnoxious. We concur in this opinion. The suggestion for the appointment of outside auditors appears to have been the result of the experience of failures of banks. Such failures were, however, mainly due to laxity of management and supervision, and the institution of an outside audit would in our opinion leave a loop-hole for an unscrupulous or inefficient directorate to shelter itself behind the screen of such audit. We have already suggested in paragraph 720 that the law should be strengthened in this respect by rendering auditors liable for omission to state material facts.

### *Inspection*

724 Under section 138 of the Indian Companies Act shareholders of a bank holding one-fifth of the shares issued can apply to the local Government for investigation by inspectors. This proportion, it is urged, is very high and acts as a definite handicap in the case of banking companies having a large share capital. It has, therefore, been proposed that it should be reduced to one-tenth. Considering that credit institutions need all possible protection against any proceedings likely to shake the confidence of the public, we are not in favour of the proposed alteration in the existing provisions of the law. For the same reason we are not in favour of the proposal that applicants for the investigations of banks' affairs by inspectors should be exempted from giving security for payment of the cost of the enquiry. Under clause (3) of section 141 of the Indian Companies Act expenses of the enquiry are payable by applicants unless the Government direct that they shall be paid by the bank. It is suggested that the expenses shall be borne by the State if it results in a prosecution and in all other cases by the bank, unless otherwise directed. We are unable to support this suggestion.

### *Form of Balance-sheet*

725 There appears to be a general demand that balance-sheets should contain more information than what is embodied therein at present. Form F of the balance-sheet prescribed by the Indian Companies Act is not considered comprehensive enough, and it is suggested that the manner in which accounts are drawn up at present leaves much to be desired, because even those who are conversant with account-keeping are unable in many cases to gauge from the balance-sheets the actual position of a bank concerning assets and liabilities. This, it is urged, is one of the reasons why many people hesitate to rely upon balance-sheets of banking institutions. Some suggest that balance-sheets should be published at

least once a year in a recognized form. Others suggest that there should be half-yearly, and a few even monthly, balance-sheets in prescribed forms. In addition, it is suggested, a bank should issue a fortnightly or monthly statement of its liabilities and assets in a form prescribed by the Reserve Bank or by the Government of India. Several witnesses have suggested that foreign banks working in India should also be required to publish their balance-sheets. According to some witnesses, private bankers and firms should also be required to file their annual balance-sheets or statements showing the business done by them during the year. It is stated that the various exemptions and privileges allowed by law to a private limited company are inconsistent with a private limited company doing banking business and using the word "bank" in its name.

726 Among the definite suggestions put forward as regards the revision of the existing form of the balance-sheet the most important are those for obtaining more detailed particulars concerning book debts, loans to directors and officers, and investments.

727 Under 'book-debts' witnesses have asked for numerous particulars regarding the different securities against which the debts are secured, debts guaranteed by directors of banks, debts due by joint-stock companies guaranteed by managing agents, etc. In the form of balance-sheet which we have suggested later on we have not included such particulars. It is not in consonance with the practice followed by banks in other countries, nor is it in the interests of the shareholders to give such details.

Original Form F of balance-sheet included the following item on the Assets side

*Book debts* (distinguishing in the case of a bank between those considered good and in respect of which the bank is fully secured and those considered good for which the bank holds no security other than the debtor's personal security, and distinguishing in all cases between debts considered good and debts considered doubtful or bad. Debts due by directors or other officers of the company or any of them either severally or jointly with any other person to be separately stated in all cases)

On the Liabilities side of the balance-sheet was an item 'Provision for Bad and Doubtful Debts'

Where a bank had a bad debt which was written off and thereby expunged, there was no question of showing it in the balance-sheet. As a general rule, it was not the practice with the banks to show doubtful debts. If they did not write them off as bad, they created a specific provision out of profits (or out of some existing reserve account) to the exact amount of the doubtful debts. In such a case the debts were for practical purposes



expunged, though, in fact, they still remained on the books; for instance, if a debit against the debtor A B had a corresponding credit in the A B provision account (or some such account), when a balance-sheet was taken out at the end of the year, the debit and credit referred to would cancel out and the balance-sheet would accordingly not show the doubtful debts or the corresponding provision. In the year 1927, however, the Bombay High Court held that this procedure was illegal and that as long as the debt due by A B was not actually expunged, so long must it be shown as a doubtful debt and so long must the provision be shown on the other side of the balance-sheet as "Provision for Bad and Doubtful Debts". As a result of this decision, a notification was issued by the Government of India in that year by which Form F was altered so as to exempt banks from disclosing bad and doubtful debts, if such debts had been provided for to the satisfaction of the auditors. Some of the witnesses consider that the alteration is not an improvement but a "definite slide-back". This change, they say, was effected without consulting the various interests involved. The original provision, they urge, was useful in that it required the banks to bring to the notice of the shareholders the actual amount of bad and doubtful debts and put them on enquiry as to whether such debts were due to carelessness or dereliction of duty on the part of the management. After careful consideration of the question in all its bearings, we are of opinion that bad debts must be written off and that if full provision is made for doubtful debts, the figure of loans and advances should be given in the balance-sheet after deducting the amount of such provision. If, however, this has not been done, any balance of doubtful debts not fully provided for should be shown as indicated in the form suggested by us.

728 It is suggested that loans granted by a bank to a limited company, the directors of which are also directors of the lending bank, should be separately shown and that similarly loans granted to a limited company in which any of the bank's directors are members of the managing agents' firm should also be stated separately. It is further suggested that loans granted by a bank to its directors, managing director, manager and secretary, including the sum repaid by them during the currency of a financial year, should be stated separately in the balance-sheet duly classified and that they should not be mixed up under one heading with the loans granted by the bank to its other officers and employees. We have taken this suggestion into our consideration in drawing up the amended form of balance-sheet.

729 It is also suggested that investments should be classified under important headings such as (1) Government paper, (2) immovable property, (3) debentures, (4) shares or stock of joint-stock companies, and (5) shares in subsidiary companies, distinguishing

between those quoted on a recognized stock exchange and those that are not so quoted. To cover all gilt-edged securities, it has been suggested that they should be classified for the purposes of the balance-sheet as Trustee Securities. It is moreover suggested that investments in shares or debentures of companies in which a director of a bank is interested as managing agent should be clearly specified in detail. Further, it is pointed out that the mode of valuation is very elastic. The bank is not required to show its investments at either cost or market value, with the result that investments are shown in some cases at a valuation which may be neither the cost nor the market value. This position, it is urged, needs improvement, as instances have come to light in which appreciation in the market prices of investments was taken into account before the investments had been realized at those prices. It is, therefore, suggested that it should be made obligatory by law that all investments held by a bank should be valued for the purposes of its balance-sheet at or under market price and that this fact should be clearly stated on the face of the balance-sheet. We had the benefit of the advice of the foreign experts on the question of the basis of valuation of securities. They have expressed the opinion that the valuation should be at cost or market price, whichever is the lower. If, however, this is laid down definitely as a basis for valuation of securities banks that would, with a view to building up a secret reserve, prefer to show the valuation at a figure even lower than the cost or market price, whichever may be the lower, may be precluded from doing so. We are, therefore, of opinion that in order not to take away such option from them, the prescribed basis of valuation of securities should be that the valuation should not be in excess of cost or market price, whichever is the lower.

730 Having examined the various suggestions placed before us for a revision of the form of balance-sheet, the more important of which have been mentioned in the preceding paragraphs, we have drawn up a form of balance-sheet which in our opinion should meet all practical requirements. It does not require banks to give such details as may be inconvenient for them to divulge and at the same time it embodies particulars which the shareholders are entitled to have to enable them to gauge the financial position of the banks. We recommend that this revised form of balance-sheet, as given below, may be adopted in lieu of the existing form.

## FORM OF

*Balance-sheet as at*

	Rs	a	p.	Rs	a	p.
<b>Capital and Liabilities.</b>						
<b>CAPITAL—</b>						
Authorised Capital . . shares of Rs . . . each	..	..	..			
Issued Capital      shares of Rs.      . each .						
Subscribed Capital . shares of Rs      . each .	..					
Amount called up at Rs . . . per share . .	.	.	.			
Less—Calls unpaid . . . . .		.	.			
	..					
Add—Forfeited shares (amount paid-up) . .				..	..	..
<b>LOANS ON MORTGAGE OR MORTGAGE DEBENTURE BONDS</b> . . . . .				..		..
<b>RESERVE</b> . . . . .				..		..
(Details of separate funds, if any, may be given)						
<b>LIABILITIES—</b>						
Current and Savings Bank Deposits . . .	..	.	.			
Fixed Deposits . . . . .	..		..			
Debts due to Banks, Agents, etc , fully secured against securities <i>per contra</i> . . . . .	..		..			
Debts due to Banks, Agents, etc , unsecured . . . . .	.	..				
Bills payable . . . . .	..	.	.			
Sundry Creditors . . . . .		.	.			
Unclaimed dividends . . . . .			..			
				.	..	
<b>ACCEPTANCES FOR CUSTOMERS <i>per contra</i></b> . . . . .				.	..	
<b>BILLS FOR COLLECTION BEING BILLS RECEIVABLE <i>per contra</i></b> . . . . .				..		..
<b>PROFIT AND LOSS—</b>						
Balance as per previous Balance-sheet . . . . .		..	..			
Less—Appropriation thereof . . . . .		..	..			
Balance brought forward . . . . .		.	.			
Profit since last Balance-sheet . . . . .	..	.	..			
				..		.
				..		..
<b>CONTINGENT LIABILITIES . . . . .</b>						



*Profit and Loss Account*

731 The Indian Companies Act does not make it obligatory on joint-stock companies to lay before the company a profit and loss account every year. It has been suggested that banks in India should be required to publish such a statement every year and that the form of this statement should be prescribed. We see no necessity for any statutory provision prescribing the form of the statement. Most of the banks already append a statement of profit and loss account to their balance-sheets. In order that shareholders may have sufficient time to consider and discuss the Directors' Report and the statement of accounts, we recommend that the Directors' Report together with the balance-sheet should be posted to the shareholders not later than ten days before the day of the meeting and that the necessary provision should be made in the Articles of Association.

*Form G*

732 Under section 136 of the Indian Companies Act every banking company is required to make a statement in the form marked G in the Third Schedule of the Act, or as near thereto as circumstances will admit, and to display a copy thereof and, until the display of the next following statement, keep it displayed in a conspicuous place in the registered office of the company and in every branch office or place where the business of the company is carried on. The existing form does not, however, include such particulars as are necessary to give an adequate idea of the liabilities and assets of a bank. It has, therefore, been suggested that in lieu of this statement an abstract of the balance-sheet may be displayed by the banks. We concur in this suggestion and recommend that there should be a provision in the Act requiring banks to display a copy of their entire balance-sheet in lieu of the statement in Form G and to continue to display it until the next following statement is published.

*Other Statements*

733 Whether in addition to the balance-sheet banks should be required to prepare and publish other periodical returns and statements of their liabilities and assets, and if so, in what form, and at what intervals, is a question which we think had better be left for the Reserve Bank to decide, when it is started. So far, however, as the exchange banks are concerned, we have recommended that in addition to periodical statements provided for in the Reserve Bank Bill, annual statements showing their assets and liabilities relating to their Indian business, as prescribed by the Reserve Bank

from time to time, should be furnished by them to the Reserve Bank as a condition of the grant of licence. Such statements should be exhibited by the exchange banks along with the balance-sheet at all their offices. The returns to be submitted by the banks to the Reserve Bank should be audited in such manner as may be prescribed by the Reserve Bank.

### *Annual General Meeting*

734 Section 76 of the Indian Companies Act requires that a general meeting of a banking company shall be held once at least in every year and not more than fifteen months after the holding of the last preceding general meeting. It has been suggested that for computation of time a distinction should be made between the ordinary annual general meeting and the extraordinary general meeting and that the annual general meeting to pass the balance-sheet, accounts, etc., must be held not only once at least in a calendar year but also not later than 12 months (instead of 15 months as at present provided) from the date of holding of the last annual general meeting. We are of opinion that it should be sufficient if it is provided in the proposed Bank Act that the annual general meeting of a bank shall be held not later than three months after the close of the year.

### (4) LIQUIDATION AND AMALGAMATION

735 If a Canadian Bank fails to meet any of its liabilities as they accrue, it is taken charge of by a "Curator" appointed by the Canadian Bankers' Association. If within 90 days he is able to restore the solvency of the bank, it may resume business, otherwise the bank may be wound up. During the first three months of a bank's suspension the stock-holders have a chance to raise funds and to restore the bank to solvency. If they fail, the Curator gives place to a liquidator. It should be possible for a bank in India which finds itself involved in difficulties to be reconstructed or amalgamated with a strong one. Timely assistance in such cases often averts disaster to all concerned. We, therefore, recommend that the law should permit a temporary moratorium on the recommendation of the Reserve Bank to prevent untimely and compulsory liquidation of a bank which is in difficulties.

736 Amalgamation and reconstruction must remain a matter of free negotiation and no legislation can assist in what would be an arrangement of mutual interest to the parties concerned. It is, however, suggested that the agency most competent to foster a movement for amalgamation is an Association of Bankers started on the lines of those in Canada and Australia. Others suggest the instrumentality of the Imperial Bank of India or the Reserve Bank of India. It is also suggested that if a scheme for amalgamation

or reconstruction falls through, the Reserve Bank or an Association of Bankers, if such an Association exists, should be charged with the duty of giving, after examination of the assets of the insolvent bank, a guarantee to facilitate advance payment to depositors, as was given by Government in the case of the Alliance Bank of Simla. We are of opinion that it should be one of the functions of the Reserve Bank, when established, to lend its advice and co-operation in cases of amalgamation or reconstruction of banks which are in difficulties.

737 It has been suggested that there should be a provision in the Bank Act requiring that there can be no amalgamation of banking institutions without the permission of the Central Banking Institution of the country. We see no necessity for any such provision. Generally, amalgamations are not and cannot be carried out secretly. The approval of the shareholders of both the institutions has to be obtained and wide publicity is given to the proposal for amalgamation before it is effected. It is primarily a matter for the shareholders to decide and any interference with their obvious right to dispose of their property as they think best would, in our opinion, be unwarranted.

### *Appointment of Liquidators*

738 It is superfluous to stress the desirability of selecting an independent person as liquidator. One of the duties of a liquidator is to examine the affairs of a bank and to take such action against its officers, auditors or directors as may be necessary in the light of such examination. It has, therefore, been suggested that no person should be appointed liquidator of a bank if, before or at the time of appointment, he was its director, officer or auditor, or held any other place of profit under the bank. We, however, do not recommend any legal provision expressly prohibiting of such an appointment inasmuch as in certain cases, particularly in the case of voluntary liquidation, it may be considered desirable and expedient to appoint as liquidator a person connected with the institution concerned and conversant with its affairs.

739 It has been represented to us that at present creditors do not possess any effective control over the liquidation of an insolvent bank, although their stake is probably the largest. The position in England in regard to the question of appointment of a liquidator is as follows:

“Where it is proposed to wind up a company voluntarily, the directors of the company, or, in the case of a company having more than two directors, the majority of the directors may, at a meeting of the directors held before the date on which the notices of the meeting at which the resolution for the winding up of

the company is to be proposed are sent out, make a statutory declaration to the effect that they have made a full inquiry into the affairs of the company, and that, having so done, they have formed the opinion that the company will be able to pay its debts in full within a period, not exceeding twelve months, from the commencement of the winding up" (Section 230)

A winding up in the case of which a declaration has been thus made and delivered to the Registrar of Companies in accordance with the provisions of the Act is referred to in the Act as "a member's voluntary winding up" and in such a case the right of appointing a liquidator vests in the company. A winding up in the case of which no declaration has been made and delivered as aforesaid is referred to in the Act as "a creditor's voluntary winding up". In such a case the creditors and the company may at their respective meetings nominate a person to be liquidator for winding up the affairs and distributing the assets of the company. If the creditors and the company nominate different persons, the choice of the creditors prevails and the person nominated by them becomes liquidator, provided, however, that any director, member, or creditor of the company may apply to the court for an order either directing that the person nominated as liquidator by the company shall be liquidator instead of or jointly with the person nominated by the creditors, or appointing some other person to be liquidator instead of the person appointed by the creditors (section 239). Similar provisions are advocated in regard to the winding up of banks in India. We consider, however, that the object in view will be met by a provision that in the case of voluntary liquidation of a bank the appointment of a liquidator shall be made by or with the approval of the Board of Directors of the Reserve Bank.

740 It is also suggested that in the case of compulsory liquidation there should be provisions on the lines of the English Companies Act for safeguarding the interests of creditors by the supervision of a committee of inspection or where there is no committee of inspection by the Board of Trade. We bring this suggestion to the notice of Government with a view to such action being taken in the matter as may be considered suitable.

#### *Committees of Inspection*

741 In the case of compulsory winding up, as well as creditors' voluntary winding up, of a company in England, the (English) Companies Act, 1929, provides for the appointment of a committee of inspection consisting of creditors and contributors of the company, or persons holding general powers of attorney from them, in



such proportions as may be agreed on by the meetings of creditors and contributories, or as, in case of difference, may be determined by the court (sections 199 and 240) It has been represented to us that in the matter of liquidation of the Alliance Bank of Simla the committee of investigation appointed by the creditors of that bank was powerless as it did not carry any such legal status, and a suggestion has been made that the Bank Act should provide for the appointment of statutory committees of inspection as in England We accordingly recommend that provision should be made in the proposed Bank Act for the appointment of committees of inspection in the case of compulsory as well as voluntary liquidation of a bank

### *Protection of special classes of depositors*

742 It has been suggested that depositors of small amounts should be given protection and preference by law and that in case of liquidation savings deposits should be given priority over other deposits It is also suggested that banks should be required by law to hold in reserve 50 per cent of their current deposits, 25 per cent of savings deposits and 12½ per cent of fixed deposits, that amounts held by a single individual in current account and savings bank account up to Rs 500 should be exempt from attachment under civil court decrees, that a special class of deposits called "provident fund deposits" or "specific purpose deposits" may be created and that these deposits should be given priority in case of failure of a bank with which such deposits are lodged We are, however, not in favour of any preference being given to any class of depositors

### *Liquidation of non-Indian banks.*

743 It has been suggested to us that special safeguards should be provided for protecting the interests of Indian depositors and creditors in the event of winding-up of non-Indian banks We may mention that the view of the foreign experts on this question is that although on principle it would not be unreasonable to make such a provision, it would not be wise to do so inasmuch as, if every country where a foreign bank were working did the same, the bank would have to split up its assets against its liability in several countries and the position of the whole institution and perhaps of all the creditors would be weakened We have carefully considered the difficulties pointed out by the experts, but having regard to the peculiar conditions prevailing in this country we recommend that there should be some arrangement under which the Indian creditors of a non-Indian institution taken into liquidation should have a prior claim on its assets in India and should also share in the general distribution of its assets outside the country should there be a shortage in the assets held in India

*Acquisition of controlling interest in banking institutions*

744 It is proposed that banks should be prohibited by law from acquiring a controlling interest in other banking institutions without the disclosure of such information to the Central Banking Institution. It is also proposed that any party, firm, institution or company which is non-Indian should be prevented from acquiring a controlling interest in any bank or company registered in India. We are unable to support these proposals as we hold that it is a matter for the shareholders to decide.

*Protection of banks from unjust attacks*

745 The desirability of protecting banking institutions against wild rumours and unjust attacks has been very forcibly brought to our notice. Several witnesses are in favour of some protection being given to banks against credit-wreckers and have suggested that there should be a provision in law to the effect that a certificate should be obtained from the Advocate General or from the Registrar of Companies before any one institutes criminal proceedings against a banking company. Others, however, consider that such a remedy would be worse than the disease. The Advocate General would only consider whether there is a *prima facie* case and if he certified a prosecution, the position of the bank would become more serious and much worse than under the existing conditions. Moreover, it cannot be expected that the application for a certificate would be kept secret, so that even if the suggested remedy were provided for by law, it would prove inefficacious. We are inclined to believe that concealment in such a case would have a more harmful effect than a full disclosure. While, therefore, we are not in a position to suggest any legal remedy, we leave it to the legislature to consider whether any practical remedy can be devised to protect banks from frivolous proceedings.

746 It is suggested that proceedings against banks should be conducted *in camera*. We find that under the present procedure the magistrate concerned has the power to conduct the proceedings *in camera* and to make sufficient enquiries before a process is issued.

747 It has been represented to us that a greater danger to banks from discontented shareholders is the facility given by clause VI of section 162 of the Indian Companies Act under which an application may be filed for the winding-up of a company "if the court is of opinion that it is just and equitable that the company should be wound up", and that the panic created by such an application is likely to be greater than a criminal suit against the directors on technical grounds. It is, therefore, suggested that the clause should be amended so as to exclude banks and other credit institutions from its operation. We cannot support this suggestion.

*Bear Raids on shares*

748 Sometimes a bank's credit is sought to be damaged by a bear raid on its shares on the Stock Exchange. It is suggested that this can be effectively checked by requiring that every seller of banks' shares shall give the actual numbers of shares at the time he sells them. This suggestion is based on Leeman's Act in England (The Sale and Purchase of Bank Shares Act, 1867) which curbs speculation in bank shares by insisting on the numbers of the shares or stock bought or sold being specifically stated in the contracts, or if there are no distinguishing numbers, the names of the registered proprietors being mentioned. We regard this as a measure of great importance for the protection of banks and recommend that there should be a provision in the Act to the effect that it should be incumbent on every seller of banks' shares to give the actual numbers of the shares at the time he sells them.

## CHAPTER XXVI.

### BANKING EDUCATION

#### RECOGNITION OF STUDIES IN COMMERCIAL SUBJECTS INCLUDING BANKING

749 Until the end of the last century commercial education appears to have received little attention in this country. Banking education, which is a branch of higher commercial education, was not even thought of. During the last three decades, however, public interest in the question has been aroused and considerable impetus has been given to the systematic study of commercial subjects, including banking, which have been incorporated by almost all the Indian Universities in the curricula for their examinations. In nearly all the provinces commercial subjects also form part of the optional subjects which may be taken at the various examinations held at the end of the intermediate and secondary school courses. Several schools and colleges specializing in commercial subjects have been established in the principal cities. The number of students attending such institutions and reading either for a diploma or a degree has been steadily increasing. In the year 1928-29 there were 7 colleges with 1,599 students and 149 schools with 7,069 students imparting education in commercial subjects. The distribution of schools and colleges by provinces is shown in Annexure A.

#### EXISTING INSTITUTIONS PROVIDING FACILITIES FOR COMMERCIAL STUDIES

750 The institutions providing facilities for the study of commercial subjects, including banking, may be classified as follows —

- (1) Commercial schools preparing students for a certificate or diploma
- (2) Secondary schools where commercial subjects are taught as optional subjects or to which separate commercial classes are attached
- (3) Universities awarding either a special degree in Commerce, or the general arts degree, after a study of economics and other cognate sciences. Theoretical instruction for the B Com degree is imparted either in a special Department of the University or at a separate institution specializing in such subjects and affiliated to the University. Examples of the former type are furnished by the Departments of Commerce

established by the unitary teaching Universities of Lucknow and Allahabad, and of the latter type by the Sydenham College of Commerce of the Bombay University and the Harley College of Commerce affiliated to the Punjab University

(4) The Indian Institute of Bankers

### THE SYDENHAM COLLEGE OF COMMERCE

751 The question of recognizing the scientific study of commerce was raised in Bombay in the year 1905. After investigation of the question through a Committee, the Senate of the Bombay University adopted, in the year 1912, the Committee's recommendation advocating the institution of a degree of Bachelor of Commerce as the most suitable method of encouraging commercial education. In the following year the Sydenham College of Commerce and Economics was inaugurated by the Government of Bombay for training students for the degree. Under the old regulations of the University the subject of "Special Branches of Economics", which included elements of Banking and Currency, was one of the compulsory subjects prescribed for the examination for the B Com degree. The new regulations adopted in 1925 give prominence to the subject of Indian Currency, Banking and Exchange for the B Com examination. Those who take Advanced Banking as their optional subject are required to acquire a knowledge of the Credit Organisations of the principal countries of the world, Banking Law and Practice and Currency Problems. Candidates are required to have a fair knowledge of Economics, Accounting, Commercial Geography, Public Finance, Mercantile Law, Modern Economic Development, Trade and Statistics, and of one of the following optional subjects —

- (1) Advanced Accounting and Auditing
- (2) Advanced Banking, including Banking Law
- (3) The Organization of the Indian Cotton Industry
- (4) Actuarial Science,
- (5) Economics of Transport

752 The Sydenham College of Commerce is so far the only institution preparing students for the B Com degree that has been affiliated to the Bombay University. The first examination for this degree was held in the year 1916 when 50 candidates sat for the examination. The number of candidates that appeared for the two examinations held in 1930 was 153. Compared with the number of candidates for other examinations, this increase in the

entries for the examination for the B Com degree during the period of fifteen years appears to be very small, as will be seen from the following table —

Year	No of candidates for the degree of		
	B A	B Sc	B Com
1916	780	55	50
1930	1,494	933	153

It would appear from a study of these figures that either graduates having the B Com degree are not much in demand or that the initial salary offered to this class of graduates and their prospects are not such as to attract many students. The statistics regarding the other Universities in India also show that the B Com degree has not much attraction for youths at our universities (*vide* Annexure B)

753 Besides preparing students for the University examination, the Sydenham College of Commerce arranges from time to time for special courses of evening lectures being delivered at the college on subjects of interest to those engaged in banking. Among the subjects dealt with are banking, banking law, stock exchange securities, foreign exchanges and bankers as lenders. These lectures are open to bank employees and others either free of charge or on payment of a small fee.

#### GOVERNMENT COMMERCIAL INSTITUTE, CALCUTTA

754 The Government Commercial Institute in Calcutta also imparts education in banking by courses of evening lectures. As early as 1906 the Calcutta University recognized Banking and Currency as special subjects for the M A degree in Economics. It has also since instituted a Bachelor of Commerce degree, the syllabus for which covers Accountancy, Auditing, Banking and Currency, Business Organization, Inland and Foreign Trade, Transport and Commercial Law. This is followed by the M A degree in Commerce, which requires a higher form of training in these subjects.

#### OTHER INSTITUTIONS

755 In some of the University centres, such as Bombay, Calcutta and Lahore, certain commercial institutions affiliated to the Universities prepare students for the degrees instituted by them. For instance, the Universities of Lucknow, Allahabad, Punjab and Agra which have during the last decade instituted the Commerce degree, have made arrangements to prepare students for the degree courses, which include Banking. At Lahore the Hailey College of Commerce and Economics has recently been

established more or less on the model of the Sydenham College of Commerce in Bombay. The Madras University has a faculty of commerce and has made provision for a degree in commerce, but there are no arrangements for preparing students for the degree in any of the constituent or affiliated colleges. Provision is, however, made by the University for a post-graduate course extending over a year leading to a diploma in Economics and Banking, and Co-operation and Rural Economics form an important part of the diploma course. It is in our opinion desirable that in every University there should be some arrangements for the training of students at recognized institutions for the degree courses.

### ELEMENTARY INSTRUCTION IN COMMERCIAL SUBJECTS

756 In nearly all the provinces commercial subjects are included among the optional subjects for the examinations held at the end of the secondary school course. Most of the commercial schools provide courses in shorthand, typewriting, book-keeping, banking and commercial geography, but a few have a larger variety of courses. There is a Government Commercial Institute at Madras and also at Calcutt. There is also a School of Commerce at Vizagapatam, which prepares students for the Government Technical Examinations in shorthand, book-keeping, theory and practice of commerce, banking and commercial geography. In the year 1926 the Government of Bombay started two commercial secondary classes attached to the ordinary secondary schools at Bombay and Broach and instituted the Government Commercial and Clerical Certificate Examination. For the training of students for this examination they recognized several private institutions also. About the same time the Indian Merchants Chamber, Bombay, instituted the examination for a diploma in Commerce, similar to the Certificate of the London Chamber of Commerce. In the syllabus of studies for both these examinations banking occupies an important place. In Bengal, apart from the University commercial classes, the most important commercial institution is the Government Commercial Institute, Calcutta. Several important changes have taken place in the Punjab during the last few years. The Institute of Commerce, Lahore, was closed and in its place a two years' training class was started for matriculates at the Central Model School. Pre-matriculation classes were closed and post-matriculation classes opened at Amritsar, Jullundur, Lyallpur, Multan, Jhang, Sialkot, Ambala, Rohtak and Ludhiana. In the province of Delhi there are seven commercial classes attached to Secondary Schools and the Commercial High School has been recognized by the Secondary Board of Education. In the United Provinces and in Bihar and Orissa there are very few commercial schools, in the Central Provinces and Assam there is none.

## ACTIVITIES OF THE INDIAN INSTITUTE OF BANKERS.

757 Recently the Indian Institute of Bankers has entered the field of banking education. The Institute was established in the year 1928 with the following among other objects —

- (1) To encourage the study of the theory of banking and for that purpose to institute a scheme of examinations and to give certificates, scholarships and prizes
- (2) To promote information on banking and kindred subjects by lectures, discussions, books and correspondence with public bodies and individuals
- (3) To collect and circulate statistics, and other information relating to the business of banking in India
- (4) To maintain a library consisting of works on banking, commerce, finance, political economy, and kindred subjects
- (5) To print and publish such newspapers, periodicals, books, or leaflets as the Institute may consider advisable

758 It is the aim and intention of the Council of the Institute that it should develop and function on lines similar to those of the English Institute of Bankers, the activities of which are mainly educational. The Institute has already inaugurated an annual 'Associate Examination'. The examination was held in April 1930 at no less than 43 centres. The number of entries for Part I of the Institute's Examination was 954 and for Part II 191, the number of successful candidates being 421 and 114 respectively.

759 The standard of this test is intended to be in all respects equal to that of the examinations held by the English Institute. While, however, the examinations conducted by the latter are mainly adapted to the needs of bankers in Great Britain, the examinations of the Indian Institute will closely conform to the needs of bankers in India. There is no reason why Indian youths living in India and working in Indian institutions should now read for the examinations of institutions outside the country, when there are ample arrangements for such studies and examinations in India.

760 In England most of the banks give a grant towards the expenses of the tuition of their employees reading for the Associate examination, and they also give substantial rewards to those who pass the examination. In some of the banks the names of such employees are taken out of the routine staff list and filed in a special list marked "for promotion". Similarly, in India importance will no doubt, be attached to the professional qualification which the Associate certificate implies. The examinations of the Institute are already recognized by some of the banks and it is intended that a high standard of examination shall be maintained.



761 It is necessary to add that the Institute merely holds examinations. It is not a teaching body. It does not maintain any school or staff for teaching, nor does it give any grant-in-aid to any educational institution for conducting classes. The conduct of examinations is not, however, the only branch of the Institute's activities. In addition, it arranges for a series of lectures being given by experts on various subjects of interest to bankers, particularly with a view to assisting members in their studies for the Associate examination. To keep the members in different parts of India, Burma and Ceylon in touch with the activities of the Institute, a journal is issued every quarter and is supplied free of charge to all members. Besides furnishing information relating to the affairs of the Institute, the journal contains articles by important persons in the world of finance. Facilities for reading and studying literature on banking, finance and kindred subjects have been provided by the establishment of libraries and reading rooms for members at Bombay and Calcutta. A nucleus of a library has also been formed at Madras. It is the aim of the Council to open additional centres at important places and to provide similar facilities at such centres. The number of members is now over a thousand and is steadily increasing. Thus within a short time after its establishment the Institute has extended its activities in different directions, and it gives promise of being a powerful factor in the banking system of the country particularly in the sphere of banking education. We have only one suggestion to offer for the extension of its activities. It is, in our opinion, desirable that arrangements should be made by the Institute for University lectures and courses of instruction at different centres in the subjects included in the curriculum of the Institute.

#### CO-ORDINATION OF EFFORT BETWEEN BANKS AND EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTIONS

762 No co-ordination of effort exists at present between the Universities and the banks in India. The Universities do not appear to have devoted much thought to the question of giving their commercial courses a more practical turn than is the case at present. On the other hand, banks do not appear to attach much value to the theoretical instruction in banking given in the Commercial schools and colleges, nor do they provide facilities for supplementing such instruction by practical training. A few banks give facilities to students preparing for the examination of the English Institute of Bankers, but this is rather to enable the students to be admitted to the examinations than to train them with a view to recruitment in the service of the banks.

763 As a rule banks in India do not provide any special facilities for the training of boys in banking business. Judging from the

information available to the Committee, with the exceptions of the Imperial Bank of India and the Peoples Bank of Northern India, there is no bank in the country that has a definite scheme for training young men in banking business with a view to recruitment in the bank's service. Under the Probationers' scheme of the Imperial Bank of India, preference is given to candidates who have obtained the degree of Bachelor of Commerce, to graduates of a recognized University of the United Kingdom or India, to persons who have passed the examination of the Institute of Bankers in England, Scotland, Ireland or India, and to those who have had previous banking experience. Facilities for training are given to selected candidates. Staff officers have in the past been largely recruited in England, but such posts are now to an increasing extent being filled by promotion. It may be noted, however, that some of the witnesses have complained that the process of Indianisation of the superior staff has been far too slow.

The Scheme of the Peoples Bank of Northern India is designed to select suitable candidates for employment with a view to their being trained in the theory and practice of banking. The selected candidates are required to join the school maintained by the bank. After a time they are again examined and the final selection is made.

764 It is the opinion of some that the practical training received by employees in a bank in the course of their employment meets all the requirements of the bank and that it is not particularly necessary to institute theoretical courses of study in banking in schools and colleges. Some of the witnesses have, however, expressed the opinion that the development of banking has been hindered owing to the paucity of Indians trained in the theory as well as in the practice of banking. Owing to lack of co-ordination between the banks and the educational institutions there are at present, on the one hand, many men trained in banks in the business of banking but devoid of sound general education and sufficient knowledge of the theory of banking, so that they are not considered fully qualified to hold posts of bank manager or assistant manager. On the other hand, there are graduates well versed in theory but devoid of practical knowledge, who are not readily taken up by banks.

765 It has been suggested that the Institute of Bankers should serve as a liaison between the banks and the Universities in connection with the training of youths in banking. Close co-ordination of effort is essential on the part of the Universities, the banks and the institutions engaged in imparting or promoting banking education (1) to make the courses practical, (2) to provide for practical training, and (3) to arrange for the employment of trained youths in the banks. In these directions there is much scope for useful work for the Institute of Bankers. For instance,

it can make useful suggestions to the Universities concerning the courses of studies and may approach educational institutions and secure their co-operation in arranging courses of lectures of special interest to bank employees. It may also arrange to receive inquiries from its members for suitable candidates for vacancies in their banks and pass on such enquiries to the educational institutions concerned. We approve of the suggestion.

### HIGHER TRAINING OUTSIDE INDIA.

766 Generally speaking, higher training outside India is not necessary for youths aspiring to a successful career as bankers. It appears to be the general opinion that there are better opportunities for bank probationers and bank assistants to get a sound training in this country than in England. An Indian student passing the examination of the London or the Indian Institute of Bankers, with a few years' practical training in India, would, it is stated, be better qualified for, and prove more efficient in, the discharge of his duties than one who works in a branch office of a London bank and returns to India with the idea of having received special training outside India. An Indian apprentice in an English Bank would not ordinarily have the opportunity to get an insight into higher banking problems. He would be more or less employed on routine work, and the knowledge gained cannot be of material assistance to him in his future career. The best results could only be obtained if practical knowledge and experience were combined with theoretical study. It would, however, be desirable, if it could be arranged, to send young Indians possessing high qualifications after they have had a good preliminary training in banks in India for the study of advanced banking, especially for the practical study of international exchange and other subjects connected with currency and exchange in exchange banks abroad. A note of warning may, however, be sounded. Deputing recruits of mediocre ability for the study of banking in foreign countries would serve no useful purpose. Only students possessing high qualifications and having good practical banking experience would be able to take real advantage of such studies, provided they were given adequate facilities.

767 It is suggested that, should it be found difficult to secure for Indians adequate facilities for such advanced studies in foreign banks abroad, Government might make special arrangements for such training and that exchange banks doing business in India should be required to provide the necessary facilities in return for the business facilities they enjoy in India. It is also suggested that scholarships should be given by Government and by banks to employees of banks proceeding to Europe for such studies.

## STUDY OF THE INDIGENOUS BANKING SYSTEM

768 The practical training of youths desiring to take up indigenous banking as their profession begins early in the form of indigenous bankers. It is held by some that such training leaves little to be desired. Others, however, are of opinion that a knowledge of the theory and broad principles of banking would be decidedly an advantage to such bankers. It has, therefore, been suggested that banking and commerce should be introduced as an additional subject in secondary school classes. The Central Provinces Committee recommend the addition of banking and commerce as an optional subject in the vernacular and Anglo-vernacular middle schools and high schools so as to enable sons of bankers and moneylenders to acquire knowledge of modern methods of banking.\* We recommend that, wherever possible, instruction should be given in secondary schools in elementary accounting, discount, co-operative principles and elements of banking and that the subjects should be taught systematically wherever introduced.

769 The All-India Co-operative Institutes' Association consider that the Indian Institute of Bankers should arrange, in different important centres, for courses of lectures in the vernacular of the community to which the local indigenous banker belongs and to hold special examinations, on the result of which certificates could be awarded. They are inclined to believe that it is possible that such an arrangement would attract the sons and relatives of indigenous bankers who would like to have some theoretical grounding in their profession in their own vernacular, in addition to the practical training that they might be receiving in their own *pedhi* (office). The suggestion is one worthy of consideration by the Institute.

770 It is also suggested that a paper on banking should be set at the vernacular final examination and that there should be some arrangement for the continuance of the study of indigenous banking beyond the high school course. We are not in favour of this suggestion, nor do we recommend the proposal that a special chair for the subject of indigenous banking may be instituted in the universities. There is at present no chair even for modern banking and it would be idle to press for a chair for indigenous banking at this stage. Moreover, there are hardly any special features of indigenous banking that could be taught with advantage at the Universities.

771 An interesting suggestion has been made by the Managing Governor of the Imperial Bank of India that sons of the indigenous banking families may be encouraged to join joint-stock banks. Asked whether the competition between indigenous bankers and

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\* Central Provinces, para 2134

joint-stock banks would not militate against the proposal, he stated that in spite of competition such an arrangement should be feasible. We are of opinion that, if possible, it would be very desirable to introduce such an arrangement, as it would accelerate the process of modernizing the methods of indigenous banking while retaining its identity.

### STUDY OF CO-OPERATIVE BANKING

772 One of the principal complaints heard from the supporters as well as the critics of the co-operative movement is in regard to the lack of understanding of the principles of co-operation among the general body of members of co-operative societies and the scarcity of trained men for employment on the staff of co-operative organizations. The remedy suggested is "teaching, more teaching and still more teaching." It has, no doubt, long been the policy of the co-operative departments in the different provinces to train members in the principles of co-operation and rural finance, but almost all the Provincial Committees have pointed out that a good deal remains to be done in that direction. We desire to emphasize the need for such education and training on an extended scale.

773 There are some facilities for education in co-operative banking in the existing system of secondary and university education in the country. For instance, co-operation is included in the Economics course for the B.A. degree and for the B.A. Pass and Honours courses. Most of the Universities prescribe a special paper or papers on co-operation for the examination for the degree of Master of Arts. It is also an optional subject for the Intermediate course. There is, however, no regular school or college where training in co-operative finance and banking is imparted, although in the Economics departments of some of the Universities agricultural economics and co-operative banking have been receiving increased attention. The curricula for the examination for the degree of B.Com. and other commercial examinations and for the Associate examinations of the Indian Institute of Bankers do not specifically include co-operative banking. It has been suggested that considering the importance of this branch of banking, particularly to this country, it should find a place in the curriculum of studies for the examination of the Institute of Bankers, at least as an optional subject. We commend this suggestion for the consideration of the Institute.

774 In the Sindenham College of Commerce of Bombay a separate paper is set to candidates aspiring for service in co-operative banks. The Bombay Provincial Co-operative Institute also holds an examination for the Banks' Officers' Diploma. Candidates

\* *V. de* Reports of the Townsend Committee (paragraph 51), of the Linlithgow Commission (paragraph 373), and of the Provincial Banking Enquiry Committees (Bombay, paras 208 and 209, Madras, para 340, Punjab, paras 151 and 152, and Bihar and Orissa, para 291).

for the co-operative bank managers' and bank inspectors' examinations, conducted by the Provincial Co-operative Institute, Bombay, have to undergo a course of practical training at the Provincial Bank and its affiliated institutions for which facilities are provided by these banks. Apprentices are entertained by this Bank and also by some other banks. It is believed that this system has proved useful in training junior workers for all grades of co-operative institutions. The Institute holds classes for these examinations and has established three co-operative schools in Gujerat, Maharashtra and the Kainatak where among other courses special courses are arranged for preparing candidates for the posts of central co-operative banks' inspectors and urban co-operative banks' secretaries.

775 In Madras also arrangements have been in existence for the last three or four years for imparting training in co-operation. There are at present seven training centres at work. The one in the city of Madras is attached to the Government School of Commerce and admits only graduates, preferably those who have graduated in economics. Besides this institution, there are six training schools in the mofussil which provide shorter courses in the same subjects and admit for training not only graduates and intermediates, but also those who hold the secondary school leaving certificate. We understand that the syllabus now in force is undergoing revision and that co-operative production and co-operative marketing have been included in the new syllabus. The activities of these institutions are co-ordinated by a Central Committee consisting of a representative from each of the training institutions, and two educational experts co-opted by them, with the President of the Provincial Co-operative Union and the Registrar of Co-operative Societies as ex-officio members. The Government of Madras bear the entire cost of the institute in the city and subsidize the mofussil institutes, besides lending the services of a few departmental officials to teach some of the subjects. The Madras Provincial Co-operative Bank trains 3 or 4 apprentices every year for higher appointments in co-operative central banks or district federations. Some of the district co-operative federations, are arranging to have with the aid of a Government subsidy, peripatetic instructors who would go round lecturing to the villagers singly or in small groups.

776 The Madras Committee suggest\* that the difficulty of finding persons to carry on the business of co-operative sale societies may be mitigated by introducing closer study of the marketing of agricultural produce in the co-operative training institutes in the mofussil and in the Central School in Madras. It is not essential that such persons should be trained in the technical methods involved in growing the crops but, it is urged, they must be taught

and, if possible, given practical training in the technicalities of trade in the country and also in the methods which have been successful in organizing co-operative marketing in other countries. We approve of this suggestion and recommend that closer study of marketing of agricultural produce may be introduced in the co-operative training institutes. The co-operative institutes can do a great deal to assist marketing by investigating through their permanent staff marketing conditions and by collecting statistics of prices of produce and cost of production.

777 The report recently published on the system of training co-operative officers in the Punjab and the United Provinces contains interesting details concerning the training classes conducted at Gujdaspur and Lyallpur in the Punjab and at Partabgarh in the United Provinces. The main object of the training class for inspectors at Gujdaspur is to impart thorough knowledge in the theory, law and practice of co-operation, rural economics and other allied subjects, to those who seek employment in the co-operative department and to equip them fully for rural reconstruction work. Since 1918 candidates have been selected from members of the notified agricultural tribes (who are generally M A 's or graduates with first class honours in Economics or in Agriculture) as it is considered that in propaganda and in missionary and educational work an intimate acquaintance with the life of the cultivators and the artisans, who are to be approached, and sympathy with their outlook is essential. The candidates receive a course of intensive teaching in Rural Economics and Law and Theory and Practice of Co-operation, Banking and Finance. A terminal examination is held, the standard of which corresponds to that of the examination for the M A degree of the Punjab University. Just after the terminal examination candidates are sent to the central banks to study their methods of working and account-keeping. A permanent inspector is also required to attend the Rural Economy class at Lyallpur for a month. He must continue his studies as long as he is in service. Refresher courses are annually held in cycles of Assistant Registrars. An inspectress has been appointed to work among the women of the province. Classes are also held for the training of candidates for the posts of sub-inspectors.

778 In the United Provinces of Agra and Oudh also there are training classes for officers. The period of instruction, which is both theoretical and practical, lasts for about six months. After the completion of the training at Partabgarh candidates are placed under cycle inspectors for practical training for a period of three months. Rural reconstruction is an important item in the syllabus and a refresher course is also arranged for, as in the Punjab.

779 We recommend that co-operative educational institutions should be established in each province. The subjects, which amongst others will have to be studied, are co-operative education,

propaganda, progressive farming methods, banking, accountancy, rural economy, marketing methods and rural industry. We feel that there is need for an All-India Co-operative College also for higher study of co-operation and allied subjects and research work. The Provincial and the Central Co-operative Colleges should not be Government institutions. The question of their establishment should be left to organizations conducted by co-operators themselves, though Government may assist them by means of grants. In this connection we invite attention to the recommendations made by the Royal Commission on Agriculture in India in paragraphs 376 and 389 of their Report regarding the provision of facilities for the study of co-operative developments in India and abroad.

780 As regards recruitment of the staff, the co-operative banks generally prefer B Coms or G D As and those who have passed the examinations held by the Co-operative Institutes. It has been suggested by the All-India Co-operative Institutes' Association that appointments should be made on the result of a competitive examination, which should be specially held for the purpose once a year by the Association at different centres and that arrangements for the practical training of the selected candidates should be made in co-ordination with the Registrars of Co-operative Societies and the Provincial Co-operative Banks. We consider it necessary that officers of co-operative central and provincial banks should have received full training at, and passed the examinations of, the co-operative educational institutions mentioned above and that this should be an essential condition governing the recruitment of the staff of officers.



## ANNEXURE A

## I—Commercial Schools by Provinces in the year 1928-29

Province	Schools	Number of pupils
Madras . . .	44	1,682
Bombay . . .	32	1,801
Bengal . . .	32	1,942
United Provinces . . .	4	203
Punjab . . .	12	328
Burma . . .	11	491
Bihar and Orissa . . .	13	363
Central Provinces . . .		
Assam . . .		
Delhi . . .	1	256
British India	149	7,069

## II—Commercial Colleges by Provinces in the year 1928-29

Province	Colleges.	Number of pupils
Madras . . .		
Bombay . . .	1	283
Bengal . . .	4	486
United Provinces . . .	1	748
Punjab . . .	1	82
Burma . . .		
Bihar and Orissa . . .		
Delhi . . .		
	7	1,599

*Statement of candidates who offered themselves for the B A , B Sc , and B Com degrees.*

Name of University	Class	1916	1917	1918	1919	1920	1921	1922	1923	1924	1925	1926	1927	1928	1929	1930
1 Bombay	B A															
	B Sc															
	B Com	780 55 50	1,201 77 75	1,393 75 91	1,825 102 106	1,470 121 83	1,268 121 55	1,205 180 52	1,138 206 57	1,204 316 77	1,437 422 96	1,781 560 129	1,515 711 133	1,475 772 129	1,523 870 99	1,194 933 153
2 Calcutta	B A															
	B Sc															
	B Com															
3 Allahabad	B A															
	B Sc															
	B Com															
4 Punjab	B A															
	B Sc															
	B Com															
5 Lucknow	B A															
	B Sc															
	B Com															
6 Agra.	B A															
	B Sc															
	B Com															

## CHAPTER XXVII.

### SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS

781 Before proceeding to summarize our recommendations we should like to emphasize that all our recommendations are based on the fundamental assumption indicated in paragraph 16, namely that the administration of the provinces and the central Government would be wholly in the hands of ministers fully responsible to the respective legislatures

782 We now summarize our recommendations as follows

(1) In order to provide Government with the information it requires to pursue a progressive and constructive agricultural policy, a Provincial Board of Economic Enquiry should be established in each province (Paragraph 73)

(2) Attempts to relieve prior indebtedness may be usefully made in localities where co-operative land mortgage banks exist and the further establishment of these banks should be encouraged where there is reasonable prospect of their successful working having regard to all the local conditions (Paragraph 87)

(3) To satisfy the credit requirements of the large class of agriculturists who are outside the co-operative movement and to provide substantial loans to big land-lords, Provincial Land Mortgage Corporations on a joint-stock basis or on the model of the English Land Mortgage Corporation are necessary (Paragraph 87)

(4) A scheme of debt conciliation on a voluntary basis is recommended for the consideration of local Governments (Paragraph 91)

(5) The case for a simple Rural Insolvency Act should be considered in every province. Certain special provisions in the Act are also suggested (Paragraph 93)

(6) The Governments concerned should also explore the possibility and desirability of undertaking other legislation to secure the settlement of debts on a compulsory basis (Paragraph 94)

(7) The Punjab Regulation of Accounts Act (1930) is commended to the other provincial Governments for consideration (Paragraph 116)

(8) The Usurious Loans Act (1918) is capable of being worked to the advantage of the debtors in many provinces and should be retained and a special report on the working of the Act should be included in the Annual Reports on the Administration of Civil Justice (Paragraph 116)

(9) Provisions similar to the following provisions in the English 'Money-lenders' Act are recommended for introduction in India by legislation in regard to money-lenders as defined in the Punjab Regulation of Accounts Act, 1930 —

(a) No amount shall be charged by the money-lender for expenses, incidental to or relating to the negotiations for or the granting of a loan by a money-lender. If it is found necessary to permit the money-lender in India to recover certain classes of expenditure from the borrower, these should be clearly specified in the legislative enactment

(b) The enhancement of interest for default in repayment should be illegal

(c) No contract for the repayment of money lent by a money-lender shall be enforceable if there is no note or memorandum in writing of the contract made and signed by the borrower or if it is proved that the note or memorandum, mentioned above, was not signed before the money was lent (Paragraph 122)

(10) Money-lenders should be induced to join co-operative societies on the condition that they cease lending privately to the members of such societies (Paragraph 123)

(11) Where complaints about Pathan money-lenders are common and no proceedings can be taken against them under the ordinary law, Government should take action under Section 3 of the Foreigners' Act or under some special legislation, and deport such money-lending Pathans as are found to be a menace to society. (Paragraph 123)

(12) Courts should be empowered to dismiss cases brought before them by money-lenders for recovery of sums due from borrowers in distant districts in cases where the borrower is made to sign a promissory note stipulating that the loan shall be repaid in any of the several districts mentioned therein (Paragraph 123)

(13) Such indigenous bankers as are engaged in banking proper or are prepared to shed their business other than banking should be eligible to be placed on the approved list of the Reserve Bank in the same manner as joint-stock banks. The Reserve Bank should prescribe a standard which indigenous bankers must satisfy before they can be given the concession recommended. Such indigenous bankers should also agree to have proper books of accounts kept in the usual recognized manner and to have them audited annually by recognized auditors. These books of accounts should also be available to the Reserve Bank for inspection and audit. Such of the indigenous bankers whose deposits do not exceed five times their capital should, during the first five years of the working of the Reserve Bank, be exempt from the rule relating to compulsory

deposits At the end of that period it would be left open to the Reserve Bank to take such action in the matter as it may consider necessary in order to make its credit policy effective (Paragraph 139 )

(14) Institutions receiving rediscount facilities from the Reserve Bank should not charge to the public rates which, in the opinion of the Reserve Bank, are unduly high (Paragraph 141 )

(15) Facilities for remittance of funds at the same rates as are charged to all joint-stock banks should be given to indigenous bankers who are included in the schedule of member-banks of the Reserve Bank (Paragraph 142 )

(16) The benefits of the Banker's Books Evidence Act should be extended to such indigenous bankers as are placed on the approved list of the Reserve Bank (Paragraph 142 )

(17) The proposals in paragraphs 137 to 142 should apply equally to money-lenders who satisfy all the conditions prescribed for indigenous bankers (Paragraph 143 )

(18) The adoption of a more liberal policy by the Imperial Bank of India and other joint-stock banks in granting facilities to the large number of indigenous bankers whose principal business is not banking, or who do not take to banking as their principal business as soon as a Reserve Bank is established, is commended for the sympathetic consideration of these banks (Paragraph 144 )

(19) The co-operative primary societies should serve as savings banks for their members and promote thrift (Paragraph 155 )

(20) The present legal provision in section 19 of the Co-operative Societies' Act (1912) giving to the society a prior claim is not satisfactory The prior claim should be converted into a first charge (Paragraph 155 )

(21) The proposal that central banks should lend to societies at concessional rates sums up to the extent of the reserve fund in deposit with them is recommended for the consideration of the authorities concerned (Paragraph 155 )

(22) Central banks should start a bad debt fund and carry a reasonable amount of profits to that fund, in addition to the statutory allocation to Reserve Funds (Paragraph 157 )

(23) Provincial banks should continue to be bodies incorporated under the Co-operative Societies' Act The executive head of a provincial bank should be a thoroughly trained banker with competent knowledge of the principles and practice of co-operative credit (Paragraph 159 )

(24) Provincial banks should not deal directly with primary societies but should consolidate and strengthen their position as financing agencies and balancing centres for central banks (Paragraph 159 )

(25) The Co-operative Societies Act should be amended so as to provide for the registration of societies on an All-India character or societies operating in more than one province (Paragraph 161 )

(26) The ordinary co operative credit societies should confine themselves to dispensing short-term and intermediate credit, long-term credit can be provided only by land mortgage banks (Paragraph 165 )

(27) In order to popularize the co-operative movement and to promote a sense of responsibility among the members of the society, the official control that now exists in certain provinces should be slackened (Paragraph 168 )

(28) The need for carefully scrutinizing the economic purpose of the loan and the repaying capacity of the borrower in dispensing co-operative loans is strongly emphasized. Exemptions from repayment should be given only in circumstances of exceptional difficulty and any tenderness in dealing with the defaulting members should be avoided. Repayments of loans should not be restricted to the same period for all debtors but should be fixed according to the special needs of individual borrowers (Paragraph 170 )

(29) It is strongly recommended that the non-official leaders of the co-operative movement and the officials of the co-operative department should make special efforts in promoting special type societies (Paragraph 171 )

(30) A special scheme of audit is recommended for the due discharge of the statutory functions of audit imposed on the Registrar (Paragraph 173 )

(31) The introduction of the normal credit system in co-operative primary societies is recommended (Paragraph 174 )

(32) Granting credits on current account and cheque transactions should be introduced wherever possible (Paragraph 174 )

(33) Certain suggestions for a reduction in the present rates of interest charged by co-operative primary societies are recommended for the consideration of Provincial Governments and non-official co-operators (Paragraph 176 )

(34) If a rural society charges its members a rate higher than 12 per cent per annum, it should form the subject of careful enquiry by the Provincial Government and the provincial bank concerned and steps should be taken to reduce the rate of interest (Paragraph 176 )

(35) Special steps should be taken for the efficient and adequate training of both the official and non-official co-operative staff. Endeavours should be made to secure trained secretaries for the societies (Paragraph 179 )

(36) If the *panchayat* of a society should advance loans in excess of the limits prescribed by the bye-laws of the society or otherwise, they should be held personally liable as guarantors of the loan and the rules under the Act should, if necessary, be amended accordingly (Paragraph 179)

(37) Generally speaking, central banks should operate over fairly large areas with a good number of societies affiliated to them (Paragraph 179)

(38) The management of a central bank should be in accordance with businesslike and co-operative principles and there should be full-time secretaries and managers of the best character well-versed in banking and co-operation (Paragraph 179)

(39) The importance of cash credit and overdraft facilities being generously given by the Imperial Bank of India on proper co-operative paper satisfying the standards prescribed by the bank is emphasized (Paragraph 181)

(40) Free remittances of funds for co-operative purposes is of the utmost importance to the co-operative movement and no attempts should be made to curtail those privileges under the rules of the Government of India in this matter (Paragraph 182)

(41) As regards remittance facilities for other than co-operative purposes co-operative banks should be entitled to the same privileges as joint-stock banks (Paragraph 182)

(42) Loans against produce to members of co-operative societies are of great economic benefit to the cultivators and the encouragement of such loans, subject to storage accommodation being available and subject also to the provisions of the bye-laws of these societies, is recommended (Paragraph 185)

(43) When the co-operative movement requires State aid in any exceptional circumstances the State should continue to give temporary aid sufficient to enable the societies to tide over the crisis (Paragraph 187)

(44) When a Provincial Government is satisfied that for meeting the needs of the co-operative movement in exceptional circumstances or for the development of the agricultural industry it is necessary to make loanable capital available to the co-operative banks, the provincial Government should, with the concurrence of its legislature, place at the disposal of the provincial co-operative bank such loans as may be necessary to meet the requirements of central banks and primary societies (Paragraph 189)

(45) Contributions from Government funds to the expenses of the co-operative movement in backward tracts and among the backward classes should be continued and increased (Paragraph 189)

(46) In order to ensure the supply of cheap and adequate credit to agriculture, certain provisions should be made in the Reserve

Bank Act for linking up the co-operative banks with the Central Bank of the country (Paragraph 191 )

(47) Profits of co-operative societies should be exempt both from income-tax and super-tax (Paragraph 195 )

(48) The exemption of co-operative societies from payment of income-tax and super-tax on earnings from investments in public securities or land mortgage debentures to the extent such investments are necessary for the purpose of their fluid resources and for the investment of reserve funds as prescribed by the rules is recommended (Paragraph 196 )

(49) No money should be advanced by co-operative land mortgage banks which is not economically profitable to the borrower and loans should be devoted to the principal objects specified (Paragraph 218 )

(50) The amount and period of loan should be fixed with due regard to the repaying capacity of the borrower and also to the purpose for which the money is advanced. Loans might be granted for a stated purpose and for stated periods and for the present the maximum period should be 20 years. With sound management the bank should be able to extend the period to 30 years if necessary. Until more experience is gained the amount of individual loan should be limited to a maximum of Rs 5,000 and in no case should the amount of the loan exceed 50 per cent of the value of the mortgaged security (Paragraph 219 )

(51) The repayment of loans should be by a system of equated payments, but if local conditions require, a system of graduated payments may be adopted, so as to provide for repayment by larger instalments commencing after the investment of the loan on land has resulted in increased profit (Paragraph 220 )

(52) The working capital of the co-operative land mortgage bank should be derived from share capital and debentures. The share capital should be raised by deduction of 5 per cent of the amount borrowed by members at the time the loan is advanced. In order to ensure the supply of the initial resources wherewith to start the operation of the mortgage bank, it is recommended that the provincial Government should, where necessary, make advances free of interest under a stipulation that the advances should be repaid out of the realizations of the debenture issues. If larger share capital is required with the development of the banks the supply of such share capital by provincial banks is commended for their careful consideration (Paragraph 221 )

(53) The proportion of the debenture to the share capital should be left to the discretion of the co-operators in each province but in no case should the value of debentures outstanding exceed the outstanding amount under mortgages given by the borrowers and over which the debenture-holder has a floating



charge The interest on debentures should be guaranteed by the Provincial Governments for the whole period of their currency. (Paragraph 221 )

(54) Debentures, the interest on which is guaranteed by Government, should be included among trustee securities provided Government is satisfied that adequate arrangements have been made by the bank for the redemption of these debentures at regular intervals (Paragraph 221 )

(55) If in any province it becomes necessary and appears to be more advantageous for the movement that the Government should purchase debentures of certain value such form of State assistance is recommended (Paragraph 221 )

(56) The debentures should be issued by a central institution called the Provincial Land Mortgage Corporation and the actual sale of debentures should be made not only by the Provincial Corporation but also by primary land mortgage banks which may be called the district mortgage banks (Paragraph 222 )

(57) The district mortgage banks should operate over fairly large areas and must not be too small (Paragraph 222 )

(58) The district mortgage banks should be entitled to obtain the necessary finance from the provincial land mortgage corporation against a transfer of the mortgage securities which should be available to the latter for issuing debentures (Paragraph 222 )

(59) Provincial co-operative banks should not function, except as a temporary measure, as central land mortgage banks for the province but there is no objection, until the Provincial Land Mortgage Corporation is established in a province, to the provincial bank financing the primary land mortgage banks with long-term capital specially raised for the purpose (Paragraph 222 )

(60) When an application to a land mortgage bank is made by a member who is also a member of a credit society, the opinion of the credit society should ordinarily be obtained in regard to the advancing of the mortgage loan, though the responsibility regarding the ascertainment of the financial standing of the applicant and the grant of the loan must rest with the land mortgage bank (Paragraph 223 )

(61) The primary land mortgage banks and the co-operative credit societies should work entirely apart and the transactions of the two should not in any way be mixed up (Paragraph 223 )

(62) The land mortgage bank should be given the power of foreclosure and sale without recourse to civil courts subject to certain safeguards (Paragraph 225 )

(63) The amendment of the insolvency law so as to give greater protection to the land mortgage bank against avoidance of mortgage by the unsecured creditors of the insolvent is recommended (Paragraph 226 )

(64) From a purely banking point of view the removal of all impediments to the free transfer of lands is desirable. It is recognized that other considerations are involved and it is recommended that Provincial Governments and their legislatures should properly weigh the various considerations in shaping their policy (Paragraph 228)

(65) An alteration in the Land Alienation Acts so as to give co-operative land mortgage banks right to take possession of land through foreclosure on default of the payment of the instalment of the loan and to sell it is recommended (Paragraph 228)

(66) The development of well organized joint-stock land mortgage banks for the benefit of the numerous classes of landowners who cannot be adequately served by the co-operative credit organizations is recommended (Paragraph 235)

(67) Normally loans for improvement should be spread over a period of years and only in cases where the amount advanced is very small or the improvement effected is very temporary should the repayment be required within a shorter period (Paragraph 238)

(68) Provincial Governments should take steps to minimize delays in the disposal of applications for *takavi* loans and to lessen the opportunities for illegal gratifications. Officers distributing *takavi* loans should be of some standing and should be on the lookout for cases of illegal exactions (Paragraph 240)

(69) Where funds are insufficient, advances might be restricted to a smaller number of recipients whose need is the greatest and their requirements might be satisfied in full (Paragraph 240)

(70) Loans should be given on a more liberal acreage rate than at present (Paragraph 240)

(71) Any laxity in realizations of *takavi* loans is not approved though liberal suspensions and remissions when necessity arises is favoured (Paragraph 240)

(72) Dates of repayment should be fixed with due regard to the dates of harvest. Cattle loans should be repaid, if necessary in two instalments instead of one, and similarly the recovery of loan advanced in times of distress should invariably be effected in more than one instalment (Paragraph 240)

(73) When joint bonds are taken the amount due from each individual borrower should be entered separately in the bonds, every attempt should be made to realize from each individual the amount so shown, and joint liability should be enforced only as a last resort and should even then be apportioned as fairly as possible (Paragraph 240)

(74) Steps should be taken to remove the general ignorance about the credit facilities available under the Land Improvement and the Agriculturists Loans Acts and the procedure to be followed in securing these facilities (Paragraph 241)

(75) The definite policy of agricultural improvements and famine protection followed in the Byapuri District in the Bombay Presidency is recommended for adoption elsewhere with suitable agencies for advice, guidance and supervision (Paragraph 241)

(76) The attention of provincial Governments is drawn to the recommendations of the Royal Commission on Agriculture and of the Provincial Banking Enquiry Committees for examining and suggesting to cultivators the possibilities of agricultural improvement (Paragraph 241)

(77) In backward tracts where the cultivators are not fitted to exercise the rights of transfer of land and where co-operative credit societies cannot be successful and also in areas which frequently suffer from defective distribution of rainfall and water supply the free availability of facilities under the Agriculturists Loans Act is strongly recommended (Paragraph 241)

(78) The operation of the Agriculturists Loans Act should be generally restricted to relief of distress (Paragraph 242)

(79) The attention of Government is drawn to the weighty observations made by the Indian Famine Commission, 1901, regarding the policy to be followed by Government in the matter of granting loans under the Agriculturists Loans Act and the Land Improvement Loans Act (Paragraph 243)

(80) The grant of advances under the two Acts should not replace the assistance for famine relief (Paragraph 243)

(81) It is inadvisable to use the co-operative agency to advance loans to non-members on the responsibility of the society for their recovery and their proper application. There is, however, no objection to Government using the co-operative societies as agents for distribution (Paragraph 245)

(82) An extension of the system of advances by joint-stock banks against precious metals including ornaments is supported. (Paragraph 252)

(83) The recommendations of the Bengal Provincial Banking Enquiry Committee in regard to loan offices are generally approved with certain minor modifications (Paragraph 257)

(84) The appointment of a special officer by the Bengal Government for the first few years at least of the working of the proposed Loan Offices Act in order to supervise and give sympathetic guidance to the loan offices is recommended (Paragraph 258)

(85) The Government of Bengal and the provincial legislature should examine Mr N R Sarker's note on the question of the position to be occupied by the loan offices hereafter in the Indian banking sphere (Paragraph 260)

(86) The enactment of a special provincial legislation to deal with *Nidhis* and Chit Funds in Madras with certain detailed provisions is recommended (Paragraph 264)

(87) The recommendations of the Royal Commission on Agriculture in India and the various Provincial Banking Enquiry Committees for improving and organizing agricultural marketing are supported (Paragraph 272 )

(88) The establishment of co-operative sale societies wherever there are reasonable chances of their successful working is recommended. Such societies should not only purchase their members' produce outright, but should also continue the present practice of acting as agents to producers for the sale of their produce. They should deal only with the produce grown by the members except in any particular locality where the society is competent to deal with non-members' produce (Paragraph 275 )

(89) In their own interest merchants and traders should take all steps that are possible to use liquid goods in their possession for getting cheaper accommodation from banks (Paragraph 279 )

(90) Provincial Governments should consider the desirability of advancing long-term loans at concessional rates of interest to co-operative societies to build godowns in centres which provide good markets (Paragraph 280 )

(91) The question of providing warehouses by private agencies and licensing them, and the provision of capital for their construction, should be taken up by Provincial Governments, the efforts of the Provincial Governments in this matter being co-ordinated by the Imperial Council of Agricultural Research (Paragraph 281 )

(92) A detailed investigation of the problem of starting railway warehouses in the chief centres of trade should be undertaken by the Railway Board and the railways should be asked to start experiments at selected centres (Paragraph 282 )

(93) With a view to encouraging private enterprise to provide and work warehouses in the vicinity of railway stations certain modifications in the terms of the lease suggested by the Railway Board are recommended (Paragraph 282 )

(94) The placing of railway receipts by the legislature on the same footing as bills of lading is recommended. It is further recommended that railway receipts should be made negotiable and that the railway authorities should issue instructions that the receipt should give as full a description as possible of the goods covered by it (Paragraph 283 )

(95) Proposals for the establishment of Provincial Marketing Boards should be examined by Provincial Governments in connection with the creation of regulated markets by provincial legislation as recommended by the Royal Commission on Agriculture. (Paragraph 284 )

(96) The activities of the Provincial Marketing Boards may be usefully co-ordinated by the Imperial Council of Agricultural Research (Paragraph 285 )

(97) Certain points are mentioned for consideration in connection with a proposed scheme for the establishment of a corporation for stabilizing jute prices. It is recommended that the Governments concerned should examine the matter and introduce an arrangement which may be suitable for all interests affected (Paragraph 286 )

(98) It is recommended that the local Governments concerned should take prompt steps for the fixation of proper standards of jute (Paragraph 287 )

(99) The establishment of Chambers of Agriculture on a provincial or regional basis is recommended (Paragraph 289 )

(100) Provincial Governments should not hesitate to make advances to co-operative banks at concessional rates of interest for the development of co-operative sale societies (Paragraph 293 )

(101) Provincial Governments should devote their earnest attention to the development of cottage industries (Paragraph 301 )

(102) The establishment of co-operative institutions to finance rural industries on a larger scale than at present and the study of German experience in the field of co-operative organization for small industries and small traders and retailers are recommended (Paragraph 307 )

(103) State assistance in connection with propaganda and education and provision of funds for the movement, if required, are also recommended (Paragraph 307 )

(104) The recommendation of the Provincial Banking Enquiry Committees to establish licensed warehouses and co-operative wholesale depots for storing and sale of products of cottage industries is supported (Paragraph 309 )

(105) The extension of the activities of the Arts and Crafts Emporium at Lucknow is supported (Paragraph 310 )

(106) Proposals for the enactment of State Aid to Industries Acts in the Provinces other than Madras and Bihar and Orissa on lines similar to the Acts in those two Provinces are recommended to the Provincial Governments for their consideration (Paragraph 311 )

(107) The establishment of limited liability co-operative societies generally known as urban banks, wherever necessary facilities and conditions exist, for the benefit of the middle-class people small traders and shopkeepers and salaried classes is recommended (Paragraph 317 )

(108) Certain detailed recommendations regarding area of operation, share capital, management, business, advances, etc., of the co-operative urban banks are made (Paragraph 319)

(109) The employers should in their own interest give greater attention to the provision of credit facilities for their employees and should also take more part in the supervision of co-operative societies started for their benefit. They may assist the co-operative organizations by effecting recoveries of loans by deductions from wages (Paragraph 320)

(110) The establishment of mortgage institutions similar to the city mortgage institutions in Germany for extending to cities the principle of *Landschaften* in agricultural areas is recommended (Paragraph 321)

(111) Any technical difficulties in the way of Government communicating acceptances of tenders to contractors and to their financing banks or bankers and payment of all monies due to the contractors through these banks and bankers should be removed (Paragraph 322)

(112) An attempt should be made to make industrial enterprise in India less dependent on the managing agency system for future development and to establish direct friendly relations between industrial companies and commercial banks (Paragraph 353)

(113) In connection with the issue of shares and debentures of industrial companies such of the existing commercial banks as are well established and carry on their ordinary banking business on the safest and soundest lines might with advantage to the industries follow, as far as possible, the German system, the Imperial Bank of India making a start in this direction and giving a lead as soon as the Reserve Bank comes into being (Paragraph 391)

(114) With the co-operation of banks, the deposits now taken from the public by the cotton mill industry should be replaced by share or debenture capital as soon as possible (Paragraph 393)

(115) Banks in India may establish useful liaison between themselves and industries by appointing one of their Managing Directors or Managers as one of the Directors of the industrial concerns financed by them (Paragraph 395)

(116) The appointment of Local Advisory Committees in banks by the Board of Directors with functions of a purely advisory character is recommended (Paragraph 396)

(117) If a provincial Government in the discharge of its responsibility for the development of industries within its territories finds it necessary to ensure the supply of financial facilities to industrial concerns a Provincial Industrial Corporation with branches, if necessary, should be established (Paragraph 401)

(118) The advisability of giving assistance to any particular industrial concern should depend on the extent to which the

enterprise will be of benefit to the public and will add to the productive power of the province and provide employment for its people (Paragraph 401)

(119) The Provincial Industrial Corporation should obtain its share capital as far as possible from the public, Government taking such portion as cannot be raised by public subscription (Paragraph 402)

(120) The share capital of the Corporation should be supplemented by debenture capital not exceeding at the outset twice the amount of the share capital (Paragraph 403)

(121) Government might, if necessary, purchase a portion of the debenture issue of the Provincial Corporation until a regular market has been created for them and also offer a limited guarantee of interest on debentures (Paragraph 404)

(122) The question of classing debentures of the Industrial Corporation among trustee securities should be examined by Government in due course (Paragraph 405)

(123) The Industrial Corporation should specialize in the provision of long-term capital to industries which should continue to obtain their working capital from existing institutions (Paragraph 406)

(124) The Corporation may take long-term deposits for not less than 2 years. The period of loans issued from such deposits should be based upon the period of currency of the deposits (Paragraph 406)

(125) Government should be entitled to be represented on the Board of Directors of the Industrial Corporation during the continuance of Government interest in and liability for the concern. (Paragraph 407)

(126) Should a Provincial Government desire, the Government Director may be entitled to ask for a reference to the Government if he does not agree with the views of the Board in regard to important matters such as increase or reduction of capital, granting of loans in any particular cases and appointment of chief officials of the Corporation (Paragraph 407)

(127) By-laws should be framed by the Corporation defining the conditions under which financial facilities may be granted by it to industrial concerns. These by-laws should require the sanction of Government so long as Government have interest in the Corporation (Paragraph 408)

(128) The enactment of provincial legislation on the lines of the Madras State Aid to Industries Act to provide credit facilities to new and nascent industries or industries newly introduced into an area of cottage industries is recommended (Paragraph 418)

(129) Any Government assistance in regard to provision of capital under such legislation should be given through the Industrial Corporation if and when one is established in any province on the lines suggested (Paragraph 408)

(130) The suggestion that exchange banks should consider the possibility of changing their present custom to the extent that they should be prepared to accept the import bills instead of purchasing them in the same way as house paper of a London export house is now accepted by them is commended for the careful consideration of the exchange banks (Paragraph 430)

(131) If Indian importers find it convenient to have the exporters draw on them in rupee bills, the exchange banks should co-operate and encourage their efforts in this direction (Paragraph 430)

(132) The Exchange Banks' Association should consider the advisability of consulting commercial bodies in all cases of changes in the rules of the Association (Paragraph 442)

(133) Exchange banks should take steps to remove the existing grievances regarding payment of drafts held by the banks for collection (Paragraph 444)

(134) It is suggested that exchange banks, in consultation with representatives of the Indian Insurance Companies, should arrive at some understanding similar to that between the Imperial Bank of India and the insurance companies (Paragraph 445)

(135) All non-Indian banks wishing to do banking business in India should be required to take out a licence from the Reserve Bank. Licences should be freely granted to banks already established. Every licence should be in force for a stated period and should be automatically renewed if the licensing authority is satisfied that the provisions of Indian law applicable to the banks and other conditions specified in the licence are complied with (Paragraph 451)

(136) The conditions of the licence should be the following —

- (1) Furnishing to the Reserve Bank annual statements showing their assets and liabilities relating to the Indian business as prescribed by the Reserve Bank from time to time
- (2) Submission for a few years to come, at any rate, to some prescribed authority in India, preferably the Reserve Bank, periodical reports of Indian and non-Indian business handled by them
- (3) Other conditions imposed on basis of reciprocity (Paragraph 451)

(137) The appointment of Local Advisory Boards at each branch of the exchange banks is supported (Paragraph 471)



(138) The exchange banks should consider the introduction of a scheme of probationary assistants in their banks on the model of the Imperial Bank of India scheme (Paragraph 474 )

(139) Such of the Indian joint-stock banks as are well established should open foreign connections useful to their clients (Paragraph 482 )

(140) On the establishment of the Reserve Bank and the simultaneous withdrawal of the restrictions now imposed on the transactions of foreign exchange business of the Imperial Bank of India, the latter should be induced to take an active share in the financing of India's foreign trade. For this purpose a definite arrangement between the Reserve Bank and the Imperial Bank for a period of five years or such other period as the Reserve Bank may consider desirable for utilizing the Imperial Bank as agents of the Reserve Bank on terms to be settled between the two banks is recommended (Paragraph 483 )

(141) If the Reserve Bank finds it impossible to arrive at a satisfactory settlement with the Imperial Bank of India or finds that within the stipulated period the Imperial Bank is unable to participate actively in the financing of India's foreign trade the establishment of an Indian Exchange Bank is recommended (Paragraph 485 )

(142) The lines on which the new Indian Exchange Bank should be established are also suggested (Paragraph 486 )

(143) The suggestion for the establishment of joint banks is supported and may be usefully explored by the Indian joint-stock banks and foreign banks (Paragraph 492 )

(144) It is on the whole desirable that the Imperial Bank of India should continue to be governed by a special charter with suitable amendments (Paragraph 529 )

(145) We recommend that the Reserve Bank may place, for the first five years, with every new branch opened by an approved joint-stock bank at a centre where there is no joint-stock bank, a deposit of such sum on such terms and conditions as it may consider necessary (Paragraph 530 )

(146) Any bank desiring to open a new branch in India should obtain the approval of the Reserve Bank before doing so. Licences should be freely granted to the already established branches and the licensing authority should see that the provisions of the law and any conditions specified in the licence are complied with (Paragraph 545 )

(147) The opening of sub-offices or part-time branches in small centres contiguous to places where there are regular branches of banks, is recommended for the consideration of banks (Paragraph 546 )

(148) The suggestion that banks in India should aim at combining the efficiency of the European system of banking with the economy of indigenous bankers is commended for the consideration of the management of banks (Paragraph 547)

(149) The development of any banking business by Postal Savings Banks other than that supported in chapter XXIV is not recommended at this stage (Paragraph 548)

(150) No obstacles should be put in the way of mergers among smaller joint-stock banks by stamp duties or taxation, and any existing obstacles in this direction should be removed (Paragraph 549)

(151) Banks in India generally should adopt, as far as possible, and consistently with safety, a more progressive policy in the matter of granting clean advances on the personal credit of borrowers (Paragraph 555)

(152) The problem of pooling information in regard to customers and organizing a suitable system of collecting reliable information should be studied by the banks and the Bankers' Association proposed by us (Paragraph 555)

(153) Steps should be taken, as early as possible, to remove the impediments which now stand in the way of immovable property belonging to a Hindu or Muhammedan family being accepted by banks as a normal security. It is left to the Governments concerned and the legislatures to weigh the various considerations involved and determine what action should be taken in the matter (Paragraph 562)

(154) The provisions of Section 58(f) of the Transfer of Property Act should be extended to other important centres of trade and commerce (both internal and port towns) throughout India (Paragraph 563)

(155) The Negotiable Instruments Act should be amended so as to provide that cheques originally drawn to bearer would, despite any endorsement, retain their character as bearer instruments. The recommendation that any holder of a cheque should have the right to alter the character of the cheque from "bearer" to "order" on the face of it and that the alteration should be supported by the name of the drawer or holding endorser who makes the alteration is approved. *Hundis* which are drawn in the form of cheques should be treated similarly (Paragraph 564)

(156) The legal position as regards trust receipts should be investigated by the legal advisers of Government and such action taken as may be considered necessary (Paragraph 565)

(157) The cost of internal remittance in India should be reduced as far as possible (Paragraph 566)

(158) When the Reserve Bank is established, its published rate should be the minimum rate at which it is prepared to buy or rediscount first class trade bills and promissory notes arising out of *bona fide* commercial or trade transactions of member banks and bankers. The Reserve Bank may, at its discretion, charge a higher rate for demand loans against authorized securities. Should the Reserve Bank find it necessary to discount the paper of the public without bank endorsement, it should consider whether it should not in the first few years at any rate charge a higher rate of discount to the public than that charged to member banks and bankers. (Paragraph 593)

(159) A suggestion for reducing charges for discounting bills in certain cases is commended for acceptance by banks. (Paragraph 593)

(160) The abolition of the stamp duty on bills of exchange is recommended. The recommendation should be given effect to within a period of five years and as an initial step the stamp duty on all bills of less than one year's usance should be reduced to a uniform rate of two annas per one thousand rupees. (Paragraph 593)

(161) We commend for the consideration of the Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry certain suggestions made for developing the bill market in India. (Paragraph 593)

(162) The suggestion that in places where *hundi* business is important an expeditious procedure for disposing of suits based on negotiable instruments should be introduced, on the lines of Order XXXVII of the Civil Procedure Code, is endorsed. (Paragraph 593)

(163) It is recommended that banks should take the initiative in the matter of encouraging usance bills for the finance of village bankers by *shroffs* by suggesting this method to *shroffs* seeking accommodation from them. (Paragraph 597)

(164) The suggestion that further experiments may be made in the establishment of licensed warehouses in select localities is supported. (Paragraph 599)

(165) The introduction of bills in place of open account credits is recommended for the consideration of all parties concerned. (Paragraph 600)

(166) A Central or Reserve Bank should be created at the earliest possible date. (Paragraph 605)

(167) Additional provision should be made in the Reserve Bank Bill enabling the bank to make loans and advances on the security of movable goods, wares and merchandise as well as against the warehouse warrants or warehouse receipts representing such goods. (Paragraph 607)

(168) The Reserve Bank may be permitted to purchase, sell and rediscount rupee import bills (Paragraph 608)

(169) If the limit prescribed in the Reserve Bank Bill for the holding of agricultural bills of maturity longer than 3 months is at any time less than the share capital of the Bank, the total face value of such bills may, at the discretion of the Bank, go up to the amount of the share capital (Paragraph 609)

(170) The period of six months for agricultural bills in the Reserve Bank Bill may be extended to 9 months (Paragraph 610)

(171) The Reserve Bank should be permitted to act as agents for any Indian States that may desire to utilize its services (Paragraph 611)

(172) If any securities were issued with the guarantee of Government both for capital and interest, the question of including them in the list of securities eligible for purchase and sale by the Reserve Bank should be considered (Paragraph 611)

(173) The limit of the powers of the Reserve Bank to borrow money should be extended to the amount of the share capital and the Reserve Fund of the Bank (Paragraph 611)

(174) The Reserve Bank bill should provide for the concessions recommended in paragraph 120 to indigenous bankers (Paragraph 613)

(175) An all-India Bankers' Association should be inaugurated as early as possible and should include as members the joint-stock banks, the exchange banks, the Imperial Bank of India and the indigenous bankers. There should be two kinds of membership, full membership open to banks and bankers enjoying rediscount facilities from the Reserve Bank, and associate membership open to the rest of the bank and banker (Paragraph 620)

(176) The existing arrangements under which there are more Exchange Brokers' Associations than one at the same centre are undesirable and all engaged in exchange broking should have an association at each centre (Paragraph 623)

(177) Pending the establishment of the Reserve Bank, it is suggested for the consideration of Government that efforts should be made to obtain more complete statistics for the various classes of banking institutions and to publish them as early as possible (Paragraph 627)

(178) The limit for savings bank deposits in the accounts of minors may be raised (Paragraph 645)

(179) (a) Persons having post office savings accounts should be allowed to operate on these accounts, and to make deposits by means of cheques (Paragraph 646)

(b) Accounts may be opened jointly in the name of two persons payable to either or survivor (Paragraph 646)

(c) Depositors may be allowed to name nominees to whom the payment of deposits should be made in the event of death (Paragraph 646)

(180) The holder of a postal cash certificate should be allowed to nominate a person to whom the amount may be transferred in the event of death (Paragraph 647)

(181) The issue of savings certificates payable in gold, as recommended by the Royal Commission on Indian Currency and Finance, 1926, is supported in principle (Paragraph 649)

(182) The issue of a new type of gold certificate, called 'sludhan certificate', is supported in principle (Paragraph 650)

(183) Facilities afforded by the post office to investors for the purchase and sale of Government securities and for their safe custody may be extended to small investors generally and not confined to those who are savings bank depositors (Paragraph 652)

(184) The reduction of charges for the purchase and sale of securities, collection of interest, safe custody and other services incidental thereto, is supported in principle and commended for the consideration of banks (Paragraph 653)

(185) Existing banks and their branches, including co-operative banks and other financial organizations, may render useful service by undertaking the work of buying and selling stocks and securities for their customers on a commission basis (Paragraph 655)

(186) Transfer duty on debentures may be reduced to a uniform duty of 4 annas per cent (Paragraph 657)

(187) Insurance companies, Indian as well as non-Indian, should be required by law to lodge an initial deposit with Government and to invest, and keep invested, a fixed proportion of their premia funds in approved Indian securities (Paragraph 660)

(188) (a) Facilities for payment of land revenue by cheque may be extended to taluka sub-treasuries and district treasuries

(b) All material payments by Government should be made by cheques. The proposals made by the Bengal Committee on the subject are commended for the consideration of Government

(c) All municipalities and other local bodies should be asked to consider the feasibility of making and accepting payment by cheque on account of salaries to some of their employees, and other items of receipts and disbursements (Paragraph 665 )

(189) The formation of National Savings Associations in all provinces is supported in principle (Paragraph 667 )

(190) The passing of a special Bank Act is recommended (Paragraph 673 )

(191) Foreign banks should be brought within the purview of the Act to the extent indicated in the report and provided for in the Act (Paragraph 673 )

(192) Members of the all-India Bankers' Association should be allowed to affix to their names the appellation, 'Member of the Bankers' Association' (Paragraph 682 )

(193) Firms and companies using the term 'bank' or its equivalent and desiring to be incorporated under the Act should make adequate provisions in the Memorandum and Articles of Association regarding the following matters

- (i) Prohibition of activities other than banking (Paragraph 692 )
- (ii) Powers of directors regarding registration of transfers of shares (Paragraph 699 )
- (iii) The period during which a member should have held shares of a banking company before being entitled to take part in its proceedings at a meeting (Paragraph 700 )
- (iv) Prohibition of loans on the security of a banks' own stock (Paragraph 709 )
- (v) Limitation of loans to directors, managers and members of the staff of the bank (Paragraph 710 )
- (vi) Borrowing powers of Directors of a bank (Paragraph 712 )
- (vii) Qualifications, appointment, retirement, and voting powers of Directors and Officers of banks (Paragraph 713 )
- (viii) Holding of proxies by officers and employees of a bank, the admissibility of a general form of proxy and the maximum period of its duration and validity (Paragraphs 714 and 715 )
- (ix) Voting power of individual shareholders (Paragraph 716 )

(x) Validity of votes tendered at the poll (Paragraph 717)

(xi) The period within which the Director's report and the balance sheet should be posted to the shareholders (Paragraph 731)

(194) An existing company using the title 'bank' or its equivalent, other than banks registered under the Indian Co-operative Societies Act or under any special charter or enactment and banks registered under laws of other countries, should arrange to conform to the provisions of the Act within five years of the passing of the Act (Paragraph 682)

(195) Any bank, Indian or non-Indian, wishing to do banking business in India should be required to take out a licence from the Reserve Bank. Licences should be freely granted to the already established banks. The licensing authority should see that the provisions of the law and any other conditions specified in the licences are complied with (Paragraph 684)

(196) The following provisions should be made in the Act —

(i) Every institution doing banking business in British India other than a foreign bank should have a majority of natural born or domiciled Indian directors (Paragraph 689)

(ii) No new bank, other than a foreign bank, should be allowed to operate in British India unless it has a majority of Indian shareholders and is incorporated under the Indian law (Paragraph 690)

(iii) Organization of a bank on the Managing Agency system should be prohibited (Paragraph 693)

(iv) A joint-stock bank with limited liability registered under the Act should not commence business until its paid-up capital is at least Rs 50,000. Its authorized capital should not be more than double the subscribed capital and the paid-up capital should not be less than 50 per cent of the subscribed capital before commencement of business (Paragraph 695)

(v) There should be a separate index of the names of members of a banking company for ready reference and inspection by shareholders (Paragraph 697)

(vi) Institutions doing banking business in India should be required to keep a separate register of shares owned by non-nationals (Paragraph 698)

the Bank Act requiring  
in two months of the date  
presented to the bank whether  
accepted or not (Paragraph

fees and charges should be  
Joint-Stock Companies of  
which has branches. (Para-

movable property acquired  
should (Paragraph 702 )

should be recorded before the  
)

, the paid-up capital, and  
2½ per cent of a bank's  
taken before distribution of  
(Paragraph 704 )

member of a firm of auditors  
should (Paragraph 711 )

a mortgage or charge on  
any part thereof should  
712 )

bank should be rendered  
material facts in their re-  
turn of the accounts of the

of a bank in addition to the  
passed at a general meeting  
invalid unless fixed or con-  
(Paragraph 721 )

balance-sheet of a bank should  
(Paragraph 730 )

off and if full provision is  
in figure of loans and ad-  
should be given after  
the provision. If provision  
balance of doubtful debts not  
be shown as indicated in  
balance sheet (Paragraph

valuation of securities should  
and not be in excess of cost



or market price, whichever is the lower (Paragraph 729 )

(xix) Banks should display a copy of their entire balance-sheet in lieu of the statement in Form G and should continue to display it until the next following statement is published (Paragraph 732 )

(xx) The annual general meeting of a bank should be held not later than three months after the close of the year (Paragraph 734 )

(xxi) A temporary moratorium on the recommendation of the Reserve Bank to prevent untimely and compulsory liquidation of a bank which is in difficulties should be permitted (Paragraph 735 )

(xxii) In the case of voluntary liquidation of a bank, the appointment of a liquidator should be made by or with the approval of the Board of Directors of the Reserve Bank (Paragraph 739 )

(xxiii) Provision for safeguarding the interests of creditors in the case of compulsory liquidation on the lines of the (English) Companies Act, 1929, is suggested (Paragraph 740 )

(xxiv) The Act should provide for the appointment of committees of inspection in the case of compulsory as well as voluntary liquidation of a bank (Paragraph 741 )

(xxv) It should be incumbent on every seller of banks' shares to give the actual numbers of the shares at the time he sells them (Paragraph 748 )

(197) Regulations of loans by banks should be left to the discretion of the management and the control of the board of directors (Paragraph 708 )

(198) It should be one of the functions of the Reserve Bank to lend its advice and co-operation in cases of amalgamation or reconstruction of banks which are in difficulties (Paragraph 736 )

(199) There should be some arrangement under which the Indian creditors of a non-Indian bank taken into liquidation should have a prior claim on its assets in India and should also share in the general distribution of its assets outside India should there be a shortage in the assets held in India (Paragraph 743 )

(200) In every University there should be some arrangements for the training of students at recognized institutions for the

courses of degrees in commerce instituted by them (Paragraph 755 )

(201) The suggestion that arrangements should be made by the Indian Institute of Bankers for University lectures and courses of instruction at different centres in the subjects included in the curriculum of the Institute is commended for the consideration of the Institute (Paragraph 761 )

(202) If it could be arranged, young Indians possessing high qualifications should after they have had a good preliminary training in banks in India, be sent abroad to study advanced banking, especially international exchange and other subjects connected with currency and exchange (Paragraph 766 )

(203) Wherever possible, instruction should be given in secondary schools in elementary accounting, discount, co-operative principles and elements of banking and the subjects should be taught systematically wherever introduced (Paragraph 768 )

(204) The suggestion that the Indian Institute of Bankers should arrange, in different important centres, for courses of lectures in the vernacular of the community to which the local indigenous banker belongs and to hold special examinations, on the result of which certificates could be awarded may be considered by the Institute (Paragraph 769 )

(205) Sons of the indigenous banking families should be encouraged to join joint-stock banks (Paragraph 771 )

(206) The question of inclusion of co-operation in the curriculum of studies for the examination of the Institute of Bankers, at least as an optional subject, is commended for the consideration of the Institute (Paragraph 773 )

(207) Closer study of marketing of agricultural produce should be introduced in the co-operative training institutes. (Paragraph 776.) -

(208) (a) Co-operative educational institutions should be established in each province. The subjects to be studied should include co-operative education, propaganda, progressive farming methods, banking, accountancy, rural economy, marketing methods and rural industry

(b) There should be an All-India Co-operative College for the higher study of co-operation and allied subjects and research work

(c) The Provincial and the Central Co-operative Colleges should not be Government institutions, but should be left to organizations conducted by co-operators themselves, though Government may assist by means of grants (Paragraph 779 )

(209) Officers of co-operative, central and provincial banks should have received full training at, and passed the examination of, the co-operative educational institutions mentioned above and this should be an essential condition governing the recruitment of the staff of officers (Paragraph 781)

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 PURSHOTAMDAS THAKURDAS \*  
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 M JAMAL MAHOMED  
 \* ABDUL QAIYUM

V K ARAVAMUDHA AYANGAR—*Secretary*

R P MASANI—*Joint Secretary*

2nd June 1931.

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\* Subject to a minute of dissent.  
 \*\* Subject to two minutes of dissent  
 \*\*\* Subject to observations printed below

## Minute of Dissent by Mr. V. Ramadas Pantulu

## THE INDIGENOUS BANKING SYSTEM

1 It is with the utmost diffidence that I venture to give expression in this minute to my views on the future development of indigenous banking. I fully realise that my colleagues have bestowed much thought to the problem, evinced considerable desire to develop indigenous banking and made very helpful recommendations in that behalf. The representatives of the Indigenous bankers themselves do not seem to have asked for much more. My task therefore becomes all the more difficult to justify the necessity for this minute. But I felt that I would be failing in my duty if I did not give expression to my strong conviction that the question of placing the indigenous banking system as a whole on sound, stable and solid modern foundations cannot be satisfactorily solved by the mere provision of facilities, however valuable they may be to individual private bankers, selected for special treatment by the Reserve Bank or the Imperial Bank. There is too much of personal element in it and too little of system. The success of the scheme must in the long run depend not upon the survival of a few individual bankers to take advantage of it but upon the reorganisation of the indigenous banking classes so as to bring them into the banking system of India.

2 I admit that the establishment of the Reserve Bank and the provision for the indigenous bankers (who satisfy certain prescribed standards) being put on the Reserve Bank's list of banks eligible for discounting and rediscounting facilities and the Imperial Bank giving certain facilities such as using them as agents for collection of bills and cheques and discounting their bills more freely, will to a certain extent improve the position of some of the indigenous bankers and increase their contact with the joint stock banks and the money markets. But I feel that these arrangements by themselves will not help to develop indigenous banking system as a whole and arrest the decay that has already set in into the working of that system. I am of opinion that there is need, as well as scope, for reform of a larger magnitude and more far reaching character. I have from the outset of the enquiry felt that something could be done to confer on the indigenous banker, who carries on pure banking, the legal status of a banker *qua* banker with the privileges and responsibilities attaching to such status. I can see no difficulty from a banking or legal stand-point to bring family partnerships of indigenous bankers, as well as individual bankers, with requisite resources, within the scope of the Bank Act recommended by the committee. It should surely not be difficult to fix standards of eligibility for registration as bankers and to frame a set of banking regulations which are suitable to the peculiar conditions of such partnerships and bankers. I do not see why a bank should always be associated with the joint stock and the dividend. Transform the private banker into an "indigenous banker" func-

tioning under the law governing banks and bankers in this land, create a recognised field for indigenous banking as an honourable profession and make it an integral part of the country's banking system. That should be part of our plan to build up our modern banking structure on indigenous foundations and to supplement the joint stock and co-operative effort in the banking sphere.

3 "The adaptation of indigenous banking system to modern requirements" is a phrase of which one hears a great deal, but what its precise implications are and what the means whereby it can be accomplished are matters on which very little light has hitherto been forthcoming. The present enquiries both by the Provincial Committees and the Central Committee, have however thrown a certain amount of light on the activities of indigenous bankers and the role which they may play in Indian Banking Organisation in the future. These bankers present a bewildering variety. According to the census of 1921 the number of "bankers" was about 1,461,000 and included "Bank managers, moneylenders, exchange and insurance agents and money changers". Perhaps for the first time in the history of Indian banking, the attempt is made to give a more restricted and technical meaning to the words "indigenous banker", obviously with a view to separate those whose main, if not sole, business is banking from those who are primarily moneylenders or traders or land owners doing some banking and to bring the bankers proper, to the extent possible, into the banking organisation of the country. In the Committee's scheme, those who shed trade and other business which they at present combine with banking and confine themselves to banking, that is to say, receive deposits, make advances and discount hundies and bills, are marked out for special treatment. Eligibility for such treatment is however not restricted to recognised classes of private bankers such as Chetties, Multanies or Maiwarees but is conferred on all classes of people, provided they elect to engage themselves in banking proper and conform to certain conditions and standards. This is perhaps as it should be having regard to modern tendencies in social evolution. Notwithstanding the fact that the designation "indigenous banker", thus no longer carries with it implications of a hereditary or traditional occupation it does carry with it a notion of historic continuity of the *system of banking*, which has long served the people of this country well and truly and which still serves them very largely, though not as efficiently as the altered conditions of our social economy require. The designation has acquired a new connotation in the report and will soon gain new currency. The joint stock banks owned and managed by Indians and the co-operative banks which were imported into India from the west and planted on Indian soil, which has fortunately proved congenial, are also indigenous in a sense. They are not foreign. So are the loan offices and Nidhis and chit funds for whose development on lines suited to the people served by them we have recommended special legislation. In any scheme of banking reform for India all these parts of Indian banking organisation should be brought together.

4 The question then is can indigenous banking be developed along side with the Indian commercial and co-operative banks? Is there room for it? Is there need for it? Before answering these questions it must be first ascertained whether there is any indigenous banking left in the country to be developed. This task has been admirably performed by the provincial banking committees who have collected and marshalled valuable material regarding the organisation, methods of business and capital of the indigenous bankers and the vast extent to which internal trade, commerce and agriculture are still financed by them. Our report summarises these details. On the materials on record I am unable to share the view that the extinction of the indigenous banker is a matter of time and will quickly follow in the wake of the expansion of commercial and co-operative banks. As regards the resources of the indigenous bankers which are made available to the economic development of the country, they still constitute the bulk of the capital of all the credit agencies put together. The External Capital Committee who enquired into the available capital resources of the country say that the indigenous banking system "fulfils valuable functions in affording credit facilities and it will be required to fulfil them for a long time to come. Every endeavour should therefore be made to utilise it and to fit it into the modern banking system which is being developed in rural areas." If the borrowing policy of the Government specially short-term borrowing, undergoes a change the resources of the indigenous bankers which are dwindling will be greatly improved. It may be as that committee points out that the "indigenous system is in itself incapable of development to an extent that would satisfy the banking requirements of the country." That is why we are developing commercial and co-operative banking also. So much for resources.

5. As for human material the findings of the Provincial Committees generally speaking are that there is still plenty of traditional knowledge and skill available and that the members of these banking classes are known for their honesty, business habits, resourcefulness and aptitude to earn and save money. A certain number of them are said to work at present on largely modern lines and transact all kinds of business which the ordinary joint stock banks do, including the issue of pass books and cheque books. It is further stated that the system of banking pursued by the better class of these bankers is suited to the commercial and financial genius of the people, their local requirements, habits, customs, and traditions. In any scheme to link up the private banker with the general banking organisation of the country we can of course accept only those who confine themselves to banking proper and do no trade. (Sinha's Early European Banking in India, page 236.) These facts are helpful to show that there is promising material in the country on the foundation of which one wing of the superstructure of the modern banking system of the country can be built. (See Early European Banking in India, page 236.)

6 There is thus room for indigenous banking system and for its development. I shall now set out my reasons for the view that

there is also a clear need to re-organise our indigenous system of banking on modern lines, in addition to developing commercial and co-operative banks. The following are my reasons —

- (i) I agree with my colleagues that both the multiplication of sound joint stock banks with branches penetrating into the interior and the spread of co-operative credit movement, so as to serve the bulk of the rural and urban population, will take a very long time. Indeed the laissez-faire policy of the Government under which the joint stock banks get no assistance or encouragement and the serious encroachment on the sphere of finance of internal trade by powerful foreign banks react adversely on the growth of joint stock bank. So the displacement of indigenous banking is not the right policy. Re-constructing it on modern lines is more helpful.
- (ii) I consider that while the development of banking in India should undoubtedly be adapted to modern conditions it cannot be wholly achieved by a mere slavish imitation of the English Joint Stock Banks' model. I agree with the following observation of a recent writer on Banking in India: "Commercial banks alone will not create the needed credit for our agricultural and nascent manufacturing industries. That the Indian Joint Stock Banks have borrowed, copied and translated the chief features of the English banks is an undisputed fact. \* \* Like the English banks they wish to trade largely on credit. \* \* The superficial elements alone have been copied while the really vital and progressive features of English banking have not been engrafted on our system." (*Vide* Rau's *Present Day Banking in India*, page 379.) In this connection I also wish to draw attention to the view of Sinha regarding the unsuitability of the expensive standards of banking establishments set up by foreign bankers and copied by Indian commercial banks. He says "somehow or other people cannot think of a bank except as a lofty and spacious hall, with shining counters and a large army of clerks and peons. It is not realised that the security of a bank lies in none of these things, but in the rigorous cutting down of charges, in honesty, integrity and efficiency of management. In a vain attempt to win the confidence of the public, expenses for spectacular shows are undertaken which are not at all warranted by the volume of business." (*Vide* "Early European Banking in India", pages 222-23.) Evidence to this effect was also tendered before the Committee as mentioned in paragraph 547 of the Report.
- (iii) The savings of the people locally collected in the form of deposits by the Commercial Banks are transmitted to cities and large urban centres for more favourable investments than can be locally found. Collection of

small savings by the Government through postal savings banks and cash certificates, however beneficial the policy may be in other respects similarly starves local needs by intercepting the resources of local banking agencies. More than one Provincial Banking Enquiry Committee adverted to the fact that mofussil centres specially rural areas, suffer for want of funds, as capital raised in those areas by the banks is not made available for local requirements. Perhaps it may not be feasible to remedy this evil by imposing conditions on the Banks as to where they should invest their capital (*Vide* para 542 of the Report). That is precisely the reason for developing local banking agencies which will be more truly serviceable to the people whose savings they can mobilise to satisfy local needs. This is the fundamental claim of co-operative banks for further development and indigenous bankers can largely supplement the activities of co-operative banks in this direction. This aspect of the matter is also recognised by my colleagues in paras. 144 and 145 of the report.

- (iv) The real banking agency of the people still lies outside the modern banking organisation of the country. Agriculture, rural trade and rural industry derive their finance almost exclusively from the indigenous agency. So do small traders and handicraft industrialists in urban areas. The finance thus derived is considerable and enters very largely into the economic life of the vast rural and urban population who depend solely on it. Nevertheless the terms on which the indigenous banking agency finances the movement and purchase of produce or of imported goods and the rates of interest charged to trade and industry for accommodation are onerous and not conducive to the development of our internal trade, commerce and industry.
- (v) The evils of uncontrolled moneylending are increasing with the deteriorative indigenous banking agency of the proper kind. Moreover indigenous bankers are transferring themselves into usurious moneylenders. Unlike a banker he does not weigh each debt by itself, but balances good against bad debts and in order to earn an average return on his capital, distributes his risks on the transactions with his various clients. This operates to the prejudice of good borrowers.
- (vi) The operations of the indigenous bankers lie outside the influence of organised joint-stock banking system of the country, very little affected by the credit policy of those bankers.
- (vii) Only a small portion of the demands which indigenous bankers supply is derived from the banks and that only at times of monetary stringency or pressure. Nor do



indigenous bankers place their idle funds with the banks either as demand or time deposits. So the banks are not in a position to adequately interfere to moderate or govern the operations of private bankers dealing in credit.

(viii) Conditions for the extension of the bill market cannot be adequately created without organizing the indigenous bankers whose knowledge of local trade conditions will form a valuable basis for good trade bills.

(ix) There are thus no means available to secure for the Central Banking authority, which is expected to be set up very soon, an effective control over the credit operations of the indigenous bankers, although they admittedly form an important limb of the banking agency of the country.

7 It is my firm conviction that if the indigenous banker is put on a statutory basis by registering all those who wish to avail themselves of the provisions of the Bank Act it will impart vigour and tone to the whole system of indigenous banking and result in the better equipment of the existing indigenous banking agency to finance internal trade, commerce, industry and agriculture on terms which modern conditions demand and which ensure the economic development of the country. I agree with my colleagues that if indigenous bankers are brought within the sphere of operation of the Reserve Bank a much greater proportion of agriculturists will be benefited than if the Reserve Bank dealt with joint stock banks and the provincial co-operative banks only. These proposals will further result in bringing about a closer contact between the indigenous banking system, the commercial banks and the Central Banking authority and secure to the latter a large measure of control over the operations of the indigenous bankers who are still the largest credit agency of the country from the point of view of the funds handled. Conditions necessary for the extension of the bill market will be also forthcoming. As an enthusiast in Indian banking reform puts it, we shall have then helped to "broaden the channel between the bazar and the banks, enlarge and quicken the contact between these two elements in the Indian banking system and secure that credit operations throughout the whole system will respond to the policy of the Central Banking authority."

8 I am, however, told that indigenous bankers do not like the idea of registering themselves as bankers under the Bank Act. I do not see why they should dislike the idea. Now, lawyers, auditors, doctors, engineers and men of other professions consider it an honour and a privilege to be registered. They have acquired a status and dignity by the very act of registration under the several statutes pertaining to their professions. The registration I contemplate is not a writ of restraints but a charter of rights. If the leaders of the indigenous banking communities take up this question and popularise the idea, I have no doubt it will be enthusiastically received. It must be impressed on them that "if at this time when the general banking machinery of the country is being re-

organised, they refuse to become serviceable in the direction of establishing a real money market in the country, an attempt would be made to exclude them from the national credit economy of this country "

9 It is then asked why should they register themselves under the Act? What will they get as *quid pro quo*? I scarcely think that the question arises. According to all accounts this class is steadily losing ground. Except from limited circles of their friends and acquaintances many of them are not able to get deposits or loans for their business. The Indian Chamber of Commerce, Calcutta, have described the position very clearly. In their expressive language "The position to-day is that the indigenous bankers in India are like Lilliputians who in spite of their numbers are helpless in tackling financial problems of the country " I do not wish to dwell on the causes of this deterioration in their position or as to why they failed to develop into modern bankers as the merchant-bankers of Japan did in the wake of the economic reorganization of their country. The very fact that they carry on banking as recognised bankers and submit themselves to regulations which are framed to protect the interests of depositors and to ensure the adoption of efficient business methods will inspire confidence in the public and will enlarge their resources, and expand their business. There is a great future before them if they move with the times and adjust themselves to modern conditions and do not by their adherence to out-of-date methods court their own extinction. In this I fully share the optimism of my colleagues (para 146 of the Report)

10 If considerations of *quid pro quo* do enter into the question of this reorganization of indigenous bankers there is much to be had in that way too. Their position as bankers under the law of the land will surely entitle them to be placed on the same level as joint-stock banks in many matters like receiving money into their counters without stamping their receipts and having remittance and collection facilities on terms open not to the general public but to banks. The more prominent of them who have their offices at the provincial capitals where there are clearing house arrangements may claim membership of the clearing houses. I see no reason why bankers' lien may not be extended to them. The provisions of the Bankers Books Evidence Act will be attracted to them. If and when the joint-stock banks get any facilities for speedy determination of their claims or reduction in costs of litigation, the registered indigenous bankers will have them too. The Reserve Bank will necessarily have to make its choice, for enlistment on its roll of banks and bankers entitled to discount and rediscount facilities, from the ranks of the registered indigenous bankers. The Imperial Bank will similarly have to choose for its agency work for collection only registered bankers and so too it must offer discounting facilities only to members of that class. The associations of the registered indigenous bankers will then have a wider influence and higher prestige than those of a nebulous class. The whole organization

will thus undergo a marvellous change and a new orientation will be given to the indigenous banking system

I make these reservations in subscribing to the chapter on indigenous bankers in the hope that possibilities of banking reform on the lines indicated by me will be explored when the time comes to enact the Bank Act and the Reserve Bank Act

V RAMADAS PANTULU

## Minute of Dissent by Nalini Ranjan Sarker.

### I.—INTRODUCTORY

I am constrained to write this minute of dissent as there is, in important respects, a fundamental difference of outlook between the majority and myself. The terms of reference imposed on us, according to my understanding of their significance, the duty of investigating the entire problem of Indian banking with special regard to our national requirements. The findings of the majority are, in my opinion, markedly in the nature of a compromise. I am not in every case averse to a compromise, but as I believe that in certain respects the compromise has "overshot the mark", I feel I must state my views separately.

2 The subjects on which I found my views to be sharply at variance with those of majority, as also with those of the foreign experts, are those relating to industrial finance and the financing of foreign trade, with relevant reference to the future status and function of the Imperial Bank.

3. In regard to the problem of Industrial Finance it has been impossible for me, for reasons stated hereafter, to endorse the lukewarm attitude of the majority in support of a matter of such grave national importance. They have also omitted to refer to certain important details, which are necessary to give an indication of the line of action to those who will be responsible for the initiation of schemes of industrial banks. I have also thought it advisable to refer to the question of long term industrial credits particularly with regard to their working in other countries and in this behalf I have endeavoured to meet the objections of the foreign experts to our proposal for an industrial corporation. Again, I differ markedly both from the arguments and conclusions of the majority in regard to the financing of foreign trade. I consequently also differ from the majority in their endeavour to maintain the existing status of the Imperial Bank even if no special arrangement is made for the Banks undertaking foreign exchange business, and in this I was influenced by the fact that this bank cannot expect to have the privileges rightly belonging to a national institution so long as the majority of its shares are held by non-Indian interests.

4 Now, even assuming the full acceptance by Government of our recommendations in regard to the assistance and encouragement of Indian banking, and the imposition of the restrictions recommended by us upon foreign institutions the point should be clearly borne in mind that these alone will not be found adequate. There is yet another aspect of the problem that required to be presented. It is evident that ultimately it is left largely to the people themselves to develop their own institutions, without which no outside assistance can be completely effective. Accordingly, the initiative and support of the people should be regarded as factors of vital importance. With their confidence and co-operation,

there should be nothing to hamper the healthy development of Indian banking

5 Among the many factors that are responsible for the present backwardness of Indian banking, the lack of faith of the Indian public in our banks is one, a manifestation of the general predilection, unfortunately rather too common, in favour of things Western and against things Indian. I can, of course, appreciate the timidity to the extent that it signifies the fear of one who has slender resources which he naturally hesitates to risk by placing them in banks. But what I cannot understand is why a bank is believed to be sound simply because it is managed by Europeans and to be unsound for the sole reason that it is Indian.

6 This timidity has been accentuated by the failure of some Indian banks, of which too much is made by interested foreign concerns. No one will seek to extenuate the crimes and follies of one or two Indian banks, such as the Bengal National Bank, in the past, but these require to be viewed in their proper perspective and proportion. Mismanagement and dishonesty in banking are by no means a monopoly of Indians. On the eve of her commercial expansion, Great Britain likewise had a number of failures, but banking was borne on the high tide of economic prosperity and the nation had little difficulty in consolidating her banking system. Much the same can be said of other countries and in fact some countries even now are suffering from what may be described as an epidemic of bank failures. During the nine years 1921-1929, the bank suspensions in America numbered 5,642 involving deposits of \$1,722,486,000 while during the first eleven months of 1930 so many as 981 banks with a total deposits of \$515 million suspended business. (National City Bank Bulletin—January 1931) The phenomenon is, therefore, not peculiar to India and a few bank failures, negligible in comparison with those of other countries, should not lead to a blind preference for foreign banks. As pointed out by the Punjab Inquiry Committee, of 1913, the bank failures of that year were not due to any inherent inefficiency in Indian banking organisation nor to any incapacity on the part of Indians in managing banks, but to causes inevitable in the formative stages of banking in any country.

7 On the other hand, the facile confidence in foreign banks is often quite inexplicable. The Indian institutions issue balance sheets, which are comparatively much more informative and more calculated to give a true idea of their intrinsic position. Their head offices are situated in this country. Their meetings can be attended and any necessary information is easily obtainable. On the contrary in regard to foreign banks it is next to impossible to know their real position from their balance sheets. Their head offices are situated outside this country and most of us can have no access to them. Nor have we any means of knowing much about their directors, or what their vested interests may be. These considerations would lead one to expect an attitude of greater scepticism towards and less confidence in, foreign banks, whereas

we find the reverse to be the case. This attitude is tantamount to placing a handicap on the national and offering a bounty to foreign banking enterprise in this country. I do not wish to withhold my tribute to the efficiency of some of the foreign banks, but it is necessary to point out that efficiency is not a prerogative of foreigners.

8 My remarks are largely prompted by the consideration that the psychology of the Indian public is bound to have a vital influence on the successful development of banking in this country. This psychology which has till now shown all the characteristics of an inferiority complex, is showing signs of change, and it is necessary that we should contribute our conscious efforts to make this healthy change permanent. Failures may shake our faith in our institutions for the time, but, if our faith be not utterly lacking and moreover be supported on reason, we should be able to support our banks through their period of struggle until they get firmly established. True it is in most cases that people get what they deserve. It is certainly true of banking in India. The remedy for the existing defects of Indian banks does not lie in turning away from them but in demanding of them and assisting them to maintain a suitable standard. What is essential is an alert public opinion in regard to the methods and practices of Indian banks, not merely a critical but also an enlightened opinion. It is up to the leaders of Indian thought to rouse our people from their accustomed apathy in these matters to a better appreciation of the situation. With vigilance and sympathy on the part of the public, the possibility of failures will be greatly minimised and this in turn will serve to create greater confidence in their own countrymen to the mutual benefit of both the banks and the public. I hope, it will be agreed that I am right in thus calling attention to the need for developing a lively and enlightened public opinion in regard to Indian banking enterprise, for it is not by banking laws alone, but also by public support that Indian banking will be able to grow and thrive.

9 One of the aspects of Indian banking, on which I would like to make a few remarks in this connection is the problem of indigenous bankers the examination of which led to the recognition of the fact that they occupy an indispensable position in the financial system of the country. In the rural areas they render a valuable service to small industries and agriculture, although co-operative societies are steadily making a headway. In the urban areas too, they play an important role in financing some of the bigger industries and internal trade but there also the competition of established banks is adversely reacting on their position and importance. This was bound to happen owing to their following the old conservative methods of business. But as the United Provinces Committee have correctly observed, "they possess wide knowledge and varied experience and the world would be the poorer by their extinction." It has therefore been proposed by us to improve the status of these bankers by conferring certain privileges on them from the Reserve Bank which in effect would place them

in a more advantageous a position than that of the joint stock banks. In my opinion it should further be clearly emphasised that the purpose of these privileges is to bring them within the folds of the modern banking organisation. So far as the bigger towns are concerned banking facilities are growing through the activities of the joint stock banks. In the smaller towns, into which the banks have not extended their operations, it is highly desirable that institutions like joint stock and co-operative banks, run on the principles of corporate finance, should gradually replace the indigenous banker, wherever possible, so that banking facilities may not be dependent on the chance of the successor possessing the liberal outlook, constructive genius and business integrity of the original proprietor. I beg leave to repeat the observation made by the External Capital Committee, that "the indigenous banking system is in itself incapable of development to an extent that would satisfy the banking requirements of the country" (Report of the External Capital Committee, para 10)

## II — FINANCIAL REQUIREMENTS OF INDUSTRIES (CHAPTER XVI)

1 I am glad that my colleagues have come to the conclusion, after studying the evidence placed before us and before the Provincial Banking Enquiry Committees, that as regards initial capital for promotion of industries the existing facilities are very inadequate. They further add that the special necessity of making India more self-sufficient in respect of her requirements and less completely dependent on the precarious pursuit of agriculture makes it imperative that some steps should be taken to mobilize her resources for the promotion of new industrial undertakings and for the expansion of existing ones. In view of these two statements, with which I entirely agree, I consider the recommendation in the second sentence of para 401 as rather weak and halting.

2 I am convinced, and I have no doubt that my colleagues are also equally convinced, that the establishment of industrial banks is not only desirable but absolutely necessary. I regret that with their minds fixed on the constitutional responsibilities of the ministers in the provinces, my colleagues have been led to make their recommendation vague and perhaps misleading. For, as the recommendation now stands, it seems to imply that the case for the establishment of such institutions has still to be proved before the Provincial Minister takes any action. The Industrial Commission which considered the matter in 1918, along with various other problems relating to industries, recommended the constitution of an expert committee to consider the question of the establishment of industrial banks for financing industries in India. The Banking Committee, which is surely an expert Committee of the nature contemplated by the Industrial Commission, would be failing in its duty if it did not unequivocally press for the establishment of industrial banks in the provinces, the need for which has been emphatically pressed by all the Indian witnesses, including important chambers of commerce, and also by some of the European witnesses of the so-called conservative school. I do not think, therefore, that it will be necessary for the future ministers in the provinces, at any rate in those provinces where the Banking Committees have recommended the creation of industrial banks, to go over the same ground as we, and other Commissions and Committees before us, have traversed.

3 Assuming, in agreement with my colleagues, that it would be wasteful in provinces where industries are not sufficiently well developed to start industrial corporations for utilizing the financial facilities that may be provided by the industrial banks, I should still urge that the evidence placed before the Provincial Banking Enquiry Committees and the conclusions they have reached thereon, as also the evidence before the Central Committee, provide sufficient materials which may demand a conclusive recommendation



as to which of the provinces have an unmistakable need for an industrial corporation and which of them have not. In regard to the latter, the Governments concerned may perhaps be advised to await future developments before proceeding to inaugurate the industrial corporation such as we have in mind. But conditions in Bengal, Madras, and Bombay at least are fully ripe for the establishment of industrial banks and we shall not be justified in giving the Governments of these Provinces what seems to me the mistaken impression that the question of providing financial facilities through a specially devised institution is still an open question, calling for further enquiry. Their aim and endeavour should rather be to take up the threads where we have left them and to inaugurate the next step, namely, the creation of the financial machinery for encouraging the industrial development of the provinces.

4 I must here refer to the lukewarm support, if not positive hostility, of some of the European Chambers of Commerce and even the foreign experts, to the proposal of establishing separate institutions for industrial finance. It seems to me that there is a danger, from which even some of my colleagues on the Committee are not wholly free, of being carried away by the notion that for stimulating the development and strengthening the position of industries in India it is not essential to establish any special institution of the nature of Industrial Corporation, it being contended that the clamour for provision of special finance to industries is due to the inaptitude of the Indian people. To my mind such a contention appears to be quite unjustifiable in the light of the experience of all the industrially advanced countries of the modern world. The only notable instance of industrial enterprise which grew up without financial assistance from Government or specialized industrial banks is to be found in Great Britain. The British witnesses who have appeared before us have naturally tried to convince us of the folly and futility of devising special measures for financing industry. But it must be borne in mind that England is a singular instance of an industrial nation which has risen to eminence more or less purely on the strength of individual initiative. The conditions, in which that country was originally industrialized, were peculiar to it. It was altogether free from the intense and fierce competition to which world industry has been subject in the present century, and by the time world industry passed into this phase, Great Britain had begun to enjoy a large national surplus which was far in excess of the needs of her domestic trade and industry. Owing to the vast expansion of her trade and commerce and owing to the fact that London had become the entrepot of world trade the financial mechanism of the City had become so perfect, that the direction of the fluid resources of the country called for no special machinery or effort. In short the development of English industries was from small beginnings and gradual, and when they entered upon a period of large expansion, they found a ready and more or less efficient money market in London. Since that time, however, the conditions in which trade

and industry could flourish on a policy of absolute *laissez-faire* have not been present in any other country. It is not present even in Great Britain to-day! Under stress of modern competition and with the paramount need for rationalization, opinion in Great Britain has veered in recent times to the closer co-operation of finance and industry, secured by means of a body acting as an advisory and regulating organization between the two.

5 It is necessary, before detailing the practical effects of that change of opinion to note the harm which has been done by the attitude of unconcern adopted by banks towards the actual internal management of industry. In the case of the British cotton mill industry, it has been found that banks had been continuously making advances without any attempt to satisfy themselves that the use of those funds resulted in any appreciable improvement of the financial position of the mills concerned. The result has been that both the banks and the mills are in the slough and further accommodation has been denied just when they are needed most. The opinion of the Expert Committees appointed to enquire into the state of British industry is that if the Banks had (on the strength of the advances which they were making) acquainted themselves with the details of management and had exerted their influence in favour of the reconstruction and re-organization, the position of the industry would have been better and the banks also would have suffered loss. All this only shows that even the only country which followed a policy of *laissez-faire* and on which the "conservative school" (as the report refers to them) has relied, has later on come to grief by persisting in that policy, when it would no longer serve. That Great Britain has at length realized the wisdom of devising a closer link between banks and industry is amply demonstrated by the establishment of such institutions as the Securities Management Trust, and the Bankers' Industrial Development Company.

6 It will be clear from the foregoing that it was essential even for a country like England, where individual resources were so large, the investment habit so ingrained and the capital market so well-organized, to set up specialized institutions for providing the necessary financial equipment and help the rational management of industry.

7 In regard to nations which industrialised themselves later than England, the initial impetus, the subsequent progress and the maintenance of the position gained, have all been due in no small measure to the establishment of institutions for providing long term credit and other assistance to industrial enterprise. The German system, which is roughly representative of the system followed in all the countries of the Continent, has been summarized in paras 386-388 of the report. The description of the system as contained in the summary is not only inadequate but the lesson of the German experience has not been duly appreciated in formulating the recommendations of the Committee. The German Banks play a large part in the provision of long term capital

They have satisfied the need for an institution to educate and encourage the general public in investing their surplus funds in industries. There was a place for some kind of agency which should obtain the confidence of the investing class, and use this confidence to direct their capital towards sound industrial undertakings. It was primarily the filling of this place that called into being the credit banks of Germany and accordingly these banks gave a prominent place in their programme to the promotion of joint-stock companies. The German investors are even now, after a long period of industrialization, reluctant to participate in any undertaking before it is fully launched and they have a peculiar preference for projects in which a leading bank has interested itself (*Vide* Whale's book, pages 11-12 and 40)

This intimate relation between banks and industries is clearly emphasised by Dr. Jeidels, the German expert on industrial banking, who collaborated with us, in the following words:—

“The banks attend an industrial undertaking from its birth to its death, from promotion to liquidation, they stand by its side while it passes through the financial processes of economic life, whether usual or unusual, helping it and at the same time profiting from it” (Quoted by Mr. Whale, page 52)

8 The interest which the German Banks take in respect of the development of local industries, and which I have endeavoured to describe above, is still being maintained. It is no doubt true that during the War, the banks had to give their attention mostly to the business of financing the Government by the flotation of its loans but the industries in their turn, thanks to war profits, could afford to be independent of any help from the banks. But the situation was again reversed after the mark had been stabilised. The re-organisation of the whole German national economy—including the industrial concerns—as a result of the stabilisation brought into clear relief the evil effects of the inflation. The losses sustained by the industries due to this fact made the industries again to depend on the banks for their financial requirements, and as pointed out by S. G. Feodossief in an article in the *Bankers' magazine*, (June, 1930), “to a much greater extent than before the War, the advances made to industry by the banks, especially during the first year after the stabilisation of the mark (1924), were long term credit for the purpose of replenishing the permanent liquid capital and some times of providing fixed capital”. The banks have also in later years utilised their foreign connexions by intervening “as members of foreign syndicates for floating new industrial issues on the European and American markets”.

9 The importance of the German system in regard to our enquiry consists in the fact that it is representative of the systems which obtain in most countries of the Continent, and it should be highly instructive and interesting to us in considering the needs of a country like India, where there is little or no co-ordination of effort in matters relating to banking and development of industries.

10 Belgium owes a great debt to her banks for their services to industry. As in Germany, the banks were the only source from which Belgian industries could obtain financial assistance. Hence a close relationship between banks and industries grew up in that country at a comparatively early stage. In fact the *Societe Generale de Belgique* (established in 1822) was the first Joint Stock Bank in Europe to adopt a purely industrial policy involving some degree of control over the various industrial concerns in which it was interested. Others followed and are operating successfully to-day to the advantage of Belgian industry.

11 In France, on the other hand, along with the commercial banks, a specialised type of institutions called "*Banques d'Affaires*", has grown up for the purpose of financing industries. These institutions which are in essence "*Investment Banks*" assist the industries very much on the lines of the German Banks, partly by participating in their capital and partly by placing their bonds and shares with the public.

12 In no other country, perhaps, is the connection between banking and industry so close as it is in Switzerland. The specialisation there has been carried on by the Trust Banks, whose function consists in issuing their own bonds and utilising the proceeds, partly to grant long term loans and partly for participation in the capital of industrial enterprises. The remarkable development of the system of deposits and savings accounts has been of great assistance in helping industries.

13 It may also be pointed out in this connection that even in other countries where industrial finance was largely taken up by commercial banks, the conviction is steadily gaining ground by experience, that these banks are not equal to the task of providing long term credit to industries.

14. In Italy, for example, the commercial banks were led to make advances to industrial concerns by purchasing their shares and these created such complications that a special institution had to be created to take over these long term securities. There was established lately the *Societa Finanziaria Italiana*, with the object of taking over the industrial securities held by the *Credito Italiano*, which, in spite of local runs, was not intrinsically unsound.

15 While the continental banks were specialising in the financing of industries, Japan was not shown in putting into practice the principles and methods of the west. In fact she has gone a step ahead and created a special institution for expediting the industrial progress of the country. The Industrial Bank of Japan was established in 1902 with the object of financing Government loans, advancing against Government and semi-government securities, as well as against ships, shipbuilding materials and accessories, and other industrial issues. It could, with the approval of the Minister in charge, subscribe or underwrite share and stock issues. It could issue "*Industrial Bank Bonds*". Government control is exercised through the Minister in charge, who appoints to "*Controller*" for superintending the business of the Bank. The

minister's approval was required for payment of dividend to the shareholders. Originally the Government also guaranteed dividend up to 5 per cent for 5 years. Although the Government does not participate in the capital of the Bank, it lends to a considerable extent at a moderate rate of interest out of the funds at the Deposit Bureau, the Department of Finance. Further, the Government guarantees the capital redemption and interest payment of the Industrial Bank of Japan loan bonds, in case such loans are floated in foreign countries. The favourable effect of the establishment of the Bank on Japanese industries has been quite remarkable.

16 Among recent endeavours to make suitable arrangement for providing long term credit to industries a reference may be made to the example of the Industrial Trust Company of Ireland, which was started in 1926 with direct assistance from the Irish Government. One of the functions of the Trust was to facilitate the financing of such enterprises as had previously received advances in the form of Government guarantees, under the Trade Loans (Guarantee) Acts, which were then due to expire. In 1926, when the Banking Commission of Ireland submitted its reports, the Trust had a paid-up capital of about £163,000, of which £50,000 was held by the Government, £50,000 by the banks and £50,000 by American subscribers. The public character of the concern was ensured by nearly two-thirds of the stock of the Trust being held by the Government and banks. In the Third Interim Report the Banking Commission recorded its appreciation of the importance and usefulness of the Industrial Trust Company, as being a suitable medium through which arrangements for long term credits might be made and recommended that the Government support to business might be continued and administered through the aforesaid Trust Company. The Commission further recommended that the practice of direct Government guarantee on industrial bonds should be discontinued thereafter, and proposed that in the future such guarantees as the Government might be disposed to make should be confined to the Bonds of the Industrial Trust Company, which would then be left to advance funds to enterprises approved by it, subject to certain specified conditions.

17 A study of these facts leads to the following conclusions. First, private initiative and enterprise alone cannot be depended upon to provide the necessary financial aid to industries. Secondly, some special institution is required for providing long term credit, infusing confidence among the investing public and leading them to invest their capital in sound industrial securities, as also for initiating schemes for re-organisation and rationalisation of industries if and when necessary. The special institution contemplated should, as a rule, be a distinct organisation, apart from the commercial banks.

18 The observation that industrial credit should, as a rule, be provided by a special type of institution distinct from the ordinary Commercial banks is particularly true with reference to the conditions which prevail in India. The commercial banks in this

country cannot undertake the responsibility, as their deposits are mostly for short periods and they cannot afford to tie up any portion of their capital or reserve in financing industry. They require all their resources to maintain public confidence in carrying on their legitimate business of commercial banking. This caution is particularly necessary, as the failure of any such institution would disturb the commercial banking structure, which is now in the initial stage of development.

19 It is true that in some countries on the continent of Europe, particularly in Germany, the responsibility of providing industrial capital has been satisfactorily discharged by commercial banks doing mixed business. But it should not be overlooked that in those countries there were special circumstances which made it possible for them to meet the varied capital requirements of industries. First and foremost, the banks, in many cases, had immense resources of their own in the form of capital and reserves, enabling them to provide long term loans to that extent. Besides, the banks in these countries were not embarrassed if their funds occasionally happened to get tied up in industrial investments as they could easily avail themselves of an already developed capital market within the country in which the industrial securities lying in their hands might be disposed of whenever necessary. On both these grounds, the disparity between the conditions on the continent of Europe and those in India is markedly pronounced.

20 It has been suggested that the task of industrial finance in India might be left over to the private Issue Houses and Investment Trusts. I do not deny that institutions of this kind have been found to be very useful in supplying long term capital to industries, particularly in England and in America. But I need hardly point out that there are at present no such institutions in India, and I do not think that circumstances are quite favourable in India for the establishment and successful working of these institutions in sufficient numbers at this stage, nor can I accept the view that these institutions alone could be regarded as a dependable machinery to provide the necessary industrial capital. The creation of such institutions generally follows and does not precede public demand for investment information and facilities. I am confident, however, that when, as a result of a greater industrial progress and development, and as a result of growing public confidence in the industrial system of the country, private Issue Houses and Investment Trusts will be established in sufficient numbers, the latter may be expected to take up their share of the responsibility of financing industry and supplementing the work of the institutions that require to be created specially for the purpose.

21 For almost identical reasons I find it impossible to endorse the view that individual industries should depend for their long term financial requirements on the debentures issued by them. The success of this method of capitalising industries on a wide scale is presumed to rest on the idea that such debentures are popular and that there is in existence the machinery of investment institutions

as intermediaries between the borrowing industries and the genuine investing public, which can make such forms of investment popular. It is conceivable that a few very big industries can, with some measure of success, depend on the issue of debentures for their financial requirements, but the numerous middle sized industries would not be able to raise capital by this method. And although capital has, in many cases, been successfully raised through individual private initiative, no organised efforts have hitherto been made to ensure its steady supply in respect of all efficient and promising industries. In fact the supply of industrial capital has been retarded by the failure of many concerns brought about (amongst other causes) by the very want of timely financial aid and the currency and fiscal policy of the Government exercising a depressing influence on their prospects. Even to make the raising of industrial finance by the issue of debentures a success the creation of an agency, strong and sound enough to counteract the depressing influence mentioned above, is eminently called for.

22 The difficulty of obtaining industrial finance is often ascribed to the shyness of Indian capital, owing to the nervousness of investors. I think, the shyness is due not so much to the attitude of investors, as to the fact that hitherto no systematic endeavour has been made in this country to create a status in favour of indigenous industries, directly and indirectly, through Government support calculated to inspire confidence among investors. In India the attitude of absolute unconcern shown by the Government till recently towards the development of indigenous industries, has long remained a strong deterrent factor in the matter of industrial investment. The fiscal policy of the Government, which was often subordinated to British Industrial interests, coupled with adverse railway rates and stores purchase policies, have very naturally stifled the initiative of promoters in many cases, while investors have mostly lost their faith in the success of new industrial ventures. The alien character of the Government subordinating Indian to British industrial interests, the gradual decadence of Indian industries in certain areas, accentuated by the unequal competition of imports of British manufactures had all combined to create a most pessimistic outlook in regard to the prospects of indigenous industries, particularly those owned and managed by Indians. The pro-British tendency commonly, associated with the Governmental policy yielded the curious result that industries in this country under the management of British firms have come to be looked upon as the safest channels of industrial investment, while Indian managed industries have not been able in many cases to inspire similar confidence. The dearth of finance suffered by the latter has not been due, as I have already pointed out, so much to the shyness of Indian capital which is disproved by the steady increase of investments in other directions, particularly in the form of bank deposits, Government securities and investments in European managed concerns. The hesitancy of the investors arises

ing out of the circumstances mentioned before, has proved a stumbling block to the industrial renaissance of India and it has little chance of being removed early unless the Government acknowledge the responsibility of radically changing the whole industrial outlook of the country. No doubt they have made a beginning by moving towards the right direction since the outbreak of the War, to which reference has been made in our report. The Government have recognised the claim of discriminatory protection, and have appointed a Tariff Board to consider the demands of particular industries for protective tariff. But these have not yielded any results commensurate with expectations, and have been regarded rather as half-hearted concessions to the public demand. What is required in the particular circumstances in India is an active and vigorous industrial policy pursued by the Government, which should be reflected in their fiscal, currency, railway and stores purchase policies. They must truly identify themselves with the economic interests of the country and follow the active policy of the Government of Japan, which has been raised to the status of a first class industrial country in course of less than half a century. Such an attitude on the part of the Government can alone create a favourable atmosphere which may be assuring to the investors in regard to the prospect of indigenous industries, leading them more and more to employ their surplus capital in industrial investments.

23 It is clear from a study of the conditions in India and the experience of foreign countries, that industrial development requires the active support and direction of a body specially created for the purpose. We require an agency which will attract and mobilise private funds for investment in the capital market for industrial purpose. This agency would work with funds drawn from the investing public and by its efficient organisation, expert care and supervision so regulate investment as to minimise the chances of loss of capital.

24. The Committee's recommendation in this regard should, in my opinion, be quite unequivocal and they should throw the weight of their support in favour of the creation of industrial corporations. The question would then be, how far we can indicate the details of the constitution and working of the industrial corporation. It has been suggested that in formulating the required legislation, the provincial ministers should have liberty to devise measures to suit the conditions in their respective provinces, and I agree with my colleagues that it is inadvisable to lay down any hard and fast rules. But I am sure that when the ministers take up questions concerning industrial banking they will turn to this Committee's report for guidance on fundamental issues. This Committee could, therefore, discharge its responsibility by enunciating certain fundamental principles for the guidance of future ministers.

25 My colleagues intend that the proposed industrial corporation should specialise in the provision of long term capital to



industries and they have not attempted to lay down any practical suggestions regarding the functions of the corporation. It is difficult, I agree, to anticipate all the credit demands that may be made upon the corporation by the existing industries as well as those which will come into being at a future date. But, in order to make these institutions really useful for stimulating industrial development of the country, I am of opinion that the corporation should take upon itself, as a matter of policy, at least the following specific functions. —

- (i) Granting long term loans to industrial concerns on the security of their assets or against debentures secured by those assets or against industrial shares,
- (ii) Underwriting or subscribing the shares and debentures of industrial concerns,
- (iii) Taking long term deposits from the public,
- (iv) Lending money to industrial concerns for short periods when funds are idle, through discounting their bills or otherwise,
- (v) Acting as trustee for individual concerns, raising money by debentures on their own assets,
- (vi) Guaranteeing interest on the principal of approved industrial debentures or loans

26 The desirability of establishing an industrial corporation with a scheme of Government participation in its finance has been questioned on the ground that it may eventually become responsible for a dangerous strain on the revenues of the Government through lack of proper guidance and control over its investment methods. In due recognition of the weight of such contention I should like to emphasise the need for certain precautionary measures for controlling the practices of the corporation with a view to keep them within the limits of safety. Such measures are necessary not only for safeguarding the interests of the Government but also for the absence of experience in the new line of business, and the danger that some reverses suffered by the corporation at the initial stage, may retard the progress of industrialisation beyond all hopes of early recovery.

The measures I would recommend for this purpose are sufficiently indicated in the following points —

- (1) In making loans, the Corporation should satisfy itself that there is the proper margin and that the concern will be able to pay the interest and principal on stipulated dates. In the case of debenture issues of industrial concerns, it should satisfy itself that they will be able to make adequate allocation to the sinking fund to redeem them on the due date. Through its continuous contact with the industrial concerns it should see that proper allocations are made as required.

- (2) It should not make any investment in any speculative ventures nor extend any financial aid in any particular line of industry which is already threatened with over-production or has otherwise become unsound
- (3) Regarding its own debenture issues it should provide adequate sinking funds for redemption and also build up suitable reserves out of current income
- (4) When underwriting, subscribing to or granting loans against industrial shares, it should assume only a reasonable proportion of these obligations
- (5) The extent to which it assumes such obligations should be determined by its ability to liquidate them within a reasonable time
- (6) To safeguard its commitments in these concerns and the interests of the investing public on whose confidence it will depend for its success, it should maintain a permanent and continuous touch with them, somewhat on the German model. It should associate itself with the management through representatives and receive information about them not only when matters are bad, but long before this stage is reached, so that it might initiate and suggest reorganisation and other remedial measures to avert possible loss to the parties concerned
- (7) Provision should be made to distribute the assistance it gives to industrial concerns so as to minimise the possibility of its resources being tied up in one or two concerns or one or two classes of industries

27 My colleagues have not ruled out the possibility of creating an All-India Industrial Corporation in future for looking after industries of national importance, the development of which will fall within the functions of the Federal or Central Government. It has been suggested that the All-India Corporation may secure proper liaison in the matter of finance and a direct connection with the large spending departments of the Central Government as well as direct correlation of the industries as a whole with railway rates, customs, stores purchase and other policies of the Central Government. My colleagues have kept the question open, to be finally decided by the demands of the Provincial Governments requiring the services of such a central co-ordinating agency to advance their common interests, or if its need is otherwise established to the satisfaction of the Central Legislature. Industries of national importance at least for some time to come, would not be so numerous as to justify the establishment of a Central Corporation enabling it to invest its full resources on a remunerative basis. The financial requirement of the existing national industries might be met directly by the Central or Federal Government either giving direct loans or guaranteeing the interest on debentures issued by such industries

The actual grant of any loan or guarantee of interest to any such industrial concern will naturally depend on the merits of each case. A pretty long time might elapse before the number of such industries would sufficiently increase to justify the establishment of the proposed corporation. But before that stage is reached, the co-ordinating and supplementary functions proposed to be entrusted to the All-India Corporation, will remain no less urgent from the point of view of the Provincial Corporations. I should, therefore, propose that pending the establishment of the All-India Corporation, the contingency might be effectively met by an All-India Industrial Board, vested mostly with advisory functions. The Board should be constituted of some Government Members of the Industries and Finance Departments, representative businessmen concerned with banking, finance and industry, and representatives of Provincial Corporations.

28 The functions of the Board will be as follows —

- (1) To maintain a staff of experts, if found necessary, whose services will be available to the provincial corporations for examining schemes in connection with their investments in industries
- (2) To keep up to date the results of the industrial survey by studies and researches conducted by the experts.
- (3) To give suitable advice regarding the terms and conditions of issue of debentures of the corporations, and, if necessary, help in getting them subscribed.
- (4) To advise regarding the general policy to be followed by the provincial corporations in investing in shares or debentures of industrial concerns, or underwriting or promoting their issues
- (5) To advise the corporations regarding the financial assistance they may render to industrial concerns, with special reference to the advisability of seeing that neither over-production nor undue competition is encouraged
- (6) To enquire into the organisation of the Indian Industries and make any recommendations to them that would improve them in the light of experience in India and elsewhere
- (7) To advise the Government regarding the commercial and industrial education in India and to suggest necessary improvement, on the model of the United States of America Bureau.
- (8) To formulate schemes for drawing out small savings for investment in industries and suggest means for popularising them.
- (9) To advise the Government and the Provincial Corporations in matters relating to the flotation of inland and foreign loans for industrial purposes.

- (10) To urge on the Central Government the need for framing their fiscal, financial, railway and stores purchase policies in consonance with the interests of Indian industries
- (11) To take such other necessary action, consistent with its status, to protect or advance the interests of industries in general

29 I need hardly point out that some of the functions proposed to be vested in the All-India Board are of sufficient importance to indicate the desirability of a distinct status being given to it rather than its being considered a superfluous adjunct to the Provincial Boards. The All-India Board should take the lead in initiating periodical surveys of Indian industries, to suggest that true lines of progress by avoiding the dangers of overproduction and waste. From its very inception it could come to the aid of the various Provincial Governments in formulating their respective programmes of industrial reconstruction which will demand not only expert advice but also the guidance of some central agency viewing the different Provincial Schemes from a wide national perspective. Divorced from such a national outlook the programmes of different provinces may lead to a development on parallel lines, leading to the risk of interprovincial competition in particular industries while others might remain comparatively ignored. This would mean needless national waste which can be avoided by the intervention of such an agency as the All-India Board. The services of the latter relating to the collection and dissemination of statistical intelligence would be useful to all the Provinces by giving them a lead in regard to the volume of industrial production in their respective spheres. Such statistics of production are now being compiled on a strict scientific basis in almost all industrially advanced countries of Europe and America with great advantage to their respective Governments enabling them to follow a definite policy regarding currency and credit while the same has been found useful to the industrialists as giving an insight to the general conditions of production throughout the country. The need for such statistics in India cannot be over-emphasised and the most suitable agent that might be entrusted with such functions should be the All-India Board. Needless to say that for securing the necessary uniformity in the matter of collecting statistics the Board will require the support of the Central as well as of the Provincial Governments. For efficiently discharging its function of guiding the industries in India it would have further to keep itself apprised of the world conditions of production and consumption of such articles as are produced in India and publish the relevant statistics for the benefit of the industrialists at large.

30 In conclusion I may refer to some points whereon my views are to some extent divergent from those of my colleagues. My colleagues have proposed in paragraph 403 that the debenture issues of the Provincial Industrial Corporation should at the outset be limited to twice the amount of its share capital. This proposal,

together with the other that the permissible limit may be raised at a later stage does not pay due regard to the consequences which such restriction would bear on the revenue earning position of the Corporation. Nor does it clearly emphasise the need for ensuring the adequate security of the debenture issues beyond that at the initial stage, the additional security provided by capital should be so high as 50 per cent of the debenture issues under the specified proportion. I would, therefore, propose to fix the proportion in closer consonance with the principles that should underlie the issue of debentures, *viz* , security and elasticity, in the following manner

31 The share capital of the Corporation should be supplemented by debentures under the conditions that the amount of debentures should in no circumstances exceed the amount of the outstanding long term loans and further, must not be more than five times the amount of share capital. I do not think that in fixing this proportion any risk is involved, for if, as I have proposed, the debentures be covered at all times by long terms secured investments with ample margins, the additional security provided by capital coming up to 20 per cent of the total debenture issues must be considered sufficient. On the other hand a moderately high proportion of debentures may be necessary for carrying on such volume of business as would enable the Corporation to earn a profit for the shareholders after meeting the necessary current expenses, within a reasonable period of time. For, unless such prospect of earning a dividend is assured the shares of the Corporation may not successfully attract private investors

32 I am also constrained to express my dissent from the opinion of my colleagues, as contained in paragraph 406, that the Industrial Corporation may take deposits only if the deposits are for comparatively long terms of two years and over. While I entirely agree that the activities of the corporation in the field of deposit-taking should not set up any undue competition against the commercial banks, I am convinced that this measure of safeguard would be sufficiently provided if it be laid down that the corporation should take term and current deposits only from those industrial concerns whose block and other asset are mortgaged to it. This is advantageous to such industrial concerns inasmuch as they can obtain short term accommodation from the corporation for working expenses, which otherwise may be denied to them by other banks or capitalists, with their assets mortgaged elsewhere. For the corporation itself it is an advantage since it can keep a day to day watch on the business of the concerns. This practice would be strictly in consonance with the "one bank, one client" idea and would not involve any difficulty on the score of setting up competition with the existing banks, as such cases of granting short term advances would not be so numerous as materially to affect the business of existing banks, nor would such advances be available, so far as the Corporation is concerned, for all classes of borrowers

### III —FINANCING OF FOREIGN TRADE (CHAPTER XVII)

1 In paragraph 477 of the Report the majority have observed that "speaking from the point of view of trade alone, it may be said that the facilities available at present for financing India's foreign trade both import and export, are sufficient" This statement is true so far as it means that the number and resources of the existing exchange banks are fully equal to any demand for finance that may be made by the export and import business of India. But surely this is not all! To have adequate resources is one thing But whether those resources are used impartially as among the different classes of traders, Indian and European, is quite another In other words, it is just possible—and allegations have been made to this effect—that though there are resources available for trade, those resources are not available in an equal degree to individual traders The distinction between "trade" and "traders" so vital in this context, seems to have been overlooked by the majority The Committee may feel satisfied that there is no lack of resources for meeting the requirements of foreign trade. But it would still remain to enquire whether individual traders are having a fair share of these facilities and whether such resources are being used to subserve what may be called the broader national interest, *viz*, the increasing participation of nationals in the country's foreign trade If the last mentioned objective is not before us the present adequacy of resources will be a matter of comparatively little significance

2 But without further elucidation what I have just said does not reveal the whole truth in regard to the existing conditions of financing India's foreign trade, particularly as it does not give an insight into the facilities as respectively available to different sections of traders, European and Indian.

3 No doubt the statement in the Report of the majority is a qualified one, as it is followed by some observations which should help one to comprehend its real significance, but in detachment from these qualifying remarks there is a danger of the statement being misconstrued in the sense that the facilities available at present are sufficient for the traders concerned

4 I, therefore, feel that it is necessary to emphasise the distinction between the two aspects of these facilities, *viz*, their availability for the trade as a whole on the one hand and for individual traders on the other In fact, the real question at issue is that associated with the latter For purposes strictly germane to our enquiry, the more important problem is one of facilities available to Indian traders and firms from the exchange banks which are all non-Indian institutions holding a virtual monopoly of the exchange business Looked at from this point of view it is impossible to maintain, in view of the evidence placed before us, that the existing facilities are 'sufficient' Owing to the fact

that the foreign trade is mostly in the hands of non-nationals it will be found that these facilities are available to them to a great extent. But the point I wish to emphasise is the different attitude of the bank officials towards their European and Indian clients. I believe that the present low proportion of our share is due to the helpful advice and financial and other assistance which were available to non-nationals, but which have not been available, at least to the same degree, to Indian businessmen. Several witnesses including representatives of important Indian Chambers of Commerce have pointed out that Indian exporters and importers do not get all the facilities they require and that they are seriously handicapped by the discriminatory dealings of foreign banks. Even though a large number of instances may not have been placed before the Committee in support of these allegations, the few that were produced, taken together with other circumstantial evidence gave clear indications of the differential treatment that is being meted out to Indians. The reasons which must have impelled most of the witnesses to withhold even such evidence as might have been in their power to give are so obvious that I need not mention them here. Those who ask for documentary evidence in support of these allegations might with equal justice and propriety turn to the exchange banks for a more convincing reply to these charges than they have so far been able to put up. Instead of resting on the "onus of proof", they could, for instance, point to specific cases in which Indian firms and individuals have been helped to expand their business through their co-operation.

5 I regret I cannot find my way to join my colleagues in the non-committal attitude they have taken in this matter. For even apart from the complaints of Indian traders and firms, which, I cannot but believe, have a substratum of truth, the discriminatory attitude of the foreign exchange banks is corroborated by other well-known facts. The most striking of these is the very meagre participation of Indians in the export and import trade of the country since the advent of the foreign exchange banks. The majority have referred to a statement made by the exchange banks showing a higher proportion. This cannot be accepted for reasons detailed in para 437 of the Report. From the enquiries that I have been able to make I am inclined to believe that the actual proportion is about 20 per cent.

6 The representatives of the Exchange Banks Association stated that there was absolutely no racial bias in the granting of their facilities to trade and that the same rules and same standards were applied to both classes of customers. The complaint with regard to the Exchange Banks is not an isolated one but refers to all aspects of the British rule in India. We find that in all spheres of our national life, in trade, industry, commerce and Governmental transactions there is in operation a subtle difference of treatment due to the fact that the officials with whom we come in contact are mostly Europeans. To a large extent this is natural

as we cannot expect from foreign traders, businessmen and officials the same solicitude for our welfare and the same fostering care which we would expect from our fellow countrymen. How is it possible for us in these circumstances, to believe that the banking system alone is managed by such supermen that they will forget the instinctive urge to help their own friends and countrymen and go out of their way to help Indian traders and businessmen in the same degree? In fact, the representatives of the Exchange Banks themselves admitted that through social inter-course their European officials had more opportunities of obtaining intimate knowledge of the integrity and resources of foreign clients than that of Indians. One should have to forget the political and economic history of India for the last one hundred and fifty years to treat this claim of the Exchange Bank as anything other than an incorrect picture of the situation.

7 The majority have rightly stressed in para 478 that "the extent of a nation's participation in its foreign trade depends considerably on the facilities which the banking system gives to its traders", the truth of this statement has been amply demonstrated by the amazing progress which Japan has made during the last fifty years in this respect, due to the special assistance which the Yokohama Specie Bank, established in 1880, gave to the Japanese traders. The extent of participation by the nationals in the Japanese foreign trade has increased from less than one per cent in 1874 to 69.6 per cent of exports and 86.6 per cent of imports in 1922 ("Present Day Japan," 1930, page 136). Our meagre share in Indian foreign trade is in striking contrast to that of the Japanese in theirs and unmistakably points to the scanty support given by, and the lack of sympathy of the exchange banks towards the requirements of Indian traders. There is no doubt that the share of Indians in the foreign trade of the country would have been far greater if the exchange banks had treated Indian and European traders alike and had given the Indians anything like the generous facilities which might have been expected from national exchange banks for the development and expansion of their activities.

8 The problem arising out of these circumstances is in my opinion, a grave one, and such as may demand of the Committee their special recommendations for removing the existing handicaps with the object of increasing the share of Indians in the country's foreign trade. It becomes graver still when viewed in the light of the facts that the foreign banks have been strengthening themselves and the foreign commercial interests without due regard to the effects on national banking and economy. I shall make an endeavour to examine these points for the purpose of bringing out such implications as have a direct bearing on our problem.

9 The first of these points necessarily raises a question with regard to the nature of foreign trade and foreign exchange bank-



ing The majority have defined the financing of foreign trade as consisting of two parts

- “ (1) the financing from the Indian port to the foreign port or *vice versa* and
- (2) the financing from or to the Indian port to or from the up country distributing or collecting centre ”

10. Evidently the practice of foreign banks as prevailing in India includes both, but this is not accepted as a necessary function of banks financing foreign trade In describing the functions of foreign banks in India the majority have stated in paragraph 39 that “ they also play some part in the financing of inland trade, mainly on account of goods or produce in transit prior to export or immediately subsequent to import ” The majority have not questioned the propriety of such collateral operations of exchange banks in regard to the financing of actual exports and imports, nor have they examined, much less appreciated, the harmful effects that might result from the continued performance of these subsidiary functions by the foreign exchange banks The danger arises out of the fact that if we allow foreign trade to extend beyond the port-to-port movements to the distributing or collecting centres up-country, the distinction between the financing of internal trade movement and the financing of foreign trade will tend to disappear, and foreign banks might well prove a serious menace to the development of national banking As a matter of fact the Punjab Committee refer to the practice of the exchange banks in that province financing the textile imports right down to the consumer (Para 106) The finance of foreign trade seems in theory and in practice to be confined to the port-to-port movements As Mr Spalding has pointed out,\* the exchange banker comes on the scene as regards export only at the time of shipment Similarly as regards imports the exchange banker would vanish from the scene as soon as he has brought the documents to the port and handed them over to the importer This view is also supported by Mr P B Whaley† who says that the financing of foreign trade by banks in Germany followed the practice of English bankers and consisted in financing exports for the interval between the shipment of goods and the arrival of the purchaser's remittance, and in financing imports by opening credits, against which the foreign exporter draws drafts

11 In this connection the proceedings of the ‘ International Conference on the Treatment of Foreigners ’ held in Paris in 1929 will be found instructive It was there claimed that there should be no restriction on the movements and activities of foreigners in so far as they are connected with the requirements of international commerce In the course of the discussion it was accepted that the right of international commerce would not apply to the retail trade or hawking and peddling and that every nation could

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\* “ Finance of Foreign Trade ”

† “ Joint Stock Banking in Germany,” page 83

reserve to its own nationals these subsidiary trades. In other words, international trade and commerce would be concerned only with the import and export of merchandise between port and port but not to the distribution of imports into the interior or the collection of the exports from the interior.

12 The practice of foreign exchange banks in other countries is also significant in this respect. In almost all countries foreign banks are confined to the chief financial centres like Paris and Berlin or to the port towns as in Egypt, Australia, Brazil and Argentine. In their advertisements the banks also point out that their branches are established at all important ports and have correspondents throughout the world. They do not generally claim to have branches at inland centres. The Yokohama Specie Bank has forty foreign branches, all in port towns. The Guaranty Trust Co. of New York has branches only in London, Liverpool, Paris, Havre, Brussels and Antwerp. The Comptoir National France has several branches in England, Belgium, Australia, India, and Egypt, but all at the ports. All foreign exchange banks have adopted this practice and have carried on their work in the interior through agents or correspondents.

13 The encroachment of the formidable foreign banks beyond the requirements of foreign trade finance as explained above restricts the scope for expansion of indigenous banks. They have been carrying on business in India long before the Indian banks were established, and this fact, coupled with their vast resources, enormous influence, and valuable goodwill, have placed them in a dominating position over the indigenous institutions. The latter having had no time nor opportunity to develop, have been rather hard hit by the unequal competition with them both in the port towns and in the up-country centres, where the latter have got their branches. As I will show presently the foreign Exchange Banks together with the Allahabad Bank have been able to gather nearly 80 crores of deposits as against the same amount in the case of the Imperial Bank and 55 crores in that of the Indian Banks. I do not deny that the Exchange Banks have been able to attract this huge amount of deposits even though they pay interest at a lower rate than the Indian banks, but this cheaper money enables the former to compete with the latter so far as inland business is concerned. The majority seem to have agreed with the contention of the Exchange banks that there is not much competition between them and the Indian Joint Stock Banks and the statement furnished by the Exchange banks and printed in para 455 indicating the location of branches of Exchange Banks has been used to show that the number of such up-country branches of Exchange Banks is not large. But whether the number is large or small, it admits of little doubt that the foreign banks in these places do compete with the indigenous banks of the respective centres. That there are sufficient number of Indian banks in these places is also a matter which can be verified from the "Statistical Tables relating to Banks in India" and these banks

have been deprived of much of the business of financing local trade and the trade between these centres and the ports

14 The report of the majority gives in para 466 a statement showing the growth of deposits of banks in India, and concludes that there has been no change in the respective shares of the Imperial Bank, the Exchange Banks and the Indian Banks. As the Allahabad Bank is included among Indian Banks, I must point out that this statement is not one on which to base such conclusion. I give below a statement including the Allahabad Bank deposits among those of the Exchange Banks

*Reconstructed table including Allahabad Bank among Exchange Banks*

	Imperial Bank	Foreign Banks	Indian Banks
1920	8,705	7,481	7,348
1921	7,258	8,573	7,063
1922	7,116	8,442	5,398
1923	8,276	7,937	3,676
1924	8,421	7,939	4,594
1925	8,330	8,000	4,846
1926	8,035	8,160	5,309
1927	7,927	6,913	5,403
1928	7,925	8,223	5,516

15 It will be noted from the above table that the deposits of Indian Banks have come down from 70.63 crores in 1921 to 55.16 crores in 1928, while exchange banks have been able to maintain their deposits very nearly, the figures being 85.73 crores and 82.33 crores respectively. It is true that there was a big shrinkage of deposits in 1921 and 1922 following the deflation, after the War but even then the result of the decade's operations has been decidedly in favour of foreign banks. Even if due allowance be made for the shrinkage in deposits due to the failure of some banks during the period for which figures are given, it is not correct, to hold with the foreign experts, that there has been no disproportionate growth of deposits of these types of banks. On the other hand, the increase in deposits of the Allahabad Bank from 9.35 lakhs in 1920 to 11.19 lakhs in 1928 is itself a sign of the movement of funds and this may become an inducement to some other Indian banks in the future to seek amalgamation with the British banks.

16 I cannot agree with the contention of the majority in para 463 that it is not "a correct interpretation of the speech of Mr Beaumont-Pease that the Indian branches of the Exchange Banks are not drawing on their head offices outside India but have more than enough funds from India itself." In this connection

the majority have given a statement of the assets and liabilities of foreign banks in India I give below the figures separately for British and non-British Banks.—

*Detailed statement of position of British and non-British Exchange Banks' Deposits and Advances in India*

<i>Current Accounts and Call money</i>		In crores of Rupees	
Non-Indian—			
British Banks	. 13		
Other Banks	2	15	
	<hr/>		
Indian—			
British Banks	. 17		
Other Banks	. 2	19	34
	<hr/>		
<i>Fixed and short deposits</i>			
Non-Indian—			
British Banks	9		
Other Banks	3	12	
	<hr/>		
Indian—			
British Banks	. 18		
Other Banks	2	20	32
	<hr/>		
<i>Outstanding Loans, etc , outside India</i>			
British Banks	. 16		
Other Banks	. 6	22	22
	<hr/>		
		Total .	88 crores
Total non-Indian Deposits	. .	. 27 crores	
Total Indian Deposits	. .	. 39 crores	
<i>Advances in India</i>			
Non-Indian—			
British Banks	11		
Other Banks	4	15	
	<hr/>	<hr/>	
Indian—			
British Banks	. 26		
Other Banks	. . . 5	81	46
	<hr/>	<hr/>	
<i>Investments in securities, etc.</i>			
British Banks	24		
Other Banks	2	26	26
	<hr/>	<hr/>	
<i>Bills of Exchange in Transit.</i>			
British Banks	. 7		
Other Banks	. . 3	10	10
	<hr/>	<hr/>	
<i>Cash and other assets</i>			
British Banks	5		
Other Banks	. 1	6	6
	<hr/>	<hr/>	
		Total .	88 crores.
			<hr/>
			28

17 It will be seen that the British Banks have not borrowed in London or elsewhere for their operations in India. Though they have loans, etc., outstanding abroad to the extent of 16 crores, they hold securities for 24 crores in India. In other words, the foreign loans really represent investment of foreigners in Indian Treasury Bills. In the case of non-British Banks on the other hand the foreign loans amount to six crores while the value of their security investment is only two crores, that is, they use about four crores of their own money in India, while the British Banks have large amounts of unusable deposits which have led them to invest as much as eight crores in Treasury Bills. It is evident, therefore, that on balance the British banks do not have to bring money from abroad.

18 The figures also indicate a difference in the practice of British and non-British banks. The former have invested seven crores of Indian deposits for buying bills of exchange but non-British banks use three crores of their own money for the same purpose. In other words, British banks with deposits of Rs. 57 crores, have advanced 37 crores in India and maintain cash and other assets 5 crores, having invested the balance in securities and bills of exchange. The non-British banks with deposits of nine crores have lent the whole of it in the country.

19 The dominant position of the foreign banks has been utilised not only to advance the interests of their nationals but also to foster other subsidiary foreign interests in India. For example, Indian Insurance Companies have received very little encouragement from the Exchange Banks in their progress. By insisting on their customers obtaining their policies from non-Indian insurance companies they have practically shut out the Indian companies from this business. Definite instances were placed before the Committee in support of this complaint.

20 I have so far endeavoured to show how the foreign exchange banks in this country are conducting their operations without a proper regard for our national interests. The non-national outlook maintained by these banks has hindered to a great extent the development of monetary organisations of the country. This is clearly borne out by their lukewarm support and even opposition to any scheme of banking development and their pronounced lack of sympathy towards anything Indian. I am aware of the claims that are often made in regard to the services rendered to India by the British Exchange Banks. But I am sorry that I cannot agree to this evaluation of their operations. It is true that Indian foreign trade has been financed by them, but it is also true that this was done mainly because these banks wanted to finance the movement of the necessary Indian raw produce to England and to help the marketing of British goods in India. This pro-British feature of their operations was apparently so marked that other countries found that for marketing their goods and buying their own requirements of Indian produce, it was essential

that their own banks should be established here and that it was unwise to leave their interests to be looked after by British banks

21 If these banks were really serving the interests of India, their attitude towards Indian traders and Indian banking would have been quite different from what it has actually been. In this connection I should first refer to the overshadowing importance of these foreign banks in our country. The position which they occupy in the Indian banking system far outweighs that which foreign banks occupy in other countries and they have not failed to take full advantage of this favourable position to prevent a proper re-organisation of the money market in India.

Time and again they have opposed measures in this direction, as such organisation would not only diminish their prestige but also decrease considerably their domination of the market. They opposed the first Central Bank proposal of 1900 with such vehemence that even the Government of India was forced to protest against their attitude. In 1904 they again opposed the proposal to allow the Presidency Banks to borrow in London to relieve monetary stringency in India. Their opposition continued till the appointment of the Chamberlain Commission in 1913 and persisted in an acute form even up to 1920 when the Imperial Bank Act was passed, debarring the bank from transacting exchange business. It was carried even before the Hilton Young Commission when they stated that they did not care much whether there was a Central Bank or not\*.

22 Their indifference towards Indian interests is also shown in their attitude towards Indian Banks. There have been a number of banking and monetary crises during the last three or four decades, and I do not know of their having rendered timely assistance even to a single Indian bank. It was, on the other hand, pointed out by the Government of India in their despatch to the Secretary of State, dated 31st December 1900, that they frankly prepared to let a crisis come though happily it was averted. As Mr. Pochkhanawala has observed in his written evidence to the Committee, "most of the foreign Exchange Banks do receive deposits from Indian indigenous banks, but they would not lend them a rupee without security, though amongst themselves they do large lending business on credit. They combine at every opportunity even against first class indigenous banks and by withdrawing, at the spread of any and every rumour, credit facilities in the matter of purchasing of drafts and telegraphic transfers, they jeopardise the position of the indigenous banks and lower their prestige in the eyes of the investing public and the brokers."

23 I should also refer in this connection to the fact that the foreign banks in India have by the nature of their operations retarded the development of a discount market in this country. Generally speaking, import bills pass off into the hands of banks after acceptance. In India, similarly, import bills, if drawn in

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\* For all this information I may refer to Mr. Baster's book "The Imperial Banks".

rupees, could have been absorbed by local bankers or the discount market if it were allowed to develop. Even when the bills are drawn in sterling as at present, the exchange banks, if they had been so inclined, could have devised suitable arrangements for placing them in a discount market. Instead of this, the foreign banks have been retaining in their own hands the bills which should have gone to a discount market,—this in turn, calling for large deposits to finance them. It is now contended by the Exchange Banks that these bills are in very small amounts and are of no use for a discount market. It is difficult to concede such an argument in the light of certain patent facts. If the exchange banks can lend as much as 30 crores to Indians on their local advances, including advances against import bills, in spite of the bills being in small amounts, surely a discount market could do the same and if it wanted to borrow on them it might rediscount them in parcels to make up sufficiently large amounts. It is not, therefore, the size of the bills which stood in the way of the creation of a discount market in India but the reluctance of the banks to part with the profits of this business.

24 Still another instance of the apathy of these foreign banks towards Indian interests is to be found in the matter of appointing Indians in the superior grades of their service. The majority have accepted two definite conclusions on this point, *viz* —

- (1) that it is surprising that through half a century the foreign banks have not found one Indian whom they could appoint to a superior post and (2) that the attitude of European Officers towards the Indian Staff has been a subject of criticism. This has led them to suggest that these banks should adopt a system of probationers on the model of the Imperial Bank of India. In view of the benefits they derive from the use of Indian deposits, I think the Government should insist on their training a suitable number of Indians for employment in the superior grades.

25 It is claimed that the appointment of staff is a matter to be determined by the shareholders. This contention is not tenable for several reasons. In the first place, it can hardly be denied that unless there was some special reason, the shareholders would not interfere in this matter. Secondly, it can no longer be contended that Indians are temperamentally unfit for banking. Apart from our ancient banking traditions we have proved ourselves capable of running such institutions on the European model even without the help of foreigners. Thirdly, if the present practice is defended on the score of political considerations the same political considerations should impel us to demand a change. Fourthly, past records do not justify the assumption that Indians are less trustworthy than Europeans. Lastly, the argument that superior officers should be prepared for world-wide service cannot be accepted as the appointment of local men and the habit of

relying on them would reduce the number of general service men required and thus considerably reduce overhead charges

26 These in brief are the problems confronting us, namely first, that the Indian exporters and importers are seriously handicapped by the step-motherly treatment of the foreign banks, secondly, that our general economic development is being jeopardised by their present mode of operations, and thirdly, that these are matters in which our nationals do not receive due encouragement. The situation demands immediate intervention by the Government particularly as these foreign banks are now holding a predominant position in the banking world of India.

27 The majority have referred to the treatment of non-national banks in other countries. They have found the licensing system fairly common and have suggested its adoption in India, but the terms of the license proposed by them fail to touch the real difficulty. Curiously enough, while they note that there are various restrictions on non-national banks in other countries, they have suggested reciprocal treatment on the basis of these restrictions instead of finding out the *rationale* of their existence and applying the reasoning to India. The Indian problem is a peculiar one and therefore calls for peculiar measures and it is unnecessary to quote precedents to justify them. Our problem is how to give the Indian banks a fair field for development and extension by confining the foreign banks to their proper sphere in the port towns; and the measures proposed should be designed to accomplish this purpose.

28 I think that unless the Government takes an active interest in these matters, it is not likely that the exchange banks will willingly submit to any proposal to change their methods of operation or their policy in consonance with our economic interests. But it would be futile to leave the matter of such national importance entirely to the discretion of the foreign banks, and to be content with making certain recommendations to them to change their policy, having no obligatory sanction behind them.

29 As proposed by the majority the purpose of the license is to regulate the future entry of foreign banks and in the case of existing banks it will be only a formal procedure. A license to have any meaning, must entail certain obligations, failure to carry out which, would be penalised by its cancellation. Apart from the submission of some statements the majority have suggested no obligations and this as well as the reciprocal treatment proposed by them could well be enforced without any licensing at all. In my opinion the conditions of the license should be more specific and effective and should include the following —

- (1) They (the foreign exchange banks) should confine themselves to port towns and mainly to foreign trade finance. They should not open any new branches in the interior.
- (2) They should transact only such inland business as (a) making and taking temporary loans to and from banks,



- (b) advancing against goods in port towns awaiting export or movement into the interior, (c) investment in securities to the extent necessary to keep a liquid position and (d) accepting deposits from the public
- (3) They should observe the conditions of the Indian Bank Act in so far as they are applicable to them
  - (4) They should submit to the licensing authority duly audited balance sheets reports, returns, etc., of their Indian business in such forms as may be prescribed
  - (5) They should submit to the same authority quarterly reports of their business transacted with Indian and non-Indian clients in such form as may be prescribed by the Reserve Bank from which it may be possible to decide whether there are grounds for complaints of discrimination against Indian clients or interests
  - (6) They should make suitable provision for the training and employment of Indians in the superior grades of services, to the satisfaction of the licensing authority
  - (7) They should distribute insurance business between Indian and non-Indian companies in accordance with the arrangement suggested in para 34 of this note
  - (8) They should have Advisory Boards at each branch, with a majority of Indian merchants and businessmen
  - (9) They should not purchase shares in any Indian bank without the previous permission of the Reserve Bank
  - (10) The licences will be issued for a period of five years and will normally be renewed. But if the licensing authority is convinced that a foreign bank is acting contrary to the policy of the Reserve Bank or against the general national interest, or has violated any of the conditions of the license, it may be cancelled after giving due notice to the bank.

30 I am aware that the majority of the Committee have accepted the principles underlying some of the terms suggested by me, but they have been content with making recommendations to the Exchange Banks to carry them out. It is possible that the Government may establish a convention with the Exchange Banks regarding some of the terms and to that extent they need not be included specifically in the licence. But if they fail to establish such a convention the terms suggested will have to be enforced by a licence

31 I am aware that my proposed terms for the licence will evoke a protest on a question of principle, that these involve discrimination against non-Indian banks. I would point out, however, that the restrictions on the Exchange Banks are not proposed in a spirit of racial discrimination but are the minimum necessary to ensure the ordered development of Indian banking, and they are not calculated to inflict any hardship on the foreign banks

Discrimination in this sense against foreign banks is now more or less common even among the commercially advanced countries. It may be legal as in the United States, or conventional as in the United Kingdom. In the United States of America the law prohibits the establishment of branches of foreign banks who have thus to organise subsidiary local companies for the purpose, or do mere agency work, while in the United Kingdom the Bank of England by insisting on a British acceptance for making bills eligible for re-discount has effectively prevented foreign banks from borrowing in the London market. In countries where there is no discrimination legal or otherwise, there is the national sentiment working against them. In fact, international rivalry, jealousy and diplomacy apply as much to banks as to other spheres of national expansion and development. Examples of these restrictions and special taxation regulations are given in the appendix to the report but it is essential to add that some of these restrictions have secondary effects on the working of foreign banks and that some restrictions obtain in practice though not in law. In the few countries, where there is no such restriction or discrimination, it is because the local banks are so powerful and organised that they have not required such protection.

32 I will now proceed to give my reasons for introducing some of the terms in the license —

The restriction to port towns is necessary for the development of existing Indian banks and for the promotion and successful working of new ones. Moreover the Exchange Banks being mainly confined to port towns will have to utilise the services of these banks for their business in the interior and this will strengthen the position of the latter. It may be reasonable to claim that the operations of the foreign banks even at the port towns should be confined to purely foreign exchange business. But in view of the fact that they have been transacting other connected business in the past, I consider it advisable to allow them to continue conducting such operations so that they may not be severely handicapped. It has also been suggested that the existing up-country branches should be closed within a specified period. While I consider the suggestion not unreasonable in view of what has been stated above, I do not believe it will be necessary to go so far at the present moment, if all the other suggestions are adopted. Moreover, with the change in the political atmosphere and the general environment in which these banks will have to work, I believe such action will not be necessary. But if at any future time the Reserve Bank or the Government is satisfied that the closing of these branches is absolutely necessary for the development of Indian banks, the licensing authority will take suitable action.

33 The majority's suggestion to the Exchange Banks to adopt a scheme of probationers does not go far enough. I would refer to the practice in Italy, where foreign banks can hardly appoint their own nationals managers of local offices. In Turkey, there is a provision that half the superior officers of foreign banks should

be Turks I might also refer to the International Conference on the Treatment of Foreigners, which contemplated that only one or two foreigners could be imported into any country as manager, etc., of foreign concerns. I think, therefore, that a suitable scheme on similar lines should be adopted by which a sufficient number of Indians may be appointed to the superior grades in these banks in a reasonable time.

34 In regard to the distribution of insurance as proposed in clause (7), I think, it is a matter of sufficient importance to be specifically provided for among the conditions of the license. In our discussion with the foreign experts it was brought out that in almost all countries one half of the insurance on foreign trade was done with national companies. There is no reason why the foreign banks should not allow Indian exporters to give policies of Indian companies. Where the banks themselves insure the business, I think it is but proper they should find it practicable to patronise Indian companies, as most of this business is for stored goods or inland business which a national government would reserve to local companies. I would, therefore, suggest that the proper allocation of insurance business between Indian and non-Indian companies should be settled by a meeting of representatives of the banks and the associations of Indian insurance companies. But if they cannot come to an agreement, the Government will have to step in and arbitrate.

34A I have referred already to the loss to Indian banking arising out of the acquisition of the Allahabad Bank by outside interests. I think that, at least so far as the future is concerned, we should provide against such contingency. While public opinion could in most cases exert itself in time to present it, and it might plausibly be argued that this is a matter for the shareholders to decide, I am of opinion that the wider interests of the nation require that the controlling interest of Indian banks should not be allowed to pass to non-nationals. I may also mention that the public in India knew of the acquisition of the Allahabad Bank by the P & O Banking Corporation only after it was an accomplished fact. So far as its re-acquisition is concerned I discuss it separately in paras. 40 and 41.

34B I have referred to the necessity to vest the licensing authority with power to cancel the license of a bank in certain cases. This is not intended to be an arbitrary power to curtail successful competition of individual banks or their liberty to transact the type of business, which they would handle. It is meant to be put in operation only when wider issues are involved. I have given examples to show when it may be considered that such action is called for. The foreign banks will have to work in co-operation with the Reserve Bank and in consonance with our national economic policy. Moreover, it will be the business of the licensing authority to see that the foreign banks do not give room for such complaints as are now made, *e.g.*, that they do not give Indian traders adequate facilities. It will, therefore, be

seen that the licensing system is proposed chiefly to ensure that the banking institutions in India may work in a spirit of goodwill and co-operation and be free from the bitterness and controversies now prevalent in the country, which, if allowed to continue, cannot but result in loss of business to the foreign banks

35 The majority are of opinion that some of the terms and conditions of the license suggested by me would amount to discrimination and that it would not be expedient to adopt such measures. I may point out that effective discrimination can be hidden even under a cloak of justice. It was endorsed by the International Conference on the treatment of foreigners that the foreign institutions in any country would have to abide by any new measures applicable under the same conditions to national companies. The Exchange Banks also admitted that they would be prepared to abide by any such common regulations. Supposing it was enacted that no bank in India should employ more than half its superior staff from foreigners, to provide against policies adopted by say, the Imperial Bank of India and the Bank of India, would not this hit the foreign banks without involving discrimination? Supposing that it was proposed that five years after the starting of the Reserve Bank, it shall have power to declare, after due enquiry, that certain branches were unnecessary at certain towns and to call on the bank concerned to close the branches, would this not be effective discrimination? I am personally against such underhand discrimination. If it is considered wrong that the foreign banks should conduct their operations in a particular way I think it is far better to have it understood and legislate against it in an open manner.

36 The majority suggest that such legislation might evoke retaliatory measures against Indian banks and bankers in other countries and quote the case of Burma. I would point out that we are not suggesting any action against individual foreigners in India but against foreign banks. All banks in Burma are in the port towns and I do not think our restrictive action in India can justify their being driven out of the port towns in Burma. So far as the suggestion about Chettyais is concerned they are individuals and no restriction on their liberty could be justified on the basis of restrictions in India on banking corporations. But if Burma is separated and the Burmans feel that for the development of their own institutions Indian banks should be put under such restriction I would not object to it.

37 The majority have suggested that any restrictions on the foreign banks should be on the basis of "reciprocity". This is a much misused term, due perhaps to a failure to recognise its true import. Reciprocity is defined in the Encyclopaedia Britannica (14th Edition) as "The condition or state of being reciprocal, *i e*, where there is *give and take, mutual influence or correspondence* between the two parties, persons or things. In a more particular sense reciprocity is a special arrangement between two nations under which *the citizens of each obtain advantages or privileges*

in their trading relations with the other " Judged by this definition, there can be no real reciprocity between India and any of the other advanced nations As in our banking organisation, so in all spheres of activity we are behind all the others "Reciprocity" in our case, therefore, can only mean giving away to others the unrestricted right of exploitation without any compensating advantage being received by our country Reciprocity means "give and take", but for us there can be no "give and take", for while we are in a position to "give" as freely as we like (or even do not like), we are so heavily handicapped in regard to taking care of ourselves in our own country, that we have not the power or capacity to "take" anything from others Reciprocity means "mutual influence" but while others can and do influence us very much to our disadvantage, we are unable to influence matters in our own favour even in our own country, much less can we hope to exert influence elsewhere Reciprocity means "correspondence" between the two parties but there is absolutely no correspondence between us and the other nations who lay claim to reciprocity here Reciprocity is a special arrangement between two nations for the granting of advantageous trade relations to each other But it is impossible to see what advantages can accrue to any Indian bank in foreign countries in return for foreign banks being allowed uncontrolled domination in India We are giving to these banks the real privilege of doing business in India, both at the ports and in the interior, and to transact any and every form of banking business, resulting in a profit to them of more than one crore per annum, yet we are supposed by reciprocity to have the same rights in England and other countries. What are the possibilities of any Indian bank entering a foreign country and competing in its inland business When they are unable to compete in India even with the smallest foreign bank, what are their chances of competing with the "Big five" in England, the huge banking trusts in America, the "D" Banks in Germany or the great French banks?

38 It is to my mind very clear that there is no chance of any reciprocity between us and others at present When we are masters in our house, when we have a chain of banks, some of which at least may compare with the bigger institutions of other countries, when our citizens occupy as important a place in other countries as foreigners do in India, then and only then can we seriously consider the terms of reciprocal relations The foreign banks have already established themselves here and they may say "you may also come and establish yourself in our country" Such an offer of reciprocity in the existing unequal conditions can be nothing but mockery

39 According to the terms of the license proposed by me, foreign banks may continue to receive deposits in India The majority have come to the conclusion that legislative measure for restricting the receipt of deposits by exchange banks are not immediately called for While not agreeing with the arguments

adduced in this regard I do not dissent from their conclusion as I hope that conditions necessitating such a drastic course of action will not arise

40 I now come to the complicated problem of the Allahabad Bank. It appears that not very long ago, there were three Indian Directors out of seven on that bank but by the continuous purchase of the Indian holdings there is now only one Indian Director and the entire management has passed into foreign hands. As most of the shares are held by the P & O Banking Corporation, over which the Chartered Bank has acquired the controlling interest, the Allahabad Bank is in effect a foreign bank. Unless its management is again transferred from foreign control to Indian hands, the frictions regarding operations of foreign banks would become ineffective as they could utilise the Allahabad Bank for extending into the interior of the country. The Chartered Bank or the P & O Banking Corporation should, therefore, be persuaded to arrange within a period of five years to dispose of its shares to the Indian public. This may be done in one of two ways. Either the shares may be sold off in small lots in the market or a new company may be formed to take over the assets and liabilities of the bank. In the former case there is bound to be undue fluctuations in the value of the shares according as it is the Bank that *has* to sell or it is the public that *has* to buy. If a new company is promoted, it could have a proper valuation made of the shares to be disposed of. For example on the basis of the balance sheet as of June 1930, the value of the concern would be about Rs 90 lakhs, which corresponds very nearly to the share quotation of the bank. It is necessary that the Government should take the initiative in creating the new company and in negotiating for the acquisition of the bank. The foreign holdings in it were acquired by purchase at a market value and what is proposed is to reverse the action and let the shares go back to Indians. The majority claim that this would be an act of expropriation, but I think that there is nothing inherently wrong in acquiring such an institution in the national interest so long as proper consideration is paid to the parties concerned.

41 I have not overlooked the recommendation in para 689 of the Majority Report that every existing Indian bank should have a majority of Indian directors. So long as the controlling interest in the shareholding remains in foreign hands the carrying out of this recommendation would only be in the letter and not in the spirit.

42 I have so far made an endeavour to consider the methods by which it should be possible to regulate the monopoly power of the foreign banks in the interest of Indian trade and banking. Such regulation as I have proposed in the preceding paragraphs would undoubtedly remove some handicaps which now retard the development of our participation in foreign trade as well as our internal banking. But these would not furnish a complete solution of our

problem for, as the majority have correctly stated in paragraph 481, "it is not desirable that India should rely for all time on the facilities afforded by non-Indian Institutions for the financing of her foreign trade" The majority have, therefore, proposed the establishment of an Indian Exchange Bank, but the manner of their recommendations in favour of such an institution makes it impossible for me to agree with them While favouring the establishment of a separate Indian institution later on, they would first like to try the experiment of "inducing" the Imperial Bank "to take an active share" in the business I cannot accept as sound the proposal to make the Imperial Bank, the official Indian Exchange Bank, with all the privileges and status that the latter is proposed to be endowed with Of course no one can have any objection to the Imperial Bank taking to exchange business, after the Reserve Bank is established, but if it so decides, it should do it on its own initiative and responsibility, and no special concession need be made to the bank for this purpose But I cannot contemplate the transformation of the Imperial Bank into the Indian Exchange Bank for the reasons stated below —

- (1) I think that the argument which weighed with the Hilton Young Commission when they opposed the proposal of converting the Imperial Bank of India into the full-fledged Central Bank of the country holds as good in this connection The experience and the resources of the Imperial Bank of India, should, in my opinion, be utilised for the expansion of banking facilities within the country and it is not desirable that part of this should be diverted towards the business of financing foreign trade especially when its existing resources are most likely to be considerably reduced on account of the withdrawal of deposits by Governments, public bodies and Clearing Houses
- (2) The shares of the Imperial Bank are held, to the extent of more than half by non-Indians, as it is shown in the supplementary answers by Mr MacDonal. Thus even if the Bank agrees to the condition suggested by the majority as to the 75 per cent of the Directors on the Local Boards and a majority of those on the Central Board being Indian, there would still remain the objection that the major portion of the profits would pass into the hands of non-Indians I do not see now the majority can reconcile their "definite conclusion", "that it is not desirable that India should rely for all time on the facilities afforded by non-Indian institutions for the financing of her foreign trade" (para 481) with the proposal of making the Imperial Bank, having a majority of non-Indian shareholders, the official Indian Exchange Bank
- (3) The responsible positions in the Imperial Bank of India are filled by Europeans and even if the majority's re-

commendation is adopted regarding stopping of further recruitment of non-Indians, I think it will be a long time before Indians come to occupy such responsible positions, particularly in the Presidency and other port towns, where the exchange business is handled. The attitude of the bank during all this time may be no more sympathetic than that of the foreign exchange banks.

(4) If the Imperial Bank should be given the sole agency of Government business, as proposed by the majority and endowed with the status and special facilities proposed for the official Indian Exchange Bank, it will be impossible for any Indian bank to compete with it to any extent. It might even be reasonable to fear that the banking business in India may become the monopoly of the Imperial Bank.

(5) I am not quite sure whether the Imperial Bank will agree to enter the exchange field under the conditions proposed by the majority, especially because it would involve it in effective competition with the foreign banks. The whole scheme therefore might prove illusory.

43 For these reasons I do not think that we would be justified in wasting any time in negotiating with the Imperial Bank. The Indian Exchange Bank should be started as soon as possible and for several reasons it will be better to start it immediately after the establishment of the Reserve Bank. In the first place, when the Reserve Bank is started, the Indian Banks will feel more confident about investing some part of their resources in the shares of the Indian Exchange Bank. Secondly, the Bank's operations would require the use of the suggested facilities from the Reserve Bank. Thirdly, the Bank's status in foreign countries will be greater, if it is known that it is working in co-operation with the Reserve Bank and is its official agent.

43A I have explained why I do not agree with the majority recommendation to make the Imperial Bank the official Indian Exchange Bank. Apart from this aspect of the problem, there is the more fundamental one as to whether the Bank, as at present managed, can be allowed to continue to enjoy the privileges and status of sole and even Chief Agent of the Government or of the Reserve Bank, with or without a charter. In view of the importance of the question from the national point of view, I append, as Annexure B, a note on this subject.

44 So far as the scheme of the Bank is concerned, I am unable to agree with the one proposed by the majority or with that of a purely state exchange bank proposed by others. The latter idea does not appeal to me, as I am anxious to make it possible for the Indian Joint Stock Banks, which do not at present take any part in the business of financing foreign trade, to enter the field. Their aspirations to deal in foreign exchange must be recognised and they should be given a chance to undertake the business of financing



India's foreign trade. Yet it can hardly be denied that with their present resources, any attempt on their part to do this business in the near future, will not only jeopardise their inland business but will also introduce an element of unhealthy competition among themselves in a field in which they have at present no experience. The sporadic expansion of their activities involving waste of capital and misdirection and frittering away of national economic energy can, however, be avoided if instead of entering the exchange field unaided and isolated they combine to create a new bank, on which would be conferred some special privileges both by the Government and Reserve Bank as proposed by the majority in paras. 486-487 and which would further be able to utilise for its business the services of a specialised expert staff not easily available to any single banking institution.

45 Much of the progress of the British and non-British exchange banks is due to their close co-operation with mercantile houses of their own nationality and the success of the Indian Exchange Bank will be ensured by similar co-operation with the Indian mercantile houses and individual merchants. This aspect of the matter cannot be too strongly emphasised and it is my firm conviction that unless Indian merchants and traders make genuine efforts to strengthen the hands of the Bank, the progress of the Bank cannot be as healthy and rapid as we would wish. The Indian Exchange Bank will thus be both an opportunity and a test. It is for this reason that I recommend that shares should be kept open for subscription by the Indian commercial community.

46 I have prepared a scheme for the Indian Exchange Bank based on these principles and it is appended to this note (Annexure A.)

47 The meagre participation of Indians in our foreign trade make me ponder over the part played by Governments in the promotion of foreign trade. In other countries Governments take a very active part in providing facilities to merchants engaged in foreign trade. These facilities may be in the form of services of Trade Commissioners and Consular Officers or may be financial aid through bounties and exemptions. They may also assume the form of cheaper credit for foreign trade than for domestic trade.

48 The most important of these are, however, the various Export Credit Schemes. In England, for instance, though private organizations, such as the British Trade Indemnity Company have been working for a long time and performing useful service in protecting exporters and bankers against possible loss due to the failure of foreign importers in meeting their liabilities, the British Government have nevertheless considered it necessary to come forward and initiate a number of Export Credit Schemes themselves. Their main object in this respect has been to help exporters in financing their shipments to those countries bills on which are not considered safe by the banks, and to enable the former to accept orders from importers in these countries. After trying two or three schemes, the Government adopted in November 1928 the new con-

tract Form B by which through agreement between the banks and the Export Credits Guarantee Department, a scheme of Government guarantee was inaugurated insuring the bank against risks of failures of the foreign importer. The total amount of guarantee approved under this scheme in December 1928 was £ 4,532,000

49 In Germany again, though there are two private companies providing export credit insurance, the participation of the Government also deserves special mention. For, besides helping these companies with funds, they also re-insure the whole of what is called catastrophic risk and a portion of the normal export credit risk.

50 In France, the Government started the French National Bank for Foreign Trade for enabling exporters to obtain advances against their shipments by drawing bills on the bank to be discounted in the open market. This bank has a special annual subsidy and a loan without interest from the Government so that it might stimulate the export trade of the country.

51 In Japan special schemes have always been in operation to stimulate exports and this has been managed through the special credit facilities enjoyed by the Japanese Exchange Banks with the Bank of Japan in connection with their purchases of export bills. This has resulted in practical exclusion of foreign banks from export trade though imports into Japan are mostly handled by the foreign banks.

52 A scheme of stimulating Indian participation in our foreign trade and modelled on the lines of the British and French schemes cannot but be a great success. The Government should create an Export Credits Board which should guarantee the bills of Indian exporters after taking suitable security. These bills would then be eagerly sought after by the exchange banks instead of being taken for collection as now. In this way, the funds of the Indian exporter would come back to him as soon as his export is made, instead of his having to wait about five months. There should then result a considerable increase in Indian participation in foreign trade which is so urgently and essentially necessary.

53 I cannot agree with the majority regarding the feasibility or advisability of the "joint" banks. These joint banks are contemplated in two forms. In the first form, equal amounts would be subscribed by India in rupees and a particular foreign country in its own currency and the control and establishment would be under joint supervision and the division of profits equal. In the second form there would be an interchange of shares between Indian and foreign banks and each party acquiring an equal interest in the other, and the two institutions would work together as one concern for the interests of both.

54 With regard to the first suggestion it must be remembered that the foreign countries have their own banks in India and unless some form of compulsion is brought in they would not agree to the formation of the new companies which would not bring any additional advantage to them and in fact would practically mean their



## ANNEXURE A

*Scheme for an Indian Exchange Bank*

(Vide para 46 on page 568)

*Capital*—The initial capital of the proposed Indian Exchange Bank will depend on the volume of business it will handle. Assuming the Indian share of foreign trade at 15 per cent there will be about 40 crores of exports and 40 crores of imports to be handled. It has been estimated by a writer in the *Indian Finance* (23rd November 1929) that the amount which all the Indian branches of the Exchange Banks are required to provide out of their own resources in order to finance the total export business is about 65 crores and the foreign offices supply funds to the extent of 15 crores, making a total of 80 crores. For handling 15 per cent of this business and for making advances in port towns to exporters and importers, the bank will require 15 crores of resources. The requisite share capital may therefore be put down at three crores. This amount need not be called up all at once but may be subscribed in two or three years. The capital of the bank may be increased as and when required, particularly when the establishment of more foreign branches is contemplated. The subscription to the shares should, in the first instance, be thrown open to the joint-stock banks and the general public and, if not fully subscribed within a prescribed time, and any portion unallotted should be taken up by the Government, who may dispose of them later on to the public. It is necessary to provide that no non-national banks or individuals will be allowed to take up shares of the bank and this restriction will naturally apply to any transfers of shares also.

It may be necessary that the Government should guarantee a minimum dividend or say 5 per cent for the first ten years. The guarantee of a minimum dividend is required to facilitate the participation of the banks in the share capital of the Exchange Bank. It would enable the subscribing banks to earn the normal return on their respective holdings of shares and so maintain their own balance-sheet position. I have the authority of an experienced and reputable exchange banker to the effect that under a strictly conservative management, the Government would not stand to lose on the whole by this guarantee. If, however, the Government have to make any payments on account of this guarantee, provision should be made to repay these amounts out of future profits above the guaranteed rate.

Provision may also be made for the Government to receive a share in the profits above a certain rate of dividend so long as they continue their guarantee or other financial assistance.

*Clientele*—At first the bank may have to rely mostly on export business of clients as the selling of the export bills is usually the only transaction that the exporter is free to conduct as he likes. Import bills are presented through the agent banks in India of the banks which originally paid for them in the foreign country and until Indian importers are able to insist that the bills shall be sent to and be presented by the Indian Exchange Bank, this business in sufficient volume will not be available. When the bank opens a London or other foreign branch, during the first few years it may have to count chiefly on the handful of Indians in that place, but the main advantage of these branches would be to buy import bills on India which would considerably increase the margin of profit. Hence, even if the branches themselves do not pay for their expenses, it may be found that they contribute indirectly to the profits of the institution and in increasing the clientele in India.

With the increased facilities that Indians will receive from the bank and the advantage of its helpful advice, Indian participation in foreign trade is bound to grow and this will increase its clientele both as regards number and volume of business.

*Functions*—The Indian Exchange Bank will have branches only in the port towns in India and will finance the operations of exporting and importing firms in these ports but it will not compete in inland business. If it requires representation in the interior, it will utilize the services of local institutions in the same manner as is proposed in the case of the other exchange banks.

In order to avoid competition with the Indian banks in the matter of attracting deposits it should be provided that the bank will not accept deposits except from its own clients engaged in foreign trade.

*Resources*—It has been pointed out that the total resources required for the bank will be 15 crores. Three crores will be share capital and about two crores of deposits may be expected. The balance of about ten crores will have to be supplied in a special way until the bank is able to establish itself properly. The Reserve Bank should therefore be authorized to lend, at a concessional rate, up to ten crores to the Indian Exchange Bank. The whole of this amount will not be required in the beginning, but the limit should be established from the start. As the bank's business increases, it will be increasing its own resources by way of deposits but this special loan may be called for during a considerable period.

*Agency business in London*—The Reserve Bank will naturally have to arrange for the service of the Public Debt and for payments on account of the Secretary of State. Instead of opening a London Branch for this purpose it can help the Indian Exchange Bank to maintain its London Office without loss by making it its agent and paying it a service charge. This privilege is enjoyed by semi-national banks everywhere. As instances may be quoted the Commonwealth Bank of Australia, the Yokohama Specie Bank and the Bank of Montreal. If the London branch is unable to meet its expenses, the Government should pay a bounty during the first five years to make up the deficiency. Such bounties have been given in France for the National Bank for foreign trade and in England to the Agricultural Mortgage Corporation.

The Government may in this respect specify certain conditions to be satisfied by the bank.

*London resources*—The Bank will have to keep a good portion of its own funds, between two and five crores, in London either in sterling securities or with the banks. If the Reserve Bank will lend some of its floating London balances instead of investing in sterling bills, this will enable the bank to do without resort to the London market.

*Remittance business of the Government*—The Government's remittance business will be carried on through the Reserve Bank which will judge of the time and manner of such remittances. If it decides to adopt the system of tenders, the Indian Exchange Bank should receive preference in allotment, provided it can be done without loss to the taxpayer. If that bank and other banks have tendered at the same rate, the Indian Exchange Bank should, subject to the discretion of the Reserve Bank, receive full allotment and the other banks should receive *pro rata* distributions. Thus the banks will be furnished with a dependable demand for its sterling balances. If the remittance is arranged for by negotiation, the Reserve Bank having decided on the rate at which it will buy sterling should buy from the Indian Exchange Bank the amount it is prepared to sell at that rate and buy the balance only from the other banks.

It is not unlikely that the foreign banks may combine to defeat the scheme of the bank and for this purpose may quote uneconomic rates so as to prevent the Indian bank receiving any allotment. For this reason the Reserve Bank should be authorized in such special cases to buy from the Indian Bank at such rates as it considers are justified by market conditions, but it may penalize the banks which tendered the uneconomic rates by allotting the balance to them.

In view of these privileges, the Indian Exchange Bank should undertake to place at the disposal of the Reserve Bank any surplus foreign resources.

which it may have at any time and which the Reserve Bank may require for the purpose of strengthening its international position. In such a case the Indian Exchange Bank will be entitled to receive payment for the same at a rate which to take the ease of sterling may be better by the equivalent of  $1/32d$  than the average rate at which the Reserve Bank's purchase of foreign currencies were made in the preceding week.

*Other foreign branches*—The opening of other foreign branches by the bank will depend on the business it has at those centres. At first it will, of course, establish connections through agents and correspondents, but later on it may find it useful to have branches in New York, Berlin, etc. As already stated, these branches may not be paying in the absolute sense, but their value would be in increasing business, better profits in India, and enhanced international status.

*Access to the London Market*—The Bank will have its own London resources as stated above. But as regards access to the London Market, it will be no worse off than other non-British banks handling our foreign trade. As regards export bills on London, if the acceptor is a British subject, the Indian bank can discount them at the same rate as other banks as the Discount Houses can put their own signatures as the second one. If accepted by non-Britishers, the Indian bank will have to pay a higher discount rate or hold them in portfolio like other banks. As regards House Paper, British Houses will not approach it and until Indian business houses have London offices, this problem will not arise.

*Management*—The Board of Directors of the Bank will be appointed in the same manner as in the case of ordinary joint stock banks. But in view of their participation in the share capital of the Bank as well as for the proposed guarantee on shares, the Government should have the right to nominate at least two directors to keep watch over and safeguard their interests. For the same purpose the appointment of the Chief Executive Officers of the Bank as well as his Deputy should be subject to the confirmation of the Government. Owing to the facilities proposed to be given to the Exchange Bank by the Reserve Bank of India, the latter should also have the right to keep itself apprised of the state of affairs of the Bank and call for such information as it may consider necessary.

*Distribution of profits*—Owing to the financial assistance rendered by the Government to the Bank, which will be essentially a commercial bank owned by shareholders, the profits earned by the bank in excess of 8 per cent will be apportioned between the Government and the shareholders on the basis of such proportions as may be approved by the former.

NALINI RANJAN SARKER

## ANNEXURE B

*Imperial Bank of India*

(Vide para 43-A on page 567)

The Imperial Bank of India has come to occupy a very important place in the banking structure of the country through its long association with the Government for about a century. It has now total deposits of nearly eighty crores which is just over one-third of the total deposits of all banks in India. It enjoys a prestige and status which it has consolidated during all these years, and which has considerably helped it in its competition with Indian joint stock banks.

2 It now enjoys most of the privileges and is entrusted with some of the responsibilities of a Central Bank, and indeed it seemed possible at one time that it might become a full-fledged Central Bank. But now that a separate Reserve Bank is going to be established in the near future, it would be useful to discuss the position of the Imperial Bank, pending the creation of the Reserve Bank and after. For as the latter will have only a limited number of branches, it will have to transact its Government business at other centres through agents.

3 The majority have suggested in para 529 that though the Reserve Bank will have full discretion in choosing its agents, it is likely of its own accord to choose the Imperial Bank as its chief if not the sole agent on account of its having numerous branches all over the country. I would point out that the number of branches will not be the only or even principal deciding factor, but the Reserve Bank should be guided in its choice by the advantages to the public of its arrangement by the requirements of a rational banking policy and by the suitability of the terms and conditions under which the agency can be arranged. Consequently, I do not see why the majority should fetter the choice of the Reserve Bank by thus forestalling it.

4 As regards the advisability of such a choice I am unable to agree to the granting of any special privilege and status to the Imperial Bank of India so long as it maintains its existing characteristics both in respect of its share participation as well as its working policy. The majority proposals envisage a position for the Imperial Bank which is only bestowed on truly national banks in other countries. I am at a loss to understand how the Imperial Bank could legitimately be held to correspond to a national bank while it lacks the element of national control in regard both to its shareholding and to its management.

5 It is no doubt true that the Imperial Bank occupies a strong position in the country. It has nearly 170 branches, but it is more to the point to realise that at present the majority of its shares are held by non-Indians (284 lakhs being held by non-Indians as against 278 lakhs held by Indians). It would, to my mind, be an anomaly to regard such an institution as national, so long as this non-national predominance is allowed to prevail, and I cannot see how effective national control can be obtained unless steps are taken to establish and maintain a substantial majority of shares in the hands of nationals. Otherwise, the position of the Imperial Bank would not be different in this respect from that of foreign banks in India, who have acquired considerable status in the country. When, therefore, the majority propose to allow the Imperial Bank to develop further in its entrenched position it becomes imperative to lay down some specific conditions so as to establish it on the footing of a true national institution.

6 Apart from the question of shareholding, there are other considerations, which require to be taken into account. It is no doubt true that with the majority of shares in Indian hands, the policy of the bank would tend to be nationalistic, but it is necessary also that the staff should be increasingly Indian for otherwise it would be difficult for any national

policy adopted by the shareholders to be implemented with any sincerity or enthusiasm. I maintain that the question of *personnel* is second in importance only to the question of shareholding, for, in any case, a predominant element of non-Indians in the higher *personnel* tends to work to the advantage of non-Indians and disadvantage of Indians. Non-Indians are likely to be given preference, in many indirect and subtle ways, over Indians. The question of staff is, therefore, of such importance that it cannot be left as a matter of internal concern to the bank, and at the entire discretion of the directorate alone if the Bank is to enjoy any special privileges. No doubt a majority of Indian shareholders would accelerate the process of Indianisation, but until and unless the majority is established the question has a wider national significance demanding Government intervention to ensure that a policy of effective Indianisation is carried on as rapidly as is compatible with efficiency. The majority are apparently satisfied with the Indianisation policy of the Bank as explained by Mr. MacDonald and do not consider that the privileges of free Government balances and Treasury work justify the enforcement of "further Indianisation" particularly as in connection with the former work the Bank is incurring large expenditure. There are three points which I would bring out in this connection —

The first is that where the Bank employs special staff for the Treasury work, the Government could well insist that they shall be composed almost wholly of Indians. Secondly I am not convinced that the Bank spends as much on this work as it gets out of it. With a free average balance of ten crores, I think the work involved, considering its total expenses, would be more than the profits derived by lending the funds. Thirdly I am not satisfied with the Indianisation policy of the Bank. Accordingly to the figures furnished to us, ten years of working of the scheme have not produced the desirable result. There are now only 43 Indian staff officers against 80 Europeans and I understand that the number of Indians is not more now than it was in 1925. Moreover there are as many as 197 Indian probationers, who have completed their training awaiting promotion to the higher grade. During the year 1925 the Bank appointed 32 Europeans to the higher grade and only 14 Indians. Since then 23 Europeans have been appointed as against 17 Indians. I am led to believe therefore that the policy of Indianisation will be effective only if further non-Indian recruitment is stopped from now onwards particularly as even then, it will take many years before an Indian would occupy a responsible administrative post in the bank. To this condition the majority are also agreeable but only in case the Imperial Bank is made the official Indian Exchange Bank. I do not see why the Indianisation policy should be dependent on this factor. The privileges at present enjoyed by the bank are just as valuable as those it will have as the Indian Exchange Bank and if the restriction is justified in the latter case, it can as well be imposed in the former.

7. Turning then from the internal aspect to the outer aspect of the Bank's policy, the charge of partiality towards non-Indians is substantiated in many ways, and undoubtedly is due as much to the predominance of the non-Indian element in the staff as to the composition of its directorate. Complaints have been made by many witnesses that the European *clientele* of the bank get a more favourable treatment at its hands than the Indian *clientele* and the following items taken from the statement submitted by Mr. MacDonald regarding the deposits and the advances and the loan policy of the bank, support the contention —

<i>Deposits</i>		<i>Advances</i>	
	Lakhs		Lakhs
Non-Indians—			
Current Accounts	5,64	Non-Indians	11,70
Fixed deposits	2,64		
	<hr/>		
TOTAL	8,28		
	<hr/>		



Indians—

Current Accounts	17 32	Indians	30,38
Fixed deposits	21,49		
	<hr/>		
TOTAL	38,81		
	<hr/>		

Thus it will be seen that while non-Indians have been getting more advances than their deposits, advances to Indians are far short of their own deposits. The privileges of free Government balances cannot justifiably be granted to a Bank whose attitude towards the clients, Indian and European, is shown to be so strongly contrasted. In my opinion, the situation demands the making of certain provisions whereby it should be possible to withdraw the privileges whenever the Reserve Bank has been satisfied that the Imperial Bank pursues a policy of discrimination against Indian clients.

8 In regard to the Imperial Bank's treatment of Indian insurance companies, it was stated by the Managing Governor that they had adopted a plan of freely accepting from their clients the policies of certain approved Indian companies. But regarding its own insurance, which would be far more than its clients' business, he said that it insured only with foreign companies with whom it had a long connection. Asked whether he would not like to consider the desirability of distributing some of this business to Indian companies, he put forward the preposterous plea that it would be inadvisable to disturb the existing arrangements. This is illustrative of the attitude of the officials of the Bank and their attitude to Indian industries and institutions. I think it is necessary that a Bank enjoying special privileges from the Government should as a matter of policy prefer Indian institutions to foreign ones.

9 Like some other institution under Government control the Imperial Bank is a member of the European Chambers of Commerce and has not cared, so far as I am aware, to seek membership of any Indian Chamber. I consider it very undesirable that a bank so intimately associated with the Government should identify itself so closely with foreign interests. The undesirable result of such close association was clearly perceived from the fact that the evidence of the Bank's representative before the Committee followed rather too closely that of the European Chambers of Commerce and the Exchange Banks. Indeed one might very well expect an attitude of close co-operation with Indian interests in a Bank seeking special status.

10 In view of the facts mentioned above, I think it is not desirable to grant the Imperial Bank a charter under existing conditions. I would, however, be prepared to support it if some conditions were imposed on the Bank in return for the bestowal of privileges. In that case, the charter should allow an opportunity of Indianising the institution, and I give below some of the more important conditions that should be imposed on a quasi-national bank of the kind contemplated in the Imperial Bank of the future —

- (1) It shall have a 60 per cent majority of Indians on the Central Board and 75 per cent on the Local Boards, nominations to be made by the Government to make up any deficiency in the shareholders' election.
- (2) The Imperial Bank shall not hereafter recruit any non-Indian except with the special sanction of the Finance Member.
- (3) It shall not transact business with foreign insurance companies, nor act as agents for them, when suitable Indian insurance companies are available for the purpose.
- (4) There will be no transfer of shares to non-Indians until their holdings become less than 33 per cent and then only to such extent that subsequent transfer will not increase the non-Indian holding above this proportion.

- (5) That it shall not compete with Indian joint stock banks by introducing an uneconomic rate of interest or by opening new branches in centres already served by them
- (6) It shall not identify itself with any particular section of foreign or Indian businessmen

11 Even if no charter is granted I must emphasise that these stipulations are necessary if the Imperial Bank is given the sole or even chief agency of the Reserve Bank for its Government work. If, however, the Reserve Bank should not choose the Imperial Bank as its sole or even chief agent, the latter must be content to occupy a position like that of other joint stock banks in India and will have to abide by the provisions of the banking law as regards such matters as shares and management. The Reserve Bank may also, in pursuit of a national banking policy, choose other Indian banks as its agents even in places where the Imperial Bank has branches. It will then find a vast amount of difference between its present status and its future one.

12 There is one other important aspect of the working of the Imperial Bank which from the point of view of the Indian joint stock banks is of great significance, namely the Imperial Bank's competition with them. It is contended that the Bank attracts deposits at a cheaper rate on account of the prestige of Government association and lends the money cheaply. This is claimed to be an advantage to the public. No doubt it would be so if the bank were actuated by this motive alone. It might be argued on the other hand that this has jeopardised the interests of Indian banks, entailing loss of business to them, and also confining them to comparatively more risky business. The contention of cheaper rates is belied by the fact that in places where there are no branches of other banks, or where other banks have been ousted, the Imperial Bank has generally imposed high rates. When his attention was called to such facts the Managing Governor defended himself by saying that the rate in certain localities might be higher than in others as the public interest was not the Bank's sole motive in fixing the rates for lending or depositing and that it had its profits to look after. I am of opinion that this unequal competition is unhealthy and undesirable, particularly when it is remembered that out of the 100 branches opened under the Act, no less than 50 were opened at places where other banks were already established.

13 I am, therefore, of opinion that the Reserve Bank should give due consideration to this aspect when it exercises its discretion in permitting the opening of new branches by the Imperial Bank. I would also suggest to the latter that it should seriously consider an attitude of non-competition with Indian banks. It may go one step further and decide to close those of its branches which are not working at a profit, provided the public in these centres have other Indian banks to whom they could resort.

14 In the interim period, it will be well for the Bank to consider seriously the unwisdom of pursuing the lines of policy which I have referred to, and to which Indian opinion could justly point as reasons for discontinuing the existing Government patronage. If it will adopt from now on a new outlook as suggested by the conditions proposed by me for the charter, it would be acting in its own true interests. To the extent to which it changes its policy on these fundamental matters it may reasonably expect the support of India public opinion which would otherwise be reluctantly forced to disfavour the continuance of the privileges, which have fostered the growth of the premier Indian Bank.

### *Conclusion*

The comprehensive character of the development of Indian banking envisaged by us, comprising schemes of rural, industrial, commercial and foreign trade finance, easily tends to show that however desirable or theoretically sound these propositions may be, the translation of the schemes into practical action will depend absolutely on the availability of resources for these projects. This would be the crucial test to demonstrate that our pro-

posals have been prompted by considerations of actualities. I have carefully considered this essential aspect of our enquiry and have come to the conclusion that our recommendations including those contained in my separate minutes do not involve any proposition that might be regarded as either utopian or too ambitious for immediate action. I have constantly borne in mind these practical considerations when according my support to the proposals of the majority as well as in framing my separate report.

2 The adoption of our schemes will call for a considerable augmentation of our resources for the purposes of both short and long term finance. The former will be required in connection with the reorganisation of the credit facilities for agriculture, trade, industry and commerce. This demand will be met to a considerable extent by the increased fluidity of funds secured by the general banking development of the country and the close co-operation of the different agencies in our internal money market. Considerable facilities for the increased requirements of short term accommodation would also be available from the Reserve Bank, which, if started with a margin of gold assets of 10 per cent as suggested by the Hilton Young Commission, will enable to meet increased trade demands by new issues of currency up to 50 crores under normal conditions. Even on the existing strength of the currency reserves, as shown by Dr. Trip, it will be possible to issue additional currency to the extent of Rs 25 crores (*Vide* Dr. Trip's Note on Money Market in India).

3 Long term finance will be required for the share capital and debentures of the Industrial Corporations, Land Mortgage Banks and the shares of the Reserve Bank and the Indian Exchange Bank. It will be noted that the demand for these funds would not be made at once to the extent of the full amount that may be needed to conduct their operations. The Industrial Corporations and Land Mortgage Banks will depend for the bulk of their funds on debentures which will be issued in separate blocks from time to time. The floatations of the debentures will therefore be spread over a few years and in normal years, it should not be difficult to direct the annual savings of the nation and the disorganised individual investors into this form of investment. Even now the requirements of industrial finance and land mortgage credit are being provided, though often on prohibitive terms, by some agencies which will have the funds returned to them as a result of the activities of the proposed institutions. These funds must seek re-investment and the debentures of the Land Mortgage Banks and Industrial Corporations, should become safe and attractive investments particularly when it is known that the Government itself subscribe to them. The fact that the debentures will be made Trustee Securities will make them popular with the Insurance Companies and other Trustees.

4 I do not think, there will be any insurmountable difficulty in mobilising sufficient resources necessary for investment in shares and debentures of the institutions we have proposed, provided attractive schemes are adopted and the national leaders appeal to the nation for mobilising their small savings for these purposes, as the leaders in the belligerent countries did during the last War. With a national economic policy actively pursued by the Government, public confidence and enthusiasm will be created for successfully tapping the scattered resources of the people. A change of policy regarding the capital expenditure programme of the government in consonance with the needs of the schemes of development proposed by us will have to be adopted and pursued with determination. If, however, all the resources necessary for the development of our big national industries be not forthcoming by the methods stated above, the necessary capital may be secured by foreign loans. But sufficient precaution will have to be taken to ensure that such loans do not in any way result in a transfer of control over industries into foreign hands, with which object the state or industrial corporations should borrow the money in foreign markets and make the same available to individual industries.

NALINI RANJAN SARKER

## Minute of Dissent by Six Members of the Committee.

Our colleagues' conclusion is that "speaking from the point of view of trade alone, it may be said that the facilities available at present for financing India's foreign trade, both imports and exports, are sufficient." We disagree with this premise. According to them the interests of trade alone do not require the immediate establishment of an Indian Exchange Bank, strong enough to compete successfully with foreign banks. We disagree with this solution too.

2 They, however, mention that after a careful review of certain representations made to the Committee, they have come to consider that it is not desirable that India should rely for all time on the facilities afforded by non-Indian institutions for the financing of foreign trade.

3 Reasoning thus our colleagues propose that after the starting of the Reserve Bank for India the Imperial Bank should be "induced" to take an active share in the financing of India's foreign trade. With the terms to be offered to the Imperial Bank and the restrictions to be placed on it in connection with such work, we are not immediately concerned here. Our main difference with our colleagues is on the diagnosis of India's complaint regarding finance of her foreign trade till now. We view the grievance of India in this connection more seriously, and, our proposals for remedying the same are therefore more definite, and of a more urgent nature.

4 We fail to see how from the "point of view of trade alone" it can be said that the facilities available at present for financing India's foreign trade are sufficient. If our colleagues mean that India's foreign trade has not come to a standstill at any time yet for want of financial facilities, one may at least pause to consider before challenging the statement. But every Indian commercial body that has appeared before the Committee has complained that, in the matter of providing financial facilities for import and export trade, the Exchange Banks have, generally speaking, been differentiating between national and non-national exporters and importers. This complaint, so unanimously lodged before the Committee by Indian commercial bodies, can be confirmed by some of us from personal knowledge. Indeed, the history of foreign trade passing into European hands since the establishment of these Banks in India, proves, for all practical purposes, the truth of the case of the Indian commercial community as urged on this Committee.

5 Sinha observes in his "Early European Banking in India"—"During the latter half of the eighteenth century, when the East India Company was in power without responsibility, most of the foreign trade passed out of the hands of the people. The inland trade was also monopolised by the servants of the Company for a considerable time. As a result of this, the indigenous bankers naturally lost their old pre-eminence. But European Banks could not fill the void created by the decay of the old indi-

genous banks                      Almost the entire foreign trade had passed into the hands of Europeans when European banks came to be established "

6 The foreign trade with Europe in those days passed from the hands of the East India Company to those of non-Indian private merchants and Agency Houses, which latter were chiefly formed of " gentlemen, who had been in the Civil and Military Services, who finding their habits better adapted for commercial pursuits obtained permission to resign their situations and engage in agency and mercantile business " These European Banks started with the privilege of issuing notes and, being under European management and proprietorship, commanded a prestige which completely put the indigenous banking system and personnel at a most serious disadvantage In fact, it is said that the political and economic upheaval at the time was at once destructive and constructive With a history of this nature, the process that started with the commencement of the nineteenth century, has continued unabated, with the result that the volume of foreign trade of India in the hands of Indians to-day, as direct exporters and importers, is not estimated at a higher figure than 15 per cent. of the total trade This figure, given by the Indian Chamber of Commerce, Calcutta, has been challenged by the European Exchange Banks who have merely given percentage figures for different centres where they have offices in India, leaving the Committee to work out the total percentage for all India They have not explained how, from percentages of different banks, one could justifiably arrive at a percentage of the total They have admittedly included in the Indian share, all the business in respect of which bills were drawn on Indian consumers or distributors, though the real importing parties were non-Indians, who controlled, contracted for, and earned commissions or profit in the transaction They have also admittedly not taken into consideration the large volume of business done by firms like Ralli Brothers, who do not operate through the European Exchange Banks, in the usual course, for finance of their foreign trade

7 On the other hand, the basis\* of the calculation adopted by the Indian Chamber of Commerce, Calcutta, is the actual value of trade as disclosed by official and private publications We, therefore, prefer, in the absence of any other data which will enable us to arrive at a more accurate estimate, to accept the estimate of the Indian Chamber, which is in harmony with, and receives corroboration from, the general estimates prevalent among the Indian commercial community

8 We feel that the Committee cannot dismiss lightly this phase of the working of the non-national Exchange Banks in this country Indeed, we are convinced that as far as the Indian commercial community is concerned, this Committee will have failed in its duty if it does not examine the reasons why the foreign trade of the country is so preponderatingly in the hands of non-nationals and

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\* See appendix III, Volume of Written Evidence

suggest suitable and speedy remedies for it. We cannot accept the plea that the Indian has not enterprise enough to compete with the non-national in respect of commerce, either internal or external, on anything approaching fair competitive terms. Before the advent of the British, and, before European Banks drove foreign business from the hands of Indians into those of European traders, Indian commercial firms are known to have successfully carried on foreign business on a large scale in ordinary country crafts and Indian-made wooden ships to various parts of the world.\* What is it then that has led to the virtual concentration of the entire foreign trade of India during the last 100 years in the hands of non-Indians? Control of shipping and of banking facilities are the two main causes which can chiefly be mentioned in this connection. We are convinced that, of these two, the concentration of foreign trade finance in the hands of banks controlled and run by non-nationals has played the more important part.

9 The knowledge of banking in India was long anterior to the settlement of the English in India, though the system under which it was carried on, may be regarded as different from that which the Europeans introduced. Writing in 1863, Cooke, in his "Rise, Progress and Present condition of Banking in India", says — "From time immemorial, the banker has always been an important member of Indian society. Formerly, in all divisions and subdivisions of that society, he had his type and representative, discharging functions of indispensable necessity to the well-being of the community. The Empire had its Banker, the Subah had its Banker, the Zillah had its Banker, and Village had its Banker. Each in his sphere exercised an engrossing influence; each, in addition to his financial, was charged with a large proportion of social and political responsibilities. The traditions of the Hindu, and records of the Mohemmadan periods of our history, endow the higher classes of Bankers with the character and powers of the Ministers of the State. No Royal or Imperial Council was complete in its members without the Banker."

"The character and extent of Indian Banking have been frequently cited in refutation of the unjust calumnies with which the opponents of Indian political reforms have aspersed this nation. There can be no surer proof of the soundness of a people's moral condition, and their habitual regard to truth in the transactions of life, than the prevalence of so much credit as is necessary to the existence of such a system of Banking. The native Bankers themselves are patterns of commercial morality. The dishonouring of a *hundi* is an event of rare occurrence with them. They transact business with each other, and with their constituents, with a total disregard of those forms which English commercial men deem essentially requisite, and, without the aid of which, indeed an English house of business would scarcely be secured. One peculiar feature of native Banks has always struck us as peculiarly gratifying. The business is usually carried on by *gumasthas*, or clerks holding a

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\* R. M. Martin's Indian Empire, Vol. III page 559, referred to on page 263, Ran's Present day Banking in India

confidential position in the firm. They are often poor men and yet are never called upon to furnish security. Their remuneration is not high, and they have often the entire disposal of the capital of a *Cootee* yet it rarely happens that a firm loses anything by their dishonesty.

“ The fact that Europeans are not the originators of Banking in this country need not strike us with surprise, for, both from internal evidence, which the success of the British aims in the Punjab further extended and opened out, we know that civilization and the arts distinguish the *East* for a very considerable period before the *West* had begun to emerge from ignorance and barbarism ”

It is in a country with such history and a people with such latent qualities that the total finance of its foreign trade is with non-nationals. No wonder that its people smart under a sense of material loss and moral humiliation involved in this ousting of her sons from this field of activity which should be theirs.

10 On the various complaints of discrimination lodged before the Committee, it was not possible to sift the instances supplied more closely than we did for the simple reason that the Committee could not summon the Bank complained against, to refute the charge. Efforts were made in some cases by representatives of Exchange Banks to explain away some of those charges but nothing substantial has been adduced before us which would justify our coming to the conclusion that the charges levelled against the Exchange Banks were without substance.

11 Indian commercial bodies giving evidence before us said that several of their members based their opinions on instances within their personal knowledge. But, for obvious reasons many of them were not prepared to give details of their grievances for formal submission to this Committee. Even those who did volunteer such instances were prompted to do so by a sense of public duty and we have no reason to believe that they either exaggerated their complaints, or concealed the truth.

12 If, therefore, the share of Indians in handling the foreign trade of India is extremely limited, if not nominal, as explained above, and if as we conclude, one of the main reasons for this is the finance of foreign trade being the monopoly of non-national banks, we cannot agree with our colleagues' solution that the interests of trade alone do not require the immediate establishment of an Indian Exchange Bank strong enough to compete successfully with foreign banks.

13 If by trade our colleagues mean trade as conducted by any body, they may be right. By “ the interests of trade alone ” we however understand “ the interests of the trade of India bringing the best share in it by way of profit, employment, scope for ability to the nationals, and prestige to India ”. The Indian Chamber of Commerce, Calcutta have the following remarks to make in this connection —

“ As a result of this monopoly Indian firms find it very difficult to compete with European firms who get all the assist-

being supplied. The practice of "One firm, one Bank" has still to develop in India, and it may be regarded as a tall order from a Bank, advancing a casual loan, asking its customer to disclose his fullest position to it. We disagree with the statement made by the experts that "secrecy about business affairs seems much more cherished in India than in other countries." The fact of the matter is that Managers of non-national Banks, not being either willing or able to keep in touch with their Indian customers, as is the case in our Experts' friends' countries, rely for reports about the standing and financial position of their Indian customers on either their subordinates or third parties like brokers and other intermediaries, and hence the ultra-conservative estimates of the credits deserved by Indian customers. We cannot help deploring the reflection implied in the impression conveyed to the foreign experts by their informants—and we feel that such an extraordinary demand as that of having balance-sheets audited by "approved auditors" is, by itself, sufficient to make out a case for a change in the monopoly of the finance of India's foreign trade.

16 In paragraph 268 of the Report our colleagues refer to the practice in other countries of banks engaged in the financing of export trade rendering invaluable assistance by supplying their customers with information regarding foreign markets and the prevailing prices. They further say that the existing institutions which finance the foreign trade of India, and which are almost entirely non-Indian, have not taken any steps in this direction. We wonder why our colleagues overlook the effect on our foreign trade of this serious handicap of the agency of the finance of foreign trade, as it exists at present. We will only say that if this defect of the non-Indian Exchange Banks has not been remedied during a period of about 70 years of their existence, it is unreasonable to find fault with the Indian commercial community for their persistent demand for a change in the inevitable angle of vision of the existing Exchange Banks.

17 Our diagnosis, therefore, is (1) that all is not well with the foreign trade of India, particularly with reference to the benefit from it to the nationals, and (2) that the absence of adequate banking facilities for this purpose as supplied by the Exchange Banks has militated against Indian acquiring their due share in this trade, and the loss to the country as a whole by this handicap to the commercial community is enormous. On purely practical and financial grounds alone, without sentiment being allowed to weigh the scales, we are of the opinion that our colleagues have erred in their conclusions in this behalf.

Sinha puts the case in a very succinct way in his book 'Early European Banking in India' —

"More than 150 years have elapsed since the first European Bank was established in India. Yet the foreign exchange business, which is as safe as it is lucrative, has remained a closely guarded monopoly. It is as true to-day as when Keynes first



money and finance" in 1913, that it would be exceedingly difficult to start a new Exchange Bank except under the strong position in India. "Even house already established in a trade is much smaller than ours, small countries whose foreign branches have no branch of our own even then foreign trade. But our trade has to be financed. That in London, where the bulk of entire foreign business of the hands of the children of the soil patriotism but for solid financial not imply out of emptying that the Chartered Bank of reasons. It is not for nothing as denied a foothold in Australia, India Australia and China voted to it by the mother country in spite of the Charter granted, especially in important money-centres like Calcutta where Exchange Banks do not as a rule co-operate with the Indian Joint Stock Banks."

18 There is one danger of an important character in leaving the non-national Exchange Banks largely to pursue their course as they have done hitherto. Then, joint stock Banks in India in a manner that places a handicap on the financing of foreign trade exclusively in the hands of these Banks, becomes the monopoly of this bank investments, viz, trade. What is left to the Joint Stock Banks is advances on landed property, or, merely short period advances against raw materials in rule, this raw material, as soon as of the marketing of crops. As goes to the Exchange Banks for it reaches the port, generally taken charge of by the foreign finance where it has not been itself porter in the up-country station

19 A very significant instance of this is the case of the import bill, which is generally a non-sterling, is either sterling in the case of imports from Europe and America, or yens in the case of Japan. In ordinary course, in any country, with its banking fairly organised, these Bills after being Discount Market of the importing available for discount in the country. In India it cannot be said that discounting of Bills is either new to the people or is being imports running into about Rs 250 crores a year, if the import bill be a great help to India's money purposes, such a Bill market would

market  
in Exchange Banking is no business for  
-- Keynes further says -- "India, and the large profits which it earns are speculative or enterprising outside India, and the large profits which it earns are protected by established and not easily assailable advantages" (page 208)  
+ See Mr R G Srinayana's will

Owing to the non-Indian currency in which the Bills are drawn, they are rendered useless for a Bill market in India, and have to be locked-up in the portfolios of Banks holding the Bills. This dead-weight on the money market in India is a paying proposition to the Exchange Banks because the rate at which the Indian importer pays interest on the usance Bill, from the date it is drawn until the date of payment of the Bill *plus* the period of remittance of the amount from India to London, is the Bank of England rate with a minimum of 6 per cent all the year round. How often the Bank of England rate reaches 6 per cent is well-known—generally speaking it is only during an unforeseen and exceptional period of stringency—and yet the minimum rate of interest on a usance Bill drawn on India is fixed at 6 per cent.

20 On a rough calculation, out of a total import of about 250 crores, Rs 150 crores may be taken to be the amount on which the Exchange Banks earn interest at 6 per cent for an average period of 2 to 3 months. As the bills are D/P and have the signature of the drawer and the acceptance of the drawee on them, this first class security for investment to the Exchange Banks may be said to be all jam for them in which the indigenous bank has no look-in. We therefore wonder if our colleagues can be correct when they say that "the interest of trade alone" does not require a change from the present state of affairs.

21 These sterling bills are in form, substance and nature nothing but *hundis*, the circulation of which,—the most perfect portion of the Indian commercial system—was according to Cooke "very great and although millions were invested in them, the loss by bad debts arising out of the dishonour of the instruments at maturity, was a most insignificant per cent. The terms for which the *hundis* were, and still continue to be drawn, vary considerably." This natural form of investment for Indian Banks has been taken away from them owing to the Exchange Banks continuing to encourage sterling bills for imports. The Exchange Banks in India, relying on their monopoly, have not till now thought of this loss to India's money market. On the contrary, they have put forward the plea that it is for the importer to persuade the exporter abroad to sell to India in the rupee currency. The plea is a little naive. We would venture to ask if this would not have changed years, almost decades ago, if Indian Banks were handling finance for import business?

22 There is a peculiar advantage enjoyed by British import houses who have their offices in London in the matter of the finance of import business. These firms do not finance themselves by drawing on their offices in India, with documents attached—but they enjoy the privilege of drawing on the Exchange Banks which have their head offices in London, the Exchange Banks accepting the bills, and the drawer discounting them in the London market at the cheap current rate of discount prevalent there—which generally is between  $2\frac{1}{2}$  and  $3\frac{1}{2}$  per cent. The shipping documents for such imports are sent and handed over to the Indian branch of the

London house, and such British firms in India get an advantage of at least 1 per cent. in price over their Indian competitor. When asked whether this sort of facility was made available to any Indian importing house the reply given by the Exchange Banks' representatives was that no Indian house had a London branch. The question remains open whether if there was one, such a facility would have been made available. The position to-day, however, is that even though bills could be discounted in the Indian money market at under 6 per cent the Indian importer must finance his imports at a rate of interest the minimum of which is 6 per cent.

23 We need only mention the all too pathetic manner in which the opening for Indian intellect, seeking scope for work in the field of banking, is practically blocked owing to the valuable and important field of financing of foreign trade having been till now in the hands of non-national banks. The Committee is unanimously of the opinion that the Indian, *per se*, is not intellectually unfitted for the banking line—and yet, it is admitted that during the last 75 years, none of the Exchange Banks which have thriven so much in India have thought it their duty to the sons of the soil to employ them in the higher posts of their offices in India. Such enforced starvation of the intellect of the country cannot be regarded as a matter of such small loss to the country as can be easily measured.

24 The Committee were apprised of the manner in which Exchange Banks have been resisting the Insurance of goods, both for internal and foreign trade advances, with the Indian Insurance Companies. Although no instance could be mentioned by the Exchange Banks' representatives of any loss incurred by any of these, owing to insurance being placed with Indian Insurance Companies, the latter had to carry on a most persistent agitation for the last several years to assert their right to recognition by the foreign Exchange Banks. Indeed, the struggle is not over yet but the Committee understand that since complaints were made to the Committee, special orders have been issued by the Exchange Banks Association in London, to their offices here, for more discreet treatment of Indian Insurance Companies.

25 One of the most serious defects in the money market of India, owing to the footing which the Exchange Banks have secured, is the splitting up of the market into two. It is admitted by all writers, including Keynes, that the money market is divided into, what the latter calls, "European" money market and "native" money market. He quotes from a letter by Mr. Sleight, Secretary and Treasurer of the Bank of Bombay, written in 1898, which says that "the shroffs who finance nearly the whole of the internal trade of India, rarely, if ever, discount European paper and never purchase foreign or sterling bills." This holds good even to-day and the reason for it is that this section of the Indian Banking System never get the opportunity to handle the paper. It has to be borne in mind that the inland trade of India is not less than fifteen times her foreign trade, and as the foreign trade is estimated at 600 crores a year, the inland trade may be taken at 9,000 crores. And yet for

the last 70 years and more the gulf between these two sections of the money market in India has shown no sign of narrowing, if any thing, they continue to keep quite apart and separate and the resulting chaos in the money market of India can be easily imagined. It has indeed been a fertile source for criticism to all writers on the Indian Banking System. Some writers have opined that these two important sections of the money market have remained in mutual ignorance of the doings and methods of each other. This ignorance has been unfortunate for both. It is a question of great practical interest and importance at the present time, whether it is desirable in the industrial and economic life of India that this division should continue. The working of these two markets side by side is a great handicap to the progress of India's economic regeneration. It is therefore necessary that Indian talent and capital should have access to the field of financing of the foreign trade of India without any further delay and thereby a beginning be made in the direction of unifying the Indian money market and putting a stop to the perpetuation of the two divisions of it, which feature threatens to continue for some decades to come if things are left as they are. It may be said that for this purpose there is no bar to Indian enterprise taking to the field of exchange business without State assistance. We have already quoted in paragraph 17 above the opinion of Professor Keynes that owing to the fortified position of the existing Exchange Banks in India it would be difficult to start any Exchange Bank with mere private enterprise. That opinion of Professor Keynes expressed in 1913 can be said to be doubly true to-day and for the next few decades.

26 Such, in brief, is the list of outstanding acts of omission and commission by the foreign Exchange Banks against which the commercial community of the country protest and agitate. Impressed as we are, with the reality of these protests, and the genuineness of the discontent engendered by them, we feel that a solution of this highly involved position must be sought without delay. In our discussions with the foreign experts, we were advised to restrict our solutions to such remedies as other countries in the West may be known to have resorted to. Our difficulty is that none of these friends of ours have been able to name to us any country in the wide world, which either is, or, was placed in the peculiar position in which India finds herself to-day. It is freely admitted that there is no parallel to India's present day position in Banking that we have to solve. We are not in the happy position of having to write on a clean slate as the other countries must have been to a large extent when they evolved their present Banking Institutions and organisations, protected by either legislation or unwritten law of their land. We have to advise the Government how best to make up for the leeway caused by the policy pursued by Great Britain in India during the last 75 years at least. We have been warned that any discrimination in the treatment that we may recommend may be fraught with serious consequences to the welfare of India in other spheres. Our position is that whilst we respect the experience of other countries and propose to benefit by the same we do not think it necessary

for us to take cognisance of any consideration other than the one arising from the terms of reference to us, namely, what do the best interests of India demand from us at this juncture in solving this problem

27 We cannot help observing that every country, either in the West, has built up its banking according to its conditions and requirements and as far as we are aware no country has taken exception to such policy of any other country. The following extract from the 'Foreward' by O P Hopkins, Acting Director, Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce, United States of America, to a publication by the U S Department of Commerce dealing with 'Rights of Foreign Shareholders of European Corporations' is significant in this connection —

"There have been in recent times several examples abroad of attempts to restrict the rights of foreign shareholders and prevent the transfer of control of domestic enterprises to foreigners. There has been a great deal of speculation as to whether the corporation laws of the countries concerned permit such measures to be taken. In examining the laws of several European countries it has been found that nearly all of them provide equal rights to foreign shareholders. Spain, Rumania, Sweden, and Norway have definite restrictions on foreign capital in the development of their national resources, but these restrictions have been adopted as protective measures and are not a discrimination against any particular group of foreigners. Most countries permit corporations to make their own provisions regarding shareholders' rights, and the absence of definite laws has resulted in many private measures restricting foreign shareholders."

The peculiar conditions in India regarding foreign trade finance demand the protective measures recommended in this Minute as the minimum first step which the State should take

28 We know of various countries which still impose substantial handicaps on non-national banks working in their midst. Special taxes in this connection are known to be in vogue in countries such as France, Italy, Spain, Portugal, Netherlands, etc. In countries like Japan and America special restrictions are known to be prevalent. Even for the foremost money market of the world, the Cuneliffe Committee of 1918-19 had made the following unanimous recommendation —

"Several of our witnesses have called attention to the conditions under which it is open to foreign Banks to establish themselves in this country. We suggest that this is a matter which should receive the early attention of His Majesty's Government."

29 With such steps devised by more advanced countries, can it be said that the remedies suggested for the solution of the diffi-

culties in India are inspired merely by motives of discrimination? We are anxious to make it perfectly clear that in making the suggestions which are detailed in the paragraphs that follow, we are inspired by the sole motive of setting right the machinery of Banking in India and not by the slightest intent to injure any interest. If, however, one of the indirect results of our suggestions happens to be some discomfort to any interest we need hardly say that it must be regarded as unavoidable and inevitable in the process of making up for some of the evil effects of the policy pursued in the past. Can it be contended that the Exchange Banks have established themselves in India merely because of their superior efficiency? Does history not tell us that in many cases their origin and progress were founded on the most invidious treatment in favour of concerns run by the men of ruling race?

30 We suggest that as a first step in the direction of getting Indians their legitimate share in the finance of foreign trade, the State should start forthwith an Exchange Bank with a capital of three crores of rupees, all to be taken up by the State. This Bank should be allowed to do financing of export and import trade in the same manner as any Exchange Bank. It would receive deposits, and, lend money on produce awaiting export, or, imports awaiting distribution. For direction of such a Bank the State should constitute a Board of 7 persons at the Head Office of the Bank with Boards of about 5 persons at important centres where the Bank should have branches, and nomination to both the Central and Local Boards should be made by the Government. In order to ensure the Bank having a reasonable start, all remittance business of the State should be done through this State Exchange Bank. The Reserve Bank when it comes into being will look after this business of remittance on behalf of the State and the Exchange Bank will act merely as an agent of the Reserve Bank when operating in the open market on behalf of the State. The staff employed by such a Bank should be Indian, except where the Finance Minister of Government may be advised that it is necessary to have the services of a non-national from abroad for a few years in the beginning.

31 There are two special advantages which we wish to emphasize in connection with this suggestion of ours. A Bank, such as this, under State control can be effectively checked in its inroads in the field of activities of Indian Joint Stock Banks. It is very necessary to do this in a scrupulous manner and not to leave scope for any further harassment in the activities of Indian Joint Stock Banks. In actual practice very few hard and fast rules can be laid down demarcating the dividing line between the field reserved for internal trade and that for finance of foreign trade. There are essential differences between exchange banking and loan and deposit banking, which involve a comparatively harder task for the latter. The former is concentrated at the principal ports. The

latter has to be carried on through a number of small offices in the mofussil, entailing a heavy expense in the aggregate. The former has a quick turnover, the latter is frequently troubled with locked up advances and dwindling deposits. A Minister responsible to the Legislature and well-advised by the commercial talent of the highest order, alone, can be trusted to handle properly the difficult and delicate task at the start.

In fact, the encroachment by the Exchange Banks till now on the field of finance for internal commerce has already assumed such proportions that we are definitely of opinion that, in future, no non-Indian bank should be allowed to have any branch up country, i.e. at any place other than the main ports of India, namely, Bombay, Madras, Calcutta, Karachi and Rangoon. We strongly dissent from the recommendations of our colleagues in paragraph 545 under Chapter XIX where they recommend that licenses should be freely given to the already established branches of exchange banks up-country. We recommend that licenses should be granted only to Indian Joint Stock Banks and not to non-Indian Banks. We feel that this is the minimum that can be done without any delay by the Government to relieve the unjustified encroachment by non-Indian banks on the field of finance for internal trade.

32 Another advantage of a State Exchange Bank at present is the provision of a suitable institution to handle the enormous liabilities of the Government of India for remittance abroad to meet the foreign obligations of the country. The average of the liabilities of the Government in this connection has been ranging round about Rs. 40 crores a year. Besides this, a similar amount is estimated to be required for remittance on private account from this country. This exceptionally high figure of annual payment by India abroad necessitates the starting of an institution (for such remittance) which can carry out the work with only one motive, *viz.*, of doing it not for profit so much as for providing cheapest and most efficient method which may help to maintain the credit unimpaired of this country abroad. It is not easy to understand why such an institution was not started by the Government of India years before now. This strikes one all the more when it is remembered that the Exchange Banks in India have not always helped the Government in their work of remittance. Instances are known where these Banks through their London Head Offices brought great pressure to bear on the Government of India through Whitehall for certain privileges and monopolies which they sought.\*

33 The East India Company had invariably reserved the foreign exchange business to itself and the annual profits by it have been estimated by an English author at about £250,000. Since the Crown took over the Government of India from the East India

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\* See Sir Stanley Reed's evidence before the Royal Commission on Currency, 1926, Vol. V, page 246.

Company this policy appears to have been abandoned. But there is no reason why it should not be revived for a few years, now, especially when the other considerations in favour of starting an Exchange Bank as detailed above justify such a step on its own merits.

The above are the main outlines of the scheme that we recommended. The Government would no doubt review the position and examine the desirability of transferring the shares to Indian Joint Stock Banks and the public as soon as it is clear that the requisite conditions are found to exist.

34 It is necessary at this stage to examine the objections to our scheme raised by our colleagues in the report and by Mr. Manu Subedar in his Minority report. Both of them agree that it is necessary to take a definite step to remedy the monopoly of finance of foreign trade created and enjoyed by non-national banks. Their aim is not different from ours as detailed hereinbefore, but the measures recommended by each of them varies in important points from our recommendations. Our colleagues deal with these objections in paragraphs 486-488 of the report, Mr. Subedar refers to our scheme in paragraphs 242 and 245-249 of his Minority report. We propose to review their objections briefly.

35 Our colleagues, too suggest the starting of a Bank for doing Exchange business. But they desire that nothing should be done until a Reserve Bank is started. Thereafter they wish to offer some inducement to the Imperial Bank to start exchange business. Should that experiment of theirs fail, our colleagues recommend the State starting such a Bank. But they wish to offer, in the first instance, the capital of such a Bank to the joint-stock banks and the public, and in the last resort if such capital is not taken up by them they recommend that the Government should provide the remainder of such capital. We fear that before any effective action is taken in the manner recommended by our colleagues, years may pass, and the gravity of the situation as we perceive it, does not admit of such delay.

36 Our colleagues suggest that the Imperial Bank should be used as an Indian Exchange Bank in the first instance presumably because of its readily available organization. They have also stipulated certain conditions which the Imperial Bank must conform to in this matter. We do not think that the proposal made by our colleagues would be satisfactory even if the Imperial Bank agrees to conform to these conditions. More than half the shares of the Imperial Bank are in the hands of non-Indians and so long as this continues, the Imperial Bank cannot be considered to be a predominantly Indian concern. The stipulation made by our colleagues that recruitment of non-Indians on the staff of the Imperial Bank should cease will not have any immediate effect. The preponderance of non-Indians on the present staff of the Im-



perial Bank would make the provision non-effective for some considerable number of years and the Indian public cannot therefore expect from the staff of the Imperial Bank that sympathetic attitude towards Indian business which is so very essential to secure for Indians a larger share in the foreign trade of India. Moreover in view of the fact that complaints have been made against the Imperial Bank that they discriminate against Indians in the facilities offered in the internal trade of the country, we doubt whether it would be wholly satisfactory from the Indian point of view to entrust the foreign exchange business to that institution. We therefore feel that there is no reason to suppose that the attitude of the Imperial Bank towards Indians would be more sympathetic than that of the foreign exchange banks, and that it would not be therefore a satisfactory solution of the problem even if the Imperial Bank is "induced" to take the foreign exchange business with the conditions stipulated by our colleagues. (Sri Puushotamdas Thakurdas, owing to his connection with the Imperial Bank, does not wish to vote in this connection.)

37 The main apprehensions expressed in the Majority and the Minority reports are that the foreign exchange banks may put up a very severe competition against the State Exchange Bank recommended by us and prevent it from carrying on its normal operations. If our colleagues apprehend such a contingency, all that we can say is that it operates with perhaps greater force against the successful working of either the Imperial Bank or the shareholders' bank recommended by them. If the exchange banks, whose capital and reserve funds are known to be enormous, can be suspected of making desperate efforts to retain their grip on the finance of foreign trade of this country, may we ask our colleagues how any private institution that can be started, either now or in the distant future, can be expected to withstand such cut-throat competition. It is because of the danger of this complication that we have thought it necessary to commend our scheme in preference to the recommendations of our colleagues.

38 The other objection mentioned by our colleagues is the one that they have taken from the foreign banking experts, namely the difficulty of the Reserve Bank distinguishing between its remittance operations on behalf of the Government and its operations for currency purposes. We consider this objection to be more technical than real, and feel that in the ordinary course it should not be necessary for the Reserve Bank to often operate in the open market for currency purposes. We fear that our colleagues have been unduly swayed by the recent conditions of the exchange market, and Government operations to support exchange, when they put forward this point against our scheme. They themselves admit that the power of the Reserve Bank to operate in the open market is more of the nature of a safeguard in reserve than one for normal use. If we were making recommendations mainly for the next few

months, this consideration advanced by our colleagues would have had great weight. But under those circumstances, our colleagues will, we hope, admit that their own recommendations are absolutely impracticable.

39 In connection with this question of the relation between the State Exchange Bank and the Reserve Bank, our colleagues refer to the Bank of Japan and the Yokohama Specie Bank, which they admit, furnish an interesting parallel. It is regrettable that they have not thought it necessary to secure accurate information regarding this parallel before criticizing our recommendation. Such information as is available convinces us that there is little difference between the problem in India and the problem that faced Japan during the last fifty years. The arrangement in Japan is not known to have broken down or even suffered in actual practice, either during the War period or during the period following the last earthquake devastation in Japan, which put the Japanese currency system to a severe test. We do not overlook, however, that there is in Japan a national Government to make possible, things which may be ruled out in India owing to unnecessary apprehensions that may entertain Government of India or some of the critics of our scheme.

40 Our colleagues dwell on the difficulty of securing funds for the new State Exchange Bank until the Reserve Bank is formed and begins to operate. They quote from Thakur's book, specially his opinion that a capital of at least Rs 5 crores fully paid up is necessary for a shareholders' bank to do exchange business. The author explains that this "large capital has been prescribed because a bank of this nature should command not only great confidence in India, but also in the outside world. The Indian Exchange Bank will take some time before it can hope to get funds and financial assistance in the outside world and in the meantime, assistance on the part of the Bank of Issue is necessary in the national interests." He however does not deal with the contingency of delay in starting the Reserve Bank—and it strikes us that what can be expected from the Reserve Bank in "national interests" can be equally expected from the Currency Department of the Government of India in that contingency. The State Exchange Bank will take deposits from the public and we see no reason to fear that it will not attract more deposits from the public than any private exchange bank with ever so large a capital with which it may be started. The advances for the purposes of finance of exports and imports are generally speaking, if not invariably, against goods. The amount required for this purpose is indicated in paragraph 463 which has a statement supplied by the exchange banks showing their deposits, advances and investments in India as on 31st December 1929. The advances in India consist of three series: Rs 10 crores in securities, Rs 26 crores in advances to the Government, and Rs 46 crores in loans, cash credits, overdrafts and local bills discounted (excluding bills of

exchange) Mr Buckley has supplemented these figures with the information that these advances are mainly in connection with export and import trade. It must be conceded by all that until a proper Reserve Bank is started, the management of India's currency can be said to fall very short of the ideal. Should the worst apprehensions of our colleagues and ourselves turn out to be correct and the starting of the Reserve Bank delayed for considerations regarding exchange banks being prevented by legislation better security can even the Currency Department of the Government of India have for advances to the Exchange Bank than the security of goods under lien to that Bank with the usual margin insisted on by all banks even now? We see no risk in such finance either by a Reserve Bank or by the Currency Department of the Government. The only flaw that can prevail ultimately must be the want of will on the part of the authorities to afford any assistance at all.

41 After criticizing our proposals, our colleagues console themselves that they have "purged" their scheme "of inherent drawbacks" of our recommendations and bestowed on the new Bank "a unique and privileged position." We regret we cannot appreciate their self-satisfaction and feel that their scheme, if it is accepted at all, will prove a doubtful and sluggish remedy for the disease which they seek to cure.

42 Mr Manu Subedar also apprehends the British Banks "giving a fight" to the State Exchange Bank. We have already dealt with this in a previous paragraph. He, however, advises us that "so long as the authority of Whitehall is supreme, in the counsels of the Government of this country it would be prudent to expect the vetoing of this measure by the Secretary of State." We do not disagree with him. We only wonder if he does not overlook this sound canon of prudence when he makes his own recommendations regarding exchange banks being prevented by legislation from taking deposits in India or regarding the Reserve Bank having a department to do day-to-day business in exchange. Indeed, we do not think that Mr Subedar could have committed the blunder of visualizing our recommendations being dealt with by a Government subject to the control of Whitehall and his own by a Government not so controlled. Mr Subedar must visualize the chances of both the schemes, his own and ours, under a common form of Government only.

43 Mr Subedar refers to one aspect of our scheme which has not been touched upon by our colleagues. He apprehends that if our recommendation is accepted, Indian joint-stock banks will not be directly and immediately encouraged to take to the field of foreign exchange business. We have never been under a delusion in this respect. Mr Subedar himself has dealt at such length with the strength of the foreign exchange banks and their capacity and readiness to "give fight" to any new-comer into the exchange

field, that he must realise that the spade-work in this connection can only be done in the shortest period possible by an organization which is suitably equipped to occupy ' a unique and privileged position ' both in India and abroad

44 To deal with the circumstances and atmosphere created by the monopoly of the foreign exchange banks, we see no constructive and effective remedy except the full resources and prestige of the State being brought in, not only at the start but for such period as may be necessary to get the foreign banks to realize their correct and legitimate position in this country

45 Some witnesses who appeared before us have pressed for measures preventing non-national banks from borrowing in this country unless they have their head offices in India and are converted into Indian registered companies. We do not consider recourse to such measures necessary at the present stage. We appreciate the *bonâ fides* of this suggestion and the patriotic motives that lie behind it. We ourselves neither exclude nor deny the necessity for such legislative action at a later stage should other remedies fail. But we believe that what we have recommended herein will give, with least delay, Indian trade and banking scope for the activity which they can cope with. In fact, we expect that the non-Indian exchange banks, perceiving the necessity of giving up their monopoly will adjust their own policy and work in a manner that will still enable them to carry on their business in India without prejudice to Indian enterprise

46 Our colleagues are of opinion that no effort at starting a State Exchange Bank like the one which we recommend, should be made until the Reserve Bank is set up and begins to operate. We disagree with this view. While we realize the necessity of the Reserve Bank for the control of the Indian currency and credit systems, and admit that its creation and functioning on correct lines may help to remove to some extent the handicaps brought on by the preponderance of foreign banks in the field of exchange business, we are decidedly of opinion that there is no imperative necessity for a Reserve Bank to precede the State Exchange Bank, the immediate establishment of which we have already recommended

47 After setting out some considerations in favour of the Reserve Bank preceding an Indian Exchange Bank, our colleagues state in paragraph 489 that it is their intention that the new Indian Exchange Bank should not be started until after the Reserve Bank has come into existence *and* until after the scheme of participation of the Imperial Bank of India in the financing of foreign trade has been tried and found wanting. Then they proceed to deal with the suggestion that the Reserve Bank may take long to come into being and that the establishment of an Indian Exchange Bank should not be indefinitely postponed on that account for an avoidable delay

in creating the new Bank will strengthen the chain that holds India dependent on the foreign banks. In attempting to dispose of this suggestion of ours they state that they could not "*obviously* subscribe to any suggestion which assumes the contingency that the establishment of the Reserve Bank may be delayed." This excessive optimism in our colleagues cannot, in our opinion, be justified in the face of the conditions now prevailing. We had it from responsible quarters towards the end of the last year that a proper Reserve Bank for India could not be brought into being in the conditions that prevailed in December 1930, because India had not then enough gold resources. Since then during the last five months the gold resources of India have undergone further serious depletion and according to those very authorities the prospects of a Reserve Bank being set up would be more remote to-day than they were five months ago. The Government of India have been managing the currency during these months in a manner which has been criticized severely in India, and it is difficult for the best informed persons in India either to understand or to infer whither the Government of India are drifting by their policy during this period—a policy which responsible commercial associations and persons have not hesitated to characterize as reckless and almost desperate. Under such conditions and in these circumstances, it is difficult for any one not in the ken of official secrets to know the mind of the Government of India. We consider it imperative that the future Government of India, such as we have envisaged in the penultimate paragraph of Chapter I, should be free from dependence on the existing exchange banks, which have not in the past manifested any desire to function in the best interests and prestige of India in foreign countries. We feel that in the circumstances in which we find ourselves at the date of signing the report, the necessity of a State Exchange Bank is all the greater, both to the commercial community and to the future Government of India responsible to the Indian Legislature and free from dictation from Whitehall a dictation which has been an unfortunate factor for the last 100 years and more. We therefore entirely disagree with our colleagues when they make the starting of an Exchange Bank dependent on the establishment of the Reserve Bank, however long it may be delayed in coming. We do not propose to dwell on the indications that may be gathered from the proceedings of the first Round Table Conference regarding the provision for a Reserve Bank being made, "*somehow*" in the future constitution of India. We and our colleagues are in agreement that the Reserve Bank should be established as early as possible by an Act of the Indian Legislature. But the considerations averted to by us in regard to the possibility, if not the probability of delay in actually constituting the Reserve Bank, remain unaffected and it is for this reason that we are anxious that our scheme of an Indian Exchange Bank should not be held up till the Reserve Bank is established under the new constitution.

48 It may be asked why we have thought it fit to single out the finance of foreign trade for special recommendations involving the adoption of immediate steps, irrespective of the starting of the Reserve Bank, while we do not make similar recommendations in regard to rural, industrial and commercial finance. In these latter field of Banking there are no powerful vested interests as in that of the finance of foreign trade, which render delay in taking remedial measure equally detrimental to national interests. Moreover, we feel justified in taking for granted that in fields other than that of finance of foreign trade, the Government of India, whatever their constitution may be, will make all feasible efforts to help the economic progress of the country, even in the absence of a Reserve Bank.

49 The final stage of our inquiry has synchronised with the eve of the constitutional reform for India, and to that extent we can be said to be at a real disadvantage in making our recommendations for the future. We have got over the embarrassment of this situation to a certain extent by agreeing amongst ourselves at the very start to envisage a common angle of vision, namely, that the fundamental basis for making our recommendations should be that the administration of the provinces and the Central Government should be in the hands of Ministers fully responsible to the respective legislatures. In fact, this understanding forms the preface to our report (*Vide* paragraph 16, Chapter I). To the extent of any changes that may take place in this assumption of ours, our recommendations in the main report, as well as in this minute, will necessarily require modifications. But in connection with the Reserve Bank, our position has been further complicated by the fact that, in view of the tentative proposals which emerged at the first Round Table Conference referred to in paragraph 606 of Chapter XXII, the Chairman thought it necessary to give a ruling which prevented us from discussing the details of the constitution of the Reserve Bank. Although we are unable to appreciate the necessity, or, the justification, for ruling out the consideration of the question by the Committee, we respected the ruling. But we cannot help recording that in our opinion this Committee were not only entitled to, but owed it as their duty to discuss the constitution of the Central Bank which, in the Finance Member's words, is "essentially the crown of the whole banking in its widest sense". We fear that the omission by this Committee, to indicate the constitution and structure of the Reserve Bank after it has examined and reviewed the needs of India in regard to banking in the rural and urban areas, in the field of commerce and industry and in the sphere of internal and foreign trade cannot but be regarded by the public as a conspicuous gap in our picture of the banking system which India needs in the future. If it was apprehended that any political considerations were involved in the process of considering the details of the Reserve Bank all that we can say is, that such considerations might be no more inseparable from this problem than they were from many other problems dealt with in the rest of

the report. The responsibility for this avoidable void in the report is however not ours, and such justification as there may be for it has to come from the Chairman

PURSHOTAMDAS THAKURDAS  
D P KHAITAN  
MUKHTAR SINGH  
V RAMADAS PANTULU  
R K SHANMUKHAM CHETTY  
M JAMAL MAHOMED

## General observations by L. Harkishen Lal.

Request being made I sign the report, but the following observations are essential to be made —

1 Weak health, and other demands on my time, disabled me from placing my services more frequently and more effectively at the disposal of the Chairman of the Committee

2 The Chairman of the Committee conducted the examination of witnesses, that appeared before him for *viva-voce* examination, as a Judge does in a criminal trial when he is assisted by a Jury, or Assessors, by means of a set of prepared questions by himself—thus preventing the witnesses from developing ideas and schemes in collaboration with himself. This, if allowed, might have helped better in the solution of problems placed before the Committee

3 A certain 'Reserve', which is the *Sine Qua Non* feature of all official handling of economic problems of India, obviously ran all through the enquiry, and the process of summing up of facts, and fixing up of conclusions for recommendations was also not free from this "Reserve Policy"

4 The wealth-producing resources of the country are very limited in many directions, and the savings of the people are very small in all directions, and almost the entire field of handling, conducting, and carrying on of the international trade of India is already occupied by foreign shipping, and by foreign banks and by foreign commercial firms at both ends of the stick. These are the matters which should have formed a very considerable part of the enquiry of the Central Committee, but this was not attempted on any adequate scale. This side of economic life of India requires further and immediate investigation and adjustment, as this aspect forms, at the present juncture, a very big bone of contention. The handling of the foreign trade in its various ramifications by the nationals of a country is a source of income, employment and saving, and all the national banking systems of countries, interested in international trade, are enabled to play in it an adequate and just part. In the case of India in this direction, as in others, a serious struggle is ahead, until matters are arranged by mutual arrangement and the principle of give and take. To this aspect of the solution of the problem, very likely in view of the proposed safeguards in the new constitution, a very cursory attention has been paid, and efforts are obvious to have been made, in the body of the report, to avoid direct attack on the problem in the manner above mentioned. To my mind the present foreign banking influence in the internal and external trade of India should form a very serious matter to be solved by the Round Table Conference and my regret is that having had opportunities to effect a solution, the "Foreign Experts" have burked it and the Committee have shirked it. Let the gods now solve it.

5 The banking of a country, in the life of the modern world, is only a link in the chain of complete financing, which starts from



the production-end, the other end being of spending of money, raised by taxes, and Government borrowings, both locally and abroad. This chain has been built up in several modern countries, and in the old countries of Europe, and we had excellent opportunities of making a serious effort in forging a good and serviceable chain, but the dictum of Sir George Schuster that no entry could be permitted in the precincts of 'stability' and the 'Exchange Ratio', and another dictum, in this case of the Chairman of the Committee, that certain parts of the proposed Reserve Bank Bill were reserved for gods only to look into, and the position taken up by the experts as guarding and watching sentinels at the gates of the Imperial Bank of India, and the 'Exchange Banks' ruined all chances for the Committee to be of service in this direction. Let gods wake up now.

6 The moneylender does not seem to have had a better luck this time either, he has had continuously bad luck for some time past. He is, in fact, the Pariah of Indian finances, and he must serve the community thanklessly and also be shut out from the streets whereon the high caste and the orthodox walk. Opportunities have been lost in assigning him, in the new chain required to be forged, a proper place and position, as also in shaping this link, in such a way, as to be indistinguishable from other links, excepting in the position it may hold in the chain.

7 The indigenous Banker was also along a favourite of, and he received special attention at the hands of, the Vice-Chairman of the Committee. Having secured his patronage he was looked upon, by the other members of the Committee, as deserving of no serious notice at their hands. This is the greatest disservice that the Committee has done to the indigenous banker, and if I could offer him an advice to preserve his great position as also his great wealth and utility, he should change into a modern being and a modern institution, as the whole world and its institutions are changing.

8 The co-operative movement has received at our hands, as at the hands of the Provincial Committees, its due and well deserved consideration, and no one has been niggardly in helping the movement on; but the movement requires steadying its pace, holding its body erect, and walking without stays. The co-operators are lucky in securing blessings and help from all directions, but the thought of the patriot and the official should not be fixed exclusively in his direction, as there is also a mass of population near about 93 per cent of the whole, to whom the crumbs of financial favour are not yet thrown, and I am afraid he would be the first to listen to 'Communism' and to 'No Taxes' and to 'No Rents' and I wished all along that his case could have received at our hands somewhat greater and wider attention. The luck of the mass of society does not often change with the appointment of a Committee, nor the view of the official (perched though he may be on the heights of Simla) does extend to the fields of India, as far removed as 100 miles 200 miles and 1,700 miles and 1,900 miles. I would now humbly suggest the establishment of a permanent Aero-club to

enable its members to look down on these unfortunate people from the airy heights and to photograph life as it actually is. Much material will be thus discovered, I am sure, to enlist human sympathy. Our Committee had some sympathy for these unfortunate 93 per cent, but had no aeroplanes to play with, and did not combine heroism with their obvious wisdom.

9 The life in India, in the domain of economic sphere, has much changed within towns and villages, but the greatest change is in the life of the cultivator, and in the life of the worker, who served the agriculture and the agriculturist from untold generations. The causes are the influx of ready made goods from all corners of the world excluding India, and a system of cash payments. He is also to be helped financially to find a new or a modified occupation, but he might wait for the formation of the aero-club or any other Committee. Meanwhile he may go under, or give trouble. Let the wise consider.

10 The use of the word 'industry' is more unwelcome than the use of the word 'Banking' in this country among certain influential and powerful people, the result being dependence of India on one industry only named agriculture, and the subsidiary business of 'shop service'. The inferential problem arising out of the above observation has also a big financial aspect, and I am afraid the solution offered by the Committee in suggesting the founding of the Provincial State Banks might not prove to afford sufficient help.

11 For some reasons which may not be apparent to some and may be quite clear to others, the Joint Stock Banking in this country, which is of comparatively recent origin, receives always the step-motherly treatment at the hands of the powers that be. Whether the Committee has been enabled by its investigations and study to suggest measures and means to effect amplifications and improvements would be the care of the reader of the report.

12 I had from the very start of my co-operation with the Committee firmly resolved not to work for a *dissenting Minute*, but to help in the solution of very serious problems so far as my resources of experience and knowledge went.

13 I regret that opportunities afforded and availed of have been quite inadequate, and I would have much preferred to drop off unnoticed, but in the event of insistence on my signing the report I have been reluctantly compelled to add a few—very general observations.

HARKISHEN LAL

Lahore, the 8th June 1931

### Note by Chairman

Lala Harkishen Lal's "observations" have been shown to me by Secretary just as I am leaving for England. I have therefore no time to deal with the observations at length, and I shall leave it to the public to decide, when the report of the Committee is published, how far the observations are relevant or justified. I need only mention here that I do not understand his reference to the procedure adopted by me for the examination of witnesses which, so far as I can see, has been in accordance with the procedure followed by other Committees and was in fact settled in consultation with my colleagues on the Committee who were present when the examination of witnesses was started at Poona. The proceedings of the examination of the witnesses will indeed show that full opportunity was given to witnesses to develop their ideas and any concrete schemes which they wanted to place before the Committee.

2 Lala Harkishen Lal and six others of my colleagues who have signed a note of dissent have voiced a grievance against my ruling which, according to them, took out of the purview of the Committee certain matters connected with the Reserve Bank for India. Feeling as I did for reasons given in paragraph 606 of the report that these matters were not within the purview of the Committee, it was not possible for me to give any ruling other than that I gave.

B N MITRA

*The 12th June 1931*



## APPENDIX I

## REPORT OF THE FOREIGN BANKING EXPERTS

(Vide para 14 of Report )

COPY OF A LETTER FROM G C CASSELS, ESQUIRE, CHAIRMAN,  
COMMITTEE OF BANKING EXPERTS, TO THE CHAIRMAN, INDIAN  
CENTRAL BANKING ENQUIRY COMMITTEE, DATED THE 12TH  
MARCH 1931

I enclose herewith Report of the Banking Experts as provided for by our terms of reference together with the enclosures mentioned therein. I understand that this report will be submitted together with your own report to the Government of India.

Although the time was short, we are pleased to be able to meet your wishes and have this report in your hands before leaving India. We trust that our joint consultations will result in some lasting benefit to India.

All these matters were discussed with Dr Jendels before his departure and he authorised us to include his name as one of the signatories to this report, therefore this report of the Experts is unanimous.

I take this opportunity of acknowledging with sincere thanks the efficient services of Mr V K Aravamudha Ayangar, C I E, Mr R P Masani and Mr K C Seth which were always cheerfully rendered.

## REPORT.

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### Proceedings.

According to the Resolution of the 22nd July 1929, we were appointed by the Government of India to have joint discussions with the Central Banking Enquiry Committee and to act as its advisers with the right to submit a separate report of our own, if necessary, to the Central Committee. In this case the Central Committee should submit our report together with its own report to the Government of India.

From the date of our appointment we studied the comprehensive and instructive reports of the Provincial Banking Enquiry Committees and the statements of evidence given before the Central Committee. We landed at Bombay on the 12th of December 1930. From that date till the 26th of January 1931 when we had our first meeting with the Central Committee, we travelled over a part of India in order to amplify our knowledge and to test our provisional impressions by examining the actual conditions. We had also many interviews with leaders in banking and industry.

That we could not start our discussions with the Central Committee before the 26th of January was because of the unexpected delay of the return of the Chairman of that Committee from London, where his attendance was required at the Round Table Conference.

Owing to these circumstances and to the fact that one of our members was compelled to leave India on the 7th of February, the procedure, as originally intended, was altered. Instead of our joint discussions being based on the provisional conclusions of the Central Committee, we placed before that Committee, by way of *aide-memoire*, five memoranda, containing our views on the following subjects —

Commercial Banking,

Industrial Banking,

Foreign Trade Finance—Exchange Banks,

The Money Market in India (including the Imperial Bank of India and the prospective Reserve Bank),

Banking Regulation

They are attached (Enclosures I—V) to this report. They formed the basis of our joint discussions, which took place from the 26th of January till the 16th of February. Thereafter the Central

Committee held separate meetings for drawing up their provisional conclusions on the subjects discussed with us

All matters pertaining to the co-operative movement are dealt with separately. Two of our members who are more especially acquainted with these matters, will, if necessary, submit a report of their own. Their work in India will not be concluded till after the departure of the other three members.

Our joint discussions were resumed on the 4th of March to consider the provisional conclusions mentioned above. As a result of these further deliberations certain alterations, of which we were informed on the 10th of March, were made. The final conclusions, in which these alterations are included, are attached to this report as Enclosures VI—XI.

### Scope of separate report.

We have to state that the conclusions which are attached to this report, form the only part of the Central Committee's work on the respective subjects, with which we are concerned. We are, therefore, not responsible for any contents of the Committee's report apart from these conclusions in so far as we agree with them. We are pleased to state that most of them are in conformity with the views expressed by us and the recommendations made in our memoranda. Apart from some slight alterations of detail, to which we acceded during the course of the discussions, we maintain these views and recommendations in our memoranda as they stand.

Certain fundamental differences of opinion could not be reconciled. We have, therefore, been compelled to avail ourselves of the right, granted in our terms of reference, to submit a separate report. We endeavoured to take into account the specific circumstances prevailing in India and to adjust our views accordingly, but we cannot accept recommendations, which are, in our opinion, unsound and contrary to banking principles which ought to be adhered to under all circumstances and in all countries. Our conclusions are based on these principles and we cannot concern ourselves with ambitions or desires of a political or nationalistic character.

As already stated, the differences between the Central Committee and ourselves are few in number. In view of this and of the fact that our memoranda are attached, this report will be short. Apart from a few general observations, it is confined to the points on which we differ from the Central Committee's conclusions.

### General observations.

It is outside the purview of our task to enter into a description of the present banking system and its development in India. In so far as such a description was necessary for expressing our views or formulating our proposals, it is given in the memoranda attached to this report. It is necessary to stress our conviction, that in the field covered by this report and taking into consideration the structure and the stage of development of the country, the number of banking agencies and the amount available for the granting of credit are not insufficient. In a country of a preponderatingly agricultural character, where a large majority of the population are illiterate, the banking system cannot be expected to have reached the same level as in highly developed countries of an industrial character. Nevertheless the number of credit agencies, including indigenous bankers, is enormous. The amount of credit, granted by these agencies as a whole, though unknown, must be very great.

Generally speaking, it cannot be gainsaid that whatever deficiencies there may be in the banking position in India, they are much more the result of the fundamental circumstances, which dominate the financial and economic life of India, than of lack of banking facilities. We are of opinion, that a strong and keen competition exists in banking. In so far as no banking possibilities are available, no modern banking facilities can be expected. No bank, working on sound principles, can be expected to extend its activities unless there is a fair prospect of reasonable profits being made in the near future.

This does not alter the fact that at a later period a considerable increase of banking facilities will be needed in accordance with the development of economic and financial life and, therefore, with the growth of banking possibilities. But it cannot be maintained, in our opinion, that more could be expected at the present stage and under present conditions from the commercial banks for the spread of banking facilities over the country.

It is our opinion that the immediate problem in connection with banking is not a question of expansion but of organisation, consolidation and co-ordination. Existing banking agencies in India are marked off into different classes each doing a distinct kind of business without sufficiently close relations. This results in lack of knowledge and confidence within the banking profession, in an insufficiently developed money-market and in undue differences and fluctuations in the rates of interest prevailing in the various parts of the country and charged by the various types of banking agencies. These detrimental consequences are aggravated by the absence of close and intimate relations between borrowers and lenders, between the customers and their banking agencies.



The solution of this main problem depends in the first place upon the constitution of a strong, well-equipped and influential Reserve Bank. The paramount interests for the country involved in the establishment, within the shortest time possible, of such an independent institution, free from political influence, can hardly be over-estimated.

The other recommendations which we have made to solve this problem are explained in our memoranda and have been, together with our proposals regarding the position and task of the Reserve Bank, adopted by the Central Committee.

### Differences with the Central Committee.

After these few general observations we shall now examine the differences of opinion between the Central Committee and ourselves. We will deal with these points under their respective headings.

#### COMMERCIAL BANKING.

In our general observations we have already stressed our opinion that, taking into account the structure and the stage of development of the country, it cannot be said that the number of banking agencies and the amount available for the granting of credits, are insufficient. No bank, unless compelled by law to do so in return for advantages obtained, can be expected to open branches in places where no profits could be made or even losses would have to be incurred. The Committee mention in conclusion 1 (a) that the number of principal towns which possess a bank or a branch or agency of a bank, was only 339 in 1928. If we consider that in 1919 the number was only 185, so that during this comparatively short period of ten years, there has been an increase of 154 or 83 per cent. the figures seem to be not unsatisfactory and considerable extension of banking facilities has been achieved. In so far as the conclusions of the Central Committee could lead to the view that the commercial banks failed to provide the country with banking facilities which could reasonably be expected, we cannot agree with these conclusions. We are of opinion that no criticism in this respect can be made and it is only in accordance with the development of the financial and economic position of the country that a gradually growing number of branches or sub-agencies can be established. The anticipation expressed in the second conclusion, that it will be a long time before India is provided with a network of branches of joint-stock banks, seems, therefore, much more in conformity with the real state of affairs.

Our second remark refers to the absence of touch and the lack of knowledge resulting therefrom between borrowers and lenders in the principal money market centres, mentioned by the Central Committee as one of the reasons of the unimportant place which clean advances against the personal credit of the borrower only, occupy in India. Although the conclusions themselves do not clearly indicate the defects, from which the undeniable absence of touch and lack of knowledge originate, we gather from our discussions and from the recommendations made by the Committee, that it is the banks in the principal money market centres which, in the Committee's opinion, are mainly responsible for, and could, by changing their methods, repair these defects. We cannot share this opinion. Admitting that, as we explained already in our memorandum on Commercial Banking (Enclosure I), these methods are open to improvement, we consider that it is in the first place the duty of the banks' customers to supply their bankers with full information regarding their resources and the position of their affairs and to exhibit their properly audited balance sheets and profit and loss accounts. That a great difference exists between the attitude of the Indian bank customers and those in western countries can hardly be denied. Secrecy about business affairs seems to us much more cherished in India than in our countries. The keen competition which, especially in the principal money market centres, exists between the banks, makes it already improbable that borrowers of a sound financial standing would be refused reasonable credit facilities, if they were prepared to furnish the banks with full and reliable information about their position.

#### FINANCIAL REQUIREMENTS OF INDUSTRIES.

On two main points we are not in agreement with the conclusions, reached by the Central Committee.

In the first place we do not subscribe to the statement in the last sentence of the 3rd conclusion that industrial concerns in India may reasonably be expected to have their working capital supplied by commercial banks, if adequate security to the satisfaction of the banks is offered.

As we wrote in our memorandum on Industrial Banking (Enclosure II), it has to be made clear that it is not sufficient in itself that an industrial firm should put up its block from its own capital and that having done so, the firm can appeal to banks for loans and assistance. Not only block but also normal working capital has to be furnished out of the firm's own capital, and before the firm is fit for Industrial Banking or Industrial Finance, it must have been in operation for a sufficient period to prove that it is strong enough. It cannot be sufficiently emphasised that these two conditions are essential, and to attempt a different way

of financing is not only unwarranted for the bank but also unsound and dangerous for the industrial enterprise

It appeared from our discussions that the expression "adequate security" used by the Central Committee, is meant as sufficient liquid security including the requisite margin. We must, however, maintain our view that the normal working capital as well as the block capital should be put up by private or public subscription. We consider this as the sound arrangement so that the expressions "ideal arrangement" and "minimum working capital" used in this respect in the second resolution, seem too weak to us.

We understand by "normal working capital" the capital which the industrial concern can employ during the whole year on the basis of its present capacity, whilst only the amount in excess of that normal capital needed in the busy season, or in case of permanent extension of capacity, in anticipation of an increase of its own capital, may reasonably be expected from bank credit.

If the whole of the working capital of an industrial concern is borrowed money, part of the loan would become locked up and the concern would never be free from indebtedness to the bank. No commercial bank, which adheres to the sound and common principles that its credits ought to have a fluctuating and not a permanent character, and that its customers ought not to use their credit during the whole of the year, would be likely to consider such an advance as being suitable for its activities. The customer who has no reasonable prospect of being able to repay his debt to the bank would expose himself to a serious danger if the bank should, for any reason, decide to call in its loan.

Our second objection is directed against conclusion No. 11 concerning the supply by Provincial Governments of financial facilities to industrial concerns. Although the conclusion, for obvious reasons, leaves the decision and responsibility with the Provincial Governments, the Committee as a matter of fact advocates a system of extensive Government interference with, and assistance to, industrial business life. No restrictions are made with regard to the cases in which such assistance should be given. It is proposed that Provincial Industrial Corporations should be established and that the capital of these corporations should initially or permanently be supplied by the Government. In any case the Government should take such portion of the share capital of the Corporation as cannot be raised by public subscription. If it is found necessary by Government to offer a guarantee of interest on the debentures, Government may give limited guarantee, e.g., limited to the first issue of debentures, or limited to a certain period of currency of the debenture issue. Moreover, Government may, if necessary, purchase a portion of the debentures until a regular market has been created for these debentures.

We consider these suggestions as thoroughly unsound and we do not doubt that should the Provincial Governments follow the lines of these suggestions, taxpayers would be involved in serious losses. The experience obtained under the State Aid to Industries Acts, now in operation in some of the Provinces, may serve as a deterrent example. This experience is the common one in cases where a system of extensive State aid in economic life has been introduced.

We outlined in our memorandum on "Industrial Banking" (Enclosure II) on what lines and under what restrictions Industrial Corporations with Government assistance could, in our opinion, be started. Their work should be restricted to pioneer enterprise of a non-competitive character, the opening up of mineral resources and large public utilities, principally electrical power schemes. Small industry should be avoided. Financial assistance by Government ought not to exceed the taking up of the share capital.

Referring to our suggestions and considerations in our memorandum, we must most earnestly express a warning against the scheme evolving from these resolutions of the Central Committee.

#### FINANCING OF FOREIGN TRADE.

It is especially with regard to the wide divergence of opinion that has arisen on this subject between the Central Committee and ourselves, that we refer to the statement on page 1 of this report, that we base our opinion and our advice on sound banking principles. We cannot concern ourselves with ambitions or desires of a political or nationalistic character. It is our opinion that it is such ambitions or desires which underlie the recommendation of the Central Committee that a State Exchange Bank should be established. According to point 1 of the Committee's conclusions it is considered not desirable that the country should be dependent on the facilities afforded by non-Indian institutions for the financing of foreign trade. No arguments for this opinion are given. The only matter-of-fact argument which we can imagine, lies in the fear that the non-Indian institutions could at any time withdraw from the country thus leaving India deprived of agencies for the financing of its foreign trade. We consider this fear to be without any foundation. It is in our opinion inconceivable that eighteen, generally speaking, strong institutions of high standing with activities and connections all over the world, would, of their own free will, withdraw from a working field, which must be of importance to them. It is as inconceivable as that all the Indian joint stock banks would stop their operations and go into liquidation.

Apart from this argument, we find in point 6 the indirect allegation that the foreign exchange banks could assist the Indian

merchants to a greater degree than they actually do. We dealt with this allegation in our memorandum on Foreign Trade (Enclosure III) and can only state in this respect, that our discussions with the Central Committee have shown no necessity for us to change what we wrote on the subject.

From the point of view of banking principles we do not hesitate to define the recommendation as unfair and thoroughly unsound. It aims at the establishment of a State Exchange Bank which would exclusively be entrusted with the work connected with foreign remittances of the Government.

What we wrote in our memorandum on Industrial Banking (Enclosure II), namely, that "it would be unfair and unjust if money of the Government would be used directly or indirectly to compete with private industry" applies no less to banking. Still more is this the case since the financing by the existing banks of India's foreign trade meets, as far as we are aware, all requirements.

Competition would not be confined to the so-called Exchange banks. We fear that the detrimental consequences to the Indian joint stock banks would be worse. We take it as a matter of course that the State Bank would be allowed to take deposits and do inland credit business. This would encroach upon the field of all the private banks working in India, including the Imperial Bank. In the initial stage, when the Indian exporters and importers have no experience of the efficient and sound working of the new institution, we expect that its deposits which would practically be guaranteed by the Government would, to a considerable extent, be transferred from the Indian joint stock banks. The harmful effects of such a reaction on the banking position of India need no illustration.

This proves that the scheme is not only unfair and unjust but also unsound. It is not a business proposal. The banking situation of the country certainly does not require the creation of a new Exchange bank. The best evidence of this is produced by the fact, that the promoters of the scheme are obviously convinced that such an institution can only be worked on an artificial basis. They do not expect that private capital will be available and they propose to grant the new Bank the monopoly of the foreign Government remittances.

This last proposal would seriously hamper the task of the prospective Reserve Bank. According to section 21 of the Reserve Bank Bill of 1928 that Bank will have the right to transact Government business including Government remittances in India and elsewhere. This is the only right principle and of practically universal application. The Reserve Bank, which has as its principal function to maintain the gold value and the stability of the monetary unit of the country, ought as a matter of course to have the monopoly of foreign Government remittances. We

think it an indispensable condition for the fulfilment of the Reserve Bank's task that Government remittances should be concentrated in its hands which should not be tied down by compulsory provisions based on sentiment. We greatly appreciated the fact that the Central Committee accepted our recommendations to strengthen the position of the Reserve Bank and to provide it with the powers necessary for the fulfilment of its task. We are, therefore, all the more disappointed that a proposal has been put forward which would in our opinion seriously weaken that position and those powers. According to our conception—and this, we find, is in conformity with the recommendations of the Hilton Young Commission—the Reserve Bank ought to be free to purchase foreign exchange either by tender or in the market spot or forward, adjusting its operations to the circumstances of the moment. These circumstances may, and will indeed, frequently change. It would certainly interfere with the free action of the Bank and be detrimental to the general interest of the country if Government remittances were confided to another institution whose action would not and could not be dominated by the duty to maintain the international value of the currency of the country. It seems to us doubtful whether the system of purchasing foreign exchange by tender will be continued by the Reserve Bank. We think it by no means unlikely that the Bank will soon reach the conclusion, that private purchases spread over a longer time, either from the banks or directly in the market, ought to be preferred. The Bank will have to build up its own stock of foreign exchange and out of this stock the remittances for the Government will then be made. If this system were to be adopted, it could never be settled in advance whether a purchase of foreign exchange would be made on behalf of the Government remittances or for strengthening the Bank's cover against its liabilities or in order to enable the Bank to sell foreign exchange at a later stage to banks or in the market to keep the rate of exchange within the gold points.

The freedom of the Reserve Bank to regulate these remittances in concert with the Government, and to slacken or postpone them when exchange is weak to accelerate or increase them when the opposite is the case, is one of the strongest weapons in the hands of the Bank to keep the currency of the country <sup>in</sup> <sup>its</sup> <sup>own</sup> <sup>hands</sup> with gold. This weapon would be taken away from the Bank <sup>if</sup> <sup>it</sup> <sup>lost</sup> <sup>its</sup> <sup>efficiency</sup> would at any rate be seriously weakened if the work connected with Government remittances were transferred to the Indian Exchange Bank.

On all these grounds we feel compelled to advise most strongly against the adoption of this recommendation of the Central Committee. We are fully convinced that its adoption would shake international confidence in the financial policy and wisdom of the Indian Government.

If the Indian joint stock banks consider and decide that it is in their interest to establish by mutual co-operation a private Indian Exchange bank and to furnish the capital of that bank, we are of the opinion that it would not even then be advisable to create the new institution before the Reserve Bank has been constituted and before it has gained sufficient experience and influence to advise the Indian joint stock banks on the lines to be followed by the Indian Exchange Bank after it has started its operations

In No 7 of their conclusions the Central Committee deal with the introduction of rupee bills for import business. This subject is also touched upon in the Committee's conclusion No 12 under the heading "Money Market"

In our memorandum on the Money Market (Enclosure IV) we wrote in this respect the following —

"In the above no mention has been made of the introduction of Rupee bills in connection with the import trade of India. At the present stage we consider the improvement of the inland bill and money market as the fundamental and primary problem. This problem must be solved before progress to an appreciable extent can be expected in the use of Rupee bills for settling foreign transactions. The question as to what currency the bill will be drawn in, forms part of the conditions which have to be agreed upon by buyers and sellers. It needs no comment that they will try to find the cheapest solution. Under normal circumstances the currency of that country will be preferred where the lowest rate of interest prevails and the money and bill market is so well developed that no doubt can exist about discount facilities being available at any time during the currency of the bill. These conditions are lacking in India. As long as this is the case, trade and industry will be hampered and the cost of imported goods raised by enforcing sellers of foreign goods to draw Rupee bills."

We are still convinced, that the passage, quoted above, contains the principles, on the basis of which this problem ought to be considered. The interest of the country is being served by financing its foreign trade in the cheapest way, that can be followed. To this extent we cannot agree with the opinion, mentioned in conclusion No 12, referred to above. If, by discounting the bills in the London Market, a cheaper method of financing can be obtained than by discounting them in India, the first method is, in our view, to be preferred notwithstanding its consequence that the practice to draw the bills in sterling will have to be continued. It cannot be denied, however, that, although the bills are drawn in sterling, the majority of them have no access to

the London Money Market but are bought by the exchange banks on the conditions explained by the Committee in its conclusion No 12, mentioned above. We suggest that the exchange banks should consider the possibility of changing the present custom to the extent that they would be prepared to accept the bills instead of purchasing them in the same way as "house" paper of a London exporting house is now accepted by the Exchange banks and discounted in the London market. If this suggestion could be followed—and we see no objections of real importance—the London Money Market would be opened to these bills and a better service would be rendered to the country than by enforcing the introduction of Rupee bills. It is not inconceivable that this introduction of rupee bills which not only depends on the co-operation of the importers in India but also on that of the exporters in other countries, might result in higher costs on the transactions than have to be paid under the present system. We are of opinion that in this respect also no artificial measures should be taken and the most economic arrangement should be adopted.

#### MONEY MARKET IN INDIA

Under the heading "Financing of foreign trade" we explained our views on the introduction of Rupee bills in connection with the import trade of India. This subject is dealt with by the Central Committee in their conclusion No 7 under the heading "Financing of foreign trade" and in No 12 of their conclusions on the "Money Market in India". We may refer to what we wrote with regard to that conclusion No 7.

In the provisional conclusions Nos 17 and 19 the Committee proposed that the Reserve Bank should be permitted

- to act as agent for any Indian State and any member bank in the same way as it is empowered to act as agent for the Central and Provincial Governments,
- to act as agent in any place outside India for any member bank and to sell foreign currency or pay out in foreign currency on their behalf, to collect bills in foreign countries, and to accept against adequate securities in India, bills drawn by or on behalf of the member banks

Although these provisional conclusions have been omitted from the conclusions as finally communicated to us, we consider the matter to be of such importance that we feel it necessary to deal with it in our report.

We must object to this extension of the task of the Reserve Bank in so far as member banks are concerned. We fully agree with the opinion expressed by the Joint Committee of the Legislative Assembly, to which the Reserve Bank Bill was referred



In their Report of the 18th August 1927, they wrote on page 3 against sub-clause (13) —

“We think that the power of the Reserve Bank to open accounts and act as agents of other banks should be restricted to central banks which are the principal currency authorities in their respective countries and among which we include the Federal Reserve Banks in the United States of America ”

We consider this the right conception in accordance with the practice in most other countries. Especially with regard to the foreign exchange business of the Reserve Bank, we see great objections to the Bank acting as agent for member banks, using part of its holdings in foreign currency and doing acceptance business on behalf of these member banks. The activities of the Reserve Bank in the field of foreign exchange must on principle be restricted to what is necessary for performing its principal duty, *i.e.*, to keep the currency of the country at par with gold, in any case at a value between the upper and the lower gold points. It would be dangerous in our opinion to encroach upon this principle by inducing the Reserve Bank to place part of its foreign assets at the disposal of member banks on behalf of their foreign exchange business.

Conclusion 26 proposes to allow the Reserve Bank, if any approved joint stock bank opens branches at a centre where there are no joint stock banks, to place, for the first five years, a deposit with every new branch so opened of such sum and on such terms and conditions as it may consider necessary.

We are not in favour of this proposal. It could be interpreted in this sense that the Reserve Bank would be entitled to place these deposits without security and at a concessional rate of interest. This would mean the granting of clean credits and subsidies which would be contrary to the principles on which the policy of a Reserve Bank must be based. If this is not the intention we see no reason for the recommendation since the Reserve Bank could in these cases grant a credit to the Bank against adequate security under the general rules of the Act.

#### THE IMPERIAL BANK OF INDIA.

In the second resolution it is stated that the restrictions imposed by the present Act on its transacting foreign exchange business or other class of business which are not imposed on the operations of Indian joint stock banks, should be withdrawn.

We were informed during our joint discussions that it is the intention that the proposed action should not be taken before the

Reserve Bank has been constituted. We agree with that intention since we are of opinion that having regard to the comparatively low cash reserves of the Indian banking system, the Imperial Bank should not undertake any new task before the Reserve Bank has started its operations.

According to the third resolution, any other matters connected with the Imperial Bank Act will be considered by the Committee separately.

It needs no comment that we are not responsible for the conclusions, to which this consideration will lead the Committee.

### REGULATION OF BANKING.

With regard to this subject we felt the difficulty that a very thorough, detailed knowledge of the circumstances prevailing in India is necessary to give definite advice on all suggestions placed before the Central Committee. Moreover, the Committee themselves had not formed their opinion about many of these suggestions when our joint discussions took place. We agreed, therefore, to leave the decision on the 68 points which are mentioned in statement B attached to the conclusions, to the Committee in so far as we had no objections on principle or did not fear that the adoption of the suggestions would hamper the sound and free development of banking. In connection herewith, we distinguish between the conclusions of the Committee and the suggestions in statement B upon which no such conclusions have been arrived at.

### CONCLUSIONS OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE

We are in agreement with these conclusions with the exception of the following points:

*Conclusion 4, sub-paragraph (11)* —As stated, the Committee will later consider the question whether the form of Balance Sheet and Profit and Loss Account prescribed in the Indian Companies Act, is adequate.

We wish to warn against compelling banks to disclose particulars of their business to such an extent that their position would be damaged.

*Conclusion 4, sub-paragraphs (15), (16) and (17)* —These provisions recommend a system of licensing banks. The licences, to be granted by the Reserve Bank, would be required for doing banking business in India and for the opening of new branches. Licenses should be freely granted to the already established banks and it would be the business of the licensing authority to see that the provisions of the law and any other conditions specified in the licenses are complied with.

We are generally not in favour of the introduction of a licensing system. Banking ought to be left to free competition and its development ought not to be hampered. We recognise, however, that if the Reserve Bank is made the licensing authority, our objections would be met to a great extent since we take it that the Reserve Bank would handle the system in a sound and impartial way. We do not, however, agree with the reasons given in justification of the recommendation. We consider that the protection of the interests of depositors by means of licences will be a dangerous responsibility for the Reserve Bank to undertake. We further think that the control over the banks operating in the country should be obtained by the Reserve Bank by means of its discount rate and its open market policy and not by means of the licensing system. The opening of branches by banks, working already in India should, in our opinion, in any case be left free from any interference by the licensing authority. This opinion is endorsed by the Committee in their conclusions on Commercial Banking, where they write in **Conclusion No 3**, that it is not advisable in the larger interests of the country to restrict in any way the branch activities of the banks in India, even though it may result in overbanking in certain up-country places and in weaker banks, under the stress of competition, offering higher rates for deposits and accordingly giving loans at higher rates and increased risk.

We consider this reasoning, with which we fully agree, inconsistent with the recommendation to make the opening of new branches dependent on the approval of even the Reserve Bank.

With regard to the already established banks, we deem it a fundamental requirement of fairness and *bona fides* that licences should not only be freely granted but should also be automatically renewed as long as the provisions of the law are complied with. Apart from this, the licence should not impose any conditions on the existing banks.

The Committee recommend that annual statements showing the assets and liabilities of Exchange Banks relating to Indian business should be furnished by them to the Reserve Bank as a condition of the grant of licences. Though we are not opposed to such annual statements, we consider that their submission should not be made a condition of the grant of licences. In our opinion the submission of any statements by the Exchange Banks should be provided for in the Reserve Bank Act itself.

*Conclusion 5, sub-paragraph (1)* — We are of opinion that the Articles of Association should contain a proper regulation of the allocation of profits as proposed in conclusion 6 sub-paragraph (3). The formation of extra reserves should be left to shareholders on the recommendation of the Board of Directors.

*Suggestions (Statement B in Conclusions of Central Committee)*

We are prepared to leave the decision on the suggestions not mentioned hereafter, to the free decision of the Central Committee so that we have no comments to offer with regard to those points

*Suggestions (1), (2) and (3)* —We are of opinion that the decisions to what extent clean advances and advances against immovable property may safely be given must be left to the management under control of the Board of Directors and under supervision of auditors. The same is the case with advances to an individual without security and with the amount advanced to any single individual or to any single concern. As we stated in our Memorandum on Banking Regulation (Enclosure V), the full responsibility ought to be left with the management and the Board of Directors and no measures should be taken which would weaken that responsibility. The limitation of clean advances would, moreover, conflict with the Committee's conclusions (12) and (13) on Commercial Banking.

*Suggestions (6) and (7)* —Restrictions on investments in shares and debentures of joint stock companies and restrictions as to short term and long term business must be deprecated on the same grounds as mentioned above, whilst especially suggestion (6) would hamper the development of industrial finance as advocated by the Central Committee in their conclusion No. 7 on Financial requirements of Industries.

*Suggestion (10)* —Reservation of the field of agricultural finance for the co-operative banks would be detrimental to agricultural finance, which is only covered at present to a very small extent by the co-operative movement, and to the development of banking facilities.

*Suggestion (11)* —Prohibition of a joint stock bank or its branches in town having a population of less than 25,000 would seriously interfere with the extension of banking agencies, so strongly advocated by the Central Committee (see conclusion 3 on Commercial Banking).

*Suggestion (12)* —A provision for licensing all persons doing banking business would, in our opinion, be impracticable, specially with regard to indigenous bankers and money-lenders.

*Suggestion (14)* —We cannot recommend a provision enabling auditors to publish instances of window-dressing in a schedule attached to the balance sheet. Auditors have the right to call attention to abuses in their reports.

*Suggestion (19)* —We are of opinion that directors of a bank are not to be deprived of their rights as shareholders and that they are the proper representatives of the shareholders to hold proxies.

